Defendant-Appellant State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (“State Farm”) appeals from the district court’s Order of Remand. As a general rule, remand orders are not reviewable. Since, from the record, we are unable to determine if this case should be governed by the general rule, we shall remand for the limited purpose of having the district court clarify its Order of Remand along the lines outlined below.
I
On January 23,1991, a fire occurred at the residence of Plaintiffs-Appellees Lawrence and Catherine Van Meter. In force at the time was a fire insurance policy the Van Meters had purchased from State Farm. The Van Meters gave notice of destruction caused by the fire to State Farm, and filed a Sworn Statement in Proof of Loss (“Proof of Loss”) pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy. In this statement, the Van Meters claimed that they were owed $70,472.56 for fire-related destruction ($46,843.00 [sic] relating to the dwelling itself; $23,628.78 [sic] relating to the contents of the dwelling) under the terms of the insurance policy. State Farm denied liability.
On January 17, 1992, the Van Meters filed a Complaint and Jury Demand (“Complaint”) against State Farm in a Michigan state court. In Count I of the Complaint, they noted filing the Proof of Loss and requested damages “in excess of Ten Thousand ($10,000.00) Dollars plus costs, interest and attorney fees” for State Farm’s refusal to honor its alleged contractual obligations. J.A. at 11. In Count II, they sought compensation for “great mental and emotional distress, anguish and other damages” due to State Farm’s “bad faith, malicious acts, and refusals” in an amount “in excess of Ten Thousand ($10,000.00) Dollars plus costs, interest and attorney fees.” Id. at 12. In Count III, they alleged that State Farm’s actions constituted a violation of the Michigan Consumer Protection Act, Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated §§ 445.901-^45.922 (West 1989). For that violation', the Van Meters sought, inter alia: “1. To recover damages for the fire, damages to the building, contents and living expenses; 2. [To o]btain[ ] a $250.00 statutory penalty; [and] 3. Reimbursement for attorney fees.... ” J.A. at 13.
On March 13, 1992, State Farm filed a Notice of Removal in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. Removal was based on diversity of citizenship (which is not disputed in this appeal) and the allegation that “[t]he matter in controversy exceeds, exclusive of costs and disbursements, the value of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000)” (which is disputed in this appeal). Id. at 5.
Also on March 13, 1992, State Farm filed its Answer, Affirmative Defense & Reliance on Jury Demand (“Answer”) in the federal district court. Of note concerning this appeal, the Answer included the following:
8. Should a judgment be entered that plaintiffs are not entitled to recover under the insurance contract, plaintiffs are obli *447 gated to repay to the defendants those benefits paid during the pendency of the investigation of this loss, including but not necessarily limited to:
a. $34,197.85 paid to plaintiffs’ mortgagee;
b. $1,417.50 paid to plaintiffs for living expenses for rent;
c. $2,000.00 paid to plaintiffs as an advance on their claim for damages to contents;
d. $777.45 paid on behalf of plaintiffs to protect the residence after the fire, i.e., to board up the property; and
e. $6,034.91 paid on behalf of plaintiffs pursuant to MCL 500.2845.
9. Should a judgment be entered that plaintiffs are entitled to recover under the insurance contract, defendant is entitled to a set-off and plaintiffs are obligated to repay to the defendants those benefits paid during the pendency of the investigation of .this loss, including but not necessarily limited to:
a. $34,197.85 paid to plaintiffs’ mortgagee; ■
b. $1,417.50 paid to plaintiffs for living expenses for rent;
c. $2,000.00 paid to plaintiffs as an advance on their claim for damages to contents;
d. $777.45 paid on behalf of plaintiffs to protect the residence after the fire, i.e., to board up the property; and
e. $6,034.91 paid on behalf of plaintiffs pursuant to MCL 500.2845.
Id. at 19-20.
On March 30, 1992, the Van Meters filed an Answer to Affirmative Defenses. With respect to Paragraph 8 and Paragraph 9 of State Farm’s Answer, .the Van Meters asserted that they “neither admit nor deny the allegation contained therein and leave Defen'dant to its proof.” Id. at 26.
Count III was dismissed on April 7, 1992, upon stipulation of the parties, by Order of the district court.
On April 30, 1992, the Van Meters filed an Offer to Accept Judgment Less Than $50,-000.00. The filing specifically stated that the Van Meters “offer to limit the Judgment in the above styled cause to $40,000.00 including all claims, interest, costs and attorney fees.” Id. at 43.
On May 14,1992, the Van Meters moved to remand the case to the state court whence it came, arguing that the amount in controversy did not exceed $50,000, exclusive of interest and costs. Specifically, they argued that, in light of the payments that State Farm indicated in its Answer it had made:
the Plaintiffs cannot receive a judgment in excess of the claimed amounts under the policy of fire insurance. Therefore, the total paid of $44,427.71 deducted from the $70,472.56 total claim leaves a balance of $26,044.85 as an actual loss plus open items that remain at $250.00 per month since the date of loss which at the present time is equal to $4000.00.
Id. at 47 — 18.. They further noted that “the Plaintiffs ... filed an offer to accept a judgment limiting all of Plaintiffs claims including actual amounts owed under the fire insurance policy plus damages for emotional dis: tress for bad faith refusal and including all court costs, interest and attorney fees to $40,000.00.” Id. at 48. Along with this motion and apparently in accordance with Rule 81.1(b)(2) of the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, the Van Meters itemized the damages they were claiming:
1. Plaintiffs’ fire insurance claim Contents and Structure $26,044.85
2. Open items Rent until new home is purchased $ 4,000.00
3. Emotional Distress for bad faith refusal $10,000.00
4. Interest, cost and attorney fees $ -0-
*448 J.A. at 49.
On June 1, 1992, State Farm filed Defendant’s Statement and Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand. It maintained that:
the amount in controversy for jurisdictional purposes is that sum claimed by the plaintiff in the complaint-
In the present action, plaintiffs’ complaint alleges a claim for breach of a fire insurance contract and resulting damages in the amount of $70,472.56 (not including amounts for compensable additional living expenses), and a tort claim for a bad faith refusal to pay fire insurance proceeds for an unspecified amount of damages. Because the sum claimed by the plaintiffs in the complaint controls the determination of the amount in controversy, this Court has jurisdiction to hear the present action.
Id. at 56-57. Arguing that the determination of the amount in controversy for purposes of federal jurisdiction is made from the face of the complaint at the time the action is commenced, State Farm contended that its Answer to the Van Meters’ Complaint, which averred that payments were made on the Van Meters’ behalf (thus potentially reducing the amount at issue), should not properly be considered by the court in making its jurisdictional determination. As well, State Farm maintained that the Van Meters’ Offer to Accept Judgment Less Than $50,000.00 did not serve to diminish the amount in controversy for jurisdictional purposes because it likewise was made after the action was commenced.
On June 8, 1992, the district court made known to the parties its intention to analyze the amount-in-controversy issue in terms of whether the defendant has met its burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy exceeded the jurisdictional amount. It set forth its intention in its Order for Additional Information in which it specifically “ORDERED that ... defendant!] may file a response statement on or before June 26, 1992 setting forth in detail the facts or other information on which the defendant relies in alleging the amount in controversy.” Id. at 69 (emphasis in original).
State Farm responded on June 26,1992 by filing Defendant’s Brief in Response to Order for Additional Information. Therein, it set forth the facts that the Van Meters referred to the Proof of Loss in their Complaint and that this Proof of Loss listed fire damage amounting to $70,452.56 [sic]. It also set forth the fact that the fire insurance policy in force at the time of the fire contained coverage limits of $46,843 for the dwelling; $2,343 for debris removal (dwelling); $2,343 for trees, shrubs and plants; $32,790 for the contents of the dwelling; and $1,640 for debris removal (contents). Noting the additional fact that the Van Meters sought in their Complaint in excess of an additional $10,000 for mental anguish and emotional distress, State Farm concluded that the amount in controversy indeed exceeded the jurisdictional amount.
On July 24,1992, the district court filed its Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Remand. It generally held that State Farm did not meet its burden of proving, by a' preponderance of the evidence, that the amount-in-controversy requirement was met. It based its conclusion on the facts that “[i]n total, defendant has paid some $44,000 of plaintiffs [sic] $74,000 claimed loss,” id. at 107 (footnote omitted), and that, with regard to Count II of the Complaint, the Van Meters “have submitted ... a signed statement claiming damages of exactly $10,000,” id. (emphasis added). It maintained that, “[assuming all of defendant’s affirmative defenses fail,- and that plaintiffs succeed in full on their claims, plaintiffs will be entitled to damages in the neighborhood of $40,000, some $10,000 less than the jurisdictional minimum.” Id. at 108. Finally, it noted that, though the amount in controversy is to be determined as of the commencement of the action, State Farm put forth no facts to show that its payments for the benefit of the Van Meters were made after the commencement of the action. The district court thus ordered the action remanded to the state court in its Order of Remand, filed July 24, 1992.
State Farm filed a direct appeal from the Order of Remand on August 19, 1992. It *449 contended that we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988) (“The courts of appeals ... shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts....”) and Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
At oral argument on June 18, 1993, this court noted that, remand orders are reviewable only in limited circumstances. Not convinced at that time that this case presented such circumstances, we ordered the parties to brief the following issue not addressed or alluded to in their opening briefs:
Whether this court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal in light of: 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (1988);
Thermtron Products v. Hemansdorfer,
Van Meter v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,
No. 92-2056 (6th Cir. June 22, 1993) (supplemental order).
See Baldridge,
II
If a district court remands a case based on the grounds listed in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1988),
1
this court cannot review the remand order. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1988);
Thermtron,
Since remand orders grounded in Section 1447(c) are not reviewable, it is important to determine the nature and scope of that provision. Section 1447(e) calls for a remand when it appears that the district court “lacks subject matter jurisdiction.”
*450
Courts, including this one, have interpreted this provision as necessarily tied to a temporal reference point, namely, the time of removal.
2
Thus, if a district court determines subject matter jurisdiction to have been lacking at the time of removal, and remands on that basis, the remand order is a Section 1447(c) remand order and is nonreviewable. However, if a district court determines subject matter jurisdiction to have existed at the time of removal, yet remands for alleged lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on some post-removal event(s), the remand order is not a Section 1447(c) remand order and is renewable on petition for a writ of mandamus.
Baldridge,
Given this, we are faced with the issue of whether the district court in the instant case found that the amount-in-controversy requirement was met as of the time of removal, only to have been allegedly defeated *451 by some post-removal event(s). If the district court so found, we may review the remand order on petition for a writ of mandamus. 3 Unfortunately, given the state of the record, we find ourselves unable to determine conclusively whether the district court found the amount-in-controversy requirement to have been met as of the time of removal.
It is clear that, as to Count I, the district court believed, whether based on erroneous presuppositions or not, that the amount in controversy for purposes of federal subject matter jurisdiction was approximately $30,-000 at the time of the commencement of the lawsuit, as well as, we may readily deduce, the time of removal. If the district court concluded from this alone that the amount-in-controversy requirement was not met, we would consider a related remand order to be based on Section 1447(c) grounds. As such, we could not review it.
There is more to consider, however. Specifically, with regard to Count II of the Complaint, the district court found that the Van Meters, post-removal, “submitted ... a signed statement claiming damages of exactly $10,000. Accordingly, plaintiffs seek from defendant a total of approximately $40,000.” J.A. at 107 (emphasis added). From this, we can determine that the district court indeed believed that the jurisdictional requirement was not met at some point after removal. Whether the court understood the amount of the Van Meters’ claim in Count II, when combined with approximately $30,000 the court found to have been in controversy in Count I plus any amount associated with Count III (which was apparently dismissed post-removal), to be less than the federal jurisdictional requirement at the time of removal is nebulous at best. See State Farm’s Supp.Br. at 9 (“[j]ust what the district judge was deciding, here, is not made very clear in his opinion”); id. at 12 (the district court’s “reason for [remand] is, at best, unclear”).
The Seventh Circuit, in
Shell Oil,
Ill
Based on the foregoing, we find it proper to remand to the district court for the limited purpose of supplementing the record to indicate whether it understands that “the amount in controversy satisfies the statutory minimum,” J.A. at 109, as of the time of removal. Upon receipt of the district court’s response, we shall determine the reviewability of the Order of Remand and, if it is renewable, whether a writ of mandamus shall issue.
Notes
. Section 1447(c) reads:
A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect in removal procedure must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal under section 1446(a). If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded. An order remanding the case may require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal. A certified copy of the order of remand shall be mailed by the clerk to the clerk of the State court. The State court may thereupon proceed with such case.
. This has been true despite the 1988 amendment to Section 1447(c), Pub.L. No. 100-702, § 1016(c)(1), 102 Stat. 4642, 4670 (1988). The previous version of Section 1447(c) called for a remand when the district court realized "that the case was removed improvidently and without jurisdiction.” The amended Section 1447(c), at issue in the instant case, provides that "[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” As we commented in Baldridge:
Although the new language suggests that removal is no longer the critical jurisdictional juncture, courts have not construed it in this revolutionary way.... The legislative histoiy of the Judicial Improvements Acts (Pub.L. 100-702), the 1988 law which changed this text, reveals no intent to direct district courts to look beyond the time of removal in deciding remand motions based on lack of jurisdiction.
. We note that, though we are considering what has been styled as a direct appeal, we may treat it as a petition for a writ of mandamus for purposes of reviewing the Order of Remand.
See, e.g., J.O. v. Alton Community Unit Sch. Dist. 11,