2006 Ohio 7010 | Ohio Ct. App. | 2006
{¶ 2} The Laws have owned residential property located at 6965 Ravenna Road, Painesville, Ohio, since 1971. Shortly after acquiring the property, the Laws landscaped the back portion of their property, planting shrubs, grass and a garden, and building a tool shed. In 1978, the Laws built a children's playhouse at the back of their property.
{¶ 3} The property located directly behind the Laws' residence was formerly owned by CSX Transportation, Inc. In October 1990, this property was purchased, by quitclaim deed, by Lake Metroparks. In 2003, Lake Metroparks had a survey done of the property, which indicated that Lake Metroparks was entitled to the area at the rear of the Laws' property, measuring 15 feet deep and 207 feet wide.
{¶ 4} On August 3, 2005, the Laws filed a complaint against Lake Metroparks, seeking a declaration that they are "the true and lawful owners" of the disputed property. Lake Metroparks answered and asserted a counterclaim for trespass. Lake Metroparks moved for summary judgment on the Laws' complaint and on its counterclaim.
{¶ 5} On March 31, 2006, the court of common pleas entered judgment denying Lake Metroparks' motion for summary judgment as to both the claim and counterclaim. This appeal timely follows.
{¶ 6} On appeal, Lake Metroparks raises the following assignment of error: "The trial court erred to the prejudice of Defendant-Appellant in overruling its motion for summary judgment made at the close of Plaintiff-Appellee's case."
{¶ 7} Pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C), summary judgment is proper when (1) the evidence shows "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact" to be litigated, (2) "[t]he moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law," and (3) "it appears from the evidence * * * that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party being entitled to have the evidence * * * construed most strongly in the party's favor." A trial court's decision to grant summary judgment is reviewed by an appellate court under a de novo standard of review. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co.,
{¶ 8} The issue presented by Lake Metroparks is whether the statute of limitations in an adverse possession claim continues to accrue where the subject property is owned by a political subdivision of the state of Ohio. Stated otherwise, we must decide whether a political subdivision of the state of Ohio may be divested of real property through adverse possession.
{¶ 9} In Houck v. Bd. of Park Commrs., 6th Dist. No. H-05-018,
{¶ 10} In Ohio, the principle of "nullum tempus occurrit regi," i.e. "time does not obstruct the rights of government," bars the acquisition of land owned by "the general and state governments" by adverse possession or prescription. Haynes v. Jones (1915),
{¶ 11} The reason for the general rule that "the statute of limitations does not apply to bar the rights of the public" being "that the same active vigilance cannot be expected of it, as is known to characterize that of a private person, always jealous of his rights and prompt to repel any invasion of them." Heddleston v. Hendricks (1895),
{¶ 12} The rule that municipalities and instrumentalities of the state were immune from the running of the statute of limitations applied most consistently to encroachments on public roads and rights of way.1
The earliest of these cases held that encroachments on lands dedicated as public highways, even if neither required nor used for public travel, were "not necessarily adverse to the public," i.e. such use was permissive, and, there, the passage of time did not bar the reclamation of such lands by the public. Lane v. Kennedy (1861),
{¶ 13} Thereafter, additional reasons were adduced for barring the acquisition of public lands by adverse possession. In Little Miami RR.Co. v. Commrs. of Greene Cty. (1877),
{¶ 14} In reaching the conclusion that Lake Metroparks is not entitled to immunity against the Laws' adverse possession claim, the court below relied on Brown v. Bd. of Edn. (1969),
{¶ 15} The Brown court reconciled these cases by considering the function being performed by the school board in each case. The court noted that, in Volk, the issue involved a school board's tort liability. In Gibson, the action was based on a contractual obligation. After considering the statutes setting forth the corporate powers of a board of education, the court concluded these statutes authorized property claims against a board of education. The court reasoned that, "since Section
{¶ 16} In applying Brown to the present case, the trial court noted that the board of park commissioners of a park district is "a body politic and corporate and may sue and be sued." R.C.
{¶ 17} We disagree that the Brown decision governs the outcome in this case. Several appellate courts, including this one, have limitedBrown to the facts upon which it was decided. See Wyatt v. Ohio Dept. ofTransp. (Lake 1993),
{¶ 18} The property at issue in the present case is the Metroparks Greenway Bikeway, a bicycle trail linking Painesville and Concord Township. The character of this land as a public ground distinguishes this case from Brown and the other cases which have allowed the acquisition of land from political subdivisions through adverse possession. Although not a properly dedicated public street or highway, the Greenway Bikeway, a space opened and dedicated for public use and travel, falls within the scope of immunity for public roads as judicially recognized in the early cases. As discussed above, it has been ruled that encroachments on public roads constituted a public nuisance, which "no length of time can legalize." Little Miami,
{¶ 19} A public nuisance has been statutorily defined in Ohio since 1857 as the obstruction, "by fences, building, structures, or otherwise," of "any public ground or highway." Heddleston,
{¶ 20} The Brown case is also distinguishable because it involved property owned by a board of education. In deciding Brown, the Supreme Court was trying to reconcile conflicting decisions on the issue of whether a board of education was included within the state's sovereign immunity. As regards a park district established under R.C. Chapter 1545, the Supreme Court has always held that such districts are full "beneficiaries of the state's sovereign immunity." Schenkolewski v.Cleveland Metroparks Sys. (1981),
{¶ 21} Since this court has previously limited the application ofBrown to its facts and Brown is factually and legally distinguishable from the present case, the trial court incorrectly applied its holding in this case. As public grounds, the Metroparks' bikeway is not subject to acquisition by adverse possession.
{¶ 22} Even if Brown did apply to the facts of the present case, the statutes delineating the corporate powers of a park district do not authorize the acquisition of park property by adverse possession. The statute enabling a park district to engage in litigation provides that the board of a park district "may sue and be sued as provided in section
{¶ 23} Finally, public policy compels the conclusion that the right of private persons to acquire public lands by adverse possession or prescription be extremely limited. It has long been recognized that "the same active vigilance cannot be expected of [political subdivisions], as is known to characterize that of a private person." Heddleston,
{¶ 24} For the foregoing reasons, the sole assignment of error is with merit. The judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas is reversed and this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J., concurs,
COLLEEN MARY OTOOLE, J., dissents.