OPINION
1 Viсtor and Cindy Lawrence appeal the trial court's judgment in favor of Intermoun- *511 tain Isuzu (Intermountain). They primarily argue that the trial court erroneously determined that they are liable for (1) conspiracy to defraud, (2) conversion, and (8) punitive damages. We affirm.
BACKGROUND 1
{2 In late 1999, A. Paul Schwenke, a business client of Mr. Lawrence, established cSave.net, LLC. Several months later, Schwenke decided to lease three vehicles for the personal use of his wife, his daughter, and the Lawrences. Mr. Lawrence helped Schwenke in this endeavor, contacting a car dealership in Bountiful to discuss leasing arrangements. But then Schwenke explored leasing possibilities with Intermountain, and the vehicles were ultimately leased from that dealership. Mr. Lawrence was present for some nеgotiations with Intermountain, and at one point he advised Schwenke to go to the Bountiful dealership if Intermountain would not meet the terms that the Bountiful dealership had offered. Mrs. Lawrence was also involved in the lease negotiations at some level, at least enough to know approximately how much the monthly lease payments on the vehicles would be.
{3 Although Schwenke apparently first contacted Intermountain on behalf of eSave. net, ecSave.net never had good credit or assets of any significance and the leases were ultimately not signed on behalf of eSave.net. Rather, Schwenke, his wife, his daughter, and Mrs. Lawrence offered $10,000 to Wayne Wong, who worked for eSave.net, to use his credit-worthiness and sign the leases. This arrangement was nоt, however, disclosed to Intermountain. With no intention of making the lease payments, Wong signed the contracts to lease three new Isuzu Rodeos on March 31, 2000. And to cover a cash down payment of $1,000 on each of the three leased vehicles, Mr. Lawrence wrote a personal check for $3,000, for which he was eventually reimbursed. At this point, the Lawrences took possession of one of the three leased vehicles-a black Isuzu Rodeo.
T4 Shortly after the leases were signed, Intermountain sold the lease for the black Rodeo to Bank of America and the leases for the other two Rodeos to Isuzu Motors Acceptance Corporation/Isuzu LT (Isuzu) Soon thereafter, on May 25, 2000, Plaintiffs-Schwenke's wife, Schwenke's daughter, Wong, and Mrs. Lawrence-filed thеir complaint against Defendants-Intermountain, Bank of America, and Isuzu-asserting various causes of action, including breach of contract. Plaintiffs' complaint sought to enjoin Defendants from enforcing the three lease agreements, that is, from "declar[ing] the leases in default and repossess[ing] the vehicles."
T5 After no payments were made on any of the three Rodeos for several months, and after Wong ignored several notices and demand letters, Intermountain was forced to repurchase the leases from Bank of America and Isuzu. After regaining ownership of the Rodeos, Intermountain attempted to repossess them. Intermountain tried to repossess the black Rodeo on January 31, 2001, while it was parked outside Mr. Lawrence's office. The owner of Intermountain, George Watkins, was present for the attempted repossession and showed Mr. Lawrence documentation evidencing Intermountain's right to the black Rodeo. But Mr. Lawrence refused to turn the black Rodeo over without a court order and then assaulted Watkins, putting him in a headlock and causing minor injuries. Immediately after the attempted repossession, Mr. Lawrence turned the black Rodeo over to Schwenke, knowing that the vehicle's lease was in default and knowing that Schwenke had no right to possess the vehicle. Schwenke then allowed a family member to drive the black Rodeo to California, ' where it was thereafter totaled in an accident.
*512 T6 In May 2001, Intermountain counterclaimed against Plaintiffs and initiated claims against Third-party Defendants-Schwеnke, Mr. Lawrence, and eSave.net-pleading causes of action that included fraud, conspiracy to defraud, and conversion. Also in May 2001, Intermountain served interrogatories on Wong, the Schwenkes, and the Lawrences in an attempt to discover the location of the leased vehicles. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Lawrence entered an appearance as counsel, representing himself, his wife, Wong, and the Schwenkes. Mr. Lawrence then purposefully delayed the proceedings by attempting to remove the case to federal court despite the fact that removal would have been improper. 2 Thus, Intermountain did not obtain a Writ and Order of Replevin on the black Rodeo until October 5, 2001. And it was not until the trial court entered a contempt order and Plaintiffs were faced with jail time that they finally answered the interrogatories intended to reveal the location of the vehicle The completely totaled black Rodeo was eventually returned to Intermountain in 2002. 3
T7 Each of Plaintiffs' causes of action was eventually dismissed on motions for summary judgment, and the trial court characterized the lawsuit as "designed to impede Intermountain's efforts to recover the vehicle[s]." The trial court also determined that Mr. Lawrence had filed a similar lawsuit on behalf of himself, his wife, and the Schwenkes regarding a similar leasing deal with another automobile dealership, West Valley Dodge. In that case, (1) another entity owned by Schwenke arranged the leasing of three vehicles; (2) one of those vehicles was givеn to the Lawrences to use; (8) payments were not made on the leased vehicles; (4) shortly after the vehicles were leased, Mr. Lawrence filed a lawsuit against the degalership in an attempt to assert rights to continued possession of the vehicles; and (5) the vehicles were ultimately repossessed-less than one month before the Lawrences and the Schwenkes leased the vehicles at issue here from Intermountain.
[ 8 A bench trial on Intermountain's claims was held in June 2007. The trial court held Wong liable for fraud and held the Law-rences liable for conspiracy to defraud and conversion. The three were held jointly and severally Hable for $138,267.25, which included prejudgment interest. The trial court also determined that punitive damages were warranted against Wong and the Lawrences, and another bench trial was held in March 2008 to determine the amount of punitive damages. The resulting awards of punitive damages were $138,267.25 against Wong, $484,000.00 against Mr. Lawrence, and $99,999.99 against Mrs. Lawrence. The Lawrences now appeal.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
T9 The Lawrences initially argue that the trial court erred, as a matter of law, in determining that they were liable for conspiracy to commit fraud. We review this question of law for correctness, granting the trial court no deference. See State v. Pena,
" 10 Second, the Lawrences argue that the trial court erred in holding them liable for conversion because Intermountain did not have rights to the vehicle prior to January 31, 2001, and they "relinquished possession" on that date. Whether the facts establish the elements of conversion is a question of law, see Nielsen v. Spencer,
T11 Third, the Lawrences argue that the punitive damages awards against them are excessive under both state law and the federal constitution. In Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange,
ANALYSIS
I. The Legal Requirements of Conspiracy to Defraud
$12 The trial court determined that the Lawrences had participated in a conspiracy to defraud Intermountain of the use of the three Rodeos, and the trial court held the Lawrences Hable for the damages flowing from the fraudulent scheme. "To prove a civil conspiracy, plaintiff must show the following elements: (1) a combination of two or more persons, (2) an object to be accomplished, (3) a meeting of the minds on the object or course of action, (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts, and (5) dаmages as a proximate result thereof." Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, TAG P.2d 785, 790 (Utah Ct.App.1987). The Lawrences argue that the facts here did not support the trial court's determination that they met each element of conspiracy to defraud, specifically, that there was a meeting of the minds regarding the fraud committed by Wong 4 We agree with the trial court that sufficient facts showed the Lawrences' "knowing and intentional participation in the fraud."
113 As to Mrs. Lawrence, the trial court relied on the facts that (1) she had very recently had a vehicle repossessed that had been leased by Schwenke from West Valley Dodge under a similar arrangement; (2) she had participated in the $10,000 inducement to Wong; 5 (8) she was present for the signing of the leases and was aware of their financial terms; (4) she took possession of the black Rodeo with no intention to pay the lease and made no attempt to ensure lease payments would be made; and (5) she was a plaintiff in a lawsuit designed to impede Intermountain's recovery of the leased Rodeos. As to Mr. Lawrence, the trial court relied on the facts that (1) he had very recently had a vehicle repossessed that had been leased by Schwenke from West Valley Dodge under a similar - arrangement; - (2) he - helped Schwenke find new vehicles to lease; (8) he was present at the lease signing and was *514 aware of the leases' financial terms; (4) he provided the down payment for the leased vehicles; (5) he took possession of the black Rodeo with no intention of making lease payments and without putting forth any effort to ensure payments would be made; and (6) he likely knew of the $10,000 inducement given to Wong. 6 We are convinced that these facts demonstrate that the Lawrences intentionally participated in the fraud on Intermoun-tain, that is, they committed acts in furtherance of the fraud. We therefore affirm the trial court's civil conspiracy determination.
114 The Lawrences also argue that the above activities cannot be used to show their participation in the fraud because none of these actions are themselves illegal. But such is not a requirement of conspiracy. Rather, conspiracy simply requires one illegal action-in this case, fraud. And certainly we need not consider each of the Lawrences аctivities separately because facts that seem benign when viewed individually may establish the occurrence of fraud when considered as a whole, see id. at 798 n. 9 (" Facts of trifling importance when considered separately, or slight cireumstances trivial and inconclusive in themselves, may afford clear evidence of fraud when considered in connection with each other. It has been said that in most cases fraud can be made out only by a concatenation of cireumstances, many of which in themselves amount to very little, but in connection with others make a strong case.'"). Thus, this argument is not well taken.
II. Conversion
115 "'A conversion is an act of wilful interference with a chattel, done without lawful justification by which the person entitled thereto is deprived of its use and possession"" Fibro Trust, Inc. v. Brahman Fin., Inc.,
116 The trial court additionally held Mr. Lawrence liable for conversion of the black Rodeo for the time period after Intermountain demanded the vehicle and Mr. Lawrence refused, giving the vehicle instead to Schwenke, thereby "knowingly and intentionally act[ing] to frustrate Intermountain's attempt to recover the vehicle." The trial court measured damages for this by calculating Intermountain's cost to recover the vehicle, minus the money it received from selling the vehicle. The Lawrences challenge this determination, essentially arguing that Inter-mountain's right to the vehicle was "conditioned by self help without breach of the peace." Although the Lawrences point tо statutory authority that provides that a party *515 may repossess collateral without judicial process if doing so does not result in a breach of the peace, see Utah Code Ann. § 70A-92-609(2) (2009), the statute does not state that the right to possession is affected by a breach of the peace. A person causing a breach of the peace when faced with repossession does not somehow convert his wrongful possession into lawful possession. Likewise, the fact that the issue is being litigated does not mean that the party attempting repossession does not have the right to immediate possession, even if he cannot legally enforce that right by means of self-help. Indeed, accepting the Lawrences' argument on this issue would reward a pаrty in wrongful possession of property for his noncompliance with repossession attempts and would encourage baseless litigation. 7
{17 And we see no error in the trial court's determination that Mr. Lawrence's actions from January 31, 2001, forward amounted to willful interference with Inter-mountain's possession, done without lawful justification. First, knowing that Intermoun-tain had the right to repossess the vehicle, Mr. Lawrence attacked and assaulted Watkins when repossession was attempted. And then Mr. Lawrence gave the vehicle to Schwenke as soon as he knew Intermountain was attempting to repossess it, notwithstanding his knowledge that Schwenke had no right to use or possess the vehicle. Further, as the trial court found, Mr. Lawrence "used his knowledge of the court system to purposefully forеstall Intermountain's effort to recover its vehicles." The simple fact that Mr. Lawrence no longer had physical possession of the vehicle does not mean that he was unable to have willfully interfered with the vehicle, thereby depriving Intermountain of its rightful possession. Thus, we see no error in the trial court's conversion determination.
III. Punitive Damages
A. State Law
118 The Lawrences argue that the punitive damages awarded by the trial court are excessive under State law, that is, under the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange,
(i) the relative wealth of the defendant;
(i) the nature of the alleged misconduct;
(ii) the facts and cireumstances surrounding such conduct; (iv) the effect thereof on the lives of the plaintiff and others; (v) thе probability of future recurrence of the misconduct; (vi) the relationship of the parties; and (vii) the amount of actual damages awarded.
Id. at 808.
T19 In their evaluation of the Crookston factors, the Lawrences focus almost exclusively on those few facts that militate against an award of punitive damages.
9
We agree with the Lawrences that some of the Crook-ston factors weigh against punitive damages awards in this case, specifically the fourth factor regarding the effect on the vietim and the sixth factor regarding the relationship of the parties. Although forcing Intermountain to, in the trial court's words, "absorb a significant financial hit," the Lawrences' wrongdoing did not affect a large number of vie-
*516
tims or impair Intermountain's ability to continue its business. See generally Diversifiеd Holdings, LC v. Turner,
120 As to the first Crookston factor, that is, the defendant's relative wealth, the trial court had a difficult time arriving at an exact number for the Law-rences' wealth. The trial court found that Mrs. Lawrence is "secretive and evasive" concerning her assets and that Mr. Lawrence "has tried hard over the past several years to disguise and hide the amount and sources of his income." However, even from the limited evidence available, the trial court was able to make some findings regarding income. The trial court relied on Mrs. Lawrence's status as a member and manager of two income-receiving companies to reject her claim that she was penniless. As to Mr. Lawrence, the trial court rejected his "protestations of poverty" and was аble to determine that "he has since at least the early 2000s received substantial income, far and above what would be considered average annual income,
10
and that he owns software that "has generated huge if unspecified royalty income." Although relative wealth is a factor to be considered, we recognize that "the introduction of evidence as to the relative wealth of the defendant is not a technical prerequisite to an award of punitive damages." Bennett v. Huish,
$21 Regarding the second Crookston factor-the nature of the misconduct-the punitive damages awards here were supported by liability for both conversion and conspiracy to defraud, each being misconduct for which punitive damages may be appropriate. See generally Utah Code Ann. § 78B-8-201 (2008) ("Except as otherwise provided by statute, punitive damages may be awarded only if compensatory or general damages are awarded and it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of the tortfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others."). "Deliberate false statements, acts of affirmative misconduct, [and] concealment of evidence of improper motive support more substantial awards, as do acts involving trickery and deceit." Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc.,
122 The third Crookston factor "looks to the circumstances surrounding the illegal conduct, particularly with respect to what the defendant knew and what was motivating his or her actions." - Smith,
123 The fifth Crookston factor addresses the probability that the misconduct will occur again in the future. "'A high probability of recidivism justifies a higher than normal punitive damage award."" Id. T42. The prior incident with West Valley Dodge is pertinent here beсause the two patterns of events have striking similarities. See id. (citing case law stating that "courts should look to the existence and frequency of similar past conduct" in evaluating this factor (internal quotation marks omitted)). Further, the Lawrences do not take any responsibility for their illegal actions. See generally Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
$24 Finally, the seventh Crook-ston factor compares the amount of actual damages awarded with the amount of punitive damages awarded. "The ratio of punitive to compensatory damages does not, by itself, determine whether or not an award is excessive; an award that falls outside certain parameters will, however, elicit more searching judicial serutiny." Diversified Holdings, LC v. Turner,
B. Federal Constitutional Law
125 The Lawrences also argue that the amount of punitive damages awarded by the trial court violates their federal constitutional rights to due process. "The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor." State Farm,
CONCLUSION
{26 The trial court did not err in determining that the facts satisfy the requirements of conspiracy to defraud and conversion. - Additionally, the punitive damages awards are not excessive, and we affirm the same.
T 27 WE CONCUR: J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. and MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN, Judges.
Notes
. We recite the facts as found by the trial court. Although several arguments in the Lawrences' brief seem to be indirectly attacking the trial court's findings, the Lawrences have not made any attempt to marshal the evidence as is required when challenging factual findings, see Chen v. Stewart,
. In addition to the removal being denied, a judgment of $1,500 for attorney fees was entered as a sanction against Plaintiffs, Mr. Lawrence, and cSave.net.
. Intermountain was ultimately able to obtain possession of the other two Rodeos as well. However, both had sustained "substantial damage" by the time they were repossessed.
. The Lawrences argue in their brief that because the trial court found that neither of them directly made any affirmative misrepresentations to Intermountain, "the trial court was precluded from finding the Lawrences were liable for conspiracy to commit fraud." Although the Law-rences are correct that "conspiracy to defraud requires proof of the underlying fraud," Gildеa v. Guardian Title Co. of Utah,
. - The Lawrences contest the trial court's reliance on a judicial admission made by Mrs. Lawrence in her complaint that "in order to induce plaintiff Wayne Wong to sign on the leases, plaintiffs agreed to pay him $10,000.00." But "[aln admission of fact in a pleading is a judicial admission and is normally conclusive on the party making it." Baldwin v. Vantage Corp.,
. Notwithstanding their concession that they are not challenging the trial court's findings, the Lawrences purport to attack the trial court's finding that "Mr. Lawrence was fully aware of, and intentionally participated in, the scheme to obtain and use vehicles without the intent to pay for their use." They imply that this finding is entirely based on the trial court's subsidiary finding that because the Lawrences were married when Mrs. Lawrence participated in the inducement to Wong, it was "reasonable to infer" that Mr. Lawrence was also aware of that inducement. However, this finding regarding knowlеdge of the inducement is only one of six facis the trial court lists as supporting its finding that Mr. Lawrence knowingly and intentionally participated in the conspiracy to defraud. Furthermore, a court may look to the relationship of the parties and 'use reasonable inferences in determining whether a conspiracy existed. See Israel Pagan,
. Although it is clear from the conspiracy findings that the trial court did not believe the Law-rences' assertions that they thought cSave.net was paying for the lease on the vehicle, any such assertions would be irrelevant to the conversion claim. - "Although conversion results only from intentional conduct it does not however require a conscious wrongdoing, but only an intent to exercise dominion or control over the goods inconsistent with the owner's right." Allred v. Hinkley,
. The Lawrences make several arguments regarding the punitive damages awards that are based on their assertion that they were not liable for the fraud perpetrated against Intermountain. We need not address these arguments because we have already determined that the Lawrences were indeed liable under a civil conspiracy theory for the damages arising from fraud relating to the three leased vehicles, see supra Part I.
. The Lawrences also largely focus on the version of the facts that they argued at trial, which facts are contrary to the facts as found by the trial court. Again, as we explained above, see supra note 1, we do not address such arguments.
. The trial court subsidiarily found that Mr. Lawrence's income approached $40,000 a month in mid-2004 and that since at least 2005 he has consistently received payments of $35,000 a month in consulting fees.
. The compensatory damages figure used by the trial court included $57,854.38 in prejudgment interest. The Lawrences argue that this figure should not be included in forming ratios under the Crookston analysis, arguing that prejudgment interest, like an award of attorney fees, is not properly considered. See generally Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
Furthermore, even were we to take the prejudgment interest amount out of the denominator, it would not alter the ratio to the point where we would determine the award to be excessive-increasing the number representing punitive damages from 0.7 to 1.2 in the award against Mrs. Lawrence and from 3.5 to 6 in the award against Mr. Lawrence. We think the facts support awards of these proportions as well.
. We do, however, recognize that our decision would likely remain unchanged even were we to analyze the punitive damages awards under the federal guideposts, seeing that there is considerable overlap between the federal guideposts and the Crookston factors. The second, third, and fifth Crookston factors, which we determined to weigh in favor of large punitive damages awards here, are subsumed within the federal "reprehensibility" guidepost. See Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc.,