156 Iowa 184 | Iowa | 1912
It was conceded on the trial that
To make clear the relations of the parties and their respective interests under the will in question, it should be stated that proponent James Lawless, a son of testator, was made executor of the will, and that to him was devised an eighty-acre tract of land; that to another son, Michael Lawless, was devised another eighty-acre tract of land, subject to the payment of $1,200 to William Lawless (contestant), the only son of a deceased son of testator; and that to Nellie Lawless, a daughter of testator, with whom he resided at the' time the will was executed, was devised a tract of one hundred and twenty acres of land, with residence property and testator’s personal property.. The will specifically recites that the sons and daughter named were the only living children of testator, and that William Lawless was the only grandchild representing a deceased child, and the reason assigned- for making no other or different provision for William Lawless was that his father had received during his lifetime a fair proportion of testator’s property.
Counsel for appellant cite the case of Lundy v. Lundy, 118 Iowa, 445, as in some way qualifying this rule; but that case seems to be based upon a well-recognized exception, that declarations of the sole devisee tending to show want of mental capacity or undue influence are admissible as declarations against interest. See James v. Fairall, supra. The subsequent cases already cited indicate no other exception, nor do they suggest any inclination on the part of the court to abandon the rule first announced in the Ames case. Many authorities from other states are cited, in our own eases above referred to, to indicate that the rule as we have adopted it is supported by the weight of authority. It would be superfluous to now cite or refer to the cases from other states to which our attention is called by counsel for appellee. They are collected in text-books on the subject. See 1 Underhill, Wills, Section 163; Page, Wills, section 424; 1 Greenleaf, Evidence, section 176; 2 Wigmore, Evidence, section 1081. By these authors the weight of authority is announced as supporting the rule adopted in the Ames case.
It is difficult to see how, in cases similar to that now before us, the will could be treated as consisting of several
The judgment is therefore Affirmed.