90 W. Va. 209 | W. Va. | 1922
The plaintiff Lawrence filed his bill for the purpose of settling the interests of the various parties in the oil derived from a tract of about one acre of land known as the Ramsey lease.
It appears that in the month of July, 1918, Samuel H. Meyers and TI. F. Martin were the owners of a lease upon a tract of land, the oil from which is in controversy in this suit, by the terms of which they were authorized to develop the same for oil and gas. At' that time considerable development had been begun in the neighborhood, and it was contemplated that this would prove to be a valuable oil-bearing lease. The defendants Kennedy and Van Fleet purchased the half interest of Martin in this lease, and at the same time entered into a contract with Meyers by which they were to secure
Upon the refusal of Meyers to convey his half interest in the lease to Kennedy and Van Fleet and their associates, in accordance with what they claim to be the terms of his contracts, they brought a suit against the defendants Meyers, Stage and Burns for the purpose of compelling specific execution of those contracts. The plaintiff Lawrence was also made a party defendant to this bill, and it was alleged therein that while he was jointly interested with Kennedy and Van Fleet in the enterprise, he was acting adversely to them, and that the purchase by Stage from Meyers, and by Burns from Stage of the Meyers one-half interest was really a purchase by Lawrence, and that Burns and Stage were holding this interest for his benefit. The bill alleged that Stage and Burns had full notice of the contracts and arrangements be
Pending that litigation arrangements were entered into by the parties under which the property could be developed and the oil saved. It appears that operations were conducted on either side of this Ramsey lease, and in very close proximity thereto, which would have extracted all of the oil thereunder unless it was drilled simultaneously with the operation on these other tracts. In order to secure such operation Kennedy and his associates, being the undisputed owners of the Martin half interest, and claiming the Meyers half interest, entered into a contract with the Ring Oil Com
Various pleadings have been filed in the case, but for the' purpose of the question we have here it is necessary to notice only some of them. To Lawrence’s bill setting up his interest, Kennedy and Van Fleet and their associates filed an answer and cross bill. In this answer and cross bill the interest of the parties in the Martin one-half of the land is denied to be as contended for by Lawrence, and certain contracts and deeds in relation thereto are asked to be set aside, and others to be construed differently from the interpretation given to them by Lawrence in the bill. With this Martin one-half interest, however, we are not now concerned. As to the Meyers half interest, the defendants allege in their cross bill that they are entitled to practically the whole thereof. They aver that the purchase thereof by Stage and Burns was-in the interest of Lawrence; that Lawrence was the real purchaser; and that the- purchase of this interest, which conflicted with the interest asserted by them in the former suit, under their contract with Meyers, inured to the benefit of all of the joint adventurers. That they are entitled to have the interest so acquired by Stage and Burns in behalf of Lawrence adjudged to be for the joint benefit of all of those jointly interested in the Martin interest inasmuch as the purchase was made by Lawrence through Stage and Burns during the time the controversy was pending over this Meyers interest, and, further that Lawrence as a purchaser from them is estopped to claim an interest adverse to that which they sold him, while he is still relying upon and holding under his contract with them. They filed an amended cross bill in which the allegations in regard to the Meyers half interest were somewhat elaborated. Subsequently, it appeared from answers filed by Stage and Burns that Lawrence had acquired all of the interests held by Meyers, Stage and Burns in the Meyers half interest, and was the owner of all thereof, and Kennedy and Van Fleet contended that the conveyance to Lawrence of these interests by Stage and Burns and Meyers was simply turning over to him what he
The first question naturally is, is the plea good as a plea in equity? Ordinarily the rule is that a plea in equity, to be good, must bar the right to recover in the suit, but it seems that where separate and distinct matters upon which the right of recovery is based are set up, a plea which is effective to bar one of these separate and distinct rights and claims will be held to be a good plea. ' Story’s Equity Pleadings, § 647.
It only remains, therefore, for us to determine whether the matter. set up in the plea furnishés a complete bar to the .claims asserted by Kennedy and Yan Fleet to the Meyers half interest. It will be borne in mind that this plea relies
But this does not necessarily conclude the question. Lawrence’s plea goes further than simply setting up the former adjudication and relying thereon. It traverses the allegation in the cross bill that the purchase by Stage and Burns was for his benefit, and that they acted in his interest, anci asserts that he never acquired any interest whatever in this Meyers half interest until after it was determined that Kennedy and Van Fléet and their associates had no claim of any kind thereto. Does this make any difference ? It may be true that if Lawrence did not stand inj the relation of purchaser to Kennedy and Van Fleet he would be in a position to acquire for his own benefit the Meyers half interest from Stage and Burns at the time he says he did. We must not, however, lose sight of the fact that not only is Lawrence by reason of his purchase, jointly interested with Kennedy and Van Fleet,
We are of opinion that the plea filed by Lawrence sets up no defense to the cross bill, and that the court should have sustained the objection to the filing of the same. We will, therefore, reverse the decree, sustain the objection to the plea, and remand the cause for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.