18 Ga. 668 | Ga. | 1855
By the Court.
delivering the opinion.
The Act being interpreted by these decisions, it follows that the mere execution of the mortgage to Hindsman and Sergeant by Lavender, as stated in the bill, was not a violation of the Act.
The bill, however, states other objections to these mortgages.
This statement is a very uncertain one. The former part of it, however, the part alleging the non-existence of any real debt, has equity in it; and although this part may be in the .alternative with the latter part, yet, as under the late Act of Amendments it is amendable, as a matter of course, we will only say that the Court below ought to require it to be amended; and ought, if it is not amended, to dismiss the bill, as to Hindsman.
For in the alternate part of the statement, there is, as it -seems to us, no equity. Wo are not aware of any law which prevents a debtor, unable to pay all his creditors, from “ splitting up” a large debt into small ones, so as to enable the 'holder of that debt to obtain judgment in a Justice’s Court •sooner than the other creditors who have to sue in the higher ‘Courts may be able to obtain judgments on their debts, and thereby, to enable that debt to get a preference over these. The Act aforesaid, of 1818, is not such a law. That prohibits assignments, and assignments only. Equity does not forbid an insolvent debtor to prefer one of his creditors to another. (Stor. Eq. §370.) And then, the Act of 1801, amending the Judiciary Acts, as far as they relate to Justice’s Courts, gives its express sanction to such a division or
'[2.] The mere fact, then, that Ilindsman’s debt was “ split up,” so as to be brought within the jurisdiction of a Justice’s ■Court, was not a fact in which there was, in the opinion of this Court, any equity.
The objections to the other mortgage, that of Lavender to Sargeant, it is needless to consider, as the Court sustained the demurrer as to Sargeant.
Yisscher was a proper party plaintiff to the bill. One of the objects of the bill was to compel Lavender to perform his contract of purchase of the mill, &c. Yisscher was joint owner of the mill, &c. with Thomas when Thomas sold them to Lavender. The bill containing a prayer that Lavender, the vendee, should perform what was to be done on his side of the contract, Avould have, also, to contain an offer by his vendors to perform what was to be done on their side. That there might be such an offer, Yisscher, who was owner <of the mills, &c. jointly with Thomas, and one of the vendors, had to be a party to the bill. Yisscher was a party to the contract for the specific performance of which the bill prayed.
Was the Superior Court of Houston County, the Court which had jurisdiction of the case ?
The defendants, with the exception of Lavender, resided in other counties than Houston, and ho resided in Texas.
The great object of the bill is, to have the fund which is in the hands of the Sheriff of Houston applied in a particular way. It is true that no subpoena is prayed against the Sher
Considering the bill, then, as if he were a party to it. We answer the question, by saying that the Court in Houston was the Court which had jurisdiction of this case and of the defendants, although most of them resided, not in Houston, but in other counties.
In Gilbert vs. Hardwick, (3 Kelly, 575,) this Court say, that “Equity cases are not embraced in the term ‘civil cases,’ as used in sec. 1, art. 3 of the Constitution.” In Rice vs. Tarver, (4 Ga. R. 582,) they re-affirm this. In the cases of Jordan vs. Jordan and others, 12 Ga. R. 78, 15 Ga. R. 76, 16 Ga. R. 446,) there is nothing said by the Qourt, adverse to this position. In the last of these cases I, for myself, express a doubt as to whether the expression, “civil cases,” used in the Constitution,, does not include Equity cases. I still entertain that doubt, but I cannot, upon a doubt, dissent from the majority of the Court, supported, as they are, by two decisions of this Court, and many decisions, (as I am aware,) of the- Superior Courts.
That.being so, the best county in which to bring this suit,
The only objection which the bill states to the demand off Carver & Johnson is, that it had Ifcen “ split up” into smaller demands, that it might be brought within the jurisdiction off a Justice’s Court. This, as we have already seen, was not a good objection.
We think, therefore, that the Court should have sustained, the demurrer, so far as Carver & Johnson were concerned.
And this disposes of the case.