517 N.E.2d 984 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1986
Appellants, James Lawrence, Kathy Essik and Bobby Jett, were classified civil service employees of the Edwin Shaw Hospital, a county hospital in Summit County, prior to October 4, 1984. Effective on October 4, 1984, R.C.
They appealed their layoffs to the State Personnel Board of Review. The board ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the layoff appeals as appellants were unclassified civil service employees. The court of common pleas affirmed the decision of the board of review.
Appellants advance the following assignments of error:
"I. The common pleas court erred in its finding that the Personnel Board of Review's decision was in accordance with law because R.C.
"II. The common pleas court erred in finding that the Personnel Board of Review's decision was in accordance with law because R.C.
"III. The common pleas court erred in finding that the Personnel Board of Review's decision was in accordance with law because reliance on R.C.
"IV. The common pleas court erred in finding that the Personnel Board of Review's decision was in accordance with law because R.C.
In the first assignment of error, appellants contend that R.C.
In this case, R.C.
The United States Supreme Court stated in Penn Central Transp.Co. v. New York (1978),
Although appellants are no longer entitled to receive those benefits and protections they previously enjoyed as classified employees, the legislative amendment to R.C.
The Ohio Supreme Court has defined a taking of property as "* * * any substantial interference with the elemental rights growing out of ownership of private property * * *." Smith v. Erie Rd.Co. (1938),
The "taking clause" has never been applied by Ohio courts to the circumstances in this case. Appellants had no ownership of property in the statutory benefits and protection provided them while classified civil service employees within the scope of the "taking clause" as incorporated by the Fourteeth Amendment or under Section
Therefore, appellants' first assignment of error is not well-taken.
In the second assignment of error, appellants assert that the amendment, R.C.
As a basic proposition, the rights conferred by statute are not contractual by their nature and consequently do not preclude subsequent modification or abrogation. The United States Supreme Court in National RR. Pass. Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka Santa FeRy. Co. (1985),
"* * * For many decades, this Court has maintained that absent some clear indication that the legislature intends to bind itself contractually, the presumption is that `a law is not intended to create private contractual or vested rights but merely declares a policy to be pursued until the legislature shall ordain otherwise.' * * *"
The court further noted that it is:
"* * * [A] well-established presumption * * * that the principal function of a legislature is not to make contracts, but to make laws that establish the policy of the state. * * * Policies, unlike contracts, are inherently subject to revision and repeal, and to construe laws as contracts when the obligation is not clearly and unequivocally expressed would be to limit drastically the essential powers of a legislative body. * * *"Id. at 466.
Further, the Supreme Court has also held that the party who asserts that a state law created contractual rights has the burden of overcoming the presumption that a contract does not arise out of a legislative enactment. As the court stated inDodge v. Bd. of Edn. of Chicago (1937),
Accordingly, an examination of the language of R.C.
An examination of R.C.
While appellants were afforded the above-stated statutory benefits and protections, and procedural due process as classified public employees, these benefits nevertheless were not contractual rights. R.C.
Appellants have also failed to present any evidence to support their assertion that the appellants had an employment contract with Edwin Shaw Hospital. Since appellants have not demonstrated that any written or oral contract of employment existed between appellants and Edwin Shaw Hospital, the amended statute could not have impaired the obligations of any alleged contract between the parties as none was shown to exist.
Accordingly, appellants' second assignment of error is not well-taken.
Appellants contend in the third and fourth assignments of error that the board's reliance on R.C.
Appellants emphasize Loudermill, supra, to support their claim that their individual rights of due process were violated. InLoudermill, a classified civil service employee was dismissed from his position without notice or a prior opportunity to respond to charges made against him. The court noted that a property interest is not created by the Constitution but is derived from an independent source, such as state law. The parties agreed that there were property rights in continued employment under R.C.
The issue before the court in Loudermill was whether the legislature, which conferred the property interest in public employment, could also define the procedures to be fulfilled to protect such an interest. The court concluded that all the process due under the Ohio statutes was "* * * a pretermination opportunity to respond, coupled with post-termination administrative procedures as provided by the Ohio statute. * * *"Loudermill, supra, at 547-548.
This case is distinguishable on the facts from Loudermill. It does not involve a situation where public employees were laid off or dismissed while still employed as classified civil service employees. Appellants were unclassified at the time of their layoffs. In sum, appellants were not laid off prior to the amendment of the statute where the failure to provide notice and an opportunity to respond as set forth in Loudermill would have violated Ohio statutes and their constitutional guarantee of due process.
Appellants' property interest was derived from the statutory protections and benefits of R.C. Chapter 124. This "property interest" only existed for as long as appellants were included under the classified civil service. Thus, at the time of the layoffs, appellants no longer had a property interest in continued public employment and, therefore, no due process rights attached. Consequently, appellant's due process argument is not well-taken.
Appellants' in their third assignment of error assert that the board's reliance on R.C.
The Ohio Supreme Court in Rairden v. Holden (1864),
Appellants did not have a vested right in retaining their status as classified civil service employees. At the time the amendment was enacted, R.C.
This case is not one where classified employees were laid off, an appeal was then filed with the board and, subsequently, the statute was amended, based upon which the board refused to hear the appeal of the appellants. Under such circumstances, it could be argued that the employees' rights had vested at the time of the layoff prior to the amendment and, hence, the employees were entitled to have their appeal heard before the board. Appellants were unclassified as of October 4, 1984 and, subsequently, received notice of their layoffs almost nine and one-half months later on July 17, 1985. Thus, the amendment neither removed nor impaired vested rights acquired under existing statutes.
Moreover, it is apparent that the legislature intended to declassify all county hospital employees at the time the statute was amended. The purpose of the amended statute would be circumvented if only those county hospital employees hired after October 4, 1984 were unclassified, while all county hospital employees hired prior to the amendment would indefinitely remain classified civil service employees unless they violated R.C.
Therefore, appellants' third assignment of error is not well-taken.
In appellant's fourth assignment of error, they contend that the amended statute which excluded county hospital employees from the classified civil service, while still including other public hospital employees, violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the Ohio and United States Constitutions. Appellants assert that there is no reasonable basis for the distinction between the two groups and, thus, the arbitrary classification is invalid.Clifford v. Daugherty (1980),
R.C.
"Such physicians, nurses, and other employees may be suspended or removed by the administrator or his *142 designee at any time when the welfare of such institution warrants suspension or removal. * * *"
The amendment to R.C.
Appellants' fourth assignment of error is not well-taken.
For the foregoing reasons, appellant's assignments of error are overruled, and the judgment of the court of common pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
STRAUSBAUGH and MCCORMAC, JJ., concur.