LaVallee v. PerrinLaVallee v. Perrin
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The plaintiff, Paul J. LaVallee, appeals from the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in which he challenged the constitutionality of
On October 24, 1977, the plaintiff was convicted of aggravated assault under
*36“I. If a court finds that a convicted person is more than twenty-one years of age, he may be sentenced according to paragraph II if the court also finds that....
(d) he manifested exceptional cruelty or depravity in inflicting death or serious bodily injury on the victim of his crime.”
“II. If authorized by paragraph I, a person may be sentenced to an extended term of imprisonment. An extended term is, for a person convicted of:
(a) Any felony, other than murder, a minimum to be fixed by the court of not more than ten years and a maximum to be fixed by the court of not more than thirty years;
The court made specific findings on which the extended sentence was based. The trial court’s application of the provisions of
Subsequently, in August 1979, after a hearing in the Hillsborough County Superior Court, the plaintiff’s petition alleging that his extended sentence was excessive and disproportionate to the crime was denied.
The plaintiff then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the superior court on December 12, 1980, raising the issues presently before us. The State moved to dismiss, based largely, it appears, on our decision in State v. Morehouse, 120 N.H. 738, 424 A.2d 798 (1980), in which we held that the imposition of an enhanced sentence did not violate the accused’s due process rights. The Court (Wyman, J.) granted the State’s motion to dismiss.
On April 24, 1981, LaVallee petitioned the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire for a writ of habeas corpus, raising the same issues, and alleging that he had exhausted his State remedies. The United States District Court (Devine, C.J.) denied the petition, ruling that the plaintiff had not exhausted his State remedies because the issues raised in the petition were distinct from those considered in State v. Morehouse.
The plaintiff then filed another petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the superior court. On February 8,1982, the Court (Goode, J.) denied the petition, noting that the question concerning the constitutionality of
*37The crux of LaVallee’s argument is that he has been penalized for electing to plead not guilty and go to trial. He asserts in his brief that no person who has pleaded guilty has ever been sentenced under the provisions of
We are mindful of the fact that the trial court declined to give the plaintiff an opportunity to present evidence in support of his claim that
The plaintiff’s contention that it is impermissible to distinguish between defendants who plead guilty and defendants who plead not guilty and go to trial ignores the realities of the plea-bargaining process. “[T]he standard of punishment is necessarily different for those who plead and for those who go to trial.” Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 224 n.14 (1978). That the plea-bargaining process is relied upon as a means of disposing of criminal charges is a proposition too obvious to be disputed. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 31 n.18 (1973). It is recognized that encouraging a guilty plea by offering substantial benefits in return for the plea is constitutionally permissible. Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. at 219. One benefit is the possibility of a lesser sentence in exchange for a guilty plea. Id. at 223; State v. Fraser, 120 N.H. 117, 122-23, 411 A.2d 1125, 1129 (1980). In this State, we have rejected the notion that it is impermissible to compensate one who pleads guilty by extending him a proper degree of leniency. State v. Fraser, 120 N.H. at 123, 411 A.2d at 1129.
LaVallee’s claim that he has been punished for pursuing his constitutional right to trial by jury in violation of his right to equal protection of the law is merely the same argument phrased con*38versely. The case of Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212 (1978), is of particular relevance to a consideration of the claims LaVallee raises in this appeal. In Corbitt, the defendant pleaded not guilty, was tried, and was convicted of murder. Id. at 216. He was sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment. Id. On appeal, he argued that the possibility of a sentence of less than life upon the plea of non vult (legally equivalent to a plea of nolo contendere), combined with the absence of a similar possibility when convicted by a jury, was an unconstitutional burden upon his right to a jury trial, as well as a violation of equal protection of the laws. Id. at 218. The United States Supreme Court rejected these claims, id., as we do in the present case.
Rather, the plaintiff’s argument rests solely on the unfounded assumption that had there been plea-bargaining and had he agreed to plead guilty to the charge of aggravated assault, then he would have been sentenced under
The plaintiff argues, however, that notwithstanding its neutral language,
We have said that where there exists a rational basis for disparate sentencing, we will not disturb the trial court’s exercise of its discretion and that one who goes to trial and is convicted might not be entitled to the same consideration of leniency as one who pleads. State v. Fraser, 120 N.H. at 122-23, 411 A.2d at 1129; see Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. at 224.
We conclude that selective use of the extended term statute as alleged here, even if factually correct, is constitutionally permissible. Ex parte Boman, 160 Tex. Crim. 148, 149, 268 S.W.2d 186, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 1954); accord, State v. Howell, 240 Or. 558, 559-60, 402 P.2d 89, 89-90, cert. denied, 383 U.S. 922 (1966); State v. Bailleaux, 521 P.2d 1062, 1063 (Or. Ct. App. 1974); see Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962) (conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not, in itself, a federal constitutional violation).
In addition, we note that the United States Supreme Court has ruled that, absent vindictiveness, it is constitutionally permissible to re-indict on more serious charges a defendant who has refused to plead to lesser charges, Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365, reh’g denied, 435 U.S. 918 (1978), or one who has opted for trial by jury, United States v. Goodwin, 102 S. Ct. 2485, 2494-95 (1982). Vindictiveness in these instances is not presumed. United States v. Goodwin, 102 S. Ct. at 2494. Similarly, we do not find a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness in the instance at bar, where there apparently were no plea negotiations and the trial judge sentenced LaVallee for manifesting “exceptional cruelty or depravity in inflicting . . . serious bodily injury on the victim of his crime” (
The plaintiff’s final argument is that
We have ascribed the usual and common meaning to the statutory terms “cruelty” and “depravity,” id. at 744, 424 A.2d at 801, and conclude that the statute provides adequate guidance to a sentencing judge. See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 255-56, reh’g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976). We decline to hamstring judicial discretion in sentencing by enumerating with particularity what is considered cruel and depraved conduct.
We note that we have previously upheld the trial court’s finding of exceptional cruelty or depravity as applied to the evidence before it in the plaintiff’s original direct appeal. State v. LaVallee, 119 N.H. at 213, 400 A.2d at 484. We have held that both
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the application of
Affirmed.
King, C.J., and Souter, J., did not sit; the others concurred.