DONALDSON V. LAWHEAD, TAMMARA D. LAWHEAD, аnd BRANDON V. LAWHEAD, Plaintiffs, v. THE LAW OFFICES OF JOSEPH MARTIN CARASSO and JOSEPH MARTIN CARASSO, Defendants.
Civil No. 20-520 (JRT/DTS)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
August 31, 2020
JOHN R. TUNHEIM, Chief Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
Mark A. Bloomquist and Travis Jorge Allen, MEAGHER & GEER, PLLP, 33 South Sixth Street, Suite 4400, Minneapolis, MN 55402, for defendants.
Plaintiffs Donaldson V. Lawhead, Tammara D. Lawhead, and Brandon V. Lawhead (collectively, the “Lawheads“) filed this legal malpractice and breach-of-contract аction against their former attorney, Defendant Joseph Martin Carasso and his law office, for allegedly providing negligent legal advice regarding the administration of a family member‘s estate in New York. Carasso filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to
BACKGROUND
I. THE PARTIES
The Lawheаds are residents of Minnesota and were appointed Administrators to the Estate of Michael Blair Lawhead (“Blair Lawhead“), the late son of Donaldson and Tammara, and brother of Brandon. (Compl. at 1, ¶ 3, Feb. 14, 2020, Docket No. 1.) Donaldson and Brandon Lawhead attended William Mitchell College of Law in St. Paul, Minnesota, and run a father-son law рractice, Lawhead Law Office, in Austin, MN.
Carasso is a resident of New York and his solo law practice—the Law Offices of Joseph Martin Carasso—has one office located in New York. (Compl. ¶ 4; Decl. of Joseph Martin Carasso (“1st Carasso Decl.“) ¶ 2, Mar. 10, 2020, Docket No. 8.) Carasso also attended William Mitchell College of Law, but hаs never maintained an office or a license to practice law in Minnesota, nor has he ever advertised or
II. THE PARTIES’ RELATIONSHIP
The parties’ relationship began in 2003, after Blair Lawhead reached out to his father and brother seeking a referral to a New York lawyer for a friend‘s personal injury case. After seeing that Carasso attended William Mitchell College of Law and was a practicing attorney in New York, Brandon Lawhead reached out to Carasso to see if he would take the case. (Aff. of Brandon V. Lawhead (“Lawhead Aff.“) ¶ 3, May 4, 2020, Docket No. 22.) Over the course of their 15-year relationship, the Lawheads refеrred two cases to Carasso in New York, the last of which ended in 2010. (2nd Decl. of Joseph Martin Carasso ¶ 2, May 18, 2020, Docket No. 32.) Carasso also represented Blair Lawhead on four New York real estate matters, the last of which ended in 2009. (Id. ¶ 3.) Prior to 2018, Carasso states that he had not had any contact with the Lawheads since 2010. (Id. ¶ 2.)
On March 14, 2018, Blair Lawhеad passed away intestate after suffering a heart attack while working at his salon located in a studio space in his Cooperative (Co-Op) apartment building in New York. (Compl. ¶ 5.) Within hours after learning of Blair‘s death, Brandon Lawhead contacted Carasso from Minnesota and, within a few days, formally retained Carasso to handle Blair‘s Estate. (Id. ¶¶ 8–9; Lawhead Aff. ¶ 9, Ex. 1 at 2-4, May 4, 2020, Docket No. 21-1.) The Lawheads were concerned about protecting the Estate from Blair‘s partner, Thomas Hoskins, with whom Blair lived but was estranged and attempting to evict.1 (Lawhead Aff. ¶ 8(C).) The Estate primarily consisted of Blair‘s apartment at the Co-Op, his salon at the Co-Op, a home in Hudson, New York, and various othеr valuables, including approximately $45,000 in cash, a violin, and art collection, all of which were located in New York. (Compl. ¶¶ 5–6, 8–9; Lawhead Aff. ¶ 6.)
On the March 14 phone call and in one meeting with Carasso in New York, Carasso allegedly advised Brandon Lawhead that, prior to being appointed Administrator, Brandon (1) had an equal right to be in Blair‘s New Yоrk Apartment; (2) could change the locks on Blair‘s home in Hudson, New York, to keep Hoskins out; (3) could deposit Blair‘s cash into a bank account and use it to pay funeral expenses; and (4) could take the violin to Minnesota for Blair‘s funeral. (Compl. ¶ 10.) Brandon relied on Carasso‘s advice and took actions consistent with it. (Id.) As a result, Hoskins brоught claims for trespass, unlawful ouster, and conversion against the Lawheads in New York federal court. (Id.) The Lawheads allege that Carasso continued to perform negligently by failing to convey a settlement offer to Hoskins, falsely representing to the Lawheads that he was an expert in Estate Litigation and the Surrogates Court in New York, аnd engaging in unauthorized discovery against the Co-Op. (Id. ¶¶ 11–17.)
In October 2018, the Lawheads fired Carasso and refused to pay him his remaining fees and expenses. (1st Carasso Decl. ¶ 12.) Litigation surrounding that dispute is ongoing in New York Surrogates Court. (Id. ¶ 14.)
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 14, 2020, the Lawheads filed this action alleging four Counts: (I)
On March 10, 2020, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to
On July 7, 2020, the Lawheads filed a motion to amend their complaint pursuant to
DISCUSSION
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
II. PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND DUE PROCESS
The Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant only if doing so (1) is consistеnt with the Minnesota‘s long-arm statute,
There are two kinds of personal jurisdiction; general and specific. General jurisdiction is sometimes called “all-purposе” jurisdiction because when a court has general jurisdiction over a defendant it may hear any claim brought against them, “even if all the incidents underlying the claim occurred in a different State.” Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco Cty., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017). General jurisdiction is only appropriate when the defendant is “at home” in the forum Stаte. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014). For an individual, this is typically the State of domicile. Id. For a corporation, the paradigm is the State of incorporation and principal place of business. Id.
Specific personal jurisdiction is sometimes called “case-linked” jurisdiction because it is only proper when the plaintiff‘s cause of action “arise[s] out of or relate[s] to the defendant‘s contacts with the forum” State. Bristol-Meyers, 137 S. Ct. at 1780 (alterations accepted) (quoting Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137)). Put another way, for specific personal jurisdiction to be consistent with the Due Process Clause, there must be a nexus between the forum state itself, the defendant, and the cause of action. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 283–84 (2014). The plaintiff may not be the only link between the Defendant and the forum stаte; the Defendant must have themselves purposefully directed activity at the forum state itself. Id. at 285–86.
With these considerations in mind, the Eighth Circuit‘s personal jurisdiction analysis requires the Court to examine five-factors before deciding whether personal jurisdiction is consistent with the Due Process Clause:
- the nature and quality of the contacts with the forum stаte;
- the quantity of the contacts with the forum state;
- the relation of the cause of action to the contacts;
- the interest of the forum state in providing a forum for its residents; and
- the convenience of the parties.
Bell Paper Box, Inc. v. Trans W. Polymers, Inc., 53 F.3d 920, 922 (8th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). “[T]he first two factors go primarily to whether minimum contacts exist,” the third determines whether the action arises from the contacts, and the last two examine reasonableness and are secondary to the first three primary factors. Yellow Brick Road, LLC, v. Childs, 36 F. Supp. 3d 855, 864 (D. Minn. 2014).
As the Court has stated previously,
The five-factor tеst essentially boils down to three: (1) whether the quality and quantity of the defendants contacts with the forum State establish minimum contacts; (2) whether the litigation arises out of those contacts; and finally, if the first two are met, (3) whether it is reasonable, considering the interest of the forum state and convenience to the parties, to force an оut-of-state litigant to defend itself in the forum state.
Ahlgren v. Muller, 438 F. Supp. 3d 981, 987 (D. Minn. 2020) (citing 13 Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1069 (4th ed.)).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Personal Jurisdiction
Plaintiffs fail to allege any facts to show that Defendants are “at home” in Minnesota. It is undisputed that Carasso is domiciled in New York and is the sole proprietor of his law firm, which only has one office located in New York. Accordingly, the Court lacks general personal jurisdiction over the Defendants.
As for specific personal jurisdiction, while acknowledging that Carasso never physically entered Minnesota, the Lawheads argue the quality and quantity of Defendants’ contacts with Minnesota create sufficient minimum contacts with the State. These contacts include (1) Carasso‘s alleged solicitation of business from the Lawheads in Minnesota for nearly 20 years by phone, mail, and email; (2) the Retainer Agreement and the attorney-client relationship created between the parties; (3) the 150 emails Carasso sent to
The Court disagrees for several reasons. First, it appears that many of the purported contacts Carasso had with Minnesota were not cоntacts with the State at all. For example, the Lawheads argue they had a 20-year relationship with Carasso in which he solicited business from them. In reality, however, the Lawheads acknowledge that they reached out to and solicited Carasso‘s services and did so only because they needed a lawyer in New York, not Minnesota. Additiоnally, it is undisputed that prior to Blair‘s death in 2018, the Lawheads referred only two cases to Carasso—which pertained solely to New York matters—and had not contacted Carasso since 2010.3 The so-called “Minnesota Meeting” regarding Blair‘s estate was in fact, a phone call initiated by Brandon Lawhead to Carasso while Brandon wаs in Minnesota and Carasso was in New York, and the only physical meeting that took place between the parties occurred in New York. None of these contacts can be said to be purposefully directed at Minnesota by Defendants. See Walden, 571 U.S. at 285–86.
Second, contracting with or developing an attorney-client relationship with a resident of the forum state does not, by itself, create personal jurisdiction over the out-of-state defendant. See, e.g., Austad Co. v. Pennie & Edmonds, 823 F.2d 223, 226 (8th Cir. 1987) (“While we do not dispute Austad‘s claim that an attorney-client relationship existed between Austad and Pennie & Edmonds, we do not believe that Pennie & Edmonds had sufficient contacts with South Dakota to confer personal jurisdiction.“)
Third, although the Lawheads rely primarily оn non-precedential cases for support, the Court need not look beyond the Eighth Circuit‘s decision in Austad to decide this case. Austad affirmed the district court‘s dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction under a similar set of facts, even though the law firm in Austad sent two attorneys into the forum state for three days to review documents for the plaintiff-client. Id. at 225–26. The panel noted that рersonal jurisdiction was lacking despite this because the law firm (1) did not maintain
Similar facts exist here. Carasso has never maintained an office in Minnesota or a license to practice law here. He has nevеr advertised or solicited business here. And, much like the defendants in Austad, he did not actively seek out the Lawheads as a client—instead, it was the Lawheads that actively sought to retain Carasso. While it is true that Carasso purposefully sent telephone calls, emails, mail, and a check into Minnesota, these contacts are normal inсidents of representation and do not confer jurisdiction. See, e.g., id.; Viasystems, Inc., 646 F.3d at 594. And unlike the defendants in Austad, Carasso never physically entered the state for any reason related to the underlying cause of action.
Put simply, Carasso‘s only connection to Minnesota is the fortuitous fact that the Lawheads live here and that they attended the same law school as Carasso. When the only contacts a defendant has with the forum state are based on the plaintiffs’ affiliations with the state, the contacts are too attenuated to satisfy Due Process.4 See, e.g., Walden, 571 U.S. at 285 (“Due process requires that a defendant be haled into court in a forum State based on his own affiliation with the State, not based on the ‘random, fortuitous, or attenuated’ contacts he makes by interacting with other persons affiliated with the State.” (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 472 U.S. 462, 475 (1985))).
Accordingly, the Court finds that the quality and quantity of Carasso‘s contacts with Minnesota are insufficient to create minimum contacts and will grant Carasso‘s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to
B. Jurisdictional Discovery
In the alternative, the Lawheads seek jurisdictional discovery. Jurisdictiоnal discovery is warranted when facts that could give rise to jurisdiction are in dispute. Viasystems, 646 F.3d at 598. The Lawheads do not dispute any facts central to the Court‘s reasoning, nor do they provide any reason at all to justify their request for jurisdictional discovery. Instead, the Lawheads urge the Court to permit jurisdictional discovery because there has been none. This is an inadequate reason to grant jurisdictional discovery. Id. Accordingly, the Court will deny the Lawheads request for jurisdictional discovery.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
- Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Docket No. 5.] is GRANTED without prejudice;
- Plaintiffs’ request for Jurisdictional discovery contained in their responsive briefing [Docket No. 20] is DENIED.
DATED: August 31, 2020 at Minneapolis, Minnesota.
JOHN R. TUNHEIM
Chief Judge
United States District Court