120 A. 523 | Md. | 1923
This suit was brought in the Superior Court of Baltimore City against the appellee and William B. Rennie to recover damages for injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligent operation of an automobile by the appellee, but was subsequently dismissed as to William B. Rennie.
The narr. charges that the defendant owned and operated an automobile, and that while the same was being operated by him in Baltimore City, "and while the infant plaintiff was lawfully riding therein as an invited guest of the * * * defendant, and because of the careless, negligent and reckless driving and operation of said automobile by the * * * defendant * * * the said vehicle was caused to leave the roadbed in which it was running, and caused to collide with a wall, whereby the * * * plaintiff, without any negligence or carelessness whatever on his part contributing to the same, suffered serious and permanent injuries." The verdict and judgment in the court below being for the defendant, the plaintiff has brought this appeal, the record of which contains three exceptions to the rulings of the court below on the evidence, *224 and one to the granting of defendant's fourth, sixth and seventh prayers.
The plaintiff testified that, while he was on the corner of North and Madison Avenues talking to some young men, about 10 o'clock at night of October 5th, 1920, the defendant and his cousin, a young lady, drove up in a two-seated roadster and invited him to get in; that he got in, and after driving around for a while they drove down to the W., B. A. Station in order that the defendant's cousin might catch a car for her home in Anne Arundel County; that when they got to the station they found that it was too late for her car, and the defendant decided to take her to her home, beyond Glenburnie, on the Annapolis Road; that they took her to her home and waited there about five minutes until she got into her house, and that as they started back to Baltimore he told the defendant that he was tired, that he could take his time, and that he, the plaintiff, would try to get a little sleep; that he dozed off from time to time until he got to the Hanover Street bridge, when he got wide awake and found that the defendant was in pursuit of or chasing two motorcycles; that he noticed that one of the motorcycles had its rear light out; that he heard the defendant yell to the man, a colored man, to stop, but he did not answer, and that made the defendant mad, and the defendant was chasing him, "to have him locked up or something," he did not know what the defendant wanted to do with the man; that the defendant was driving at the rate of between fifty and fifty-five miles an hour, and that he, plaintiff, took out his fountain pen and note book for the purpose of taking the number of the motorcycle as soon as he got a chance; that as they approached Ostend Street, driving at the rate mentioned, the motorcycle, which was ahead and a little to the right of them, and moving a little faster, "swerved over" towards the front of the car; that he did not know whether the colored man did it for the purpose of causing an accident, or intended to turn down Ostend Street; that the defendant, instead of going straight ahead, which he could have done without hitting the motorcycle, also turned to the *225 left and seemed to lose control of his car, and the car struck the wall of a house with great force, wrecking the car and causing the injuries complained of. The plaintiff further testified that, when he discovered that the defendant was chasing the motorcycle and driving at the rate mentioned, the only thing he did was to take out his fountain pen and note book for the purpose of making a note of the number of the motorcycle.
The defendant testified that he met the plaintiff on the night of the accident at the corner of Madison and North Avenues, where he had stopped to get some cigarettes; that he and the plaintiff got to talking about the car, and the plaintiff asked him where he was going, and that when he told the plaintiff that he was going to take his cousin "to the train to go home," the plaintiff asked him if he could go along; that they drove down to Camden Station, and when he found that they had missed his cousin's train he proposed to the plaintiff that they drive her to her home at Boone Station, and said to him that if he preferred it he would take him home first; that they took his cousin home, and that on their way back, driving at about eighteen miles an hour and going north on Hanover Street, when they got to Ostend Street "there happened to be a motorcycle ahead of me" and it "swerved to the left practically compelled me to do that way to avoid hitting him, and as I swerved my car to the left I practically lost control of it at that time"; that he ran into the wall of the house and must have hit it with "considerable force"; that his car was "a very speedy car * * * and just as soon as I lost control of my car my foot may have gone down on my accelerator, which made the car shoot out very fast and hit that wall"; that he turned the car to the left to avoid hitting the man; that at the time the motorcycle turned in front of him he, the defendant, was going about eighteen miles an hour, and that at no time did the plaintiff protest against the speed of his car.
The defendant was called as a witness for the plaintiff, and after stating that he had had a hearing in reference to the *226
accident "in the Traffic Court of Baltimore City" he was asked: "Now, will you be good enough to tell us the verdict in that case?" On cross-examination he was again asked whether there was "a hearing in the traffic court as the result of this accident," and "What the verdict of the traffic court was," and the refusal of the court to permit the witness to answer these questions is the subject of the first three exceptions. The appellant contends that the evidence referred to in these exceptions was admissible under the ruling of this Court in the case of Mattingly v.Montgomery,
At the conclusion of the case the court below granted, as we have said, the defendant's fourth, sixth and seventh prayers. The fourth prayer was approved by this Court in Sullivan v.Smith,
We see no serious objection to the seventh prayer. It submits to the finding of the jury the facts testified to by the defendant, and also the question whether the defendant did what any ordinary prudent man would have done under such circumstances.
Finding no reversible error in any of the rulings of the court below, the judgment will be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed, with costs. *230