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Lawrence E. Anthony, Jr. v. Btr Automotive Sealing Systems, Inc.
339 F.3d 506
6th Cir.
2003
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 strate that “counsel’s errors were serious deprive

enough proceeding of a [him]

the result of which was reliable.” Glenn

Tate, clearly prejudiced by

Barnes was his coun- investigate

sel’s failure to con- medical present

dition evidence of that condi-

tion when it would likely have raised a guilt.

reasonable doubt about Barnes’ For reasons, foregoing I respectfully dis-

sent. ANTHONY, Jr.,

Lawrence E.

Plaintiff-Appellant,

BTR AUTOMOTIVE SEALING

SYSTEMS, INC., Defendant-

Appellee.

No. 01-6028.

United Appeals, States Court of

Sixth Circuit.

Argued Dec. Aug.

Decided and Filed *2 forth,

the reasons set this court AFFIRMS the district court. Background

Factual *3 Jr., Anthony, Plaintiff Lawrence E. age black male over the forty, was hired age defendant at the Be- nineteen. school, yond high Anthony attended University of ap- Tennessee at Martin for proximately year one employ- before his ment with the defendant. Anthony Stephen Hyder. (argued Talbert possess not a college degree or Certified briefed), TN, Maryville, Plaintiff-Ap- for Quality Engineer “CQE” status. pellant. Sealing Defendant BTR Automotive Deakins, Jr., (“BTR”)1

Homer L. Robert Systems, Incorporated 0. Sands manufac- briefed), Deakins, (argued and Ogletree, automobiles, tures door seals pri- for new Nash, Stewart, Atlanta, Smoak & Georgia, marily “Big sold to the Three” automobile Defendant-Appellee. for Motors, makers —General Ford Chrysler. historically BTR has had three CLAY, Before: COLE and operations mixing plant on site: BERTELSMAN, Judges; Senior District plant2 extrusion located within one Judge.* building, finishing plant3 and the located a yards away. few Each of the opera- three OPINION separate tions had laboratories. BERTELSMAN, Judge. District Anthony appeals grant of summary Jr., Plaintiff Anthony, ap- Lawrence E. judgment to BTR on his claims that BTR’s peals the district grant summary court’s promote refusal to him separate on four judgment to defendant on Anthony’s discriminatory occasions was based on his claims for race and discrimination age.4 un- race and appeals grant He also der Title VII of the Civil Act summary of of judgment by the district court seg., U.S.C. 2000e et Age days four before trial because that time Discrimination in Employment Act of already expended he had money on wit- 621 et seq., U.S.C. per ness diem and service fees for the and the Tennessee Human Rights Act. trial.' For

* Bertelsman, The Honorable finishing plant William O. Senior The is where extruded mate- coated, Judge United together, States District rials are taken for the Eastern and molded Kentucky, sitting secondary operations performed District and various by designation. prior packaging shipment for to the cus- 1. BTR has been sold and is known now as tomer. Systems. Metzeler Automotive Profile 4. At the Anthony district court level also plant In the compounds extrusion after raw sought relief for claims of discrimination for together raw materials are blended at the adverse actions related to his rubber, mixing plant to form the rubber com- pay. pay The district court found the pound through run dye. is an extrusion This were barred for failure include them in his subjects pressure. the rubber to heat and The Anthony appeal EEOC action. did product primarily final ruling. door seals. performed Anthony maintains that he all long-time that he was argues supervisory nonsupervisory duties work good BTR with a employee of faithful supervi- laboratory when there was no day record, missing never including Massey was transferred. Antho- sor twenty- During his being tardy. work or Moore, Denny ny submitted resume BTR, twenty- spent he years seven manager, the human resources laboratory years quality in the two Massey’s position. Moore told Massey. of Debbie supervision posi- fill looking BTR was not that, in his em- early Anthony maintains and, laboratory supervisor as a in- tion president then-vice ployment, BTR’s stead, wanted to fill it with someone who McManus, a John operations, technical or who had technical decree. College graduate from National Wilham, job given to Tim *4 London, taught in Polymer Technology forty. He white male the did from notebooks. directly class Anthony college degree not have a and was not. a jury have been contends a should Anthony began for BTR CQE. working Wilham as a early experi- to hear how this permitted supervisor in December production “set the Anthony’s employment ence in for loyalty and enthusiasm tone” for his assigned In Wilham had been to during company mixing plant. in the supervisor as a work in- he was demonstrates that ultimately plant objected mixing employees The to promotions. for the qualified deed previous a presence because of Wilham’s include: promotions The at issue four BTR and the union arrangement between 1997; (1) in late job to Tim Wilham given a supervisor ássigned a would not be to (2) in June job to Mark Ledbetter given employees. particular group of J.W. this (3) in to Abston 1998; job given Leann Burton, operations manager, and Ter- 1998; (4) job given to December of Brosi, manager, conceded to ry general August in 1999. The Rusty Kreyling re- employees’ request for Wilham’s promotion facts of each follow. moval, not to was determined be which fault Because through any of Wilham. given Tim Wilham The to promotion experienced supervisor an was Wilham laboratory su- Massey, In Debbie BTR, to termi- company did not want super- plant and pervisor of the extrusion BTR, Brosi According him. to nate com- Anthony, transferred to the visor Massey’s Wilham to for- assigned Burton Rockford, Massey Maryland office. pany’s laboratory supervisor position as a mer from the degree place put had a of Science Bachelor there was no other because only tempo- additional was University of Tennessee with an him. This considered until another rary placement for Wilham chemistry psy- in year of education him. was available for position Antho- supervising In addition to chology. employ- supervised other

ny, Massey two neither Wilham nor testified that Moore plant finishing ees in and extrusion position. qualified for the Anthony was Anthony responsibili- no had laboratories. the pro- Burton made Brosi and plant. finishing ties in While pe- initial After Wilham’s motion decision. primarily performing was lab tests company laboratory, in the decid- riod lines, covering Massey was extrusion out and that to work going ed it was not locations, including a few variety duties Within qualified. in was Wilham another finishing po- as well he was transferred materials as months incoming sition. plant. promotion given to Mark lab. supervising Ledbetter the extrusion CQE Abston was a who had em- been After Wilham was moved out of the ployed by BTR since October 1991 in vari- BTR it determined position, maintains quality engineer/supervisor positions ous it would seek for the candidates within quality department. assurance quality engineers. were

who significant She had a back- educational preferred with a college BTR someone ground, including an engineering degree or degree, background technical cre- degree and a master’s business adminis- Wilham, dentials to succeed instead of a previous tration. had She also automotive supervisor. BTR further lab contends experience Company. with the Ford Motor prior experience within the automo- supply industry “Big tive Three” Abston had selected been for a reduction plus. automakers was considered in early force 1998. After she contested decision, was during she reinstated May In Hood Patrick was em- departed late 1998. Ledbetter about Since manager as a ployed quality while BTR time, the same Abston Ledbet- given undergoing attempt improve its ter’s BTR agreed because had quality regain Ql” standards and a “Ford return Abston work. While Hood testi- require status. This status would the im- fied that was technically qualified Abston plementation quali- of the standard of new *5 perform job, he the did have reserva- designated QS- within ty industry, the as personality tions about her and her absen- BTR 9000.5 maintains it needed to Nonetheless, teeism from work. he was change approach quality oversight its told interim acting general manager the attempting to the identify root cause of at that time that Abston was back coming problems, testing rather than materials af- to work in quality engineering. fact. ter the Ledbetter, Hood hired Mark a white promotion The given Rusty Kreyling age forty, male the to fill the Abston in resigned August of and in June of 1998. Ledbetter had a Rusty Kreyling permanently was hired in status, education, CQE a technical and ex- early 1999 to as a quality work technician perience within the automotive industry. in plant. the finishing Kreyling was con- job comprised just Ledbetter’s more than sidered highly qualified by Hood because supervising the lab. extrusion His duties degree of his in from statistics the Univer- identifying prob- also included and solving sity of and his Tennessee advanced knowl- lems, conducting experiments, designs edge of Kreyling statistics. not a was performing bring pro- statistical studies to CQE. Nonetheless, because of his statistics control, and generally identifying cesses degree, Hood testified procedures. Kreyling developing better test CQEs more than other promotion given to Leann Abston whom he past. had worked in the quit Ledbetter five after months to take promoting BTR’s reasons job in another of 1998. At November Wilham was after Abston, time Leann a white female under transferred forty, replaced the him quali- as the ty engineer responsible for projects the While in- Hood was aware of Anthony’s which doing Ledbetter had as well in laboratory supervision been as terest position, QS-9000 system 5. The governing set of produc- standards same set of standards tion, their adopted by industry the automotive to ensure reporting, systems. suppliers that all are held accountable to the Univ., had no Bowman Shawnee State Anthony that he explained to he Summary judg after available Wilham such only one of if there is proper only genuine Wilham was ment is no moved. designated ever any who was mov individuals above issue as to material fact The other laboratory supervisor. judgment as a party is entitled to ing quality engineers. 56(c); three were law. see matter of Fed.R.Civ.P. Co., Street v. J.C. & Bradford depo- concisely in his also testified Hood Cir.1989). 56(c) “Rule mandates with a that BTR wanted someone sition entry judgment, ade summary for the degree or status technical motion, upon quate discovery time for for some- looking Hood was also position. against party who fails to make a show studies, experience in statistical one with ing sufficient establish existence QS-9000 design, administra- experiment case, that party’s an element essential to solving, tion, problem one-on-one customer party and on which that will bear after Wil- persons and PPAPs.6 The hired proof Corp. burden of at trial.” Celotex equivalent qualifica- all had these or ham Catrett, 477 U.S. to Hood. according tions (1986). In conducting 91 L.Ed.2d An- majority Hood testified that judgment summary analysis, this court job testing parts thony’s included the from must view all inferences to be drawn also filed entering the data. light fa underlying facts most regard certain documentation honmoving party. Gen. vorable had never QS-9000 as clerk would. He Siempelkamp v. G. GmbH & Elec. Co. designed any statistical studies or done . (6th Cir.1994) 1095, 1097-98 Hood, According An- any experiments. qualified, hands thony “[sjimply wasn’t *6 summary judg granting On the of why When asked to summarize down.” regard in close to trial ment so qualified, was not Hood testified docket, its controlling court’s district deposition: in his appeals such for an abuse of reviews court degree, doesn’t a technical have [H]e Guillory v. generally of discretion. one, a certified number he doesn’t have Indus., Inc., 95 F.3d 1320 Domtar name, hasn’t engineer by his he quality Cir.1996). problem solving involv- done root cause doesn’t design experiments, of he ing Analysis do knowledge have statistical input than data anymore more than — Anthony met statute A. Whether of hit computer into a a button § 1981 under U.S.C. limitations print it Analyzing have out. what argument means, first address BTR’s any back- We he doesn’t have data by is barred Ten- Anthony’s in 1981 claim ground that. one-year of limitations. statute nessee’s (J.A. at discrimination asserted Standards Review of claims, part, in U.S.C. 1870, § provides in Originally enacted appeals A court of reviews persons part that within pertinent “[a]ll novo. in summary judgment de grant approved. getting parts approval processes” which means new "part axe 6. PPAPs jurisdiction challenge employer’s the United States shall action to discrimi- conduct.”); natory post-formation Young right every have the in State and same Sabbatine, 97-5169, No. Territory make 1998 WL and enforce contracts 1998) at *3 Mar. (noting Cir. enjoyed by ... as citizens....” 42 white merely 1991 amendments were “not prohib- U.S.C. 1981. Section 1981 thus but restorative” created new substantive its racial in the making discrimination liabilities) Rivers, (citing supra). contracts and a federal remedy affords against private racial discrimination em- history This of the of 42 review U.S.C. ployment. Express Agen- Johnson v. Ry. analysis 1981 is essential to the of which Inc., 454, 460-61, cy, 421 U.S. applies statute of limitations (1975). 44 L.Ed.2d 295 In claims such those asserted this case. however, Supreme held that Court Section 1981 does not contain its own while the “make and enforce contracts” statute of limitations. In Goodman v. language proscribed discrimina- Co., 656, 661, Lukens Steel 482 U.S. it tory hiring, proscribe did not discrimina- 2617, 2620, (1987), S.Ct. L.Ed.2d tory or discriminatory termination other Supreme Court held federal occurring actions after the re- appropriate courts should select the most lationship was formed. Patterson v. Mc- or state analogous statute limitations to Union, 164, 177-78, Lean Credit 491 U.S. §to 1981 claims. The Sixth Circuit (1989). L.Ed.2d 132 period thus held that the limitations Patterson,

In Congress the wake of 1981 actions in Tennessee was the passed Civil one-year Act state’s which limitation set forth amended Ann. designating original its Tenn.Code 28-3-104. See Jack- text, (a) above, quoted son v. Richards as subsection Med. (b) a new adding subsection to define the term “make and enforce” contracts to 1, 1990, on December Con- include making, performance, “[t]he modi- gress passed a general fication, contracts, and termination of and statute applicable of limitations to all fed- benefits, enjoyment all privileges, date, eral statutes enacted after that which terms, and conditions of contractual pertinent part: “Except states in as other- 1981(b). relationship.” See 42 U.S.C. law, provided by wise a civil action arising *7 This effectively amendment reversed Pat- under an Act of Congress enacted after §

terson permitted the use of 1981 to the date of enactment of this section may challenge alleged race discrimination not not be years commenced later than after I only in the formation of the the cause of action accrues.” 28 U.S.C. but in relationship, “post-formation” em- added). § (emphasis 1658 ployment actions as well. how, all, question The if at pas

Thus, § the 1991 amendments to 1981 sage § of 28 U.S.C. 1658 affected the stat created that no legal “liabilities had exis- limitations § ute of claims 1981 is one tence passed.” before the 1991 Act that has divided the federal courts. See Inc., Rivers v. Roadway 511 Express, Harris, U.S. F.3d at (noting 300 1187 that the 298, 313, 1510, 1519-20, 114 S.Ct. 128 split federal courts “have in determining (1994); L.Ed.2d 274 see also Harris v. applies which statute of limitations to suits Co., 1183, Allstate Ins. brought 1186-87 version amended (10th Cir.2002) (“The 1981”); Rights § Civil Act of see also Jones v. R.R. Donnelley 1991 ... essentially 717, a new created cause of & Sons 305 728 F.3d Cir.

513 1981(b)). Harris, § 2002) claims under See among (e.g., circuits and division (noting § 1658 does not at The 28 U.S.C. Eleventh holding that — claims), granted, § cert. presented 1981 been with the issue but has apply has 2074, -, 155 L.Ed.2d Taylor ruled on it. v. Ala. U.S. not Inter (2003). J.T.P.A., 1059 TV 261 tribal Council Title F.3d (11th Cir.2001) 1032, (affirming 1034 dis 2000, Circuit, in discussed The Third missal of 1981 claims on immu approaches courts that three different nity grounds reaching and not statute of 219 Corp., Zubi v. AT&T have taken. issue), denied, limitations cert. 535 U.S. Cir.2000). (3d 220, 222 Summarized F.3d 1936, 1066, 122 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. (1) created briefly, are: that claims they (mem.). (2002) amending Act of 1991 Rights the Civil to the four- subject § 1981 be new should years ago, recognized Several we limitations, but all other year statute of but did not have occasion to re question subject to the state “bor- claims remain Sabbatine, 136559, it. 1998 WL solve (2) that all period; rowed” Again year, presented we *3. last were of 28 accruing passage explicitly the issue but declined to four-year to the subject 1658 are now express a on the merits because view we (3) that the period; and Civil limitations jurisdiction. did not have See Smith v. merely of 1991 amended Act Hamilton, Appx. County Fed. existing and was not a new enactment law (6th Cir.2002) (unpublished).7 and thus purposes of U.S.C. Sabbatine, plaintiff In invoked subject all claims remain employer had allege Id. period. limitations state “borrowed” discriminatory racially created a hostile Third, Seventh, Eighth Circuits The environment and it had failed to work presently hold 28 U.S.C. race. promote him on account of his any claims under district, at *1. court dis- WL original text or arising whether under its un- untimely missed the 1981 claims as Jones, 1991 amendments. See under the one-year statute of limitations der Inc., 728; IBP, 305 F.3d at Madison Kentucky. Id. *3. We borrowed from (8th Cir.2001), on vacated remanded, stating that reversed and grounds, 536 other U.S. applica- consider the district court should (2002) (mem.); L.Ed.2d 773 limitation four-year tion of the Zubi, F.3d at 225. of the 1991 light 28 U.S.C. contrast, recently In the Tenth Circuit § 1981.8 Id. amendments to four-year § 1658 stat- held that 28 U.S.C. this circuit district courts within ute of 1981 claims Several applies limitations four-year limita- since that the the 1991 amendments have held were created *8 remand, Supreme recently On the district court concluded 7. We that the Court note § granted in that 28 U.S.C. 1658 did extend statute certiorari the Jones case out of Circuit, plaintiff's § likely 1981 claims indicating it limitations for the Seventh that will of Sabbatine, years. Young v. No. See v. R.R. to four See soon resolve issue. Jones 99-6336, 1888672, Sons, Co., *2 n. 2 WL at Donnelley 305 717 2000 & - 19, 2000) (so -, holding Cir.2002), noting, granted, Dec. and U.S. 123 Cir. cert. 2074, (2003). jurisdiction to had no that the Sixth Circuit S.Ct. 155 L.Ed.2d 1059 None theless, appeal be- proceed the issue on this second panel to address consider this must of employer did not file notice it on cause the issue in this case as best can based issue). cross-appeal preserve the currently to the authorities available. 514 § period “post-formation”

tions 28 1658 results in should construction claims, apply now to 1981 in whole inor being subject four-year 1981 claims part. Kinley v. Ry. See Southern period limitations claims “formation” Norfolk 770, F.Supp.2d (E.D.Ky.2002) 776 subject remaining to the borrowed state four-year period (applying limitations not change limitations this claims); promote failure to Brown v. Jen analysis. F.3d at As the Tenth Ctr., ny Weight No. Craig Loss C-1-97- noted, routinely apply “courts dif (S.D.Ohio 0211, 2,May WL ferent statutes of limitations to different e 2000) (holding four-year that statut of claims, including claims made within a sin apply portions all limitations should of gle Particularly Id. lawsuit.” within 1981); Express Corp., Miller v. Fed. law, employment realm rights where 955, (W.D.Tenn.1999) F.Supp.2d 964-65 be, may and are typically, asserted under four-year (applying statute limitations to law, both litigants federal state racially 1981 claim alleging discriminato routinely courts differing deal with limita termination); ry Rodgers South, Apple v. periods tions for related causes of action. Inc., F.Supp.2d 976-77 (W.D.Ky. may yield While this result the great 1999) (holding four-year that statute of est it simplicity, does reflect what we be apply limitations should to all 1981 lieve to be the most faithful reading of . claims) see Shoney’s, But v. Coleman these statutes. Inc., (W.D.Tenn. F.Supp.2d 2001) (holding that apply 1658 does not B. Whether the court district erred in any claim under granting summary judgment to BTR now hold the four-year that Anthony’s on racial We claims statute of limitations in set forth 28 U.S.C. discrimination9 1658 does indeed 1981 claims by alleges discrimination they insofar portion as arise under the promote BTR’s refusal him allegedly the statute enacted the Civil Act based on his race and In age. order to legislation of 1991. undisputably That cre discrimination, employment establish An rights ated new did legal not exist thony present either must direct evidence Rivers, prior passage. to its 511 U.S. of discrimination or introduce circumstan S.Ct. 1519-20. Section 1981 tial evidence would allow an inference premised upon alleged discriminato of discriminatory treatment. Wexler v. ry occurring actions after the formation of Inc., Furniture, White’s Fine relationship, such as the (6th Cir.2003) (en banc). case, failures to in promote at issue this relies on pres circumstantial evidence and are thus actionable under only by ents no direct evidence. legislation virtue of enacted Decem 1, 1990, ber its terms 28 U.S.C. approach The burden-shifting un applies 1658therefore to them. Green, der Douglas Corp. McDonnell In regard, agreement this we are in U.S. L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), reasoning Tenth Circuit Har which was later refined Texas ris, supra. Burdine, agree, expressed Dept. We also Community Affairs Harris, the fact statutory U.S. 67 L.Ed.2d *9 Bd., Anthony’s claims of separately. discrimination See Wade v. Knoxville Utils. require 452, different (6th Cir.2001). statutes the same standards 259 F.3d 464 proof of therefore analyzed and will not be

515 promotion present case. Wilham (1981), the applies to 207 framework, Anthony faces this Under Anthony, an African-American over prima a facie presenting initial burden is age forty,11 indeed within The establishment case of discrimination. age protected ap- race and classes. He a rebuttable prima facie case creates of a promotion, for the it was plied but denied requires presumption of discrimination requirements It remaining to him. is the nondis legitimate, BTR articulate some prima a facie case that are at issue on taking chal reason for criminatory promotion. the Wilham only is one lenged action. BTR’s burden v. persuasion. Gray production, not he On whether was considered for Prods., Inc., 268 Toshiba Am. Consumer Moore, Denny promotion, the human Cir.2001) (6th Bur 595, (citing F.3d 599 manager, Anthony resources testified 1093). dine, 253, 101 S.Ct. at U.S. him resume. At that time BTR gave remains persuasion burden of The ultimate a looking laboratory supervi was not for produces legiti If Anthony. Id. BTR with sor, position Anthony sought. which reasons, Anthony nondiscriminatory mate Instead, searching BTR was someone pretext are prové must BTR’s reasons a It degree a status. is not for discrimination. with disputed Anthony did not have these prima a facie case In order make and was not interviewed. qualifications Anthony promote, upon a failure to based ordinarily the fact that a candidate While (1) that he is member prove must proper credentials did not have the class; (2) for, applied that he protected might employer excuse the from position (3) receive, was job; that he and did not him, we considering not continue (4) job; simi qualified for position facie because the was prima case was in the larly-situated person who Wilham, who did not have the filled also protected received plaintiffs class Moore testified that proper credentials. Sys., job.10 Freight v. Yellow Thurman qualified Wilham nor neither (6th Cir.1996); Inc., 1160, see 90 F.3d position. plaintiff A should not be for the 254, Burdine, 450 also U.S. that he is required prove Douglas, 411 U.S. (citing McDonnell posi for a 668). requirements the stated 1817, meet 792, 93 L.Ed.2d Cf. 01-5953, TVA, where the selected candidate likewise No. WL tion Seay v. 2003).` (6th 6, requirements.12 does not meet the Aug. Cir. Tenn., (6th Cir. Pub. 693 F.2d that in Farmer Cleveland 10.We note Cir.2002) Power, We, therefore, (6th adopt "less-qual F.3d decline Inc., Estates, 241 F.3d Roh v. Lakeshore be language used in Farmer Roh ified” Cir.2001), (6th this Court stated that prior precedent. it from cause deviates prong if the went fourth could be met less-qualified applicant who was not a to a forty-three years of when group. protected This stan member of the promotion went Wilham. the first ignores prior published with or dard conflicts "similarly using the this decisions of Court may be instances where deviation 12. There See, City e.g., Nguyen v. situated” standard. job of a from the stated criteria Cleveland, (6th Cir. 229 F.3d 562-63 of discrimina- would result in inference Corr., 2000); Dep't 165 F.3d Allen v. Mich. Anderson, Briggs v. e.g., tion. (6th Cir.1999); Aultman Betkerur v. partic- Under the Ass'n, Hasp. Cir. case, no such inference ular facts of 1996); Goodyear Ercegovich v. & Rubber Tire warranted. 1998); Cir. Brown *10 prong prima final quality engineer promotions On the of the facie case, Anthony neither nor met the Wilham position after Wilham As position stated criteria for the actual BTR moved, sought BTR only out candi sought engineer, fill with a quality but qualifications it necessary dates with experience both had which could make quality deemed engineer. essential a them viable candidates for laboratory Anthony The real issue here is whether supervisor. Accordingly, they can be con- was for qualified position quality similarly purposes sidered situated for the engineer. Anthony Hood testified that of reviewing Anthony’s failure-to-promote qualified per was not “hands down.” The Hence, position son BTR wanted for the claim. that Court finds Antho- someone with a back ny prima has hismet facie case. technical/statistical

ground degree or or someone who awas CQE. Experience with the “Big Three” The burden now shifts to BTR to companies motor was also considered legitimate, articulate a nondiscriminatory plus. reason placing position. for Wilham in the supervisor

BTR Wilham removed as of the undisputed It Anthony is that did not plant due mixing agreement to an with the qualifications, have these while the three union, and it did not want terminate persons promotions who received the did. him. Placing Massey’s Wilham into for Anthony Although argues experi- that his mer was necessary because BTR background ence and him made as well any did candidates, not have other qualified that other we can- time Anthony presented say has not in the mind that Wilham. of BTR this was equivalent degree, no to a contrary. college evidence to the

status, objective or the other qualifications sought quality To which BTR engineer. make submissible case on the credibility Accordingly, Anthony was not explanation, of BTR’s “ position, and he failed has to establish ‘required by preponderance to show a Wexler, prima facie case. (1) of the either prof evidence (holding that in determining wheth- (2) fered fact, reasons had no basis in plaintiff er has qualification prong satisfied proffered actually reasons did not mo test, prima facie on inquiry should focus (3) action], tivate [the or criteria). objective they were to motivate [the insufficient ” employment action].’ Manzer v. Dia C. Whether district court its abused mond Shamrock Chem. in granting summary judg- discretion (6th Cir.1994) (alteration in original) days ment to BTR trial four before (citing Auth., McNabola v. Chi. Transit complains because (7th Cir.1993)). F.3d the district court until four days waited Anthony has failed to show BTR’s before trial to issue its decision on sum pretextual. pres- reasons are He mary judgment. trial courts ent any evidence BTR’s showing reasons power have inherent their control dock were not based fact they or that were See, ets. e.g., Gould v. Chip Wood/Chuck not the real reasons for its decision. An- 99-1544, 99-1707, per Nos. Corp., 2000 WL thony only presents qualifications his own 2000); Aug. Cir. Oliva on pretext, Sullivan, issue of and this is insuffi- Cir.1992); Ed Tex., cient. County, wards v. Cass 919 F.2d 273

517 Rights (5th Cir.1990); enacted the Civil Act of 1991.” Wayne Polk-Osumah (E.D.Mich. Mich., I separately I there 205 F.R.D. write because believe County, Reaves, F.Supp. 2001); portion U.S. v. are no claims that arise under the of timing trials (E.D.Ky.1986). § of under the 1981 enacted Civil are best left to control matters and docket I Act of because believe trial In re Air the court. discretion of the § not intended to to (6th Disaster, Cir. Crash § 1981 as amended or otherwise. the say that district We cannot 1981(b) § Although, allows new causes judgment four granting summary court’s plaintiffs bring of in that it to action allows an of discre before trial was abuse days aris previously unavailable claims—claims tion, un considering heavy caseloads ing discriminatory that oc out of conduct district courts labor. Plain der which the private employment curs rela than he would be if the tiff is better off 1981(b) § tionship is alone cannot formed— judgment as a granted court had district of In give rise to these causes action. plaintiffs of law at the close matter 1981(b) stead, phrase § defines the “make evidence. phrase contracts” as that is enforce stated, we AFFIRM For reasons 1981(a). Specifically, § used in as the ma court. district notes, jority Supreme reaction Court’s decision in Patterson v. McLean COLE, concurring. Judge, Union, 164, 109 Credit U.S. Anthony’s Title VII and ADEA claims 1981(b) (1989),§ 105 L.Ed.2d 132 was add by Wilham relating positions filled phrase than broadly ed define that more and, are there- and Ledbetter time-barred previously it had been defined. Likewise, fore, An- no actionable. longer 1981(a), § equal entitled “Statement of Rights Act thony’s Tennessee Human rights,” is still the source substantive positions relating claims obtained 1981(b) § rights in the statute. Because Wilham, Ledbetter, and are time- Abston definitional, only to merely it functions barred, as were not filed within the they scope broaden the of causes action period. Fi- one-year statute of limitations 1981(b) 1981(a). § arise under Section precedent, An- nally, under our established itself, not, provide the basis subject to one- thony’s are Therefore, the of action. any causes period. year statute of limitations per that are now “new causes action” Bd., v. Knoxville Utils. Wade of the mitted as a result inclusion Cir.2001) explaining “[b]e- 1981(a) 1981(b) claims. actually are specify a statute of cause 1981 does Thus, post-forma find I would limitations, apply the one- [courts must] 1981(a), simply arise under tion claims period from year limitations Tenn.Code prior enacted which is a statute (citing Rich- Ann. 28-3-104.” Jackson Decem date of 28 U.S.C. effective ards Med. finding ber 1990. This renders Cir.1992)). majority supplants Today, inapplicable limitations rule that the statute of the well-established post-formation claims. § 1981 claims must be bor- limitations for Alternatively, assuming even analogous in- from state statute rowed arises under both post-formation claim applies rule to claims sofar as that 1981(a) (b),1 am- § 1658 is at least portion [§ “aris[ing] 1981] under above, solely ever arise that no claim will described I believe 1. For reasons Congress respect are biguous as to whether intended the claims that not time barred, VII, four-year ADEA, its “catchall” statute of limita- Anthony’s Title *12 to to The lan- apply § tions these claims. relating 1981 claims Med §of guage simply does not address by Kreyling Anthony’s Title VII and eventuality when cause of action relating ADEA claims filled two different “aris[es] under” “Acts of Abston, by I deny would these claims on Congress,” one enacted before one merits the reasons stated enacted after December 1990. See majority. Donnelley Sons, v. R.R. &

Jones Thus, I beyond plain language

would look

§ 1658 to determine whether it was in- post-formation § apply

tended to

claims. legislative histories of 1658 and the Civil Act of 1991 suggest that America, UNITED STATES of Congress four-year did not intend 1658’s Plaintiff-Appellee, period apply post- limitation formation claims. As the Seventh Circuit explained, 1658 was enacted to “alleviate FAISON, Lavadius Defendant- uncertainty practice inherent Appellant. borrowing analogous state statutes of limi- No. 01-6344. tations for federal causes of action that do periods.”

not contain their own limitations Appeals, United Court of States (citing H.R.Rep. 101-734, Id. No. Sixth Circuit. 24). Moreover, § 1658 “was also con- Argued June 2003. disrupting litigants’ cerned with settled ex- that, pectations.” Id. (explaining to ad- Aug. Decided and Filed 2003. concern, Congress dress this made Rehearing Sept. Denied 2003. prospective). I agree with the Seventh the conclusion that 1658’s four-year limitation does not post-formation

§ claims is consis- Congress’s purposes

tent two in en-

acting Likewise, Id. at 726-27. I

believe that the legislative history of supports this conclusion. Id. at 102-40(1), (citing H.R.Rep. No. at 63

(1991), Cong. & Admin. U.S.Code News

1991 at

Thus, I Anthony’s would find that

§ 1981 relating positions Wilham, Ledbetter, Abston,

filled not Kreyling,

but are time-barred. With 1981(b). purposes argu- mation claim could be arising viewed as un- ment, (a) (b) post-for- I concede will that a der both subsections

Case Details

Case Name: Lawrence E. Anthony, Jr. v. Btr Automotive Sealing Systems, Inc.
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Date Published: Aug 8, 2003
Citation: 339 F.3d 506
Docket Number: 01-6028
Court Abbreviation: 6th Cir.
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