*1 442 3553(a) §
II. in crafting appropriate sen- tence. Post-Booker, ap courts of “[t]he peals sentencing review decisions for un argument Crenshaw’s final is that Booker, reasonableness.” United States v. longer necessary the sentence was than 220, 264, purposes He sentencing. achieve the L.Ed.2d 621 sentencing, When claims that while the 92-month sentence district court must articulate the reasons he would been sought appropriate, have
for particular imposed sentence or excessively the 115-month sentence der to this in a engage enable Court unreasonably long. According meaningful reasonableness review of the Crenshaw, his mental illness should have Jackson, sentence. v. United States 408 been into taken account lessen his sen (6th Cir.2005). F.3d Crenshaw’s spite criminal tence of his extensive argument first is that the district court’s history. Contrary arguments, to these stated for sentencing high reasons at the mere fact Crenshaw’s mental health end of range the Guideline were insuffi problems does not render a sentence at cient appellate to allow effective review. high range end unrea Guideline argument unpersuasive. This is The dis sonable. The took district court explained trict judge that he chose a sen appropriate facts and circumstances into high range tence at the end based account and sentenced Crenshaw at the on Crenshaw’s extensive criminal history, high range. end the Guideline A sen history fact that the demonstrated a applicable range tence within the Guideline violence, propensity resulting and the presumptively reasonable. United protect public. need to Williams, States v. F.3d Cir.2006). pointed has not Crenshaw though Even district courts have anything presump which overcomes greater sentencing discretion in after tion here. The 115-month sentence rea Booker, they advisory must consider sonable. provisions Guidelines and the other 3553(a). § factors identified 18 U.S.C. III.
Jackson, F.3d at 305. Crenshaw’s sec reasons, foregoing For the we AFFIRM ond argument is that the district did the district court’s sentence this case. 3553(a) § not adequately consider the fac tors imposing before sentence. The support
record does claim. 3553(a)
district court listed the factors
and stated that it those considered factors at an arriving appropriate sentence. judge specifically district discussed history
Crenshaw’s of extensive criminal age, from a young
involvement his demon violence, propensity strated LAWRENCE, Jr., Frank J. Moreover, need to protect public. Plaintiff-Appellant, judge demonstrated that he was history aware of Crenshaw’s mental ill treatment, ness and for mental CHABOT, need health capac- Rae in her official Lee very factor Crenshaw claims was not ity and all Board Members of the Examiners; court properly considered. The district Michigan Board of Law Examiners; set forth in considered factors Michigan Board of Law *2 Berry, capacity in his official as John
Executive Director of State Michigan;
Michigan; Bar of Corrigan, in her ca
Maura D. official
pacity Michi and all Justices of the Court; Aken,
gan Supreme Diane Van capacity;
in her individual Nicole
Armbrustmacher, in her individual ca Defendants-Appellees.
pacity, 05-1082,
Nos. 05-1397. Appeals,
United States Court
Sixth Circuit.
May Nelson, Judge,
David A. Circuit concurred opinion.
and filed *3 and Fitness. on Character
Committee A5 states as follows: 120. Rule criminal charges applicant If an committee referral pending, the district Davis, Jr., Liti- Hugh M. Constitutional pending pro- until delayed be should MI, Associates, Detroit, Edward J. gation may An ceeding applicant is concluded. Christensen, MI, Lyon, for Plain- South prior made request that a referral be tiff-Appellant. adjudication criminal final Oostema, Smith, Haughey, R. Rice John request should charges, MI, Ann Roegge, Rapids, & Grand M. commit- granted provided that Sherman, Barton, Atty. Denise C. Asst. *4 does not report tee and recommendation General, Attorney of Office the General of criminal matter is con- issue until the Welch, MI, Michigan, Lansing, K Janet cluded. Kraus, Smith, Haughey, Richard Rice C. & JA 924. MI, Defen- Roegge, Lansing, East for his with defense connection dants-Appellees. filed charge, the Lawrence misdemeanor DAUGHTREY, NELSON, Before: Township in both suit Bloomfield
ROGERS, Judges. Circuit court, seeking enjoin state and federal 1324. Those prosecution. the criminal JA ROGERS, Judge. Circuit however, unsuccessful, proved efforts Lawrence, Jr., Frank Plaintiff J. scheduled for trial. the matter was brought pursuant suit to U.S.C. proceed- the start of the Months before against various officials entities the attorney, ings, Thomas township’s Michigan, alleging that those indi- Ryan, former of the State president a him unconstitutionally deprived viduals Michigan, offered allow Lawrence Michigan. admission to the State Bar of According plea enter a under advisement. The district court denied the relief Law- Ryan, Michigan procedure, “Under such and Lawrence now chal- sought, rence plea a does not result a conviction lenges rulings numerous the district record, charge defendant’s court. We affirm. dismissed, if complies the defendant with a during specific terms set I. time.” 1324. Lawrence re- period of JA Lawrence, Jr., graduated Frank J. jected offer. 1324. JA Detroit, University of accredited later, attorney year Over a and, in the Michigan, law school state of as Ryan approached immediately before the required, filled out an “Affidavit of Person- jury of the trial discuss commencement History” prior sitting July al for the possibility “plea a under advise- Michigan bar examination. JA 1344. ment.” 1324. Bloomfield Hills Dis- JA affidavit, truthfully he In that noted a Judge pres- trict Avadenka was Edward charge with interfering misdemeanor ent, present. but Lawrence was not JA Township in Bloomfield was police officer that, although Law- Ryan 1324. noted pending against him. JA 1351. still rejected rence once before such result, had passed though As a even Lawrence offer, township would consider re-ex- examination, application the bar for leniency if found tending such Lawrence was not immedi- admission to state bar time, At that option acceptable. such an ately processed, accordance with Rule that, Judge “indicated if the Standing Avadenka also A5 of the bar’s Rules parties with a plea resolved case under ferred a district com- advisement, he would communicate to the mittee to conduct an interview with Character Fitness Committee [of Lawrence. JA 1397-1400. Lawrence re- state that a plea under bar] advisement sponded by filing adjourn- motion case,” constitutes conclusion of the thus interview, alleging ment of the for the permitting the to act upon committee Law- that, law, Michigan first time under vio- application. rence’s bar JA 1324-25. township lations of ordinances should not again rejected offer, Lawrence howev- be considered criminal JA cases. 1403- er, proceeded matter to trial. request adjournment After the guilty Lawrence was found charge denied, Lawrence wrote to interfering township with a officer. JA withdrawing applica- Van Aken his bar 1317,1325. tion. JA 1411-13. conviction, A after week Lawrence later complaint filed a new wrote a letter to defendant Diane Van federal naming multiple district court de- Aken, manager of the Character and Chabot, fendants: Rae Lee the chairper- Department Fitness of the State Bar of son of Law Board Exam- Michigan, informing her that the criminal iners, *5 only in capacity; sued her official charge had previously up that held consid- Examiners; the Michigan Board of Law eration of his had been re- John Berry, executive director of the letter, solved. 1317. In JA Lawrence Michigan, only State Bar of in sued his Judge improperly accused Avadenka of us- official Bar of capacity; the State Michi- ing “law bargain- Lawrence’s license as a gan; Corrigan, Maura then Chief Jus- ing by chip” allegedly offering speak to Court, tice Michigan Supreme sued the Character and Fitness Committee on only Aken, capacity; her official Van if only Lawrence’s behalf Lawrence sued her only capacity; individual and “dropped the civil case the Town- Armbrustmacher, sued her individ- ship.” JA 1317. In capacity. ual the complaint, Lawrence In light inflammatory allegation sought declarations that certain rules of judicial misconduct, defendant Nicole unconstitutional, the state bar were Armbrustmacher, investigator in the the state bar Board Law Exam- and Department, Character Fitness tele- iners violated Lawrence’s First and Four- phoned Judge verify Avadenka to the as- rights engage teenth Amendment sertions in Lawrence’s letter. JA 1312. expressive (by conduct challenging his Judge explained Avadenka the actual con- charge), criminal misdemeanor and that plea negotiations tent of the to Armbrust- Van Aken and Armbrustmacher violated macher and stated that he “did while offer rights right personal those and same advise Character and Fitness Com- privacy. sought monetary He further concluded, mittee that the case was Mr. damages from Van Aken Armbrust- law Lawrence’s license was not used as a injunctive sought macher. He also relief chip way.” bargaining JA 1336. prohibiting private use of information or expressive protected conduct Meanwhile, with proceed- the criminal First and Fourteenth Amendments de- concluded, ings against Lawrence termining applicant’s practice fitness to began processing state bar Michigan. law within the State of Con- application. Because of various concerns sought enjoin comitantly, Lawrence plaintiffs litigation also regarding history difficulties, of Law Examiners and Standing and financial Board on interfering Committee Character Fitness re- State Bar of objections report filed law within Lawrence practice attempts with his the district with and recommendation 11-39. the state. JA addition, both he moved that In court. eventually filed motions All defendants Judge and District Scoville Magistrate court, raising with dismiss disqualified McKeague be Judge David forms of immu- based on various defenses upon their service from the case based standing, nity, ripeness, lack of lack Michigan’s Standing Com- Bar of the State upon to state claims which relief failure Judge mittee on United States Courts. granted. JA could 40— disquali- motion for McKeague denied the filed own mo- pretrial Lawrence also adopted the and recom- report fication seeking temporary restraining order tion a in all magistrate judge mendation injunction upon preliminary and a based 517-23. respects. JA his belief that defendants threatened appeal a then filed notice protected free- chill First Amendment a request for of his concerning no denial having guidelines doms suitable injunction, JA preliminary procedures applicant’s to evaluate a bar this for matter was transmitted to “good moral character.” JA 58. 2004, this In March appellate review. re- various motions were first These stay a request court denied Lawrence’s for prelimi- magistrate judge to a ferred proceedings pending of all district court nary report and recommendation. After later, appeal. 763-64. Seven months analysis comprehensive of the claims and Law- court affirmed the denial of law, applicable Magistrate Judge Joseph injunc- preliminary motion rence’s Scoville that Lawrence’s recommended so, doing noted that Law- tion. we denied, motion be claims *6 on the of allegations part rence’s of bias the the State Bar of and judge and magistrate judge the district the Board of Law Examiners be dismissed due ap- on properly not before us were immunity, to Eleventh Amendment and Law- peal. 1133. denied JA We also against that the claims Corri- Chief Justice injunctive for relief and rence’s motion gan and su- other members the state appeal. motions to dismiss that defendants’ preme court be dismissed on the basis JA 1130-33. legislative immunity. Magistrate Judge Simultaneously perfection Scoville also with the recommended that claims injunctive against appeal regarding for relief to this court denial defendants Aken, Armbrustmacher, Berry, preliminary injunction, and for a Van his motion For “Request facial filed a Clerk’s Chabot be dismissed: Lawrence’s Lawrence and challenges attorney-admission sys- Entry against to the Of Default” Van Aken Armbrustmacher, given tem failed state a claim those defendants’ upon which complaint file an answer to the granted, as-applied relief could be failure “to district deni challenges days court’s] failed because Lawrence lacked [the within 525. standing his claim was not al of their Motions to Dismiss.” JA and because defaults, magis- noted After clerk entered JA ripe. JA 306-24. As to set defendants moved judge, foregoing recommen- the individual “[i]f trate court, 527- good cause. JA adopted by dations are aside defaults filed motion damages against Although also claims for defendants 29. Lawrence judgment pursuant to Rule Aken for default Van and Armbrustmacher 55(b)(2) Pro pending.” will the Federal Rules of Civil personal capacity remain cedure, 534, Magistrate Judge Scoville JA 324. entry set aside the of default after conclud- II. ing “that to plead defendants’ failure after We following ap- address the issues on partial denial their motion to dismiss (1) peal: judge whether the district willful, that defendants have at magistrate judge should have recused defense, least one meritorious and that (2) themselves; whether defendants plaintiff absolutely suffered no prejudice were entitled to forms of immuni- various delay filing the brief an answer.” JA (3) ty; Michigan attorney- whether
577. The district court then affirmed the licensing facially scheme is unconstitution- magistrate judge’s respects. (4) in all al; order Michigan attorney- JA 765-70. licensing ap- scheme is unconstitutional as (5) him; plied to whether the district court Subsequently, Van Aken and Armbrust- abused its in setting discretion aside the macher for judgment plead- moved on the entry Aken default Van ings quasi-judicial the basis of absolute (6) Armbrustmacher; magis- whether the or, immunity alternative, in the sum- judge trate should have struck the defen- mary judgment on qualified the basis of defenses; (7) dants’ affirmative and wheth- immunity “lack of merit in plaintiffs er the district court abused its discretion claims and failure to raise genuine in assessing costs Lawrence. Be- issue fact for trial.” JA 1258-62. legal cause the district court made correct In a 47-page opinion, memorandum rulings discretion, and did not abuse its we granted summary judgment district court affirm. defendants, to the concluding that Van Magistrate
Aken and Armbrustmacher were Recusal and Dis- entitled Judges trict quasi-judicial to absolute immunity qualified immunity from suit. JA 1134-80. magistrate judges and district Van Aken and Armbrustmacher then filed in required this case were not to recuse costs, an application for and the court themselves. Lawrence insists that clerk taxed the amount of magistrate judge judge $1,953.60. filing JA 1231. Following the assigned who were to his case should have *7 Lawrence, objections of the district disqualified ju been both bias because objections court denied each of those standing rists served on a committee of judgment Michigan, entered a in the State Bar of of favor the individ- one named defendants in this action. A feder ual defendants the entire amount judge disqualify al “shall himself [when] costs assessed. 1252-56. ... ... [h]e knows that he has a financial At some point during pendency subject interest in the in matter controver- litigation, this which is not disclosed sy or in a to party proceeding, any or record, reapplied Lawrence to the Michi- that substantially other interest could be gan bar. In one of dis- his briefs to the proceed- affected outcome of the court, ap- trict Lawrence claimed that his 455(b)(4). ing....” § 28 U.S.C. A “finan- plication abeyance had been held in since as, among cial interest” is defined other August 2004. JA A few 1199-1200. director, adviser, things, “a relationship as days argument appeal, before oral or other participant active the affairs of supplemental Lawrence submitted “au- 455(d)(4). party....” § a 28 U.S.C. thorities” allegedly demonstrating interest,” that his From this definition of “financial argues latest had Lawrence the judges been denied. that should 455(d)(4). has not they themselves because U.S.C. disqualified have McKeague and Seo- Judges in the participants how were or active identified advisers that Bar. the statute in a bar committee Michigan participation Lawrence reads ville’s strictly. at too with bar admission nothing issue to do the out- substantially affected would assuming Judge McKeague that Even concerning bar admis- come of this case Judge were advis- Magistrate Scoville sion. Bar, not Michigan to were ers Whether
required recuse themselves. provisions as If we to read the were a required one has finan- recusal is when do— have us strictly Lawrence would as party of a de- cial interest affairs himself holding judge a must recuse that acts an adviser pends upon whether one as participant a he or she is when for-profit nonprofit party. to a or We likely organization is legal, nonprofit —it Circuit, Third reasoning adopt the could judge Michigan no that federal allegedly a judge which has that when held judges all of the hear case because nonprofit relationship organi- has a with a participants” presumably be “active would zation, for-profit organiza- opposed as unlikely Bar. is in the It tion, appropri- test a “substantial effect such member Congress meant reach Inc., College, ate.” Plechner v. Widener mandatory which are either or ships, Cir.1977). (3d 1250, 1262 n. 569 F.2d enacting these strongly encouraged, Plechner, the Third held that Circuit has not identi statutes. Lawrence recusal ABA, did judge, who was a member uncovered, fied, any legis not we have though the not need to recuse himself even suggest history lative caselaw a par- as propriety the ABA’s dismissal Indeed, contrary. the Fifth Circuit has ty from the case was at issue. The court judges’ memberships do not noted that bar provisions discussed same issue if is a disqualification even the bar require distinguished a judge’s here and between Bd. suit. See Parrish v. party relationship organizations with business Bar, Ala. State Comm’rs of nonprofit organization and “a concerned Cir.1975) banc). (en More 103-104 legal improvement profession with that, over, striking it after more than public good.” Id. The court con- years disqualifi thirty from the date of tinued considerations which led “[t]he enactment, case, no at least cation statute’s statutory possession test of an aware, has which we are held interest, small, profit no matter in a how are state bar judges who members corporation present not here and we may concerning that state hear cases inappropriate think it test.” use Scoville, Judges McKeague and bar.1 reasoning Id. Third is sound Circuit’s therefore, required disqualify were not *8 provisions defining because the “financial 455(b). under themselves 28 U.S.C. clearly are about interest” concerned eco- 455(d)(4) instance, § For nomic interests. Immunity 2. Claims of only equitable in- legal discusses challenges Lawrence also the district provides exceptions from terests but also immunity ap- determinations on court’s disqualification judge when a holds securi- challenges grant of sover- for-profit peal. He in both ties and mutual funds immunity to the organizations. eign quasi-judicial 28 nonprofit See san, all-embracing, directly today less related judge a less or 1. We do not address whether of legal profession. or herself if a member must recuse himself organization nonparti- nonprofit that less 450 (6th Cir.2003). challenges
various defendants. His are 615 The district court without merit. properly therefore dismissed State Michigan Michigan of and the Board of
a.
Immunity
Eleventh Amendment
Law Examiners as defendants from Law-
correctly
district court
this case
rence’s action.
determined
that
State Bar of Michigan
of
Michigan
Board
Law Examin-
Legislative Immunity
b.
ers
be
must
dismissed as defendants be-
correctly
The district court also
cause of their Eleventh Amendment sover-
Corrigan
dismissed Chief Justice Maura
eign immunity. The Eleventh Amendment
justices
Michigan
associate
of the
provides
the United States Constitution
Supreme Court as defendants after con
that
power of
“[t]he Judicial
the United
cluding
they
were entitled
absolute
States shall not be construed to extend to
legislative immunity from
In
suit.
Su
any
or equity,
suit
law
commenced or
preme
Virginia
Court
v. Consumers
prosecuted against one of the United
Inc.,
States,
Union
the United
446 U.S.
State,
by
by
States
Citizens
another
or
719, 734,
Louisiana, 1, 15, 134 U.S. S.Ct. legislative capacity its and is thus immune (1890). Moreover, L.Ed. 842 as the Court suit, retrospective or held in Pennhurst State and Hospi- School relief, prospective regarding those rules. Halderman, 89, 100, v. tal Likewise, See id. previously we have held (1984) (citations S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 67 Michigan Supreme pro that “[t]he Court’s omitted), jurisdictional “this applies bar [to activity.” rules ... mulgation legislative agencies] regardless state its of the Michigan, ick nature of the relief sought.” Ab (6th Cir.1986). justices It follows that “the light of these established consti Court[, Michigan Supreme when] principles, tutional court in this acting in legislative capacity[,] are correctly case determined the State immunity.” legislative entitled to Id. Bar Michigan Board attempt deprive the chief Lawof Examiners are entitled to Eleventh justice justices and the associate of their immunity. Amendment As we an held immunity arguing they absolute involving challenge other case to the engaged were an executive function rules governing for admission complaint alleges fails. Lawrence’s Michigan, to the Bar of “[b]ecause supreme promul the state court not Michigan Supreme arms *9 gates but also enforces the Rules Concern all purposes Court for relevant to this lawsuit, ing Michigan. the State Bar JA the Board and the Bar are state justices’ actions, agencies argues The enforcement immune from this lawsuit under Lawrence, not protected legislative the Eleventh Amendment.” Dubuc v. Exam’rs, 610, immunity. Sup.Ct. of Va., Mich. Bd. Law at See U.S. staff information” that the such factual 735-36, argu- 1967. Lawrence’s 100 S.Ct. favorable recommenda- mere forward a Lawrence’s would not well taken. ment is of Law Examiners. does not Board “enforces” tion to the of the word mention Al- to district is made a complaint. of his referral alter the thrust When a committee, some a iden- though he does seek relief drafts notice the staff for their enforcement defendants that be considered tifying issues will him, for relief prayer rules The staff committee. by the district justice the associ- the chief implicates applica- determines when generally they that justices only to the extent ate to a district ready referral for tion promulgating responsible were committee, case. it so did delay by other rules used defendants that the defendants Plaintiff contends attempt gain admission Lawrence’s judgment any not exercise sort did court, there- the state bar. district abey- they application held fore, correctly that chief determined A(5) Rule of the stand- pursuant to ance justices the Michi- justice and associate Rule procedure. rules or ing committee to abso- gan were entitled Supreme Court A(5) application that provides immunity in this case. lute delayed applicant while “should” does charges pending, criminal but has Qualified Immunity c. result in all cases. compel not Aken and Armbrustmacher Van defendants’ actions court finds that immunity as to qualified are entitled to a written preparing investigating ap On against them. Lawrence’s claims judicial de- the eventual report to assist quali peal, argued functionally analogous cision-maker are immunity proper Van fied was because by probation performed the functions engaged Armbrustmacher Aken and conducting investigations and officers ministerial, discretionary, opposed to as reports presentence preparing —func- at 43- functions. See Lawrence’s Br. to abso- are entitled tions for which 47; Br. 6-7. His Reply immunity. quasi-judicial lute contention, for the stated reasons (footnote omit- and citations 1160-61 court, Fitzger v. fails. Harlow ted). Therefore, exception the ministerial ald, “govern Supreme Court held that immunity applicable is not qualified discretionary performing ment officials here. from lia generally are shielded functions normally consider we next Although as bility damages civil insofar alleged as conduct whether defendants’ clearly established conduct does not violate right, it is unnec- a constitutional violated rights of statutory or which constitutional Lawrence has essary do so here because have known.” person a would reasonable appeal argue failed U.S. violations were alleged constitutional added). (1982) (emphasis We L.Ed.2d 396 at the time that de- “clearly established” agree the district court: with a acted. To determine whether fendants significant defendants exercised [T]he qualified im- entitled employee is state staff determines State Bar discretion. analysis: two-step munity, employ we whether, pro- on the information based “(1) whether, allegations considering through investiga- and obtained vided injured, party light most favorable to “significant” factu- tion, there is adverse violated, right has been constitutional al information such that the (2) clearly right committee, to a district is referred City Estate Carter established.” significant is “no adverse whether there *10 452 (6th
Detroit,
Cir.2005).
305,
408
attorneys
unconstitutionally
F.3d
310
does not
in
proving
The burden of
that the right was
fringe upon
applicant’s
First Amend
clearly
“rests squarely
established
on the ment right
expression
to free
or
un
give
452,
plaintiff,” Cope Heltsley,
v.
128 F.3d
bridled discretion
the decision-maker.
(6th Cir.1997),
pres
459
and the “failure to
provides
The admission process also
suffi
an argument
ent
in an appellate brief
of
cient review adverse character determin
Brown,
review,”
I.R.S.,
appellate
waives
ations.3
(6th Cir.2001) (refer
272,
3 Fed.Appx.
274
statute,
By
Michigan legislature
has
Inman,
ring to Buziashvili v.
F.3d
106
provided
general
qualifications for ad-
709,
(6th Cir.1997),
and Kocsis v. Mul mission to the
bar:
state
Inc.,
876,
ti-Care Mgmt.,
A person
qualified
admission
Cir.1996)).
argue,
Lawrence has failed to
proves
bar
this state
who
any
much
provide
less
case law to demon
satisfaction
the board
law examin-
strate,
clearly
that the defendants violated
person
good
ers that he or she is a
rights.2
established constitutional
There is
character,
moral
years
age
is 18
or
no need to decide whether the defendants
older,
required
general
edu-
violated
rights
Lawrence’s constitutional
cation,
law,
in
learning
and fitness
when Lawrence waived the issue of wheth
ability
and
to enable him or
prac-
her to
er the rights
clearly
were
established.
tice
law the courts of
record
this
Lawrence cannot demonstrate that the de
state,
he or
good
and that
she
intends
fendants are not
qualified
entitled to
im
practice
faith
or
teach law
this
reasons,
munity. For these
we do not
requirements
state. Additional
concern-
holding
disturb the district court’s
ing
qualifications
for admission are
Van Aken and Armbrustmacher are enti
in subsequent
contained
sections
this
qualified
immunity.
tled
chapter.
Challenges
S. Facial
to Bar Rules
600.934(1).
Comp.
Mich.
Ann.
Laws
The
“good
term
moral character” is defined as:
challenge
Lawrence’s facial
to the Michi-
character”,
gan
attorney-licensing
phrase “good
scheme fails to state
moral
or
upon
import,
claim
which relief can be granted.
words of similar
when used as a
process
for licensing
requirement
Bar’s
occupational
pro-
Chabot,
Avoiding
preliminary question
capacity
of wheth-
her
official
as chair of the
Examiners,
er there was a constitutional violation does
Berry,
Board
Law
and
in his
Katz,
not contravene Saucier v.
capacity
official
as executive director of the
If the
has criminal
bership
Konigsberg,
to state bars. See
referral
pending, the
committee
Moreover,
delayed
S.Ct. 997.
pending pro-
should be
until the
U.S.
may
ceeding
applicant
Supreme
is concluded. An
Court has also stated that
*12
“generalized
process
to
right
due
choose
rule. The
is
defendants’ discretion
reined
private employment
one’s field of
...
is
ability
must
because
consider
subject
govern-
nevertheless
to reasonable
fair,
applicant
public
to
in a
serve
Gabbert,
regulation.”
ment
Conn v.
526 honest,
open
and
Comp.
manner. Mich.
286, 292,
U.S.
119 S.Ct.
143 L.Ed.2d
338.41(1).
Thus,
argu
Laws
(1999). Michigan’s
desire to ensure ment that the defendants have too much
officers
the court be of sound moral
discretion fails.
fiber is both
expected,
laudable and
and its
challenge
Lawrence’s final facial
might
belief that criminal convictions
re-
the bar admission
the Michi
rules —that
upon
flect
applicant,
character
gan procedure
provide
does
suffi
furthermore,
is logical. It is understanda-
cient
review
adverse determina
ble that an informed decision on the char-
tion—is patently without merit. The
acter
an applicant
and fitness of
be
cannot
magistrate judge painstakingly described
any degree
rendered
of certainty
with
dur-
ample
protections
to a re
available
ing
pendency
charges.
of criminal
jected applicant:
Therefore, a
mandating
rule
that a final
Plaintiff
pro
dismisses
elaborate
decision on an applicant’s request for bar
cedures
forth in
set
State Bar Rule
stayed
pro-
admission be
until criminal
grounds
that are hard to discern.
ceedings have concluded is
and
reasonable
Michigan
disappointed
rule
allows
not,
way,
in any
unreasonably impli-
does
applicant
adequate process,
more than
cate an applicant’s right
to free speech.
beginning with an informal
interview
The defendants also do not have “unbri
before a district
and
character
fitness
dled
in deciding
discretion”
committee,
to a
proceeding
full-blown
reject
admit
bar applicants because
hearing
adversarial
before the State
Michigan
provides
statute
sufficient
committee,
standing
proceeding
guidance
applicants
to determine which
determination,
through
de
again
novo
“good
have
moral character.”
In Law
panoply
procedural rights,
with
full
Council,
Rights
Students Civil
Research
before the State Board of
Examin
Law
Wadmond,
154, 159,
Inc. v.
ers.
If an
applicant
unsuccessful
(1971),
S.Ct.
to the
‘injury
that the
“require[
we
petitions
adjudication,
]
to decide mandamus
Court
*13
”
matters,
Deja
impending.’
fa-
Vu
attorney
certainly
admission
in fact be
short,
Nashville,
per
cu-
Gov’t Nash
vorably
unfavorably,
or
Inc. v. Metro.
of
377,
riam
The fact that
the court
274 F.3d
County,
orders.
ville & Davidson
omitted).
Cir.2001) (citation
opinions unnecessary
(6th
most
At
long
finds
399
decision,
the
negate
applicant’s
not
cases does
the
the district court’s
the time of
judicial
review.
right under state law
had not been denied admission
plaintiff
exten-
Supreme
The
Court often issues
applica
one
He had withdrawn
the bar.
discharge
of its
opinions
sive
tion,
had not acted
the defendants
and
jurisdiction.
original mandamus
injury
No
application.
second
upon his
“certainly im
omitted).
thus had occurred
(some
Finally,
318
citations
pending.”
right
federal
extent
violated, Lawrence,
allegedly
after ex-
conclusion,
circumvent
this
To
remedies, may pe-
his state-court
hausting
act
very
Lawrence contends that
Supreme
United
tition the
Court
rendering a
holding
application
his
without
for a
of certiorari. See 28
States
writ
violated his First Amendment
decision
many
opportunities
U.S.C.
1257.
But, as
injury.
thus constituted
rights and
Michigan licensing
for review under
stated,
may
“The
have
claim
previously
we
constitu-
system amply support the facial
are
fit
if the issues
not
for
unripe
... be
tionality
system.
review,
judicial
because future
perhaps
As-Applied Challenges to
Rules
may greatly
4.
the outcome of
events
affect
litigation
waiting
is not
and the cost
as-applied challenge to the
severe.” Airline
Ass’n
particularly
Michigan attorney-admission procedures
Prof's
Teamsters,
Bhd.
Local Un
the Int’l
ripe
fails because this claim was not
for
Airborne, Inc.,
v.
F.3d
No.
332
ion
adjudication
that the
1224
at
time
Cir.2003).
(6th
983,
delay
The mere
judgment.5
ripeness
court
entered
to make
application
is not sufficient
III
doctrine “is drawn both from Article
First,
controversy
future admis
ripe.
judicial
this
power
pru
on
from
limitations
great
effect on
or denial could have
refusing
sion
dential
for
to exercise
reasons
Servs.,
require
litigation
supplementing
this
jurisdiction.”
v.
Reno Catholic Soc.
Second,
having
Inc.,
2485,
cost of
the record.
57 n.
very
delayed is not
severe
application
III. relationship est that arises from “a as ad- reasons, For foregoing we AFFIRM. or other active participant viser[] affairs of a party....” NELSON, DAVID Judge, A. Circuit I should add that I do not think that concurring. § prevent judges 455 would federal agree I dispo- with court’s ultimate hearing involving cases bar associa appeal, I am sition but uncertain as tions which members. Mere 455(b)(4) required whether 28 U.S.C. membership in a bar association does not magistrate judges and district to dis- participation]” in constitute “active the as qualify disqualification If themselves. sociation’s affairs. Parrish v. Board Cf. however, required, I am satisfied that re- Bar, Ala. Comm’rs medial action on our part is neither neces- Cir.1975) banc) (en (“No interest sary appropriate. nor exceeding membership mere is asserted. It membership seems to me that the disqualification.”), This is not a ground for the two judges denied, the State Bar Michi- cert.
gan’s Standing Committee on United L.Ed.2d 188 And even a judge might, depending States Courts on the who sits on a committee not in might bar nature and judges’ extent involve- all circumstances have “financial inter *16 committee, meaning ment with the “a within constitute est” of the statute. ... relationship as or other ac- Not all committee adviser[ ] members are “advis participant er[s],” tive in par- participation the affairs a and not “active.” 455(d)(4). ty....” § 28 U.S.C. Such a If magistrate judges in existed, if it relationship, defini- would were, fact, in this case or ... “adviser[s] tion constitute a “financial in interest” participants] active in affairs” of the party, my and in disquali- view it would be bar, required state and were on that basis fying, plain language under the of the stat- themselves, it disqualify does not neces ute, irrespective party of whether the was sarily judgment appealed follow that nonprofit organization. Supreme must be vacated. As the observed, It is in § true that Plechner v. Widener Court has 455 “neither pre Inc., 1250, (3d College, any particular F.2d 1262 n. 6 nor prohibits scribes reme Cir.1977), distinguished dy duty disqualify. the Third Circuit for a violation” of Liljeberg Acquisition between business v. Health corporations non- Services 862, profit organizations Corp., as such the American U.S. in suggesting Liljeberg,
Bar Association
that an in-
In the case now before harm- any violation of the statute was has not shown that
less. Mr. Lawrence membership magistrate and dis- bar committee on judge
trict the state likely to influence federal courts handling concerning lawsuit distinct ad-
entirely matter —Lawrence’s any I do not think
mission the bar. conclude that bias
rational observer would judges to rule as did.
caused the two
(Indeed, this the dis- court has reviewed legal
trict its court’s decisions and found discretionary
rulings to be correct and its reasonable.) Vacating
rulings to be judgment in
district court’s these circum- remedy injustice
stances would neither prevent
nor public a loss confidence judicial process.
Accordingly, I affirm the denial of would to disqualify ground
the motion on the error was harmless. all other re-
spects join majority opinion. I *17 GOLDEN, Plaintiff-Appellant,
Diane WORKERS OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AMERICA, AFL-CIO Communi- America,
cations Workers of Local
3808, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 05-6083. of Appeals, States Court
United
Sixth Circuit.
May