109 Tex. 69 | Tex. | 1917
delivered the opinion of the court.
This proceeding has for its purpose the issuance of a writ of mendamus directing Hon. Chas. E. Ashe, judge of the District Court for the Eleventh Judicial District, to vacate as to the property of Mrs. Margaret E. Allen a receivership pending in that court and order the delivery of such property into the hands of the relator as administrator of her estate.
The receivership is an incident of a suit originally filed in the District Court of Harris County in December of the year 1908 by the First National Bank of Whitney, Texas, in the lifetime of Mrs. Allen and against her and A. C. Allen, her son. In that suit the plaintiff asserted the ownership of a judgment against Mrs. Allen and A. C. Allen in an amount in excess of $7000, and constituting a lien upon their real estate situated in different counties in the State. It was also there pleaded that,'Mrs. Allen and A. 0. Allen were variously indebted to
Upon this prayer a receiver was duly appointed. He qualified, and took into possession certain real and personal property belonging to Mrs. Allen and A. C. Allen for the purpose of preserving it. This suit, with the receivership yet in force, is now pending.
Some years after all of these proceedings Mrs. Allen died. The relator was appointed temporary administrator of her estate by the County Court of Harris County and duly qualified as such. Later, he was appointed and qualified as permanent administrator. This appointment was contested, and the contest is now pending in the District Court on appeal, as yet undetermined, the County Court having continued the powers of the relator as temporary administrator in the meanwhile.
Before resorting to this court the relator, as temporary administrator of Mrs. Allen’s estate, presented a motion in the District Court suit reciting the probate action of the County Court and upon various grounds asserting that as to the property of Mrs. Allen the receivership should be vacated and the property delivered into his custody. This motion was considered and overruled, the court being of the view that-since it had acquired jurisdiction’ of the property in the lifetime of Mrs. Allen, it was entitled to hold the possession through its receiver. No attempt to appeal from this order was made.
The answer to the petition for mandamus, filed by the receiver alone, states that in the District Court suit various interventions have been filed by creditors of Mrs. Allen and A. C. Allen, seeking the establishment of debts and mortgage liens against the property held by the receiver. It also appears that prior to the death of Mrs. Allen various controversies were pending in relation to different claims involved in. the suit.
It is furthermore essentially true that when a court of equity in a cause of which it has jurisdiction takes possession of property through a receiver, the property is withdrawn from the jurisdiction of all other courts; and so long as its jurisdiction of the cause subsists, the court has the power, whether rightfully or wrongfully exercised, to continue the receivership. The power of the court to appoint the receiver proceeds from its jurisdiction of the cause and is an element of it. Jurisdiction of the property lawfully acquired may be maintained and exerted as a means of aiding and completing the exercise- of its jurisdiction over the cause and giving effect to its judgment upon the rights involved. While the jurisdiction of the cause continues, therefore, the power of the court in respect to the receivership alike continues. Whether the receivership should be continued is to be governed by the necessities of the case as related to the rights of the parties. But so long as the court maintains its jurisdiction of the cause, that is a question of judicial discretion; it is not one of judicial power. The exercise of judicial discretion is, of course, not subject to control by mandamus.
It is apparent from the answer to the petition for mandamus that ,'action upon some of the claims was pending in the District Court at ibhe time of the death of Mrs. Allen. As to none of them is the contrary made to appear from the petition. So far as the petition reveals, these interventions, as well as the plaintiff’s claim, are still pending. 'The death of Mrs. Allen did not abate the suit as to any of the claims asserted against her upon which action was then pending. Nor would a permanent administration upon her estate, if finally perfected, have that effect. As to such claims, if the administration be perfected, her administrator may be made a party and the cause proceed to judgment establishing the claims and the liens incident to them, if entitled to be established. It is not made to appear from the petition, therefore, that the District Court has lost its jurisdiction of the cause as it related to the liability of Mrs. Allen upon any of the various claims involved.
The receivership was perfected and the District Court’s jurisdiction
Further, the statute provides that the administrator of an estate of a decedent shall have the right to the possession of the estate “as it existed at the death of the intestate.” Article 3835. This does not authorize an administrator to assume possession of property not in the possession of the decedent at the time of his death and to the possession of which he was not then entitled. This has been distinctly held, with the ruling approved by this court, in respect to property pledged by a decedent in his lifetime and lawfully in the hands of the pledgee at the time of the decedent’s death. Fulton, Admr., v. Bank, 26 Texas Civ. App., 115, 62 S. W., 84. For the same reason an administrator is not entitled to the possession of property lawfully held by the District Court through its receiver at the time of the decedent’s death, and in respect to which its jurisdiction is not exhausted.
In another respect it is not made to" clearly appear,—as it must he before this court is authorized to issue a mandamus against the district judge,—that the jurisdiction of the District Court over the pending suit in respect to the claims asserted against Mrs. Allen, is at an end. Jurisdiction for the transaction of “all business appertaining to deceased persons, . . . including the settlement, partition and distribution of estates of deceased persons,” is by the Constitution conferred upon the County Court in broad and general terms. But the equity jurisdiction of the District Court is conferred by the same instrument in terms equally broad. While it is customary to speak of the jurisdiction of the County Court over matters relating to estates of deceased persons under administration as “exclusive,” and the entire current of our judicial decisions is to carefully protect the jurisdiction of that court over such matters, as it ought to be, yet it is plainly recognized that questions may arise affecting estates in regular course of administration, requiring, for illustration, the adjustment of equities, for the settlement of which the probate jurisdiction of the County Court is
The petition of the relator does not disclose the nature or the status of the controversy in respect to any of the claims involved in the District Court suit. For aught we are advised issues may have arisen and may now be pending in connection with these claims for the determination of which the powers of the probate court are inadequate and its methods imperfect, and as to which, accordingly, the jurisdiction of the District Court is clear and undoubted. Upon such a showing, affording us no means for determining whether or not the District Court is in this respect exercising a lawful authority, we would not be justified in disturbing its jurisdiction by ousting its possession of property which we must assume was rightfully held by it at the time of Mrs. Allen’s death and to which its equity powers may still extend.
To make our ruling plain, it is to be understood that only the probate court has jurisdiction to sell for the payment of debts the property of a decedent upon whose estate administration has been commenced or is pending. Rogers v. Kennard, 54 Texas, 30; Smithwick v. Kelly, 79 Texas, 564, 15 S. W., 486; Atchison v. Smith, 25 Texas, 228. Our holding is made with clear reference to the want of such power in the District Court. As applied to the character of case last discussed,— where, notwithstanding a pending administration,' the jurisdiction of the District Court may be availed of for the settlement of questions affecting the estate which the powers of.the probate court are inadequate to determine, this is also the rule. The judgment in such a case is to be performed through the probate court, and if a sale of property is necessary to its performance it must be made by that court. Cannon v. McDaniel, supra. An attempted exercise of this power by the District Court is not here involved; nor, with administration upon the estate of Mrs. Allen commenced, is it to be assumed that its exercise will be attempted. The present case concerns alone a jurisdiction which is entirely distinct from such power, and which, from aught that here appears, may be properly exercised by the District Court.
Our holding is that the District Court has the power to maintain in the suit there pending its possession of the property through the receiver until its jurisdiction over the cause is at an end; and as it is not made to appear here that that jurisdiction is exhausted, this court will not issue a mandamus to oust its possession of the property.
The mandamus is refused.
Opinion delivered February 7, 1917.
ON MOTION FOB MODIFICATION OF OPINION.
In denying a mandamus to require the district judge to vacate the receivership proceeding pending in his court and deliver the property held by the receiver into the custody of the temporary administrator of Mrs. Allen’s estate, it was stated in the original opinion that while the District Court had jurisdiction to establish against the estate the indebtedness set up in the suit there pending, it was, with the administration of the estate pending, without.any power to direct the sale of the property.
It is urged in the motion that most of the indebtedness referred to was the joint indebtedness of Mrs. Allen and A. C. Allen, who is still living; that the mortgages upon the property involved were jointly executed by Mrs. Allen and A. C. Allen, most of the property being jointly owned by them; and that it is the right of the mortgagees to have the interests of A. C. Allen and Mrs. Allen sold together instead of separately. It is also suggested that adjustment of the rights of the Allens as between themselves will become necessary in the determination' of the District Court controversy.
These and other considerations are advanced as ground for'the contention that authority to sell the property is essential to the jurisdiction with which the District Court is already invested and is a necessary part of that jurisdiction. We are accordingly asked to modify the opinion in the case and to hold that the District Court has the power to cause the sale of the property if it should find that to be necessary to the adjudication and enforcement of the rights involved in the cause.
Whether the District Court has authority to sell the property was not a necessary part of the question before us in the mandamus proceeding. The only question there presented for decision was as to the right of the relator to have the district judge vacate the receivership and order the delivery of the property into his hands. What was said in the opinion in respect to the authority of the District Court to direct the sale was for the purpose of calling attention to the general rule, that the jurisdiction of the probate court to sell property of a decedent upon whose estate administration has been commenced, is exclusive; and to make it plain that our decision of the mandamus question was in recognition of that rule. That such is the general rule as affirmed in the decisions of this court is undoubted. Rogers v. Kennard, 54 Texas, 30; Smithwick v. Kelly, 79 Texas, 564, 15 S. W., 486; Atchison v. Smith, 25 Texas, 228; Cannon v. McDaniel, 46 Texas, 303.
Mandamus refused,.
Opinion delivered June 27, 1917.