*1 174 in the asserting not from the defects township estopped trustees is of
board
v.
rel.
fiscal officer. See State ex
Steele
township
presented
petition
(relators’
355,
Conclusion requisite have not established foregoing, Based relators to a writ mandamus to they are entitled convincing clear and evidence adopt pursuant Beaver Board of resolution Township Trustees compel 504.01(A)(4) Board of Elections to submit causing Mahoning County home- should a limited question township adopt electors of whether consequently deny the writ. government. rule
Writ denied. Lundberg O’Connor, C.J., Cupp, Stratton, O’Donnell, Lanzinger, Brown, JJ., concur. McGee J., dissents.
Pfeifer, Mendenhall, Mendenhall, Inc., for Law and Warner D. Office Warner relators. Gains, Attorney, DeGenova Mahoning County Prosecuting
Paul J. and Gina Bricker, Prosecuting Attorney, respondent. Assistant City Appellee. Youngstown,
Lawrence, Appellant,
v.
Youngstown,
v.
[Cite
174,
claim or in participated a proceeding under the workers’ act compensation for an injury or occupational disease that in occurred the course of arising out of employment. R.C. 4123.90. That places statute certain time-specific obligations on a discharged employee who wishes to sue an employer for him discharging or filing her for a workers’ compensation claim. In particular, the provides statute that no may retaliation claim be maintained unless the employer receives written notice of the alleged violation of the statute from the employee within the 90 days immediately following the “discharge.” Lawrence, Keith the employee case, in was suspended from his
position
and, therefore,
with the city
was not working when the city discharged
him. He now alleges that he did not learn he had been discharged until almost
six weeks after the date
city
claims the discharge occurred. The trial court
accepted this allegation as true for purposes of its analysis, but it
ruled
allegation
to,
was not relevant
and did not delay
of,
the commencement
the 90-
day period “immediately following the discharge” for the employer to receive
written notice of the employee’s claim that his discharge had been retaliatory
under R.C.
court,
4123.90. The trial
therefore, found
Lawrence’s
notice
letter untimely. The court
appeals
affirmed. Lawrence v.
7th
Youngstown,
189,
Dist. No. 09 MA
“discharge” R.C. 4123.90. We hold that in general, “discharge” R.C. 4123.90 means the date that the employer issued the notice of employment termination, not the employee’s receipt of that or the date the employee discovered that he or might she have a claim for relief under the Nevertheless, statute. we reverse judgment of the court of appeals because the facts of this may case require an exception general rule.
I. Facts and History Procedural Because this case presents a narrow question of statutory interpretation, we focus on only those facts essential to our resolution of the certified issue. That can issue be resolved without resort many underlying factual matters extensively detailed the parties’ briefs. 2007, January 7, city Youngstown, suspended appel- appellee, On Two
lant, Lawrence, position city. from his pay Keith without contains a letter later, city Lawrence’s record employment. terminated Lawrence, him city advising by the addressed to dated prepared date. which was to be effective that same employment, of the termination his sent offices city departments indicates that were to various copies This letter did a certified of the letter city copy to Lawrence’s union. The not send not learn of until now asserts he did his Lawrence. Lawrence April attorney stating On Lawrence’s sent intended an action unlawful workers’ bring alleging racial retaliation under 4123.90 and discrimination. day.
letter the next *3 complaint city Mahoning County Lawrence his the against filed {¶ 7} 6, 2007, under July alleging Pleas Court on retaliation Common 4123.90, the support allegations regarding racial discrimination. In asserted that Lawrence had a workers’ claim complaint compensation filed city unlawfully filing. the and that his termination was related to the against city years had filed claim when working Lawrence for the earlier. city summary hearing, The for After a a judgment. moved
{¶ 8} summary on magistrate judgment granted city determined that should be to the 4123.90, claims. Lawrence’s As to the relevant claim under R.C. the workers’ statute, antiretaliation the construed facts magistrate disputed the in favor of and assumed that he not become his discharge Lawrence had aware of However, until 2007. the concluded that magistrate operative the 9, 2007, starting 90-day date for the notification was the date the Lawrence, show it city’s possible records terminated Lawrence’s was delayed awareness of the termination not relevant. Thus, magistrate, 90-day the letter from Law- according 9, 2007, by city needed to be the for notice to be by April
rence received the statutorily compliant. magistrate notify- determined that Lawrence’s claim, ing city the retaliation had impending April Therefore, meet requirement. magistrate failed to R.C. 4123.90’s the jurisdiction. concluded court had no addition, claim magistrate the reviewed the R.C. 4123.90 retaliation and, ground merits independent granting summary judgment
on the as an claim, genuine as to the found that had failed to city establish racial- magistrate of material fact. The then reviewed merits of the issue claim failed to a genuine discrimination and found Lawrence had establish claim, magistrate Finally, of material fact on that too. considered issue additional grounds offered support summary of its motion for judgment and found for grounds on those as well. Lawrence filed timely objections magistrate’s The trial decision.
court objections, overruled the and in a short judgment entry magis- made the court, trate’s decision the judgment of the that “even determining construing Lawrence, evidence in favor of Youngstown judgment is entitled as matter of law” on the claims. Laiorence, The Seventh District Appeals Court of affirmed. 2011-Ohio- ¶ 2011 WL 7. conflict, As to the sole issue in this certified court
held that R.C. 4123.90’s notice period begins on the date of actual ¶ Therefore, not notice of at Id. 33. court appellate determined that the trial court jurisdiction had no over the retaliation claim because Lawrence’s notice to his was received than “ninety days more ¶ immediately following discharge.” R.C. at 4123.90. Id. 5. 12(A)(1)(c) appeals The court of App.R. under then declined to address
as moot three other assignments claim, of error regarding the retaliation which challenged the trial court’s alternative conclusion that the claim also failed on the ¶ merits. Id. at 37. appellate court then affirmed the grant summary judgment to the city on the merits of the racial-discrimination claim. Id. at 58. Finally, the appellate court declined to address moot several additional assignments of error challenging the trial grant court’s of summary judgment. ¶ 63, Id. at The court appeals certified that its decision regarding meaning *4 in
“discharge”
R.C. 4123.90 conflicted with
of Mechling v. K-Mart
(11th
Corp.,
Ohio App.3d
Dist.1989),
court of
R.C. 4123.90 requires the action to be filed within one
eighty
hundred
days “immediately
demotion;
following
discharge,
reassignment, or
punitive action taken” and requires the
receive written notice
appellate
recognized
1. The
court
running
the certified-confliet cases involved the start of the
suit,
time limit of R.C. 4123.90 for the
to file
but reasoned that
the same
question
presented
jurisdictional
basic
here because both time limits are
and the time limitations
“discharge.”
of both turn on the definition of
complaint
days
Lawrence filed his
within 180
so there is no issue in this case
regarding
running
the start of the
time limit of R.C. 4123.90.
“immediately following the
ninety
within
of the claimed violation
Does the
demotion,
action taken.”
punitive
or
reassignment,
discharge,
to run on the
begin
mean the time limits
of the statute
quoted portion
4123.95’sdirective
considering
or when
date of
effective
to run
begin
the time limits
4123.90 mean
construction does R.C.
liberal
discharge?
notice of
upon receiving
128 Ohio St.3d Analysis
II. provides: demote, any punitive take reassign, or discharge, shall No filed a claim or because the against any employee action instituted, in under the workers’ any proceedings or testified pursued occurred or disease which injury occupational act for an Any employment employer. out of his arising the course of and county common court of the may pleas file an action such shall be may granted the relief which be of such which employment upon if the action is based pay, to reinstatement with back limited demotion, upon reassign- if based wages or an award for lost discharge, ment, taken, subsequent discharge, by earnings or action offset punitive taken, demotion, payments action reassignment, punitive or plus 4141. of the Revised Code Chapter to section 4123.56 and pursuant forever barred unless filed attorney fees. The action shall be reasonable discharge, days immediately following eighty within one hundred taken, demotion, may and no action be or action reassignment, punitive has received written notice or maintained unless the instituted immedi- ninety days within the paragraph a claimed violation demotion, action reassignment, punitive or ately following taken. added.)
(Emphasis
*5
matter,
appellate
not taken issue with the
an initial
Lawrence has
As
{¶ 17}
“manda
of R.C. 4123.90 is
requirement
that the
notice
court’s conclusion
¶
Lawrence,
R.C.
liberally
that it could not
it stated
employees,”
construed in favor of
liberally
statute,”
would be “to
4123.90,
because to do so
“unambiguous
an
construe R.C.
¶
Id. at
31. See
dischargé.”
word
‘notice of
front
add the words
¶
(because
2495659,
time
Gribbons,
that the
does
limiting
Lawrence, 2011-Ohio-
to
4123.90.
apply
of action—should not
R.C.
has a cause
Parham,
Lawyers emphasize when, deciding the whim of an “vary depending worker’s to rights ask this whether, They of his or her termination.” notify or even 4123.95, provide liberally, by 4123.90 as directed R.C. interpret court begins 4123.90 when an becomes 90-day period of R.C. not on the date notes, reiterates, that he does not seek and his amicus Lawrence only when the 90-day period running discovery rule starts expansive motivated may have been aware that employee becomes Rather, equitable seeks a narrower retaliation. Lawrence to mean the date that the in R.C. 4123.90 ruling interprets “discharge” asserts is ruling receives word of the justified by R.C. 4123.95. gives 4123.90 the em- provision of R.C. 90-day employer-notice time to small window of
ployee relatively *6 employee pursue the will a claim for retaliatory discharge based on a workers’ compensation filing. Obviously, employee cannot contemplate sending such a employee letter until the that knows he or she has been discharged. As noted in however, oral argument, the date of actual discharge and the that date the employee same, is notified of it normally are and that ordinarily date starts of 90-day period R.C. 4123.90. Usually, an employer will make a good-faith effort to communicate fact of the employee’s discharge to the employee when it occurs or within a reasonable like time thereafter. The employer commonly will use method notification, personal notice, delivery letter, hand or a certified all of which are designed to effectively communicate reasonably notice An promptly. employee expect would to be informed of the employer’s decision to discharge within a reasonable time that after decision. We therefore conclude R.C. 4123.90, when in conjunction viewed materia, R.C. 4123.95 and in pari read places an implicit affirmative responsibility on an employer provide employ- its ee employee’s notice discharge within a reasonable time after discharge occurs in order to avoid impeding the discharged employee’s 90-day notification obligation under A R.C. 4123.90. reasonable time for an employer to inform an employee of a discharge is an inquiry dependent on the facts of each situation. A delay of days several would not prevent the 90-day period for the employer to receive notification from the employee from to run commencing on the discharge date. Our conclusion that an employer should reasonably prompt
notice of a discharge to an employee for R.C. purposes 4123.90 does not burden employers and is not unreasonable. employees Some allege who compensation retaliation, for example, may not be at their workplace due to work-related injuries for periods. considerable Without reasonably prompt no- tice of discharge, an employee may affected have unwarranted difficulty providing the required notice letter to the employer within the 90-day period, or the 90-day time period may already elapsed before the becomes or should have become aware of the employee’s discharge. We do not perceive this responsibility to any occasion onerous Rather, burden on an employer. it is something rationally from flows the act of of an employee. anticipate recognition our responsibility will have limited application. Even if an employer does not communicate the discharge time, within a reasonable if the employee nonetheless becomes other- wise aware of or should have become of it in exercise due diligence time, within a reasonable then the period of 90 must still be counted from the actual discharge date. materia, it evident we find pari 4123.95 4123.90 and Reading R.C. employee’s awareness of the anticipates employee’s 90-day period rule general exception a limited
Consequently, employee’s from the violation runs 4123.90 alleged of an *7 for The prerequisites purpose. with the statute’s keeping is discharge actual fact of his aware of the not become that an does are exception not have occurs and could discharge the time after within reasonable discharge diligence. exercise of due time the within a reasonable discharge of the learned met, for the 90-day the time are prerequisites those When discharge violated claim employee’s notice of the receive written aware of becomes of the date that the on the earlier 4123.90 commences of the should have become or the date the discharge the discharge. case, the trial fully adopted by in this later magistrate’s analysis of Lawrence and evidence favor
court, conflicting began by interpreting and did not informed of his termination that Lawrence had not been assumed to him. On this asserts it mailed city receive the termination any face-to- record, the absence of evidence interpretation supported by termination, and there is no indication notification of the face or other oral Thus, city definitively did not to Lawrence. city sent a certified letter reasonably prompt notification. demonstrate that he did thus Lawrence’s assertion magistrate accepted 19, 2007, days after until which was discharge aware of his
become starting discharge maintains that the occurred Therefore, 90-day half of the nearly issue.2 analyzing the certified point have Lawrence first knew or should already elapsed by the time period may have here, circumstances we the confluence of discharge. known of his Under alleged Lawrence’s notice of timely have city may conclude that the may after Lawrence which the received 58 retaliatory discharge, learned of the
III. Conclusion in R.C. reasons, general, “discharge” that in all the above we hold For of employment issued the notice date that 4123.90 means the or the date of of that notice termination, employee’s receipt of the not the date discharge was irrelevant awareness of his court determined that Lawrence’s 2. Because the trial any statutory of the running period, trial court did not consider the start of the of the (or communication) fact of the regarding employer’s lack of particulars communication through other means. some of Lawrence’s awareness to Lawrence or issue, upon type explored a remand to to be matters of that are our resolution of the certified Given eventually in this case. a remand occur the trial court should such of an But employee’s discovery R.C. 4123.90 cause of action. because of the exception recognize today, limited we Lawrence’s may notification letter received, timely have been and the of the court of judgment appeals on the issue we address must be reversed. We therefore remand the cause to the court of appeals to address those assignments error determined to be moot and not addressed.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded. Lundberg O’Connor, C.J., JJ., and McGee Pfeifer, Stratton, Brown, concur. J., concurs in judgment only.
Lanzinger, J., dissents.
O’Donnell,
Lanzinger, J., concurring. I in judgment, concur explicitly adopt discovery but would a rule.
{¶ 31} view, my the definition of “discharge” the word implies the statute that the employee will of the termination of employment. employment know The relation- one-sided, is not ship notes, and as the it majority opinion is not difficult for the employer notify employee its that his or her services are no longer needed. Face-to-face notification obviously unnecessary, is for certified mail will provide adequate proof of the fact of discharge. There is no need to a establish “limited to a exception” general rule as
{¶ 32} the majority does here. The adopted cases, standard in other discovery “knew or known,” here, should have should apply and the time limits in R.C. 4123.90 should to run until begin known, the employee is, knows or should have is notified, of discharge. J., dissenting.
O’Donnell, I Respectfully, dissent. majority and concurring opinions stretch far perform the work of Assembly the General and as a consequence have offered two different views of why today’s how and decision reverses the court of appeals and remands the cause. a establishes cause of action against employer for
retaliating against an employee because the sought compensa- tion benefits or in a participated proceeding provided for by the workers’ act, compensation but the statute bars the claim “unless the has received written notice of a claimed violation of within the ninety [R.C. 4123.90]
183 demotion, or reassignment, punitive discharge, following days immediately taken.” action conflict from decision this case as a certified accepted being claims for those who assert District Appellate
Seventh having filed workers’ retaliation wrongfully discharged from the date the claim within 90 notice of give claim must to receive notice date the claimed not from the from the here, then, runs is whether At issue action, it or whether employment or other adverse date of the effective that action from receives notice of after the only commences employer. in R.C. 4123.90 ‘discharge’ that “in majority acknowledges general, termination, employment the notice of issued
means the date
employee discovered
of that notice or the date the
employee’s receipt
not the
position
statute.” This
a claim for relief under the
might
he or she
state,
decisions from the
including
in this
weight
authority
supported by
Court of
Ninth,
as well as the Sixth Circuit
Appellate
and Tenth
Districts
Eighth,
84212,
Inc.,
2004-
See,
8th Dist. No.
Orthopedic,
v. Acor
Appeals.
e.g., Gribbons
¶
Stores, Inc.,
Dist.
2495659, 17-18;
9th
Ohio-5872,
Parham v. Jo-Ann
2004 WL
3757403, 20;
v. Navistar
24749,
and crafts limited occurs discharge time after the discharge fact of his within a reasonable of the in a time within reasonable and could not have learned diligence.” exercise due warranted, reasonably a view, is not because my exception this action employment to discover an adverse should be able
diligent employee if com- even it period, statutory requirements meet for all starting point This is a common-sense on the date of mences created that will be exceptions the limitless number claims and eliminates legislative policy. out thought to alter this well majority today decision crafted decide, to find not interpret to simply Our role ought legislate. ways to reach And, here, conclusions we like or to avoid harsh results. when law, we do not follow the we have no law. case, tellingly, Most Lawrence did receive notice of his
and could have notified his within the 90-day period limitations statute, prescribed but he did not do so. He knew he had filed claims for and 2001 while previously employed by the city of Youngstown; he knew employees that —unlike other had been re- —he quired to sign pre-employment agreement one-year serve a probationary 2006; before the city would rehire him in and he knew that suspended him without pay Thus, when Youngstown fired him two days commenced, later and the 90-day period he already had notice of most of the operative facts on which he relies to show retaliation. Even on 2007, when he termination, claims have first discovered his Lawrence still had 49 days his employer with written notice of his claim. although And a complaint he filed for discrimination with Rights the Civil Commission day fired, learning he had been he waited more than 50 after days to send the giving notice of his claim for retaliation. I Accordingly, would analysis follow the and conclusions of Eighth,
Ninth, Districts, and Tenth and I would the judgment of the Seventh affirm District Court of I Appeals. therefore respectfully dissent from today’s majority decision to reverse it. Co.,
Martin L.P.A., S. Hume Hume, and Martin S. for appellant. Mitchell,
Harrington, Ltd., & Hoppe Schor, and Neil D. for appellee. The Gittes Law Group, Gittes, Frederick Vardaro, M. Jeffrey P. urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Employment Lawyers Association. Kilby County
The State
v. Summit
ex rel.
Board of
et
Elections
al.
Kilby
Cty.
[Cite as State ex rel.
v. Summit
Elections,
Bd. of
Ohio St.3d