367 Pa. 170 | Pa. | 1951
Opinion by
Plaintiff brought an action in trespass for personal injuries sustained on November 19, 1948, in Miami, Florida, while he was employed as a pantry-man waiter on defendant’s interstate train. Plaintiff is not a resident of Pennsylvania nor are any of the witnesses to the accident. Defendant is a foreign railroad corporation incorporated under the laws of Virginia and having its principal office in Wilmington, North Carolina. Defendant is not registered to do business in Pennsylvania, and has designated no agent upon whom process may be served in Pennsylvania. The summons in this case was served on the General Agent of the defendant at the Freight Office in Philadelphia.
The court sustained preliminary objections (filed under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure No. 1017 (b) (1)) to the Complaint which was brought under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, and set aside the service of process on the ground that defendant corporation was not “doing business” in Philadelphia County under Rule 2179 (a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, which establishes the venue in actions against corporations.
While defendant was doing considerable business, as we shall see, in Philadelphia County, the question involved is whether it was “doing business” within the meaning of our decisions concerning service of process, and whether to sustain this suit would constitute an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce in violation of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution of the United States.
It is well settled that whether a state court has jurisdiction of an action brought therein under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act is to be determined
“There is no general principle which conclusively establishes in every case what constitutes ‘doing business’. Each case is governed by its own particular facts. Mere solicitation of business within the commonwealth does not in itself constitute the ‘doing of business’. It must be ‘solicitation plus other activities:’ International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U. S. 310; Frene v. Louisville Cement Co., 131 Fed. 2d 511”:
We shall therefore briefly summarize the important pertinent facts from the lengthy stipulation and supple-' mental stipulation of facts filed by the parties:
Defendant operates a railroad as a common carrier of passengers and freight in six southern states, the northernmost of which is Virginia. It has never owned or operated any railroad line, station, terminal, yard, shop or other transportation facilities in Pennsylvania. Passenger and freight cars owned by it travel between New York City and Washington, D. C., through Philadelphia, in interstate commerce, as a part of trains operated by the Pennsylvania Railroad Company.
Defendant has maintained for a number of years a passenger office and a freight office in Philadelphia, for the purpose of soliciting business in Eastern Pennsylvania, Delaware and Southern New Jersey, from persons in this area who wish to travel or ship over defendant’s lines. At the time of institution of suit there were three employees in the passenger office, including a “Division Passenger Agent”, and four employees in the freight office, including a “General
The local freight office solicits outbound and inbound freight business and gives such information to shippers as will induce them to patronize defendant’s lines. Employees of this office call on from 3700 to 4000 prospective customers in the territory per year and send monthly reports to the Home Office showing the total freight tonnage from this area destined to travel over defendant’s lines. In 1947 17,000 carloads of freight originated in this area. It does not appear what percentage this was of the total freight carried by defendant, or hoio much of it originated in Philadelphia County. The freight office handles no cash, way bills or bills of lading, but does trace several hundred lost or delayed shipments per year by telephone or wire inquiries to offices of defendant located in the South.
Defendant has an office in Pittsburgh, the activities of which are substantially the same as those in Philadelphia.
The aforesaid facts are very similar to the facts in Shambe v. Delaware & Hudson R. R. Co., 288 Pa. 240, 135 A. 755 and Green v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
The passenger office endeavors to “drum up” business throughout the territory and to get groups of passengers, such as athletic teams and convention-bound parties, as well as individual passengers to travel on defendant’s lines. Information pamphlets such as railroad maps and time tables are distributed at this office. If complaints are made by passengers residing in the territory, the Home Office notifies the Philadelphia Office, which in turn contacts the complaining parties and attempts to pacify them. No adjustments are handled through the local office.
When requests for passage over defendant’s lines are received, the prospective passengers are advised whether reservations are available and when they may visit the office to purchase their tickets. Tickets are obtained by the local office from the connecting line over which defendant’s cars are transported to Washington, D. 0. The passenger office gives defendant’s “street orders” (72 hour credit extension slips bearing the name of the prospective passengers and their destinations ) to the connecting line; and after cash has been received by the local office from the prospective passenger for the tickets, this cash is turned over to the connecting line, which returns the “street orders”. When requested, the passenger office also obtains reservations and tickets for return northbound trips.
In 1947, between 2800 and 3000 passengers obtained tickets in the manner described above through the local office and in addition reservations were arranged for between 250 and 350 passengers who bought their tickets directly from connecting lines. It does not appear what percentage this was of the total passenger business or how much of it was developed in Philadelphia County.
The leading Pennsylvania case on the question of what constitutes “doing business” sufficient for service of process is Shambe v. Delaware & Hudson R. R. Co., 288 Pa. 240, 135 A. 755; and one of the leading United States decisions on this point is Green v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry., 205 U. S. 530, which was cited and quoted with approval in Shambe v. Delaware & Hudson R. R. Co., supra. The facts in Shambe v. Delaware & Hudson R. R. Co., 288 Pa. 240, 135 A. 755, are almost identical with the facts in the present case with respect to freight traffic; the facts in the present case as to both passenger and freight activities are almost identical with those in Green v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry., 205 U. S. 530. Both of said cases held that the defendant could not be served within the County or
In Shambe v. R. R., the defendant operated a part of its railroad in the northeastern part of Pennsylvania and was engaged in both inter- and intra-state commerce, and had registered and appointed the Secretary of the Commonwealth as its agent to accept service in accordance with the Act of June 8, 1911, P. L. 710. In this respect it was a stronger case for plaintiff than the present case, yet the Court found it was not “doing business” and could not be served in Philadelphia County, in spite of the combined effect of all its business activities therein. The only important factor which is present here, but not in Shambe v. R. R., or in Green
Order affirmed.
Italics throughout, ours.