Lawrence v. Clackamas CountyLawrence v. Clackamas County
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Petitioner seeks review of a final order of the Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA) that affirmed the denial of her application for verification of a go-kart track as a nonconforming use. We reverse and remand for reconsideration.
The following facts are not in dispute. Petitioner owns property outside of Damascus, Oregon. On that property, she maintains a single-family home, an auto repair business, and a quarter-mile-loop go-kart race track known as “Damascus Rev N’ Ride.” Petitioner’s predecessors opened that track to public use in 1960. In 1964, the county enacted a zoning ordinance that declared the track an unlawful use. The owners continued to operate the track at least until 1968. Petitioner purchased the property in 1971 and operated the track from that date on.
Petitioner’s operation of the track has generated a number of complaints from the neighboring residents and has been the subject of several enforcement actions. In 1998, in response to one of those enforcement actions, petitioner filed an application seeking verification that the track is a protected nonconforming use. The planning director denied the application. According to the director, a nonconforming use may continue as long as it is not abandoned or interrupted for more than a year. In this case, the director found, petitioner failed to establish that the track continued to operate between 1968 and 1970.
Petitioner appealed. The hearings officer permitted petitioner to submit additional evidence but stated that he would accord “considerable deference” to the director’s findings and would not, in the absence of compelling reasons, allow petitioner “to bolster an appeal with evidence [she] did not submit to the Planning Director.” Petitioner argued to the hearings officer that she had established that she had used the go-kart track for the preceding 10 years and that, under
Petitioner sought review before LUBA. Among other things, petitioner argued that the hearings officer committed two errors: (1) in failing to construe correctly the effect of the presumption created by
We begin with petitioner’s arguments concerning the statutory presumption.
“For purposes of verification of a [nonconforming] use * * *, a county may adopt procedures that allow an applicant for verification to prove the existence, continuity, nature and extent of the use only for the 10-year period immediately preceding the date of application. Evidence proving the existence, continuity, nature and extent of the use for the 10-year period preceding application creates a rebuttable presumption that the use, as proven, lawfully existed at the time the applicable zoning ordinance or regulation was adopted and has continued uninterrupted until the date of application!.]”
Petitioner argues that, because it is uncontested that she has established the existence, continuity, nature, and extent of *466 the use of her property for the operation of the go-kart business for the 10-year period preceding her verification application, she is entitled to the statutory rebuttable presumption of continuity. The nature of “rebuttable presumptions,” she argues, is such that the burden shifts to the opponent — in this case, the county — to establish by a preponderance of evidence that there was no such continuity. LUBA erred, she concludes, in holding that something less than a preponderance of the evidence is required to rebut the statutory presumption.
The county argues that, whether or not the hearings officer misapplied
At the outset, we note that the county is incorrect in arguing that whatever legal errors that may have occurred during the hearing are irrelevant if the hearings officer’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence review refers to the review of a decision maker’s findings of fact.
We turn then to the nature of the presumption imposed by
OEC 308 provides:
“In civil actions and proceedings, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of proving that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable than its existence.”
The 1981 Legislative Commentary makes clear that, in enacting OEC 308,
“[t]he Legislative Assembly rejected the so-called “bursting bubble’ theory under which a presumption vanishes on the introduction of evidence contrary to the presumed fact, even though the evidence may not be credible.”
Legislative Commentary to OEC 308, reprinted in Kirkpatrick, Oregon Evidence at 71-72. The Commentary described several reasons for the decision, among them that “the considerations of fairness, policy and probability which underlie the creation of presumptions, are not satisfied by giving them any lesser effect.” Id. at 72. The Commentary concludes with the admonition that “[a]ll presumptions, whether legislatively or judicially created, must be treated in the manner prescribed in this section.” Id.
The legislature has enacted numerous statutes using the terms “presumption” or “rebuttable presumption” without expressly defining what those terms mean.
See, e.g.,
Since the enactment of OEC 308, courts have uniformly concluded that such statutory references refer to the Morgan view of presumptions, that is to say, the presumption stands unless rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence.
See, e.g., Massee and Massee,
328 Or 195, 204, 970 P2d 1203 (1999) (applying OEC 308 to the presumption of equal contribution provided in
When the legislature intends to apply a presumption different from the one described in OEC 308, it says so.
See, e.g.,
Strictly speaking, OEC 308 does not apply to administrative proceedings. OEC 101. Nevertheless, because of its broad applicability, the rule definitely has had an effect on the legislature’s use of the term “rebuttable presumption” generally. It is clear from reviewing the other statutes that the term has acquired a well-defined legal meaning, which the courts consistently have endorsed. In that light, it
*469
becomes highly probable that when the legislature used the same term in
We turn to petitioner’s argument that LUBA erred in concluding that the hearings officer effectively conducted a
de novo
hearing. The county concedes that, under
Reversed and remanded with instructions to remand to Clackamas County.