5 Barb. 73 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1848
Where administration is granted upon the same estate, in different states, what are the principles upon which the administration is to be governed ? This inquiry has been much discussed and ably considered by the most eminent jurists of our country. All agree that it involves considerations equally delicate and difficult. It seems now to be settled, at least in this country, that the administration of the assets of a deceased person is to be governed by the laws of the state authorizing such administration. “ The ground upon which this doctrine has been established,” says Mr. Justice Story, “ is, that every nation has a right to dispose of all the property actually situate within it, so as to protect itself and its citizens against the inequalities of foreign laws which are injurious to their interests.” (Story’s Conflict of Laws, §§ 524, 525.)
The subject was very fully examined and discussed by Chief Justice Parker, in Dawes v. Head, (3 Pick. 128.) In that case Thomas Stewart had died at Calcutta, insolvent, and leaving a will which had been duly proved in the country where the testator had his domicil at the time of his death. Having property at the time of his death, in Massachusetts, letters of administration with the will annexed were granted in that state, to Head. The question considered in that case was, whether the funds collected in Massachusetts should be appropriated to the payment of such debts as might be regularly proved there, although it had been made to appear that the whole estate was insufficient to pay all the debts, and that the effects there were wanted by the executor abroad to enable him duly to administer the estate. “ What shall be done,” the learned judge emphatically inquires, “ to avoid on the one hand the injustice of taking the whole funds for the use of our
The same doctrine has been established in Pennsylvania; (Mothland v. Wiseman, 3 Penn. Rep. 185 ; Case of Miller's estate, 3 Rawle, 312;) also in South Carolina; (Topham v. Chapman, 1 Const. Rep. S. C. 292.) The general rule, as derived from all the cases on the subject, seems to be, that the effects of a deceased person are to be administered under the authority of the local jurisdiction in which they are situated ; and that in such administration respect should be had to the^ aggregate amount of the estate, and debts foreign and domestic. (See Heirs of Porter v. Heydock, 6 Verm. Rep. 374; Harvey v. Richards, 1 Mason, 381; Doolittle v. Lewis, 7 John. Ch. 49.)
It is true that in the cases to which I have referred, and indeed in all the cases I have examined in reference to this subject, the question arose upon what is called the auxiliary or ancillary administration. But I understand the terms, principal and auxiliary administrations, to be used as indicating the objects of the different administrations, and not any distinction in law as to the rights of the parties. Each administration, whether granted in the state of the deceased person’s domicil or
I am aware that a distinction has been supposed to exist between the proceeds of real estate sold for the payment of debts and the proceeds of personal estate. The general rule in respect to the latter is that it follows the person of the owner, and must be governed by the law of the place where he has his domicil, while the title to real estate and the disposition of it, is exclusively regulated by the law of the place where it is situated. Accordingly it is said by Justice Story, (Confl. of Laws, § 523,) that if an administrator sells real estate for the payment of debts, pursuant to the authority given him under the local laws reisitce, he is not responsible for the proceeds, as assets, in any other state, but they are to be disposed of, and accounted for, solely in the place, and in the manner, pointed out in the local laws. But I do not think this principle affects the question under consideration. It is admitted that the proceeds of the real estate sold in New Jersey must be disposed of according to
Suppose the converse of the facts as they are presented here liad been the case—that the defendants had not proved their debts in New-York so. as, to entitle themselves to receive their share of the funds raised hem; and that the plaintiff, after having established bis debt and received his dividends here, had also proved his debt ip New Jersey and claimed to share equally with the defendants there : would any one doubt the power of the ^ourt there to pay the defendants their full share of the estate, having reference to the. assets, and the debts in both states ? Davis v. Estey, (8 Pick. 475,). was such a case. Administration had been granted upon the estate of David Hicks, in Vermont, where he resided at the time of his death. The estate was insolvent, and the time prescribed by law for proving debts against it had expired. Davis, having received no notice of the proceedings, had not presented- his claim.