79 F. 878 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Western Michigan | 1897
The hill of complaint in this ease was filed for the purpose of recovering from the defendant the damages resulting from an alleged breach of trust on his part while acting as president and managing officer of the Northern National Bank of Big Rapids. This bank was chartered on llie 19 th day of September, 1870, for the period of 20 years, and its charter was extended by the comptroller of the currency on the 5th day of September, 1890, until the 19tli day of September, 1910. The capital stock of tlie bank at the time of its organization was fixed at the sum of $150,000, but on the 10tli day of January, 1893, its capital was reduced by tlie direction of tlie comptroller. of the currency, to $100,000. The hank failed and closed its doors shortly before the 5th day of August,
1. It will be assumed for the purpose of discussing the first two of the above propositions that the opinion of the supreme court of the state in the former suit is competent evidence of the matters there decided, and whicli formed the basis of the decree (a subject of discussion whicli will be taken up later on), for it is clear that, if that opinion is not competent evidence upon the question as to what matters were decided in that case, there is nothing in the proofs in the present case upon which it can be held that the defendant’s knowledge of the character of the Anderson & Griffin note and mortgage was found and determined in the former suit. But it is also clear that the pleadings in that case were such that such knowledge on the part of , .teams might be a material, indeed
2. The question next to be considered is whether one who has been prosecuted to judgment upon a'cause; of action based upon the negligent act of another who owed a duly to him, and where such other party has been called in to defend, and has actually assumed the conduct of (he defense, may sue such other party for indemnity, and rest his case in respect of the question of negligence upon prooí of the former adjudication, it being shown that, it was in consequence of such negligence that, the former judgment passed. I think this question must be answered in the affirmative;. The princijde involved is one which lies at the foundation of many ease's, and has become defined and settled as a distinct branch of the law of estoppel. Robbins v. Chicago, 4 Wall. 657; Washington Gaslight Co. v. District of Columbia, 161 U. S. 316, 16 Sup. Ct. 564; Oceanic. Steam Nav. Co. v. Campania Transatlantica Espanola, 144 N. Y. 663, 39 N. E. 360; Lloyd v. Barr, 11 Pa. St 41; Westfield Gas & Milling Co. v. Noblesville & E. Gravel Road Co., 13 Ind. App. 481, 41 N. E. 955. The case' of City of Boston v. Worthington, 10 Gray, 496, cited by counsel for tlu' defendant as one which clearly stab's the law upon this subject, is in harmony with tlu; doctrine stated. It asserts that the former judgment against the plaintiffs was conclusive against the defendants in the second suit upon all of the points for which the record of the former suit, is offered here. The points upon which it is said the former judgment would not be conclusive are such as in the present, case arc; established by tlu; pleadings and the1 relations of the parties. ,
3. It being established that the pleadings in the former suit of Griffin & Anderson against the bank, Stearns, and Baker constituted grounds upon which the question of Stearns-' negligence might b<' litigated, and might become' the pivotal question in the; case, the next que'stion is whether tlu; proof upon that subject which has been offerc'd is eompeb'nt to show that, in fact if. was a material and decisive que'stion in the case, and was decoded. If is insisted by counsel for the defendant that t:he opinion of the' e-ourt is not competent evidence to prove such fact, and the deffense in the; present case has bc'cm resb'd largedv upon this contention. As already stated, if the1 defendant’s position is right upon this eqiesfion, the case fails, and if appears to me to be equally e'ertaiu, if the propositions already affirme'd in this opinion are' sound, tlu' disposition of this question tlu' other way prae-ticallv dc'cides the case1 against the defendant. It is insisted that the opinion of the court is nothing but hearsay; that it is no part of the judgment, nor. indeed, any part of the record. And it is insisted that if the question as to the grounds of tlu» decre'c may be1 gone into by proof outside' of the decree itself, that witne'sse's should be e-alled, and the matter proved in tlu' ordinary way. This does not appear to me; to be a reasonable contention. In fact, I think there; can be no higher or hette'r evidence than tlie written opinion of tlu' court itself upon which the decree is framed. The constitution of the state, by section 10 of article 6, declares that:
*884 “The decisions of tlie supreme court shall be in writing, signed by the judges concurring therein. Any judge dissenting therefrom shall give the reasons of such dissent in writing, under his signature. All such opinions shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the supreme court.”
Thus an official character is given to the opinions of the court, and, when filed as the constitution requires, they become authentic evidence of their contents. How is the matter to be proved? ¡Shall the judges be called to testify upon what reasons moving their minds the decision was made? It seems very doubtful whether such proof would be admissible at all. The evidence of what they did is in writing, officially signed and filed by them, and the reasons for their decision are required to have been stated in such writing, and I am well satisfied that the writing itself is the best, if not the only, authentic evidence which could be received. I must, therefore, hold that the objection against its admissibility must be overruled. Phelps v. Harris, 101 U. S. 370; Legrand v. Rixey’s Adm’r, 83 Va. 862, 3 S. E. 864; Last Chance Min. Co. v. Tyler Min. Co., 157 U. S. 683, 15 Sup. Ct. 733; New Orleans, M. & C. R. Co. v. City of New Orleans, 14 Fed. 373; Southern Minn. Ry. Extension Co. v. St. Paul & S. C. R. Co., 5 C. C. A. 249, 55 Fed. 690; Esterbrook v. Savage, 21 Hun, 145; Insurance Co. v. Herbert (Sup.) 33 N. Y. Supp. 819. The case of Insurance Co. v. Hamilton, 22 U. S. App. 386, 11 C. C. A. 42, and 63 Fed. 93, is not in conflict with this view. The question there involved was the sufficiency of the opinion in the court below as a finding of facts upon which to review the judgment. It was not a finding of the ultimate facts upen which the judgment rested. And, further, there was no law which required the opinion of the court below to be in writing and filed with the clerk, as was the case here.
4. The statute of limitations is pleaded in the answer in this case, but it would appear that the facts upon which the defendant’s liability rested were not known until a long time after the transaction occurred. They rested in the knowledge of the defendant, Stearns. He was the manager of the bank, and conducted the transaction in question. There is no reason to suppose that he disclosed the facts within his knowledge to the board of directors. On the contrary, the inferences from the record are strong that he did not make any such disclosure. In the state court he had stoutly denied having had any knowledge whatever of Baker’s guaranty, and it is reasonable to suppose and presume as against him that lie did not disclose as a fact to the directors that he had any such knowledge, tío far as is shown, and I think it right to conclude, the first notice of the existence of such knowledge was when the bill was filed in the state court, and then it was disputed by him, and continued an open question until the supreme court of the state decided that the fact was so. I think this is a case for the application of the doctrine that laches cannot be imputed where the cause of action was concealed by the defendant,
5. Upon the facts it appears to me that the complainant’s case is made out. The defendant had charge of the business of the bank. He had suffered Baker, who was a near relative, and the Baker Lumber Company, to appropriate of the funds of the bank a sum constituting a large share of the capital of the Dank. This is not the gravamen
My opinion is that the complainant is entitled to a decree for the amount claimed.