Law v. Verde Valley Medical CenterLaw v. Verde Valley Medical Center
¶ 1 Dee Ann Law (“Plaintiff’), for herself and on behalf of statutory beneficiaries, Ariel and James Law, appeals the trial court’s judgment in her medical malpractice claim against Appellee Verde Valley Medical Center (“WMC”) for wrongful death. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶ 2 Plaintiffs decedent, Phillip Law (“Law”), died from a subdural hematoma in August 2001. Plaintiff alleged in her complaint that Law had been brought to WMC at approximately 10 p.m. on August 4, 2001 “with a history of head trauma secondary to falling and striking his heаd, and with certain neurological symptoms.” Law was also “very intoxicated.”
¶3 Law fell again in the emergency department. After having left Law alone so that he could use a portable urinal, a nurse for WMC discovered Law unconscious on the floor. Law was then treated at the medical center. As his condition deteriorated he was transferred to the critical care unit and, eventually, transferred to Saint Joseph’s
¶ 4 Plaintiff sued WMC and Drs. Brenda Howland and Vishal Chaurasia, who treated Law at WMC, alleging medical malpractice and seeking compensatory and punitive damages. Plaintiff claimed that emergency room рersonnel negligently failed to properly attend to Law, communicate with and enlist the aid of doctors, and institute proper precautions to prevent his fall. She also alleged that WMC “intentionally disregarded imposing protective safety steps before and after this incident, which is the equivalent of intending that harm occur to its patients.”
¶ 5 Plaintiff alleged that Drs. Chaurasia and Howland breached the applicable standard of care and caused Law’s death by failing tо properly diagnose and treat his condition. Prior to trial, however, both doctors were dismissed with prejudice. Dr. Chaurasia was dismissed pursuant to a stipulation in conjunction with a settlement agreement, and Dr. Howland was dismissed upon Plaintiffs motion.
¶ 6 The case proceeded against WMC and was tried for eight days to a jury, which returned a defense verdict. The trial court entered judgment in favor of WMC and awarded WMC its costs and sanctions pursuant to Rule 68, Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff raises sеveral issues on appeal. Because only our resolution of the vicarious liability issue merits publication, we have addressed Plaintiffs other issues in a separate memorandum decision issued contemporaneously with this opinion. See AR-CAP 28(g); Ariz. R. Sup.Ct. 111(h).
THE DISMISSALS WITH PREJUDICE OF THE DOCTORS ELIMINATED ANY VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF WMC FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE DOCTORS
¶ 7 Priоr to trial, the court granted summary judgment in favor of WMC on its potential vicarious liability for the alleged negligence of Drs. Howland and Chaurasia. “We review the grant of summary judgment
de novo,
and view the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light mоst favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was entered.”
Duncan v. Scottsdale Med. Imaging, Ltd.,
¶ 8 WMC moved for summary judgment on its alleged vicarious liability for the conduct of Drs. Howland and Chaurasia after the trial court’s dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiffs claims against these doctors. WMC аrgued that “where the master’s liability is based solely on the negligent acts of his servant, a judgment in favor of the servant relieves the master of any liability” and that “a dismissal with prejudice is the equivalent of a judgment on the merits.”
See DeGraff v. Smith,
¶ 9 Plaintiff argues on appeal that
DeGraff
is “no longer good law” because the “concept of joint and several liability has been abolished in Arizona” by the enaсtment of the current statutory provisions comprising the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (“UCATA”), Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 12-2501 to -2509 (2003). She contends that under UCATA, WMC should be held hable for the neghgence of the doctors even though the doctors have bеen dismissed with prejudice. She further argues that the remedy under UCATA for “one who is hable for the acts of its servant (or independent contractor) is to seek contribution against the agent or servant.” She concludes, therefore, that summary judgment on vicarious liability should not have been granted in favor of WMC. We disagree because
¶ 10 We first observe that Plaintiff cites no cases holding that the
DeGraff
prinсiples have been overruled or rendered inapplicable by UCATA.
1
We also note that Arizona courts have discussed, with apparent approval, the pertinent principles from
DeGraff
in cases decided after the enactment of UCA-TA.
See, e.g., Ford v. Revlon,
¶ 11 Furthermore, even though UCA-TA has abrogated joint liability for most tortfeasors, UCATA has not changed the law regarding vicarious liability. Section 12-2506, in pertinent part, provides:
§ 12-2506. Joint and several liability abolished; exception; apportionment of degrees of fault; definitions
A. In an action for personal injury, property damage or wrongful death, the liability of each defendant for damages is several only аnd is not joint, except as otherwise provided in this section. Each defendant is liable only for the amount of damages allocated to that defendant in direct proportion to that defendant’s percentage of fault, and a sеparate judgment shall be entered against the defendant for that amount. To determine the amount of judgment to be entered against each defendant, the trier of fact shall multiply the total amount of damages recoverable by thе plaintiff by the percentage of each defendant’s fault, and that amount is the maximum recoverable against the defendant.
D. The liability of each defendant is several only and is not joint, except that a party is responsible for thе fault of another person, or for payment of the proportionate share of another person, if any of the following applies:
1. Both the party and the other person were acting in concert.
2. The other person was acting as an agent or servant of the party.
3. The party’s liability for the fault of another person arises out of a duty created by the federal employers’ liability act,45 United States Code § 51 .
¶ 12 Our supreme court recognized the distinction between traditional joint tortfea-sors and a master’s vicarious liability for a servant’s negligence in DeGraff:
Defendant DeGraff contends that joint tort-feasors are those who jointly, or by some concerted action, commit the wrong, and that active participatiоn in the alleged negligence is necessary to constitute a person a joint tort-feasor. It is the defendant’s contention that this is a case of master and servant and that the master’s responsibility does not make him a joint tortfeasor, but thаt his liability is solely derivative. With this proposition we agree.
DeGraff,
Joint liability and vicarious liability are related but separate doctrines. The joint liability that was abolished byA.R.S. § 12-2506(D) was limited to that class of joint tortfeasors whose independent negligence coalesced to form a single injury. In contrast to those whose liability was vicarious only, each was personаlly at fault to some degree, though each was wholly liable for full damages.Section 12-2506 changed that. Each is now “liable only for the amount of damages allocated to that defendant in direct proportion to that defen dant’spercentage of fault.” A.R.S. § 12-2506(A) . Butsection 12-2506(D) preserves joint liability for both true joint tortfeasors (those “acting in concert”) and those vicariously liable for the fault of others. Those whose liability is only vicarious have no fault to allocate.Section 12-2506(D) recognizes this by stating that “a party is responsible for thе fault of another person ... if the other person was acting as an agent or servant of the party.” We see this as a simple acknowledgement that those whose liability is only vicarious are fault free — someone else’s fault is imputed to them by operation of law. The quoted language just makes express that which is implicit — the statute does not affect the doctrine of vicarious liability.
Wiggs v. City of Phoenix,
¶ 13 Therefore, UCATA has not changed the law pertaining to vicarious liability, and we reject Plaintiffs argument that the principles from
DeGraff
are no longer applicable. When a judgment on the merits — including a dismissal with prejudice — is entered in favor of the “other person” in
¶ 14 Plaintiff also relies on
§ 12-2504 . Release or covenant not to sue
If a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith to one of two or more persons hable in tort for thе same injury or the same wrongful death both of the following apply:
1. It does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability for the injury or wrongful death unless its terms so provide, but it reduces the claim against the others to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the covenant or in the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater.
2. It discharges the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for contribution to any other tortfeasor.
Plaintiff’s interpretation of this statute may be correct: a release of one joint tortfeasor does not necessarily release other joint tort-feasors. But this statute does not apply here for two reasons.
¶ 15 First, by its terms
¶ 16 Second,
CONCLUSION
¶ 17 We affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to WMC on its alleged
Notes
. UCATA was originally enacted in 1984. Various sections have been amended thereafter.
. In fact, it appears from the record that one of the doctors was dismissed with prejudice in the absence of any settlement pаyment or release.
. Because we have assumed in this analysis that the doctrine of respondeat superior was applicable, we have not addressed such questions as whether the doctors were independent contractors or whether the doctrine of apparent or ostensible authority might apply.