This is аn action wherein William Ray Lamar, plaintiff, seeks to recover from William L. Laughlin, defendant, damages for personal injuries received in an automobilе and truck collision. Judgment for $2,000 was rendered for plaintiff upon a jury verdict, and thе defendant has appealed. The parties will be referred to as they appeared in the trial court.
*373 The sole proposition determinаtive of the case goes to the admissibility of certain evidence. Shortly after noon on the 21st day of May, 1948, plaintiff was driving a 1935 Ford car in a westerly directiоn on U. S. Highway No. 277 between Fletcher and Elgin, Oklahoma. Defendant, driving a 1948 Ford dump truck in thе same direction on the same highway, overtook and started to pass рlaintiffs car at a point where another road entered said highway from thе south or left side. Plaintiff intended to turn left into the side road and the testimony is in sharp сonflict as to whether or not he had started to turn when defendant attempted to pass. The two vehicles collided and this action was subsequently instituted by plаintiff to recover for personal injuries he allegedly received.
At the triаl, over the objection of the defendant, plaintiff was permitted to introduce in evidence a justice of the peace criminal docket shоwing the filing of a criminal complaint against the defendant for reckless driving by reason of this collision and the receipt of $19 as payment of fine and costs. Predicated upon the admission of this record, extensive testimony of the justiсe of the peace about the entries made in the docket and related incidents, as well as that of defendant on cross-examination, was рermitted to be introduced. There was no competent proof that defendant entered a plea of guilty to the reckless driving charge.
The genеral rule applicable to such evidence was stated by this court in the case of Goodwin v. Continental Casualty Co.,
“As a general rule, a judgment of conviction or acquittal of a party charged with crime cannot be given in еvidence in a civil action to prove or negative facts upon whiсh it was rendered. This rule is supported 0y great weight of authority based upon various reasons, such as dissimilarity of the object of the actions, issues, procedure, and parties to the actions.”
The only exception to the general rule is where the defendant has pleaded guilty to the criminal charge. Thе reason for such exception was expressed in the case of Burbank v. McIntyre,
“It is a general rule that a judgment in a criminal prosecution may not be received in a civil action to establish the truth of the facts in which it was rendered, but an exception thereto is recognized where the defendant has entered a plea of guilty, such record then being admitted, not as a judgment establishing the fact, but as an admission against interest.”
In the case of Piechota v. Rapp,
Although, in this jurisdiction, there is no recognized plea оf nolo conten-dere, the facts in the instant case make it very similar to that type of a situation. The general rule, where that plea is availablе and has been entered, is that neither the plea nor any other part оf the criminal case is admissible in evidence in a subsequent civil suit involving the same оccurrence. The reason for the rule is that there is no admission against intеrest by the defendant. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Cloonan,
In the case at bar no plea of guilty by the defendant in the criminal aсtion was shown, and therefore any evidence relative to the criminal charge was inadmissible and highly prejudicial.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.