67 Wash. 568 | Wash. | 1912
Lead Opinion
This is an action to foreclose a lien claimed by the plaintiffs upon the interest of the defendant in a certain store building, and the land on which it is situated, in Seattle, for extra' work and for material furnished in remodeling the building under a contract therefor. A decree of foreclosure was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, from which the defendant has appealed.
It is first contended by counsel for appellant that the trial court erred in admitting in evidence a certain book of account containing a record purporting to show the amount of extra work performed upon the building by respondents’ employees in excess of that required by their original contract for the remodeling of the building. This book was kept for
“There can be no doubt that the general principle of testimonial evidence {ante, § 657) should apply here as elsewhere, namely, that the person whose statement is received as testimony should speak from personal observation or knowledge. This principle has often been invoked in excluding entries made by a person who had no personal knowledge of the supposed facts recorded.
“But does this principle necessarily exclude all entries made by persons not having personal knowledge of the facts entered? May not this lack of personal knowledge on the part of the entrant be supplemented by the personal knowledge of some other person whose knowledge is in fact represented in the entry? In other words, if the element of personal knowledge can somehow be adequately supplied by a third person, is it material that the entrant himself did not have this personal knowledge? In order to work out this problem, it is necessary to keep in mind the results already established in connection with the doctrine about memoranda of past recollection {ante, § 751). It was there noticed that a memorandum whose correctness was established by composite testimony could be used; for example, if S has made a written memorandum of a transaction done by him, and has given the writing to B, who has copied it and destroyed the original,*571 then if S swears the original to have been accurately made, and if B swears the copy to be correct, the copy produced is thus by their joint testimony rendered an accurate record of the transaction, although B alone has no personal knowledge of the transaction and although S alone does not know the copy to be correct.”
See, also, 17 Cyc. 392, 394.
Our attention is called to Union Elec. Co. v. Seattle Theater Co., 18 Wash. 213, 51 Pac. 367, in support of appellant’s contentions. A reading of that case will show, however, that the book entries sought to be introduced in evidence were made from data, the correctness of which was not vouched for by any witness nor by any correct legal method whatever. They were not made by one who had knowledge of the original transaction, nor made from data which had been collected or noted by any one in the due course of business.
Other contentions made in behalf of appellant involve nothing but questions of fact. The evidence is very voluminous, and the items involved are also numerous. To analyze these contentions here would only be to recite and argue upon a great mass of details, to no useful purpose. We have read all of the evidence and are convinced therefrom that the trial court was fully warranted in rendering its decree of foreclosure. The judgment is affirmed.
Dunbar, C. J., Gose, and Crow, JJ., concur.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting) — Without reviewing the testimony, for it will serve no purpose, I desire to say that I am not convinced that the items charged as extras are in fact extras. I believe the disputed items were understood by the parties to be included in the original contract. I therefore dissent.