45 F. 357 | D. Conn. | 1891
The above-entitled cause having been by agreement and consent of the parties thereto, as evidenced by their written stipulation on file, referred to the undersigned to find the facts and report the same to the court, the undersigned, in pursuance of said stipulation, heard said parties on the 13th and 14th days of January, 1891, with their witnesses, who were duly sworn, and by their respective counsel, George G. Sill and H. D. Donnelly for the plaintiff, and Stephen W. Kellogg for the defendant, and hereby reports that he found the following facts to have been proved and to be true. His conclusions of law upon said facts are also stated herein.
The action is an action at law, which was brought under section 4901 of the Revised Statutes, to recover the statutory penalties incurred for stamping, as patented, manufactured articles which were unpatented, with intent to deceive the public. The defendant is a corporation, which has been duly incorporated under the laws of Connecticut, and is located in the town of Waterbury, in said state, and is a large manufacturer of the brass paper fasteners known as “McGill’s Fasteners.” In the years 1888, 1889, and 1890 said company made and sold 10,000 paper boxes of paper fasteners, each box containing one hundred fasteners, and each box was stamped by the defendant with the following words and figures: “McGill’s Fasteners. Patented, April 20, 1875, Jan. 8, 1878, Oct. 2, 1883, by Geo. W. McGill.” This is the label upon which the complaint is based. In 1890, the defendant put up this kind of fasteners in brass boxes, each brass box being stamped, “McGill’s Fasteners, Pat’d by G. W. McGill, 1875, 1876.” Upon the back of each box are stamped the following:
“McGill’s Fasteners.
100 Varieties.
Pat’d
April 20, 1875, Aug. 21, 1877, Jan. 8, 1878, April 19, 1878,
Oct. 2, 1882, Apr. 25, 1884, Mar. 2, 1886.”
The United States issued to George W. McGill four letters patent', Nos. 162,182, 162,183, 162,184, and 162,185, each one dated April 20, 1875, and letters patent No. 199,085, dated January 8, 1878, and No. 286,143, dated October 2, 1883, and, before 1875, had also issued
“(2) A metallic T-shaped fastener, having a folded head, provided with indentations, c, a, to hold the blades of its double shank in close parallel contact witli the point of one projecting beyond the other, substantially as described. (3) A metallic T-shaped fastener, having a folded head, provided with indentations, c, a, to hold the blades of its double blank in close parallel contact with each other, in combination with a metal cap closed upon the folded head, substantially as described.”
Each brass fastener in the stamped paper boxes which are the subject of this controversy had a donble-bladed shank and T-shaped shoulders, upon which a separate button head was placed. This button head was tightly placed upon the shoulders of the shank, and the effect was to prevent the blades of the fastener from springing apart. This fastener was not made from a single piece of metal, and the section of the shoulders was not struck and indented. A competent expert is of the opinion, and testified, that the claim of No. 162,184 did not require the fastener to be made from a single piece of metal, and that the tightly placed button, whereby the blades were kept from springing apart, was an equivalent for the indentations upon the folded head which are described in the second and third claims of 286,143. My conclusion of law, from the facts hereinbefore stated, is that the claims of said two patents do not include and describe the fastener in controversy.
Samuel H. Willard was the general manager of the defendant in 1875, and was instrumental in getting it to enter upon the business of manu
Three questions of law arise upon the foregoing facts.
1. Is the defendant corporation affected or bound by the knowledge of McGill, who has been, since 1884, a director of the corporation? His knowledge is not the knowledge of the defendant, because the knowledge of a director does not affect the corporation, unless in a matter wherein he is acting officially as a director, or is engaged in its behalf in its business. “In order to affect a corporation by the knowledge of a fact by one of its directors, it is necessary be should have sueh knowledge, while acting officially, in the business of the corporation, unless he is acting at the sanio time under some special authority, conferred on him, other than what he would possess as merely one of the directors.” Beach, Joint-Stock Corp. 69; Bank v. Payne, 25 Conn. 444; Platt v. Axle Co., 41 Conn. 255; Bank v. Davis, 2 Hill, 451; Winchester v. Railroad Co., 4 Md. 231; Story, Ag. (6th Ed.) § 140b.
2. Does the general rule that a person must he held to intend the necessary consequences of his acts require a conclusion against the defendant, it having been found that the labels were untrue, and that they were affixed to the boxes of the defendant? The rule applies to acts knowingly or consciously done, and, if the defendant knew or had adequate reason to know that its labels were untrue, it would be presumed to have intended the necessary consequences of the acts. The fact that the label was untrue does not preclude a defendant from showing that he had adequate reason to believe that it was true, and that he had taken competent and authoritative advice upon the subject.
3. Was the defendant corporation justified in relying upon the declarations of McGill, when an independent investigation would have shown that one of the named patents did not include the fasteners in the labeled boxes? Without considering the question whether a licensee can always be at liberty to follow, with impunity, the advice or suggestions of the patentee in regard to stamps upon articles claimed to have been patented, without an independent investigation, in this case McGill had not only taken out many patents upon this class of articles, but he was reputed to be a patent solicitor, and he certainly drew some of his own patents. The confidence which the defendant’s manager placed in him, and which led to an adoption of the labels without personal examination of the patents, cannot be considered adequate evidence of the carelessness or recklessness in regard to representations which constitute fraud. The plaintiff offered in evidence the file-wrappers and contents of letters patent Nos. 162,183, 162,184, 286,143, and 308,368. The file-wrap