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Lawrence B. Thomas, and Cross-Appellant v. E. J. Korvette, Inc., and Cross-Appellee
476 F.2d 471
3rd Cir.
1973
Check Treatment

*2 McLAUGHLIN, Before VAN DUSEN ROSENN, Judges. Circuit THE OPINION OF COURT Judge. McLAUGHLIN, Circuit entry appeal on This is based judgment Lawrence Thomas’ favor accord with F.R.Civ.P. explained in 6A Moore’s Fed.Prac. 59.15 $150,000 The sum of [1]. was awarded on Thomas his malicious against suit E. Korvette. Motions for J.

a new trial and n. v. were o. court, by D.C., denied the trial 329 F. Supp. cross-ap- Also involved is a peal by plaintiff-appellee amount damages. $750,000 awarded plaintiff Thomas, this amount judge from remitted the trial $750,000 $150,000. brought against Kor- The action was security by Thomas, who was the

vette’s security King Prussia, appointment time head Korvette’s usage head, ques- was familiar with its time the incident in store at the 12, 1965 Thomas and format. tion. On November seen another store com- facts, Smith the basis of these On ground down an escalator fide determined that there was a bona package his arm. He floor with a against case so he called *3 looking a observed around bit at was e.2 polic po On the arrival of again glanc- of the escalator and bottom (7:20 P.M.) lice that Thomas claimed ing directly in front of about while purchased he had in two items ap- of the store. This was outside door toy department, carried them to his car proximately Thomas left the A.M. 11:30 through door, placed the front them package. no with There was store police, in the trunk of his auto. The package that evidence at time considering presented the facts as paid then been for. Thomas was had story, felt was sound that there a placing package in the trunk seen (P. against 678a) cause of action Thom his automobile which was store against complaint as. The Thomas was report by parking lot. On the signed by employee then Brown who had observing employee to the store leaving witnessed in Thomas’ actions management, security one a officer from game. store with the These were all of stores was sum- Korvette’s other concerning the facts the incident which investigate. A Mr. Smith moned predicate filing Brown had to his of the investigator upon, called who complaint. experienced con- in the field. Smith hearing questions concern- a fronted Thomas with There was before a Justice alleged ing package many in car. his Peace which factual time disputes he have two that did Thomas claimed became evident. Thomas here reg- games explanation an attached had a further his trunk with as to the day signifying payment. receipt, question. events on the his ister He al- leged, effect, in- opened trunk and an had his car he carried any game receipt produced or first out of spection no even the store follow- while game package.1 suspected shoplifter. a tape He residue on the asserts placed that he questioning it his trunk for conven- Thomas claimed that paid register tape ience and for it specific would later the after- cashier and a game paid noon he for a story. when second verify not turn out Such did his put along he in his had trunk a to take Thomas refused to be case. game. produced, the first time, He at this polygraph had test at time. He receipt toy department a test, from undergone previously such a receipts policy such article with the have so concealed was to attach 1. The store converting cellophane by packages intention of the same to means purchase paying by tape. own use without felt Thus Smith price meaning piece tape thereof within a affixed had there been * * * (a) package packages, this section subsection or time to one concealing goods may Persons so such be remained some evi- would at least have detained, receipt tape residue, in a reasonable manner even if the dence of length time, by missing. for a reasonable now itself were peace officer or merchant or employee 816.1, in order re- merchant’s § P.L. 872 2. Act June may covery goods July 5, 1957, of such be effected. § P.L. 501 added peace officer, by (b) Such detention P.S. 4816.1 subsection amended 18 pertinent part: provides or a merchant’s shall merchant officer, peace concealing person wilfully “(b) Any merchant render such employee, criminally unpurchased goods or merchant’s or merchandise or * * * arrest, civilly any liable false false either store imprisonment premises premises or unlawful detention.” of such or outside presumed store, prima facie shall be register launching question, the date in a criminal cash if the exactly him, correspond reasonable, facts convince as a hon- but it did intelligent games being, plus price est human tax. He al- that the two girl suspected person guilty leged some the check-out a criminal error arresting person discrepancy.3 may offense. cause of this The error, in one, if his error is an honest As a result of the conflict factual malice, personal not motivated money in- accounts and the small sum of bias, revenge, the law will hold him volved, the of the Peace decided Justice harmless, regardless of the re- eventual discharge putting the case costs of prosecution.” sult of the criminal on defendant Thomas.4 $11 regards problem arises with to who Thomas thereafter instituted this ac- should decide that in this liti- prosecution against gation. tion for malicious The trial court allowed the special Korvette. elements for a cause make factual determi- *4 nations, prosecution action for malicious are but also decide the ultimate concerning question (1938) in stated Res. Torts the existence of 653. Sum- § marizing, probable disputes says the Restatement if cause. Korvette this that proceedings disposition by declaring judge (1) were initiated with- trial probable cause, solely (2) pri- out that this is a decision with the mary bring- purpose court. other than ing justice, private per- an offender to judgment Korvette asks for a proceedings son who initiated such according o. v. n. 5A Moore’s liable, held in be cases where a [2], grant may Fed.Prac. 50.07 such be proceeding criminal had been instituted only when, weighing ed without against by defendant credibility evidence, there can be proceedings where termination of the but one reasonable conclusion as to the was in favor of the accused. proper judgment. Where there con is

Although grounds flicting evidence, there are numerous or there is insufficient appeal raised on this re- time the “one-way” to make evidence verdict prosecution sult all malicious cases judgment proper, n. o. v. not be primarily by is or affected awarded. The court must view the evi probable not there was for the cause light dence most favorable to the filing complaint. Probable cause party who secured verdict. prosecution in malicious matters de- is light conflict, of the factual obvious Co., fined Miller Pa. v. R.R. Pa. 371 story from the different versions of the 308, 314, 809, (1952) 89 A.2d 812 as here, told there is no foundation to order ground suspicion support- “reasonable However, n. o. v. motions ed circumstances sufficient to war- are on the new trial based court’s ordinary prudent rant an man in the appellate discretion and “the court will believing same par- situation in that the ty power guilty lower also, exercise its to review the of the offense.” See Neczypor Jacobs, v. ruling 403 Pa. and reverse when the court’s low ** * (1961) states, 169 A.2d which er court failed to exercise its “By probable cause is not meant an ac- discretion; or the trial where court guilt. justified tual state of One abused its discretion.” 6A Moore’s policy singly 3. Store was to total all sales of the Peace did feel The Justice register say- so that no mistake would attention this case deserved serious However, money made totals. isn’t was ad- “The amount of involved (for important enough mitted that some of the clerks him.” did not to hold “ * * * absolutely policy court) (a) this am follow at all times I P. 717 and instead added the for a deal cost more than about bucks worried 718(a) one item in their heads. like this.” P. may query there- which be found under the Our evi- 59.05 [5].5 Fed.Prac. dence, preju- the defendant did did if fore is to determine initiating the trial court dicial error proceedings.” (Emphasis supplied). adversely affected substantial suit which rights appellant a new dictate Simpson has mentioned Each here side on merits. Ward, Montgomery 354 Pa. A. An examination the Restate (1946) 2d 674 which discussed the re- it has inter of Torts and been ment how which, and cited words statement certain Pennsylvania pertinent preted by case they feel, respective posi- support their question. help will to decide this law urges point. tions on the Korvette d, Torts, Comment Restatement adopted Simpson holds, prosecution in malicious by Pennsylvania v. Pa. Miller suits, cause for A.2d R.R. Co. 371 the criminal decided must be considering situation, type (1952) Simpson, by the su- court. Thomas cites states: standing pra, proposition “ *** testimony, of fa- there is a conflict in the issues where the trial must submit the issue termination

vorable jury. cause, We think has the function finding side is correct to an extent. each the circumstances good appeal provides a acted. The This discussion the defendant court *5 whether, in those of the law the area and the determines under cir- illustrates determining cumstances, complicated function of termination was suf- the containing accused, problems ficiently probable in and favorable to the d, conflict. Res. Comment the had or had factual whether probable defendant type is- provides no to is two solutions the of cause. Where us; testimony the in to a “better” well as the what sue before as conflict were, presents appeal has circumstances the court “usual” method. This the finding jury. difficulty jury of the The notice a no need for which distinguishing probable jury unless not called to act guilt innocence there is a conflict cause from obvious presents of for its of dilem- an issue fact areas. In that kind which certain recognizes necessity ma, Simpson of determination. probable judicial cause. determination respective functions of “The the situation in 673d This is which Res. determining jury in is- court and using less usual dictates “better cause, probable sue of can exercised be cause, determining probable method” ways. bet- them one of two The designated according Simpson. That to require to ter but less usual method is likely being “jurors where are situation special jury the ting verdict set- find guilt inno- or the issue confuse forth the circumstances criminal the defendant cence of proceedings find which origi- case, civil action out which findings Upon were initiated. issue, whose deter- nated the basic with then determines court civil That decides the action. mination The defendant had cause. is the want basic issue usual is for court method Simpson, prosecution”, criminal charge jury under what combina- at In the circumstances, 46 A.2d 354 Pa. tion or combinations grade abuse, applied meant when than what is when a court’s a different 5. The term peculiarly its dis- to have abused its said discretion is court exercise legal significance, wholly in law means Abuse discretion unrelated to the cretion. meaning was in error as court’s action used in of the same term when parlance. such abuse And when of law. would be matter common Action that exists, ordinary necessary will ordered. reversal be make affairs to one abuse, guilty an connotes conduct matter, jury certainly error, specific instant situation was harmless finding (the high jury might jury, likelihood that the since because of its guilt up “no or innocence with cause” came with confuse cause) exist, yet so, award in did even enormous Thomas’ favor. “An * * * jury. improper of ma- submitted submission through problem plainly jury can seen terial issue to is another undisputed ground facts and circumstances for a new trial.” Fed. Moore’s attorney [2], appeal. in this for Thom- Prac. 59.08 compounded dif- as accentuated ficulty by There were additional factors told his summation when he present necessity show also games? jury “Did he steal those questioned a new trial. Korvette has only question That is the when because permitting the district court’s actions you get question, the answer to that plaintiff to introduce evidence on a 1969 legal questions then all of the about claim.7 slander Korvette asserts this to probable cause, investigation, reasonable damaging defense; have been most to its that, right place fall and all * into alleged pleaded slander or * (489a). Furthermore, pre-trial included order and was recognized himself mo- barred statute of limitations. rass which this statement created for Some mention of that had been claim remarked, sidebar, when he pre-trial solely respect made at the appellant brief, notes in his “Let me damage earning item of loss of point your (plaintiff’s counsel) out that capacity, (p. 23a). It was determined argument entire directed “possibly admissible to serve to guilt innocence, to the issue of vir- light any shed claim of malice con tually your argument.” entire Those original nection with the transaction.” complicated statements and the nature 31a). (p. However, through the action confusing tone much the evi- granting of the trial court Thomas’ mo presented trial, very dence make complaint, tion to amend his it allowed *6 example clear that this anwas excellent entirely an by new claim to be considered why question of a is for jury passing upon it while was jury the court to decide after the has original plaintiff. contention of interroga- appropriate special answered permit The decision of whether or not to tories,6 though even conflict there was change (in pre-trial order) a is testimony. Some indication of judge within the discretion of the trial jury’s ques- confusion of the real “appellate and interference with this by tion here their be evidenced kept discretion should be at a minimum.” inquiry rendering verdict, on a at Ely Reading Co., (3 v. 424 F.2d 758 extremely which time were con- 1970). agree wholeheartedly Cir. We cerned with what would become of the and with follow that conclusion its police and arrest records of Thomas as a but, proper place in this we result of instance their actions. Submission of question of cause to have kind of circumstance type special questions, background. Snyder 6. For see Thomas’ testified suggested by Supreme put directly those Court of that he was with line Pennsylvania Simpson Montgomery identifying security a man himself as the Co., manager. Snyder & Ward 46 A.2d 674 told man this that he (1946). plaintiff position intended hire to for a (236a). trust. This man at Korvette’s 7. pause, This slander claim was based on an said was then to check some rec- alleged ’phone February ords, Snyder call made and then tell Mr. by Snyder Miley “thief,” a Mr. Detective Thomas was a that he didn’t know Agency, security department. charges pend- to Korvette’s whether criminal were still applied ing, Mr. had Thomas for a and that “could not be Job Miley time, Snyder sup- (236a-37a). and was trusted.” posedly calling Korvette’s to check King Prussia, injustice by produced late Korvette its Store manifest Pennsylvania, of- on November much evidence addition. There was issue, Pennsylvania applies separate slander substantive law fered on this jurisdiction merely mal- done to show federal here based which was not since case, diversity citizenship. our had been ice. verdict and the as- on the slander alone reached Thomas, appellee cross-appellant, and damages been had even sertion on was arrested November argued. Finally, been after all this had by employed Korvette as its secu- while great jury, given detail rity King of Prussia store. chief at its judge 1969 slander trial stated day he At A.M. on that about 11:30 charge, such, the stat- was barred by Brown, the man- observed assistant limitations, ute of and consideration taking ager, package out of the store it be limited the assertion of should parked placing it in trunk and that the inser- malice. We are satisfied immediately report- Brown automobile. tion of slander was not mere- attack manager the incident the store ed ly de- harmless error or “favorable to thereafter, procured Smith, and, an ex- guarantee impossible It is fendant.” manager security perienced of its at one jury laymen that a would be able investigate stores, the incident. other testimony concerning slander cast Following investigation, the lo- Smith’s reaching aside, completely its decision called, complaint police cal filed, were damages. lawyer de- on Thomas’ made He Thomas was arrested. discussing it, liberate reference to when by Magistrate on released Williams damages. punitive From hearing. hearing, later At the bail jury plain- awarded sum which testimony Magistrate heard tiff, crystal ($750,000) it clear that prosecution, which he stated after prejudicial effect the admission important “isn’t sum involved to, even if relevant enough Thomas for defendant hold” for, malice, admitted the issue of upon pay- case and dismissed the court outweighed probative It far its value. of the costs of ment should allowed into evi- been defendant. dence. The manner in which it was used, pre-trial brought was not covered at an action for Thomas later circumstances, libel, arrest, prosecution, false malicious definitely It have been allowed trial. in favor and slander. found count, had an unwarranted detrimental effect Korvette on libel appellant’s defense. not to award instructed the *7 damages of a 1969 slander on the basis necessary A new trial on the merits is trial, after first count. In bifurcated appeal. many in this There are interre- remaining determining liability on the allegations error, lated all of which counts, verdict for returned a disposed be examined can must Thomas, appellee, in the sum of byof a new trial. defendant en- $500,000 compensatory pu- $250,000 judg- titled to have the district court damages. were remitted These nitive judgment ment amended to for it enter respec- $50,000 except $100,000 and provide on the 1965 court and slander tively. new accordance with opinion.8 appeal, a num- Korvette raises On issues, namely, err did the court ber ROSENN, Judge (concur- Circuit in: ring). prob- Submitting question judgment (1) appeal This is an from a jury; damages growing out an incident able cause to judgment, cross-appeal court 8. view the reversal of district No. 71-2062 In will be dismissed as moot. 478 (2) denying 416, 421, 307, Korvette’s motion for Pa. 368 84 A.2d 310 judgment n. (1951). o. v. on the Pennsylvania false arrest and In Miller v. R.R. prosecution counts; Co., malicious 314, 308, 809, 371 Pa. 89 A.2d 811- (1952), Pennsylvania Supreme (3) denying judgment the motion for probable Court defined cause as “a rea- count;

n. o. v. on a 1965 slander ground suspicion supported sonable (4) permitting introduction of evi- circumstances sufficient to warrant dence as to the 1969 slander. ordinary prudent an man the same believing party situation in society Because is concerned with bal- guilty of the offense.” ancing effective enforcement against protecting criminal law the indi- I. ALLOCATION OF FUNCTIONS “unjustifiable vidual oppres- BETWEEN AND JUDGE JURY. litigation charges,”1 sive of criminal question The crucial raised here is safeguard courts have laid down rules to whether, in the trial of an action for private persons who aid in the enforce- prosecution, malicious the determination against ment of the law suits for mali- presence probable or lack of prosecution. balancing cious jury. is for the court or the The trial interests, Pennsylvania Supreme judge, denying Korvette’s motion for regards apparently Court interest of v., n. o. held that society in law enforcement as the more jury. was for He concluded that important. Pennsylvania See Miller v. disputed there were factual issues with Co., 308, 809, 310, R.R. A.2d Pa. respect probable cause, and that “it (1952). Therefore, ma- action for would that, have been error to declare prosecution licious will not lie unless law, probable matter there was previous there has been a unsuccessful this case.” proceeding prosecuted criminal that was without interrogato- cause and malice. The trial submitted plaintiff prov- has the burden of ries to the in which he asked them (cid:127) each element.2 Want of determine whether there was indispensable cause is an cause for element of the the arrest of Thomas on No- action. It is determined as of the date vember and whether prosecution press initiated and is in cause to dependent guilt no 18, sense 1965, in- November the date of the Byers hearing.4 Ward, nocence of the accused. v. Torts, chapter 29, 1. Restatement packages intro- the two were tied to- ductory gether they note at 380. when were found in the plaintiff’s car, trunk of and even as to Simpson Montgomery Co., &Ward string the color of the with which (1946) ; 46 A.2d 674 Miller v. tied, significance were and the of this Pennsylvania Co., R.R. 371 Pa. circumstance. There were further (1952). 89 A.2d respect issues with to the extent and investiga- reasonableness of defendant’s judge, discussing opinion 3. The trial in his incident, tion of the information disputed issues, factual stated: supplied by and other em- *8 Plaintiff testified the cashier ployees, whether the circumstances of purchase toys, corroborated his production receipt the of the the whereas the defense evidence was hearing Justice of the Peace squarely contrary. The defendant’s evi- have, did, or convince the defendant’s dence was that it would be a clear vio- employees plaintiff’s innocence, company regulations lation of for the many others. plaintiff to take merchandise out through store, jury the special front doors of the 4. The returned verdicts as to purchased; probable even if it had been response where- cause and malice in to plaintiff interrogatories as the testified that this was the as follows: practice, managerial common and that probable 1. Was there lack of cause employees exempt any plaintiff were such for the arrest of the on Novem- regulation. dispute 12, There was a as to ber 1965? Tes.

479 Simpson ques- appeared approve normal of law is that the anal- rule The jury ques- ysis the for in of Torts fact are the Restatement tions of possible court. Because there are two of action of law are for the courses tions judge protecting exercising from for the in re- trial societal concerns jus- sponsibility probable public who aid cause in intimidation citizens decide however, tice, the the diffi- event of controverted factual issues: and because distinguishing culty jurors be- for respective The the functions probable cause of lack of tween issue jury determining is- court and criminal defendant’s and the issue of probable sue of by exercised cause can be innocence, guilt in this variations or ways. them in one two The bet- developed in mali- principle of law have require ter is to but less usual method Curley prosecution In v. suits. cious jury special set- verdict find 280, Co., Pa. Finance 343 Automobile ting forth circumstances 290, 48, (1941), the court A.2d 53 23 proceedings they find that the which general pre- not rule did that the noted findings Upon were initiated. cases, prosecution “for in malicious vail court then determines whether judge not the cases the trial in such jury probable The defendant had cause. not or determines is for the court usual method (i. e., the prosecutor case criminal charge combina- under what trying) had in the civil action defendant circumstances, tion or combinations existence of an honest belief may under the evi- which be found prosecution’s ini- probable dence, did or did the defendant Montgomery Simpson v. In tiation.” initiating probable cause for 87, Co., A.2d 674 Pa. 46 & Ward proceedings. opportu- (1946), had a further the court d Restatement of Torts comment nity question. It reversed to review case, In Miller Penn- at 437. sylvania a later v. Simp- plaintiff favor Co., 308, 89 R. R. A.2d judge concluding son, Supreme (1952), Pennsylvania a fundamental error when “committed Hugee adopted v. comment See Court d. or non- existence he submitted basic Co., Pennsylvania R. R. 376 Pa. the ar- existence of cause for (1954). 101 A.2d jury.” Simpson It rest Mrs. stated: FEDERAL OR II. STATE LAW. firmly principle no more There is mind, precedents in it is With these princi law than the embedded appropriate to what law—state discuss prosecu ple that in case of malicious governs The or issue. federal— tion, question want relationship problem of between prosecution cause for the criminal perennial is a one. state and federal law gave action, is rise to civil significant Supreme Court most Byrd proclamation purposes our Ridge Cooperative, Blue Electrical court.5 legally mind of the 2. Was there lack trained press or less minds the more emotional jurors, or not November 1967? Yes. decide whether prosecuting plaintiff, cause for the initiation 3. likely prosecution. are defendant motivated malice? Jurors guilt innocence the issue of Yes. confuse criminal case of the defendant court, originated civil Pa. at 46 A.2d at 676. out of which the action explaining issue determina- the basis for deviation with the basic whose case, type *9 general the That basic rule in this civil action. the tion decides from probable cause for is the want of stated: issue immemorially prosecution. that held the criminal It has been 92, public requires Id. A.2d at interest the 46 480 particular 525, 893, 2 L.Ed.2d 953 of functions be 78 S.Ct. allocation

U.S. ease, judge jury (1958). In that a workman tween a matter bound damages rights brought up action to recover with the fundamental injuries parties, procedural in the personal as a matter. suffered constructing procedural view, job character, electric of his The their course by employer options con- hired to lines. is illustrated available His coop- judge. Simpson Mont the lines for the defendant the trial See struct cooperative gomery Co., 87, on 46 A.2d The defended & erative. Ward 354 ground (1946). workmen’s not here state 674 The choice would remedy any predictable compensation made its affect the outcome in statute against Moreover, pre cooperative as well has exclusive fashion. this circuit employer, viously attempting plaintiff’s held that a “to as the immediate rule being part decide, jury as its the work done define when must because cooperative’s trade, function, particular or occu- ele business whether practice liability impinges in the pation.” on The established ments of exist” question Gatenby was to have the field state courts reserved for federal law. 443, part Corp., the defend- work was Aviation F.2d v. Altoona 407 occupation” “trade, (3d 1968); de- ant’s business or 446 see Lind v. Schene Cir. jury. judge, ly Industries, Inc., 79, (3d The cided 278 F.2d Cir.), denied, courts 835, federal Court held that cert. 364 U.S. S.Ct. following prac- should, 58, (1960). state instead 5 L.Ed.2d resolution tice, employ let rule and a federal one this issue is of the “details relat question. jury It reasoned: decide this ed to its own conduct of business” follow a federal court need independent system federal is an state In law. See Cohen v. Beneficial administering justice system 555, Corp., dustrial Loan 337 U.S. ju- litigants properly its who invoke L.Ed. 1528 S.Ct. essentia] An characteristic risdiction. (1949); Moore, Federal Practice J. cf. system the manner is (2d 1959). ed. ¶0.312 actions,

which, it in civil common-law inquiry between functions distributes Our next federal is whether judge jury. policy permit . should the trial submitting option disput- exercise the Moreover, Id. at 78 S.Ct. at 901. questions ed the ulti- of fact in terms of strong pol- noted that “there is federal legal question mate the existence as to against allowing icy dis- state rules nonexistence rupt judge-jury relationship in the jury or, rather, require that he follow federal courts.” Id. 78 S.Ct. at admittedly better Under rule? policy prevail unless 901. This rule, better the court decide would up rule is state bound with state-cre- legal question based rights obligations ated or unless findings special outweighed policy objective any disputed questions In exer- of fact. litigation coming preventing out pro- cising supervisory power our over way one in federal another court and require cedural rules court should way in state court. Id. fol- circuit the federal courts in this Applying principles, I have con- except, possibly, low the latter course two cluded choice between the This unusual most circumstances. methods detailed Restatement compelled by considerations: several d, treating Torts comment great difficulty laymen on procedural cause issue is a separating question question which a court should re- federal pro- guilt or innocence in criminal according policies to its and stand- solve regard ceeding Pennsylvania from the ards. courts do

481 sions, any such as whether the prosecution;6 the com- indi- the cause for instructing jury representing pos- viduals the defendant plexity in the involved upon plain- proper sessed a reasonable belief in the based the verdict to guilt. among many tiff’s different the its choice possible of factual find- combinations III. JUDGMENT N.O.V. ON FALSE ; society ings importance to and the ARREST AND MALICIOUS encouraging to citizens and the courts of PROSECUTION. prosecuting the law.7 aid in violators argues Korvette is entitled to court Because trial submitted jury, probable n. o. v. on the actions false to the basic issue of cause and to a new arrest malicious be- I is entitled believe defendant prove cause, alia, trial, to in- inter Thomas failed should trial. In that court prosecu- jury lack of for the only the facts. to find struct motive, enjoyed improper interrogatories tion special and and it He should submit statutory critical, immunity for the arrest. The pertaining disputed issues opinion jury was of the that there He not ask fact.8 original legal any cause for Thomas’ questions requiring conclu- (February Against difficulty Crimes Business 9 the ad- This is illustrated Depart- report 1972). case, testimony mission, This of the U.S. in this allegedly Ward, ment of Commerce also observes: Thomas’ who witnessed shoplifting appears games allegedly payment to be While stolen. problem testimony only for retail estab- serious most to the His relevant lishment, guilt most observers believe ultimate issue of or innocence. It of the reluctance of business- because was irrelevant issue of whether magnitude possessed their admit men to employee Korvette reasonable belief problem, figure guilt. prosecu- is theft In a Thomas’ malicious seriously suit, believe understated. Some tion quiry false relevant in- or arrest employee per- accounts for sub- that stantially theft is the reasonableness shoplifting by ceptions Therefore, than more loss accusers. pertaining customers. relevant matter to Ward was what Thomas told Smith prior him about inventory Apparently, result al- losses which Total arrest. entirely shoplifting parties important and em- here did realize most high ployee theft are estimated as distinction. percent five of sales at some four growth magnitude shoplifting 7. The virtually equal This stores. employee country, theft in this and its profit margins retailing. normal society, burden on enormous is revealed Id. 9-11. reports agencies. of several federal A 673, study, by comment on 8. Restatement Torts the Small Administra- Business (a) 438, tion, against business, states: clause small crime em- perform report has no function to [A] bodied transmitted the issue of with reference to United States Senate Select Committee April 3, Business, 1969, unless there is conflict Small estimated “ordinary under as to the circumstances to small cost business of initiating year 1967, acted in which defendant crimes” billion for $1.4 proceedings. although If these circumstances crimes consideration party relatively narrowly. ifor are admitted either were defined 1970, For upon crimes, ordinary uncon- them is clear and this loss evidence in- finding shoplifting cluding employee theft, need tradicted there is no give approximately informa- court $4.8 estimated Forty-one percent to determine re- tion billion. of this sum shoplifting existence nonexistence flected losses Corpora- study by A cause. theft. The Rand apparently Department law of This now the tion conducted for Pennsyl Pennsylvania. Hugee November, 1971, Justice, discloses that See private Co., prevention R.R. Pa. crime vania the cost (1954) ; Pennsyl Miller v. 1969 exceeded Pre- A.2d $3.3 billion. See Report Co., liminary vania R.R. A.2d Staff of Bureau of (1952). Commerce, Department of Domestic U.S. Commerce, Impact Economic *11 tapes registers. on arrest but concluded that of the other'two recognize suggested jury.9 that on was for the We Smith that Thomas take a appeal polygraph the facts must be viewed lie-detector test examina- light to Thomas. tion. most favorable Thomas refused. acknowledged fol- at trial the Thomas action, At trial of this Thomas the. lowing He had removed the basic facts: testified that when the cashier of the game Getaway from the Korvette Chase register” “end was called Smith to placed store it in trunk of his security questioned office paying car at about 11:30 A.M. without purchase whether he had made a at her opened for it. he the trunk of his When replied affirmatively. booth she She presence car of Smith later purchased was asked whether he the two day, allegedly pay- after he made the games and, first, found in his trunk at games ment, the two were there and the said, said, she “I think so.” She then register receipt could not be found. however, positive.” “I am not When he and returned to the Smith se- acknowledged that the store rules laid curity store, office at Smith at security down in the manual em- request, pulled tape Thomas’ “the detail ployees prescribed clearly register” and, from end in an effort purchases paid were to be for and left at pay- to corroborate Thomas’ claim of department the sale until could be ment, looking tape “went over the detail picked up and taken to the time clock (the price for a total sale $10.69” area.10 games plus tax). the two Smith said he Thus, by po the time Smith tape called could not find the <fti amount lice, suggested might merchandise had been found in that Thomas have car, the trunk of register Thomas’ Thomas was been mistaken as to the produce receipt, unable to register alleged none payment made, which the was alleged tapes supported pur gone possibly and that he chase, through apparent there registers. violation one of the other two security regulations, written suggested pulling tapes Smith the detail registers. Although Thomas had refused to lie- submit other two polygraph detector test or examination. Thomas insisted that he not mistak- en, He also Smith, nonetheless, testified at trial that he refused went out and police to tell return, his Upon version of the facts checked. five about later, reported minutes by my he that he was because “I had been advised at appropriate unable to find the amount torney not to make a statement.” Un- During trial, 9. 10. Thomas contended that course the trial the rule was judge indicated counsel that he con- applicable him, the store man templated instructing jury, or at ager, manager, assistant store or the commenting strongly, least was there manager. inapplica floor This asserted probable original cause for the ar- bility, however, ques is irrelevant to the colloquy rest. In a counsel a few cause, tion of since there was later, minutes he stated: Brown, no evidence that either Smith or at the time of the arrest and clearly [I]t seems to me rather prosecu orig- there is tion, cause for the regulations inappli considered the inal transaction. The issue would cable. be with the whether information at justice hand at police time of the report investigation, of this peace hearing however, offered evidence at trial point. cause still Thomas, existed at that give discloses that he did short, time, they as of the statement, didn’t substantially which varied any any purchase have all; evidence of from his at trial and differed you say I don’t see how can’t from the statement of his counsel probable cause, there wasn’t hearing but that before Justice of the Peace jury. is a going matter for the I am Thomas. The record reveals that defend- pass to let them representatives it. ant’s had such statement circumstances, finally Brown it to his der own use. The fur- statute signed complaint evening. provides part ther that: Magistrate found that Williams concealing goods may Persons so such cause for the issuance detained, in a reasonable manner proof process. This without more would *12 length time, and for a reasonable to lack of have failed establish by peace a officer or a merchant or a presence improper purpose; and cause merchant’s in order that re- contrary, on the it would have estab- covery goods may of such be effected. probable cause as a matter of lished law. detention shall not Such . . . officer, peace render such constraining pre- merchant or one The factor that employee, criminally merchant’s concluding or vents me from that was civilly, arrest, for false false im- liable as matter of is the a law prisonment given or unlawful detention. testimony by Thomas on cross-ex- prior had told amination that he Smith apparent 18 Pa.Stat. in- 4816.1. The § Ward, to the arrest that his friend a tent of this statute afford mer- security employee store, former at the deciding leeway chants some whether payment had witnessed for the prosecute to detain and someone games. testimony point Thomas’ on this suspect of theft. Even under Thomas’ extremely suspect he never men- since trial, pre- prima version at he facie was. evening police tioned the Ward to the game sumed to have concealed first the alleged prelimi- or theft the with the intent it at time he steal hearing. Nevertheless, nary it was the it, removed since he admits he had not obligation jury’s to evaluate his credibil- paid focus, it at that time. Our finding pertinent ity and to make however, must be on time of deten- fact. If the believed Thomas that prosecution. tion and At time light Ward, he told about Smith alleged goods pur- were apparent by corroboration the cash- chased. He testified that he (equivocal was) iers as it of Thomas’ told Smith that Ward would corroborate purchased games, claim to have then payment. disputed In view of this particular I circumstances be- testimony, say I a matter of cannot Pennsylvania place lieve that law would statutory presumption law that at- personnel a burden store to at- Pennsylvania provide taches. could tempt prior to check with Ward com- person may a he be detained whenever mencing prosecution. alleg- produce receipt goods cannot edly purchased, it has not. but Korvette also contends Pennsylvania law,12 statutory it en- opinion The trial of the liability titled to detain Thomas without separate question that a statute, any for false arrest. Under this whether, production “the the re- concealing person willfully unpurchased hearing ceipt at the Justice of the Peace goods any or merchandise store is have, did, should convince the defend- prima presumed facie to have con- so employees plaintiff’s ant’s innocence.” cealed it with the intention of convert- I believe that this should not have been ed police available to them magistrate reducing from the offense They hearing. prior the start of that larceny shoplifting as defined by interrogated knew Thomas had been statute, 'history legislative police report police. reflects the The Representatives in the state House of police presence station of Kor- primary purpose reveals representatives police vette’s when the statute to eliminate the enormous “was investigating officer, Sergeant Detective bulk of [actions]. malicious Nasielski, interrogation arrived for the Legislative Journal, .” 1959 Pa. latter’s dis- Thomas. (June (statement by 16, 1959) at 1798 presence closes their continued after sponsors Ellberg, Mr. one of the interrogation. House). bill in the 18 Pa.Stat. 4816.1. When an amend- prohibit ment was enacted 1959 to separate inquiry that, indicating guilt even if anee as or innocence were, Bryant facts as to existence of Kuntz, accused.” change Pa.Super. (1904) [Emphasis did material- ly- Moreover, added]. receipt convinced Kor- hearing preliminary on November plaintiff’s vette of innocence is rele- by was not conducted issu- vant since Korvette took no action after authority, Williams, Justice hearing magistrate decided Peace Frank Thomas. At to dismiss the case because of sum hearing, .appeared Brown and Smith involved. gave testimony subjected were'

searching counsel cross-examination Whether n. o. v. should have Thomas, however, for Thomas. did not been entered on the false arrest and ma- *13 testify. merely produced His counsel licious counts is an extreme- register receipt alleg- cash that Thomas ly case, ap- close this it but edly day following on the pears found ar- his that the court did not err since ear, rest the crucial, trunk his in the sum disputed question there was a $10.35, price $10.69, not pertaining alleged fact to the communi- games plus receipt two tax. The that presence cation to Smith Ward’s at produced was indicated that it was is- games. payment the time of on sued November at about (Smith 4:15 P.M.13 at the store IV. arrived THE SLANDERS. investiga- at 4:00 P.M. to conduct A. The 1965 Slander tion.) Thomas also claimed that Korvette my opinion, hearing, In any- if days had slandered him several his after thing, increased the reasonableness prove action, arrest. To this cause of he guilt. Korvette’s belief in Thomas’ Mary Turner, called Thomas’ trial version the events was testified Korvette. She that several put hearing. into the record this at It days arrest, after the November conflicted with his earlier version con- had Smith asked her whether Thomas police report. tained in the This con- anything day purchased on the flicting pro- version combined with the replied arrest. She that she saw Thom- alleged register receipt duction of the go through register did the end but discrepancies reflecting with its and purchased. pro- not know what he She payment only at about 4:15 P.M. could objection testify ceeded to over that: suspicion. have increased Korvette’s asking not “[Probable confined to the cause] He me said the reason he was truth of the that matters lead to the is because Thomas had over Mr. prosecution, appear- but extends to their toys or thousand dollars’ worth of day arrest, Brown following estimated time as 4:15 his car the that hearing, P.M. spare on the basis he tire removed the and found the the number receipt, produced magistrate’s sale and time the register tape (Although hearing, spare-tire was confiscated. inside “down transcript hearing tape of such in- was not wheel . . . with stick at- cluded in the evidence submitted to the tached.” He notified neither Korvette jury, put produced the court alleged ruled that it would be find his nor re- ceipt them, into the record for consideration it in led making rulings questions its drop charges. that Korvette He not jury.) were not acknowledged to be receipt pro- submitted to the report police officer, In his hearing to the wrong Thomas duced “was purchase amount,” stated that he had made personally he made games of the two at about 11:30 no A.M. search of the trunk when he first trial, however, At opened receipt he testified that he for Smith. ad- paid games mittedly discrepancies two at about 2:30 bore in the dollar purchase P.M. amount of the and in the num- At case, trial of the instant ber of items. testified that he searched the trunk of something alleged [Emphasis to that at 301. The statement is not de- effect. famatory cryptic on its face. In its con- ours.] text, it cannot said that the defama- The court submitted the slander claim tion is biguous The statement is am- obvious. allegation basis of an equivocal. It can be rea- charg- complaint paragraph sonably toys pur- construed refer ing publish- speaking Korvette acquired chased as, although otherwise Thom- defamatory on No- false words it is doubtful that complaint does vember 1965. The Therefore, Thomas the intention. had defamatory uttered state words proving Mrs. Turner the burden of and, opin- judge noted in his the trial defamatory. understood words to be ion, plaintiff’s pre-trial “the statement Moreover, carry He did burden. singu- pre-trial the final order were ex- Turner certain Mrs. larly respect to this uninstructive with something “they words were act used— deficiencies, Despite incident.” these She did not elaborate.14 effect.” go permitted the court because the incident court, reasons, closely to the main thrust related refusing to direct a verdict of erred plaintiff’s claim. the defendant at conclusion judgment enter n. o. v. evidence and to my opinion, however, this testimo *14 this count. on support ny inde insufficient to an is pendent plain of action because carry to tiff’s failure burden B. The 1969 Slander 12 Pa.

proof on an element. essential provides 1584a(1)(d) specifically retried, Stat. must com- Since case be § this respect plaintiff action that the defamation to made with ment should be recip relating proving admissibility has burden to an “[t]he understanding According alleged communi ient’s [the slander. 1969 meaning.” job evidence, defamatory applied See Thomas cation’s] Greyhound Inc., February Harbridge Lines, Miley Agency v. 294 Detective Miley, (E.D.Pa.1969). Snyder, F.Supp. employee This stat 1969. checking incorporation Re Thom- ute is a verbatim that in testified 613(1) (d). telephoned background The of- Korvette’s statement Torts he § as’ King on this section in- Restatement comment After he of Prussia store. explains plaintiff operator is relieved that he wanted formed what identified this burden if the communication to a who he referred man manager. defamatory Sny- security on its face. Restatement as the himself 613, (1) employee Torts comment on subsection the Korvette that der testified Judgment justified accuracy 14. o. be auditor’s n. v. was said but sensation) ground perception physical (the on the basis of the this alone on slander, addition, rule libel or some that sounds. actions the word defamatory frequently susceptible vari- “the and matter should false words are pleaded meanings, depending be v. the in- haeo vería.” Foltz able Lines, flection, tone, Moore McCormack F.2d and circumstance (2d Cir.), denied, danger The of a mis- cert. 342 U.S. were used. permit (1951). understanding great S.Ct. L.Ed. 655 too Foltz, purpose rule, equivocal proof as stated in in a ease such as this. example, possibility is “to enable the court decide For consider spoke just issues of the words as used Smith that word differ- one apply ently to the and tend to de than him the statement attributed grade eyes community. him in the No defama- witness. substance tory possible . . .” Before are words deemed to connotation if would be defamatory per se, proof said, pur- be Smith in fact “Mr. what unequivocal. was uttered should also chased over a thousand dollars worth of spoken toys.” Proof of the word involves only an accurate recollection of what leaving opinion Part II of this and, scribed after him to wait asked interrogatories special minutes, the submission of back telephone for a few came govern trial, “Well, you shall said, a thief to the at the new if want and (b) go working you, hire the 1969 slander evidence was ahead irrelevant on the issue of Snyder then told malice he was said him.” admitted, lar- not have been as stated arrested for Thomas had been opinion. of this 1965 and under IV-B ceny by in November he in 1965 arrested when he was “and on basis actions about his lied trusted, fired he was not be he could day.”

the same evidence admitted this

The trial court could be

and instructed light the existence to “shed used relating in- back ill will malice or GOVERNMENTOF VIRGIN I think of November 1965.” cident ISLANDS This evi- of discretion. was an abuse question of dence was irrelevant TORRES, Appellant. Emerito allegedly individual who malice. No. 72-1835. identified spoke these words give authority in- character Appeals, and his United States Court Third employees Circuit. formation about clearly years three Over established. Argued Feb. 1973. elapsed the arrest and between had April 4, Decided 1973. Moreover, there telephone conversation. May 7, As Amended to connect evidence Smith was no *15 Brown, the 1965 arrest initiated who prosecution, conversa- with the 1969 nothing Finally, to indi- there was tion. speaker knew

cate untrue; nor were statements anyone Kor-

anything show making or responsible for the vette’s retaining anyone con- records or prosecution knew with the

nected they false. Unless statements be thought untrue

were would part

not indicate malice—even phantom speaker. prejudicial evidence of the admission effect

outweighed proba- very speculative its

tive value. opinion in this

For the reasons stated judgment of the dis-

I reverse the would the case with

trict court and remand n. o. v. to enter directions retry slander count and

the 1965 arrest malicious

false opinion.

counts accordance with Judge in this concurs Van Dusen Judge Mc-

opinion, as well as

Laughlin’s subject opinion, to the under-

standing (a) procedure de-

Case Details

Case Name: Lawrence B. Thomas, and Cross-Appellant v. E. J. Korvette, Inc., and Cross-Appellee
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Date Published: May 3, 1973
Citation: 476 F.2d 471
Docket Number: 71-2061, 71-2062
Court Abbreviation: 3rd Cir.
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