198 So. 459 | Ala. Ct. App. | 1940
This cause originated in the Recorder's Court of the City of Tuscaloosa. From an adverse decision and judgment in said court, the defendant regularly appealed to the circuit court, and from a like decision and judgment in the circuit court this appeal was taken.
On this appeal the appellant has, as the law requires, assigned error, based upon four grounds, all of the same import, and as we see it, the only question presented by this appeal for our consideration is the constitutionality vel non of Ordinance No. 311, as amended, of the City of Tuscaloosa. Said ordinance provides in brief, that persons not having modern toilet facilities, connected with the city sewerage system, shall build and maintain certain specified *504 types of "sanitary privies." The amended ordinance further provides that these sanitary privies shall be cleaned by the city scavenger, and for this service the city collects a schedule of fees from the persons so served. The ordinance makes the failure or refusal to pay the fees, when they become due and payable, a criminal offense. The prosecution in this case was based upon a complaint, filed by the city charging appellant with violating the aforesaid ordinance.
In answer to said complaint the defendant interposed demurrer based upon the grounds that said ordinance was violative of the Constitution of the State of Alabama; in that, it attempted to imprison the defendant for debt; and that it was violative of the Constitution of the United States, in that it deprived the defendant of the protection of the due-process of law clause of the XIVth amendment thereof. The further insistence, by demurrer, was to the effect that said ordinance was violative of the Federal and State Constitutions, in that it failed to sufficiently define the standard of guilt, and that the complaint was vague and indefinite, in that it did not sufficiently inform the defendant of what he was called upon to defend, or allow a reasonable joinder of issue thereon.
The action of the trial court in overruling the demurrer is made the premise upon which this appeal was taken.
With reference to the insistences, (1) that the ordinance, aforesaid, was violative of the Constitution of the United States in that it deprived the defendant of the protection of the due-process of law clause of the XIV amendment; (2) that said ordinance was violative of the Federal and State Constitution because it failed to sufficiently define the standard of guilt, and (3) that the complaint was vague and indefinite in that it did not sufficiently inform the defendant of what he was called upon to defend, or allow a reasonable joinder of issue thereon, we may only say, that each of the foregoing insistences is wholly without merit. There appears no controversy, or question, as to the regularity of the adoption, ordination and promulgation of the ordinance in question by the Board of Commissioners, the regularly constituted authority of said city; and it clearly appears that the ordinance itself is a complete answer to, and a refutation of, the several insistences above enumerated. No further discussion of these questions is deemed necessary, hence will not be indulged, except to say municipal ordinances are presumed to be reasonable, not arbitrary or discriminatory, and the rule is, one claiming that an ordinance is unreasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory, is under the burden of alleging, and proving, facts to support such claim or insistence.
The remaining contention of appellant, towit: "That ordinance No. 311, as amended, of the City of Tuscaloosa, is violative of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of Alabama, 1901, in that it violates the citizen's immunity from imprisonment for debt," appears to be the principal insistence of error to effect a reversal of the judgment of the lower court from which this appeal was taken.
The City of Tuscaloosa, appellee, had the authority, under police powers, to enact the ordinance upon which this prosecution was based. It also had the authority to make proper and reasonable regulations therein for the preservation of the health of its inhabitants, and to enforce such regulations by providing for a reasonable penalty for the violation thereof, and the willful neglect or refusal to comply with the provisions of such ordinance; that is to say, with the public duty therein prescribed which may be made a crime without violating Section 20 of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of Alabama 1901, as here insisted.
The immunity from imprisonment for debt contemplated and provided in said Section 20 of the Constitution has application to, and is limited to, debts arising out of contract. Bray v. State,
What has hereinabove been said is in line with the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Alabama, in the case of L. E. Benson v. City of Andalusia,
Further discussion need not be had. It follows, therefore, that no error prevailed in the action of the trial court in overruling defendant's demurrer to the complaint. The judgment appealed from will stand affirmed.
Affirmed.