135 Minn. 109 | Minn. | 1916
Lead Opinion
Inasmuch as the court found that appellant has no title, to overcome that finding appellant must make it appear that every essential to a valid title has been clearly and palpably proven. Appellant’s position is that the deed to Hayward correctly described the land, that the error was made in the record m extenso, and that the entries in the reception book and the deed record, taken together, are constructive notice of the conveyance in fact made.
We should -have reached this conclusion were there no precedent to guide us, but we think the decision in Gaston v. Merriam, 33 Minn. 271, 22 N. W. 614, is decisive of the question. In that case, as here, the entry in the reception book and the record in extenso disagreed. The reception book described the “west half of southeast quarter of southwest quarter,” whereas the deed record described only “the west half of the southeast quarter.” There, as here, the grantor owned the tract described in the reception book, but not the other; there, as here, the grantee later conveyed the premises described in the reception book, premises to which he had no title unless acquired by this deed; there, as here, the grantor never made any other disposition of the premises described in the reception book, nor made any later claim to them. The court said: “The evidence, to our minds, proves almost tó a moral
As above indicated, the description as it appears in the deed record is an impossible one. Nevertheless, some decisions of other courts are broad enough to sustain this description as it stands on the record book, without resort to the reception book, for it has been held that, where a deed describes land conveyed as situated in a certain county, but is in some particular imperfect or impossible on its face, so that it properly describes no land within the county, and where the grantee owns land
Probably our own decisions are out of harmony with this rule, Bailey v. Galpin, 40 Minn. 319, 41 N. W. 1054, and it is not necessary to go so far here. The statute in force at the time the Skinner-Hayward deed was recorded, provided, with reference to the reception book, as follows:
“The register of deeds shall enter in the said book all deeds, * * * noting in the first column the day, hour, and minute of reception, and the other particulars in their appropriate columns. * * * He shall also certify upon every instrument recorded by him, the time when it was received, and the book and page in which it was recorded; and every instrument shall be considered as recorded at the time so noted.” Laws 1849, p. 76, c. 21, § 4.
“Every deed, * * * 0f * * * real estate within this Territory which by virtue of this act shall be entitled to be recorded shall be recorded in the order of the time when the same shall be delivered to any register for that purpose, and shall he considered as recorded from the time it was so delivered.” Laws 1849, pp. 134, 135, c. 63, § 13.
The statute undoubtedly contemplates that these entries in the reception book shall be made contemporaneously with the receipt of the deed for record. Purchasers of the land are charged with notice of the deed from the moment it is delivered to the register of deeds for record, though in the nature of things it cannot be transcribed into the record until some time later. In the meantime the entries in the reception book are the only record. It has been said that they are “evidence of the very highest character.” “The entries required by law to be made in the reception books, and the transcribing of the instrument into the record book, constitute the full record” of the deed. Whitacre v. Martin, 51 Minn. 421, 427, 53 N. W. 806, 807. Each supplies defects in the other in giving constructive notice. A subsequent purchaser is presumed to have examined the whole record, and he is charged with such knowledge as the
Order reversed and new trial granted.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
I dissent. I am unable to agree that the evidence is so manifestly and palpably against the finding of the trial court that the mistake was not made in recording the deed, but in drafting it. I do not regard Gaston v. Merriam, 33 Minn. 271, 22 N. W. 614, as decisive of this question. The mistake in that case was of a different character, and, was quite clearly made in drafting the deed. In the ease at bar the evidence does not convince me that the error was not made in recording the deed in extenso.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Mr. Justice Bunn. It is more likely that the error occurred in the deed than in the record thereof.