68 F. 69 | 8th Cir. | 1895
after stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of the court.
The present appeal presents but two questions for our considera» tion. The first is whether the master should have computed the rents of the property in controversy at the rate specified in the lease from Caines to Huff of date June 26, 1875; and the second is. whether the sum allowed by the master on account of rents was too small, even though the aforesaid lease does not govern in de-
It will be observed by reading the opinion rendered in this ease on the former appeal to the sui)reme court of the United States (vide Goode v. Gaines, 145 U. S. 141, 154, 12 Sup. Ct. 839), that the first decree was reversed because the allowance in favor of the present appellant s on account of rents was deemed excessive and inequitable, in view of the peculiar relations of the parties to the suit, and the cause was remanded to the circuit court solely for the purpose of having the rent account restated.,, The lease executed by Gaines in favor of Huff was described in the bill of complaint, and the terms and conditions (hereof, as well as the amount of rent therein reserved, could not have escaped judicial observation. Nevertheless, no direction was given to the circuit court to cause the rents on a second hearing to be computed at the rate reserved in the lease, nor was any intimation given to that effect. After pointing out the circumstances that had given rise to the litigation, and after alluding to the fact that the defendants had not acted knavishly or in bad faith, the supreme court said, in substance, that the defendants ought not to be charged with the rents prior to May 23, 1884, that being the date when the suit was instituted; that they should simply be charged with the rental value after that dale, and that “no increased rents should be allowed on account of the improvements.” If the court had intended that the rents should be computed at the rate fixed in the lease, and that the lease should control in estimating the rental value, it is obvious that the clause above quoted from the opinion would have been entirely unnecessary. We think, therefore, that the decision directed the circuit court, in effect, to ascertain the fair rental value of the lot without reference to the rent reserved in the original lease, and upon that theory (he circuit court evidently acted.
It may be well to observe, in support of the view which appears to have been taken by the supreme court, that, inasmuch as the ap-pellee, Yina Granger, bought the lot in controversy from Huff! in the year 1880, after the latter had been ousted of possession under the lease, and had attorned to the United Stales, the true owner, it is by no means apparent that any such privity existed between her .and the original lessor, Gaines, as would, in any event, render her amenable to the provisions of the lease and liable for the rent therein reserved. But, be this as it may, it was clearly the duty of the circuit court to follow the directions given by the supreme court in the opinion delivered on the first appeal, and, having done so, no error was committed of which the appellants can be heard to complain on the present appeal.
With respect to the second question above proposed, it is sufficient to say that the evidence contained in the record is not of such character as would warrant us in overruling the finding of the circuit court, and the.finding of the master as well, with respect to the rental value of the property in controversy. In Warren v. Burt, 12 U. S. App. 591, 600, 7 C. C. A. 105, 58 Fed. 101, this court said that where the trial court has considered conflicting evidence, and made