Lead Opinion
Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.
The United States appeals the district court’s grant of the writ of habeas corpus to detainee Adnan Farhan Abd Al Latif. Three errors in the district court’s analysis require us to vacate that decision. First, the court failed to accord an official government record a presumption of regularity. Second, the district court failed to determine Latifs credibility even though the court relied on his declaration to discredit the Government’s key evidence. See Al-Adahi v. Obama,
Latif is a Yemeni national who was apprehended near Pakistan’s Afghan border in late 2001 and transferred to Guantanamo Bay in January 2002. The parties agree that Latif commenced his travels at the suggestion of a man named Ibrahim and that Latif set off from Yemen to Quetta, Pakistan, and from there to Kabul, Afghanistan. The parties also agree that after returning to Pakistan, Latif was seized by the Pakistani military without a passport. What the parties disagree about is the nature of Latifs trip. The Government says Latif was recruited and trained by the Taliban and then was stationed in Kabul on the front line against the Northern Alliance. Latif says he left Yemen in search of medical care and has never had anything to do with the Taliban.
The Government’s case against Latif is based on a heavily redacted [redacted] (“Report”) According to the story attributed to Latif in the Report, Ibrahim AlAlawi began recruiting Latif for jihad in 2000. At Ibrahim’s urging, Latif left home in early August 2001 and travelled to Afghanistan via Sana’a, Yemen; Karachi, Pakistan; and Quetta, Pakistan. Latif met Ibrahim at the Grand Mosque in Kandahar, Afghanistan, and stayed with him and his family for three days. From Kandahar, Ibrahim took Latif to the Taliban. The Taliban gave him weapons training and stationed him on the front line against the Northern Alliance, north of Kabul, under the command of Afghan leader Abu Fazl. While there, Latif reportedly “saw a lot of people killed during the bombings, but never fired a shot.” While with the Taliban, Latif met Abu Hudayfa of Kuwait, Abu Hafs of Saudi Arabia, and Abu Bakr of the United Arab Emirates or Bahrain. Latif retreated to Pakistan via Jalalabad with fleeing Arabs, guided by an Afghan named Taqi Allah.
Among other un-redacted identifying details, the Report indicates that Latifs mother’s name is Muna, that he lived in the village of 'Udayn in Ibb, Yemen, and that his only prior trip out of that country was to Jordan with a friend “for medical treatment of an injury to his hand.” [redacted] In the district court, the Government did not produce the notes on which this Report was based. The Government now claims to have located the notes, which it says confirm the Report. Since this case was briefed, those notes have been disclosed to Latifs counsel in some form.
Latif does not deny being interviewed [redacted] Nor does he allege his statements were coerced or otherwise involuntary. But Latif says his statements were misunderstood or, alternatively, [redacted] were misattributed to him. In a declaration filed with the district court in 2009, Latif denies ever being part of the Taliban and offers an innocent explanation for his journey. Latif says he left Yemen in 2001 on a quest for medical treatment for head injuries he suffered in a 1994 car accident. He went to Pakistan to get help from Ibrahim, a Yemeni he had met at a charitable organization in Yemen. When Latif arrived in Quetta, Ibrahim had already left Pakistan, so Latif followed him to an Islamic studies institute in Kabul, Afghanistan. But once Latif caught up to Ibrahim at the institute, Ibrahim had to leave again and told Latif to wait for him there until they could travel together to Pakistan. After waiting in vain for several weeks, Latif says, he then returned to Pakistan without Ibrahim, fleeing U.S.—supported forces he had been told were advancing from northern Afghanistan.
The district court granted Latifs habeas petition following briefing and a hearing in which Latif declined to testify. Abdah v. Obama (Latif), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
II
In a Guantanamo detainee case, we review the district court’s “specific factual determinations” for clear error, and its ultimate grant or denial of habeas de novo. Almerfedi v. Obama,
At the heart of the Government’s case is the Report in which Latif reportedly admitted being recruited for jihad, receiving weapons training from the Taliban, and serving on the front line with other Taliban troops. Latifs whole defense is that this official government record is unreliable—in other words, that the Government botched it. Latif says his interrogators [redacted] so garbled his words that their summary bears no relation to what he actually said. Latifs case turns on this claim, because if the Report is an accurate summary of what Latif told his interrogators, then his detention is lawful. On this we all agree. Latif,
Ordinarily, at this point in our analysis, we would simply review the district court’s comparison of the Government’s evidence with the “detainee’s facts and explanation,” bearing in mind that the ultimate burden is on the Government to establish Latifs detention is legal. Id. We pause here, however, because the district court expressly refused to accord a presumption of regularity to the Government’s evidence, and on appeal the Government continues to assert its Report is entitled to such a presumption.
A
“The presumption of regularity supports the official acts of public officers and, in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that they have properly discharged their official duties.” Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv.,
Since the problems Latif cites are typical of Guantanamo detainees’ interrogation reports, the rule he proposes would subject all such documents to the he-said/ she-said balancing of ordinary evidence. It is impossible to cure the conditions under which these documents were created, so Latifs proposed rule would render the traditional presumption of regularity wholly illusory in this context. We conclude first that intelligence documents of the sort at issue here are entitled to a presumption of regularity, and second that neither internal flaws nor external record evidence rebuts that presumption in this case.
Courts sensibly have anticipated that some sort of presumption is proper in the Guantanamo, but until now we have not directly addressed the question. The dissent interprets our silence heretofore as disapproval and suggests that a presumption in favor of the Government’s evidence in this case “inappropriately shift[s] the burden” of proof from the Government to the detainee. Dissenting Op. at 1220-21. A Supreme Court plurality said just the opposite, however—and in a case involving the military detention of an American citizen, no less:
[T]he Constitution would not be offended by a presumption in favor of the Government’s evidence, so long as that presumption remained a rebuttable one and fair opportunity for rebuttal were provided. Thus, once the Government puts forth credible evidence that the habeas petitioner meets the enemy-combatant criteria, the onus could shift to the petitioner to rebut that evidence with more persuasive evidence that he falls outside the criteria.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
When the Supreme Court extended the habeas right to non-citizen detainees in 2008, it tasked the lower courts with developing a workable habeas remedy that would give detainees a “meaningful opportunity to demonstrate” the unlawfulness of their detention, Boumediene,
In that spirit, the district court has operated under a case management order that specifically authorized reliance on evidentiary presumptions. See In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig.,
Confusion about the nature of the presumption may account for the district court’s reluctance. In an order applicable to the present case, the district court held, “any evidence presented by the government that has been created and maintained in the ordinary course of business should be afforded a presumption of authenticity,” Dist. Ct. Docket No. 606, but the court rejected the government’s request for a presumption of accuracy “for the reasons stated by Judge Kessler in Ahmed v. Obama,
The confusion stems from the fact that intelligence reports involve two distinct actors—the non-government source and the government official who summarizes (or transcribes) the source’s statement. The presumption of regularity pertains only to the second: it presumes the government official accurately identified the source and accurately summarized his statement, but it implies nothing about the truth of the underlying non-government source’s statement. There are many conceivable reasons why a government document might accurately record a statement that is itself incredible. A source may be shown to have lied, for example, or he may prove his statement was coerced. The presumption of regularity—to the extent it is not rebutted—requires a court to treat the Government’s
Another reason the district court has denied the Government’s motions for a presumption of accuracy may be that such a presumption is often unnecessary or irrelevant. The Government has frequently been able to prove its detention authority without relying on any presumption that its records are accurate. And in many cases, detainees do not challenge the Government’s recordkeeping. Instead, they attack the sufficiency of the evidence, or they claim that the Government’s information is unreliable because it resulted from harsh interrogation techniques, multiple levels of hearsay, or unknown sources.
This case рresents a different question because Latifs sole challenge is to the accuracy of the Government’s summary of his own words. When the detainee’s challenge is to the evidence-gathering process itself, should a presumption of regularity apply to the official government document that results? We think the answer is yes.
To forbid a presumption of regularity in spite of Boumediene’s implicit invitation to innovate,
Just as principles of vertical comity and federalism justify presumptions in favor of state court judgments in ordinary criminal habeas proceedings, see Sumner v. Mata,
Our dissenting colleague concludes the presumption of regularity should not extend to official intelligence reports because he imagines the presumption of regularity is just a shortcut for crediting the work product of official processes we know to be “transparent, accessible, and often familiar,” Dissenting Op. at 1207, and because he thinks we know relatively little about how intelligence reports are created, id. at 1207-08. Both premises are false. Courts regularly apply the presumption to government actions and documents that result from processes that are anything but “transparent,” “accessible,” and “familiar.” The presumption of regularity is founded on inter-branch and inter-governmental comity, not our own judicial expertise with the relevant government conduct. In Riggs National, we presumed a foreign government entity’s receipt to be reliable without pretending it was produced by a “familiar” or “transparent” process. Id. at 1207; see
Rather than cast doubt on the viability of the presumption of regularity in this context, our only pertinent post -Boumediene discussion of the presumption strongly suggests its continuing viability. In Al-Bihani, the detainee complained that the district court had “erred by ... presuming the accuracy of the government’s evidence.”
Although it was decided under the preBoumediene Detainee Treatment Act of 2005(DTA), our opinion in Parhat v. Gates,
Our dissenting colleague points to four more recent cases to defend his view that intelligence documents like the Report in this case are undeserving of a presumption of regularity. Dissenting Op. at 1210-12 (citing Barhoumi,
In Barhoumi, we considered a Government intelligence report containing a translation of a diary. Although we affirmed the district court’s favorable treatment of the Government’s evidence, 609
For the same reason, we cannot extract from Bensayah, Al Alwi, or Khan the dissent’s proposed bar on evidentiary presumptions for intelligence reports. As in Barhoumi, the Government did not request a presumption of regularity in any of these appeals. See Brief of RespondentsAppellees at 38-39, Bensayah,
Apart from its precedential argument, the dissent frets that “in practice” the presumption of regularity will compel courts to rubber-stamp government detentions because it “suggests] that whatever the government says must be treated as true.” Dissenting Op. at 1215 (quoting Parhat,
A body of judge-made law is not born fully formed, like Athena from the head of Zeus. It grows gradually, developing little by little in response to the facts and circumstances of each new case. Until now, we have not had to decide whether the common-law presumption of regularity applies in Guantanamo habeas proceedings. This case finally forces the issue because Latif challenges only the reliability of the Report, and because the Government persists in its request for a presumption of regularity on appeal.
B
Because the Report is entitled to a presumption of regularity, and because the Report, if reliable, proves the lawfulness of Latif s detention, we can only uphold the district court’s grant of habeas if Latif has rebutted the Government’s evidence with more convincing evidence of his own.
We begin our rebuttal analysis with the Report itself, because Latif alleges that intrinsic flaws in the document undermine its reliability. The Report bears every indication of being what the Government says it is [redactions] Some of the information gleaned from Latifs interview is redacted, including information about [redactions] the name of a friend who accompanied him to Jordan for medical treatment. [redactions]
Despite its redactions, the Report permits the assessment of reliability we demanded in Parhat,
These general descriptions seem to be consistent with the specific document at issue in this case. Critically, the Report purports to summarize an actual interview with Latif himself—not the anonymous hearsay we rejected in Parhat. Cf. id. at 846-47.
In his attack on the reliability of the Government’s evidence, Latif relies heavily on [redactions] apparent transcription errors in the Report—an ambiguous reference to the injury that necessitated his trip to Jordan in 1994, [redactions] Though purporting not to disregard the Report entirely, the district court reasoned these errors support “an inference that poor translation, sloppy note taking, [redactions] or some combination of those factors resulted in an incorrect summary of Latifs words.” Latif,
Latif argues that the Report misstates whose injury was the reason for the trip to Jordan. Latifs medical records confirm that Yemen’s Ministry of Defense paid for him to receive medical treatment
[redactions]
Neither of the flaws Latif points to rebuts the presumption of regularity. At worst, they suggest the presence of minor transcription errors. But tangential “clerical errors” do not render a government
document unreliable. See Riggs Nat’l,
The dissent suggests an elaborate game of telephone between Latif, a translator, a note-taker, and a report-writer might have transmogrified hypothetical, innocent comments about a charity worker, an Islamic Center, an imam, and three religious teachers into the Report’s inculpatory statements about a jihadi recruiter, a war-zone tour of duty, a Taliban commander, and three Taliban fighters. Dissenting Op. at 1217-19. But as most children would tell you, any good game of telephone requires more than four participants to produce a result dramatically different from the starting phrase. The dissent also fails to account for Latifs incriminating statements about being escorted to the Taliban and receiving weapons training, and does not explain why, if these inculpatory statements were produced by government agents filling gaps in their comprehension “with what [they] expected to
The quantum of incriminating detail in the Report could hardly be produced by good-faith mistake, and we will not infer bad-faith fabrication absent any evidence to that effect. The inconsistencies in the Report may suggest a document produced on the field by imperfect translators or transcribers, but they do not prove the Report’s description of Latifs incriminating statements is fundamentally unreliable.
“[T]he reliability of evidence can be determined not only by looking at the evidence alone but, alternatively, by considering sufficient additional information permitting the factfinder to assess its reliability.” Bensayah v. Obama,
Such a recruiting tactic (or cover story) would fit the modus operandi of the man who recruited many of the detainees whose, interrogation reports appear in the record. One man reported that he
was recruited by Ibrahim [Balawi] to travel to [Afghanistan] to search for a wife and job. Ibrahim told him if he traveled to [Afghanistan] he would be able to find a bride and the Taliban would provide him with a house and incomе. Ibrahim also mentioned the jihad in [Afghanistan] ...
IIR 6 034 0365 02; [redactions] Another detainee “advised that the reasons for going to Afghanistan were to train to go to fight in Chechnya and, secondly, to immigrate to Afghanistan.” IIR 6 034 0861 02. Yet another “said he was a young man with no future who was tricked by Abu Khalud [‘true name Ibrahim AI-Balawi’], who told him he could make money and find a wife in [Afghanistan].” Petitioner’s Ex. 2. Ibrahim appears to have frequently offered his recruits tangible benefits in exchange for fighting jihad, or at least equipped them with such cover stories. Latifs medical records and his professed desire for medical treatment are therefore consistent with the Report, not inconsistent. Crediting those records does nothing
Latif cites one other piece of extrinsic evidence to challenge the Report’s reliability—the decision of the [redactions] Latifs conclusion does not follow from his premise. [redactions] The other extrinsic evidence in this case supports, rather than undermines, the presumption of regularity.
All of Latifs subsequent statements, including his latest declaration denying much of the incriminating information from his first interview, corroborate elements of the Report. In interviews that took place during Latifs confinement at Guantanamo, he confirmed several additional details of the Report, though he ascribed an exclusively medical purpose to his journey and disclaimed any involvement with the Taliban. In 2002, for example, Latif confirmed that he was from 'Udayn, that his mother’s name is Muna, and that he travelled to Afghanistan via Sana’a, Karachi, and Quetta, as stated in the Report. ISN 156 SIR (Mar. 6, 2002). Latif repeatedly confirmed that his only prior trip out of Yemen was to Jordan for medical treatment—a unique detail from his initial interview that the Report gets generally right. See id.; ISN 156 FD-302 (Apr. 26, 2002). The Government’s documentation of the chain of custody for Latifs personal possessions confirms he was captured with four thousand Pakistani rupees in his pocket, as noted in the Report.
Many characters from the Report’s dramatis personae reappear in Latifs subsequent interrogations, sometimes playing different parts in his narrative with changes to the spelling of their names. For example, the mysterious Ibrahim appears as an itinerant charity worker, not a jihadi recruiter, but his role is familiar. In March 2002, more than a year after the initial interview on which the Report was based, Latif confirmed that Ibrahim met him in Yemen, convinced him to travel, reunited with him at a mosque in Kandahar, hosted him there in Ibrahim’s family home for three days, and then took him to his next destination in Afghanistan—all details that also appear the Report.
The district court issued its decision in this case a week after we published our opinion in Al-Adahi v. Obama,
Latif makes two main arguments in defense of the district court’s decision to proceed without an explicit finding of credibility. First, he argues that the court did in fact believe his declaration even though its opinion did not use those words. Second, he argues no credibility determination is necessary because the district court relied on the inherent weakness of the Government’s evidence to discredit it. Neither argument has merit.
A
The closest the district court’s opinion comes to making a credibility determination is in its statements that Latif s story was “plausible” and “not incredible.” Id., slip op. at 26-27. A story may be “plausible” or “not incredible” and yet be very unlikely. Cf. Uthman v. Obama,
By definition, a “plausible” statement is one “seeming reasonable, probable, or truthful”; it may in reality have only “a false appearance of reason or veracity.” Oxford English Dictionary Online, http:// www.oed.com/view/Entry/145466 (definition 4.a) (emphasis added) (last visited June 16, 2011). A plausible explanation does not necessarily compel credence. See Zamanov v. Holder,
Likewise, to say Latifs tale is “not incredible” is not to imply its teller ought to be believed. At best, the district court’s statement means a reasonable finder of fact could believe Latifs story, not that he has actually done so. Cf. United States v. Wooden,
Other statements in the district court’s opinion confirm that it did not reach a decision on Latifs credibility. For example, the court rejected the Government’s “contention that Latif must be lying,” Latif,
B
The district court’s decision gives us no reason to believe it would have reached the same result had it not relied on Latifs “plausible” version of the relevant events. The court said it could not “credit” the Report’s inculpatory statements, partly “because ... Latif has presented a plausible alternative story to explain his travel.” Id., slip op. at 26. Instead of advancing from plausibility to a judgment about Latifs veracity, the court repeated its plausibility finding: “Latif asserts that he did not make the statements, and his suggestion that mistranslation or misattribution likely explain the indication that he did is plausible.” Id. The district court clearly relied on Latifs alternate account of his trip as one basis for rejecting the Report.
True, the court cited problems with the Report itself, including its substantial redactions, [redactions] its reference to Latifs “hand” instead of his head injury, [redactions] and the perceived lack of corroboration. But the Report was not so inherently unreliable that it could be discarded in the absence of countervailing evidence offering a more likely explanation for Latifs travels. See supra pp. 20-' 31. And Latif offers no evidence to rebut the Government’s presumptively reliable record aside from his own statements and the Report itself. A merely “plausible” explanation cannot rebut the presumption
By forgoing a determination of credibility for one of plausibility, the district court replaced the necessary factual finding with a legal conclusion that some other reasonable factfinder might believe Latifs story. In other words, the district court took on the role of a reviewing court, assuming in effect that Latif already had been found credible and then applying a deferential standard of review to that imaginary finding. Cf. Awad,
In sum, the district court’s failure to resolve the key question of [the lead witness’s] credibility makes it impossible for us to perform our appellate function. “The purpose of an appeal is to review the judgment of the district court, a function we cannot properly perform when we are left to guess at what it is we are reviewing.” We therefore vacate the district court’s order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
United States v. Holmes,
C
On remand, the district court may consider any relevant, admissible evi-
dence
IV
“[A] court considering a Guantanamo detainee’s habeas petition must view the evidence collectively rather than in isolation.” Salahi v. Obama,
Perhaps because it had already denied the Government’s key evidence a presumption of regularity, the district court committed both errors, explaining away some of the individual contradictions and coincidences in Latifs story one by one, as if each stood alone, and ignoring other probative details altogether. In Al-Adahi, we reversed the district court’s grant of habeas because the court had failed to consider all the evidence in context. Viewing the evidence as a whole, we concluded the Government had proven the ‘detainee “was more likely than not part of al-Qaida.” Id. at 1111. Although we do not reach an ultimate conclusion on the merits in this case, the district court’s similar treatment of the evidence in this case provides an alternative basis for remand.
A
What makes Latifs current story so hard to swallow is not its intrinsic implausibility but its correspondence in so many respects with the Report he now repudiates. Like Dorothy Gale upon awakening at home in Kansas after her fantastic journey to the Land of Oz, Latifs current account of what transpired bears a striking resemblance to the familiar faces of his former narrative. See The Wizard of Oz (MGM 1939). Just as the Gales’ farmhands were transformed by Dorothy’s imagination into the Scarecrow, Tin Man, and Cowardly Lion, it is at least plausible that Latif, when his liberty was at stake, transformed his jihadi recruiter into a charity worker, his Taliban commander into an imam, his comrades-in-arms into roommates, and his military training camp into a center for religious study. Although the court noted Latifs “innocent explanations for the names that appear in the [Report],” Latif,
In discrediting the Report, the district court cited Latifs “plausible” suggestion that the incriminating statements in the Report are the result of misattribution.
B
Nor did the district court consider that Latifs admitted route to Afghanistan from his home in Yemen corroborates the evidence that Latif trained with the Taliban. We have held that “traveling to Afghanistan along a distinctive path used by al Qaeda members can be probative evidence that the traveler was part of al Qaeda.” Uthman,
C
Latifs current version of his story conflicts in significant ways with other things he is reported to have told interrogators at Guantanamo. The district court rejected the Report “having taken into consideration the explanation of events Latif has offered” and even noted some of the “inconsistencies and unanswered questions” in Latifs story. Id., slip op. at 27. This is a welcome step toward the holistic approach to the evidence we called for in AlAdahi But as with the other evidence, the district court examined some contradictions in isolation from the rest of the evidence and overlooked others altogether.
The court gestured obliquely to what it characterized as “smaller inconsistencies” that it concluded “may be no more than misstatements or mistranslations.” Id. Apparently, the court found it unnecessary to get to the bottom of these contradictions because “even if some details of Latifs story have changed over time, for whatever reason, its fundamentals have remained the same.” Id. (The district court did not apply similar reasoning to the Government’s evidence. The Report contains two minor discrepancies but its fundamentals have been corroborated time and again.) Applied to Latifs contradictory statements, the district court’s reasoning neglects “the well-settled principle that false exculpatory statements are evidence—often strong evidence—of guilt.” Al-Adahi,
Many of these “smaller inconsistencies” shore up details in the Report in ways the district court overlooked. The court observed, for example, that in Latifs 2009 declaration (in which he claimed to be too disabled to fight) Latif said he “spent three months at the Islamic Jordanian Hospital in Amman, Jordan,” Petitioner’s Deck, ¶ 3, but his own medical records reveal that he was released just five days after admission. The court made no explicit finding about the source of this inconsistency, and it failed to mention that Latif himself testified before the Combatant Status Review Tribunal that he was “treated ... for five days,” ISN 156 CSRT Tr. at 8, a fact that is surely relevant to the credibility of Latifs recent declaration.
Although Latif now says he is married and has a son, Petitioner’s Deck, ¶ 1 the Report indicates Latif is unmarried and has no children, [redactions] The court noted this inconsistency, Latif,
The court failed even to mention other incongruities among the stories Latif has told his interrogators. Latif has said that he stayed with a doctor in Kabul, but also that he stayed in a religious study center there; that Latif was arrested at the Pakistani border fleeing Afghanistan, but also that he was arrested at a hospital in Pakistan; that he paid for his medical treatment, but also that he could not pay; that Ibrahim’s charitable organization is called Jamiat an-Nur, but also that is call Gameiat al Hekma or, alternatively, Jam-eiah Islam. Even if some of the inconsistencies in Latifs story “may be,” as the district court suggested about others, “no more than misstatements or mistranslations,” Latif,
D
[redactions]
In a recent case, we held “the location and date of [the detainee’s] capture, together with the company he was keeping, strongly suggest that he was part of al Qaeda.” Uthman,
Latif admits that he was captured in “late 2001” after being led across the Afghan border into Pakistan, Appellee’s Br. 7, and he confirmed to his Guantanamo interrogators that an Afghan guide led him across the border. The record contains no direct evidence about Latifs route from Kabul to the Pakistani border. The district court noted that around that time, “after the Taliban was defeated in the battle” north of Kabul, “many fighters went to Jalalabad, Afghanistan, moved on to the Tora Bora mountain area, ... and followed guides across the border into Pakistan.” Latif
[redactions]
The dissent admits the circumstances of Latifs flight from Afghanistan are helpful to the Government’s case, but contends they may not be very helpful since, for all we know, his route was frequented by noncombatants too. Dissenting Op. at 1222-23. This bold speculation is beyond our purview as an appellate court, and the district court did not suggest it had so much as considered the possibility. (Indeed, the record contains no evidence to support the dissent’s theory.) At this juncture, all we can say is that the location and timing of Latifs exodus is relevant evidence, and the district court erred by considering his route in isolation and ignoring the similarly situated detainees’ altogether.
F
To summarize, in addition to viewing Latifs own statements in isolation, the district court ignored the probative value of (1) Latifs familiar, four-leg route to Kabul; (2) Latifs CSRT testimony that he was hospitalized for just five days instead
The dissent makes much of the fact that, contrary to the usual practice, we do not assume the court considered all the evidence it failed to mention. Dissenting Op. at 1195-96. If that is true, the result flows from the unusual posture of this case. Even in the typical he-said/she-said case— in which two people provide conflicting statements—the court must conduct a close and precise balancing of the evidence to reach a valid result. In detainee cases the difficulties arе heightened because it is a he-said/he-said case—the same person provides both the incriminating and exculpatory statements. Thus the Al Adahi formulation becomes critical.
The district court’s failure to address certain relevant evidence leaves us with no confidence in its conclusions about the evidence it did consider. For example, the district court implicitly rejected evidence that Latifs purported benefactor, Ibrahim Al-Alawi, is actually Ibrahim Ba’alawi, known as Abu Khalud, an al-Qaida facilitator. Other detainees have described Ibrahim Ba’alawi in much the same role Ibrahim Al-Alawi plays in the Report. Several detainees reported meeting Ibrahim Ba’alawi in Taiz, Yemen, near Ibb, which the Report describes as Ibrahim AlAlawi’s hometown, and being recruited by him to fight jihad. They report that Ba’alawi arranged their travel along the same route Latif took to Afghanistan, lived in Kandahar as Latifs benefactor did, and arranged for their attendance at military training camps. Although noting the similarities between Ibrahim Ba’alawi and the Ibrahim Al-Alawi who appears in Latifs current story and the Report, the district court implicitly concluded they were different men on the basis of exculpatory statements Latif made after his initial interview. Latif makes much of the fact that Al-Alawi is a different name from Ba’alawi, not just a variant spelling, and at least seven detainees reported their recruiter’s name as Ba’alawi or some variant thereof. But such a minor phonetic mistake could easily result from a translation or transcription error.
Even if the district court had made a clear finding in Latifs favor about Ibrahim’s identity, we could not affirm it on this record. Since the probability of one asserted fact is conditioned upon the likelihood that related facts are true, we cannot uphold the district court’s evaluation of a particular piece of evidence that is susceptibie
On remand, the district court has an opportunity to evaluate all the evidence as a whole. In the event of another appeal following that evaluation, we would have to decide whether, in light of all the evidence, we are left with “the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Almerfedi,
Y
Although the district court committed the same errors here as in Al-Adahi, the evidence before us presents a closer question than we faced in that case and our subsequent reversals. Cf. Almerfedi,
As the dissenters warned and as the amount of ink spilled in this single case attests, Boumediene’s airy suppositions have caused great difficulty for the Executive and the courts. See
In light of the district court’s expertise as a fact finder and judge of credibility, I am reluctant to reach the merits before the district court has had an opportunity to apply the controlling precedent. But see Concurring Op. at 1205 (“[F]urther factfinding will be a waste of time and judicial resources.”). We therefore vacate and remand the district court’s grant of habeas for further proceedings. On remand the district court must consider the evidence as a whole, bearing in mind that even details insufficiently probative by themselves may tip the balance of probability, that false exculpatory statements may be evidence of guilt, and that in the absence of other clear evidence a detainee’s self-serving account must be credible—not just plausible—to overcome presumptively reliable government evidence.
So ordered.
Notes
. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that Guantanamo detainees must have "the means to supplement the record on review,” Boumediene,
. Even the particular presumption at issue in this case—the presumption that an official government record was accurately produced—applies in ordinary criminal habeas cases. See Hobbs v. Blackburn,
. When Latifs first interrogation took place and the Report was prepared, the Government had no expectation that its intelligence would be used in litigation. Instead, the Government was seeking accurate, actionable intelligence to protect the country from imminent attack. The Government had the strongest incentive to produce accurate reports and no incentive to frame innocent bystanders as Taliban operatives.
. The Government's argument for a presumption of regularity is unambiguous. Observing that “[i]t is well established that there is a strong 'presumption of regularity’ for actions of government officials taken in the course of their official duties,” Appellants’ Br. 30 (quoting United States v. Chemical Found., Inc.,
. We need not decide precisely how much more the detainee must show to overcome the presumption of regularity. Depending on the circumstances, courts have required litigants to meet standards ranging from “clear and specific evidence,” Riggs Nat’l,
. The dissent repeats a criticism of the Report that we have already rejected for similar documents-namely, that it is inherently unreliable because it "contain[s] multiple layers of hearsay.” Dissenting Op. at 1210. As we clarified in Al-Bihani, however, an interrogation report involves just one level of hearsay—that of the interrogator.
. [redactions]
. According to Latif, 4000 rupees were worth about $60 at the time. Tr. Classified Merits Hearing (June 8, 2010), at 5-6.
. The Report stated both that Ibrahim owned a taxi in Kandahar and that he took Latif to the Taliban, who trained him and stationed him north of Kabul. In March 2002, Latif said Ibrahim took him directly to Kabul in a taxi paid for by Ibrahim, [redactions]
.[redactions]
. Because he thinks the presumption of regularity should not apply to the Report, our dissenting colleague gives considerable weight to the Government’s lack of “independent corroboration for any of the Report’s incriminating facts.” Dissenting Op. at 1217 (emphasis added). But even without any presumption in favor of the Government's evidence, "we have not previously regarded corroboration as a requirement of a meaningful habeas proceeding.” Al Alwi,
. On appeal, Latif retorts that the Government did not put on any witnesses either. Appellee's Br. 51. This misses the point. The drafter of the Report had no incentive to misrepresent Latif's statements upon capture, as the Report was not prepared with litigation in mind. Latif, by contrast, has every incentive to lie about the purpose of his visit. His failure to testify and subject himself to cross examination therefore undermines his credibility.
. Throughout the military and judicial proceedings to determine whether he is proрerly detained, Latifs defense has been that the statements in the Report were misattributed to him. Before the Combatant Status Review Tribunal, Latif said, "I told you I wasn’t the person they were referring to. 1 never went to the places that you said I did. I am not the person this case is based on.” Ex. 30 (ISN 156 CSRT Tr.), at 3. Before the district court, Latif "argued that the statements in the [redactions] Report were likely a product of mistranslation, misattribution, or some other mistake.” Appellee’s Br. 9.
. Although Latifs more recent declaration in the district court leaves out some of these details, he does not deny taking this route. Indeed, Latif cites the consistency of his Guantanamo interrogations as evidence that his current story is true. Appellee's Br. 18-22. Latifs recent declaration confirms he took a bus to Quetta and a taxi from Quetta to Afghanistan, and then stayed in Kabul before returning to Pakistan.
. The district court did not, as the dissent suggests, "treat[ ] [this] evidence as more akin to traveling along 1-95 than a lonely country road.” Dissenting Op. at 1223. The court did not consider it at all.
. We do not "find[]" that this evidence ”do[es] in fact implicate” Latif, as the dissent accuses us of doing. Dissenting Op. at 1207. Rather, we hold the district court’s findings suspect in that the court "failed to take into account” related evidence when it made those findings. Al-Adahi,
. [redactions]
. Indeed, as the district court acknowledged, the recruiter is identified as Alawi in another detainee's interrogation report. The district court dismissed this evidence, observing that in another case, the district court had discredited this detainee’s statement about an unrelated detail—the timing of another detainee’s arrival at a guesthouse—-because it conflicted with other detainees’ statements. Latif,
. Judge Henderson would reverse the district court’s grant of habeas corpus outright. In her view, "remand is unnecessary because ‘the record permits only one resolution of the factual issue.’ ” Concurring Op. at 1205 (quoting Pullman-Standard v. Swint,
Concurrence Opinion
concurring in the judgment:
Although I agree with Judge Brown’s analysis and therefore concur in the judgment of remand, I write separately to respond to the dissent and to explain that, in my view, the better course would be to simply reverse the district court’s grant of habeas corpus relief to the detainee Adnan Farhan Abd A1 Latif. The dissent attacks
I.
This appeal hinges on one question: did the district court correctly find the government’s key piece of evidence unreliable? See Abdah v. Obama (Latif), No. 04-1254,
The clear error standard requires us to reverse a factual finding if “ ‘on the entire evidence’ ” we are “ ‘left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” Anderson v. City of Bessemer,
The dissent seems to suggest that if Latifs story “on its own terms[] is not ‘intrinsic[ally] implausible,’ ” then we cannot review the district court’s evaluation of the government’s key piece of evidence or other pieces of evidence. Dissenting Op. at 1220-21, 1221-22. It is not enough, however, for the district court to base its factual findings on some evidence in the record. The clear error standard authorizes us to reverse a finding, not unless, but ‘“although there is evidence to support it.’ ” Anderson,
With the clear error framework in mind, there is no difficulty in concluding that the district court clearly erred in failing to credit the [redactions] (“Report”) made in late December 2001 [redactions] after Latif was captured and before he was transferred to Guantanamo Bay. See Latif, slip op. at 6-7, 25. As Judge Brown demonstrates, the district court gave insufficient probative weight to the evidence supporting the reliability of the Report—including, in particular, the striking consistencies between the Report and Latifs subsequent admissions, see Majority Op. at 1189-90
II.
The dissent also asserts that application of the presumption of regularity to the Report “disturbs” the “careful and conscious balance of the important interests at stake” we have struck in past detainee decisions for admitting and assessing the reliability of hearsay evidence. Dissenting Op. at 1211-12. Judge Brown thoroughly disposes of the assertion—laying out in detail that, while we have not heretofore enunciated the presumption of regularity, we have all but done so. See Majority Op. at 1182-86. And we most assuredly are not “discarding] the unanimous, hard-earned wisdom” of district courts that have assessed hearsay evidence in detainee cases. Dissenting Op. at 1212. To the contrary, sound evidentiary considerations warrant incorporating the presumption of regularity—in the careful manner we expressly do today—into the district court’s overall reliability assessment of these records as we routinely do with others, including the point that the facts supporting the presumption of regularity have significant probative force in their own right, as discussed below.
Moreover, our holding does nothing to disturb the existing framework for hearsay evidence. All hearsay evidence “must be accorded weight only in proportion to its reliability.” Barhoumi v. Obama,
The Federal Rules of Evidence, which carve out exceptions to the general rule against hearsay on the ground that “some kinds of out-of-court statements are less subject to ... hearsay dangers,” Williamson,
Nor does the requirement that a challenger offer “clear or specific evidence” to defeat the presumption of regularity, Riggs Nat’l Corp. v. Comm’r,
III.
Based on the considerations outlined above—as well as Judge Brown’s comprehensive opinion—I believe the district court clearly erred in failing to credit the Report. Unlike my colleague, however, I also believe remanding the case for further factfinding will be a waste of time and judicial resources. Judge Brown believes remand—with the possibility that Latif might choose to testify—is necessary to allow the district court to correctly weigh Latifs credibility. See Majority Op. at 1192-93. While I agree that the district court erred in failing to assess Latifs credibility, Majority Op. at 1189-93—for “[a]t no point did the court make any finding about whether [Latifs narrative] was more likely than the government’s explanation,” Al-Adahi v. Obama,
The apparent premise behind Judge Brown’s argument for remand is that Latif might offer testimony so compelling that it would shake our confidence in the Report and overcome any doubt about Latifs credibility. But what testimоny could possibly accomplish so much? If Latif were to repeat on the stand the same unpersuasive assertions he made in his declaration—assertions that are inconsistent with his earlier statements to interrogators at Guantanamo Bay and fail to offer any explanation for his inculpatory statements contained in the Report—the district court would have no choice but to disbelieve him. “Credibility involves more than demeanor” and instead “apprehends the over-all evaluation of testimony in light of its rationality or internal consistency and the manner in which it hangs together with other evidence.” United States v. McCoy,
. As Judge Brown explains, Latif subsequently made statements to interrogators at Guantanamo Bay that confirm assertions in the Report about his hometown, mother’s name, route of travel into Afghanistan and his earlier journey to Jordan for medical treatment. Latif also told Guantanamo interrogators the names of several men he met in Afghanistan which names correspond to all of the names listed in the Report. In addition, the government’s chain-of-custody document listing Latif's possessions states that Latif had four thousand Pakistani rupees when captured—■ confirming another detail in the Report.
. Judge Brown cites a variety of examples— for instance, Latif's declaration states that he is married and has one son but he told interrogators that he “would like to get married and have some children”; Latif's declaration states that he planned to meet Ibrahim in Pakistan but he told interrogators that he planned to meet Ibrahim in Afghanistan. Latif has also made inconsistent statements about whether he stayed with a doctor in Kabul or at a religious institute in Kabul, whether Ibrahim was with Latif at the time he decided to flee Afghanistan or had already left several weeks earlier, whether Latif was arrested at the Pakistani border fleeing Afghanistan or arrested at a hospital in Pakistan, whether Latif paid for his medical treatment or not and whether Ibrahim’s charitable organization was called Jamiat an-Nur, Gameiat al Hekma or Jam-eiah Islam.
. Parhat also requires that hearsay evidence “be presented in a form, or with sufficient additional information, that permits the ... court to assess its reliability.”
. While the facts surrounding hearsay evidence may not always justify applying the presumption of regularity, it is properly applied here because the interview with Latif is recorded in a type of intelligence report [redactions]
. [redactions]
. Indeed, even Latifs continued failure to testify would likely work against him. Majority Op. at 1192-93; see Mitchell v. United States,
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
The government’s “primary” piece of evidence, Appellants’ Br. 10, is a single report: [redactions] (the Report) [redactions] After carefully laying out the parties’ arguments about the Report’s internal and external indicia of reliability, the district court found it “not sufficiently reliable to support a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Latif was recruited by an A1 Qaeda member or trained and fought with the Taliban.” Abdah' (Latif) v. Obama, No. 04-cv-01254, slip op. at 25 (D.D.C. July 21, 2010). According to the district court, “there is a serious question as to whether the [Report] accurately reflects Latifs words, the incriminating facts in the [Report] are not corroborated, and Latif has presented a plausible alternative story to explain his travel.” Id. at 26. The government concedes that its case for lawfully detaining Latif “turn[s]” on the Report. Appellants’ Br. 5. This, then, represents a first among the Guantanamo habeas appeals in this circuit: never before have we reviewed a habeas grant to a Guantanamo detainee where all concede that if the district court’s fact findings are sustained, then detention is unlawful. Cf. Almerfedi v. Obama,
But rather than apply ordinary and highly deferential clear error review to the district court’s findings of fact, as this circuit has done when district courts have found the government’s primary evidence reliable, the court, now facing a finding that such evidence is unreliable, moves the goal posts. According to the court, because the Report is a government-produced document, the district court was required to presume it accurate unless Latif could rebut that presumption. Maj. Op. at 1181. In imposing this new presumption
Compounding this error, the court undertakes a wholesale revision of the district court’s careful fact findings. Flaws in the Report the district court found serious, this court now finds minor. Latif s account, which the district court found plausible and corroborated by documentary evidence this court now finds “hard to swallow,” Maj. Op. at 1194. [redactions] the district court found did not implicate Latif, this court now finds do in fact implicate him. And on and on, all without ever concluding that the district court’s particular take on the evidence was clearly erroneous. But see Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a)(6) (“Finding of facts, whether based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.... ”).
In Part I, I explain why the district court committed no error in declining to apply a presumption of regularity to the Report. In Part II, I apply the deferential clear error standard this circuit has used throughout these Guantanamo habeas cases. Finding no clear error, I would affirm the district court’s grant of the writ of habeas corpus.
I.
All agree that this case turns on whether the district court correctly found that the government’s key piece of evidence, the Report, was unreliable. And all agree that the “question whether evidence is sufficiently reliable to credit is one we review for clear error.” Al Alwi v. Obama,
The presumption of regularity stems from a humble proposition—that “[public officers] have properly discharged their official duties.” Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv.,
These cases—in fact every case applying the presumption of regularity—have something in common: actions taken or documents produced within a process that is generally reliable because it is, for example, transparent, accessible, and often familiar. As a result, courts have no reason to question the output of such processes in any given case absent specific evidence of error. Such a presumption rests on common sense. For instance, courts have no grounds to credit a defendant’s allegation that “the state court trial docket” or “the waiver of trial by jury form” contain inaccurate information when that defendant has no support other than a self-serving allegation. See Thompson v. Estelle,
In saying that “[c]ourts regularly apply the presumption ... [to] processes that are anything but ‘transparent,’ ‘accessible,’ and ‘familiar,’ ” Maj. Op. at 1182, this court cites a single case where we presumed the accuracy of a tax receipt from the Central Bank of Brazil for purposes of claiming foreign tax credits under thе Internal Revenue Code. See id. at 1182 (citing Riggs Nat’l Corp.,
By contrast, the Report at issue here was produced in the fog of war by a clandestine method that we know almost nothing about. It is not familiar, transparent, generally understood as reliable, or accessible; nor is it mundane, quotidian data entry akin to state court dockets or tax receipts. Its output, a [redactions] intelligence report, was, in this court’s own words, “prepared in stressful and chaotic conditions, filtered through interpreters, subject to transcription errors, and heavily redacted for national security purposes.” Maj. Op. at 1179. Needless to say, this is quite different from assuming the mail is delivered or that a court employee has accurately jotted down minutes from a meeting.
To support its approach here, this court invokes presumptions of regularity for state court fact-finding and for final judgments in criminal habeas proceedings. See id. at 1181-82. Aside from the abstract and uncontroversial proposition that courts should be sensitive to the separation of powers as well as to federalism, id. at 1181-82, the analogy makes little sense. State court judgments and fact findings arise out of a formal and public adversarial process where parties generally have attorneys to zealously guard their interests, and where neutral state court judges, no less than federal judges, pledge to apply the law faithfully. That federal courts give a presumption of regularity to judgments and fact findings that emerge from such a process, where criminal defendants have ample opportunity to challenge adverse evidence, see Lackawanna Cnty. Dist. Att’y v. Coss,
In its analysis, this court ignores a key step in the logic of applying a presumption of regularity, namely, that the challenged document emerged from a process that we can safely rely upon to produce accurate information. Reliability, not whether an
To be sure, the government in this case has produced a declaration stating [redactions] see Maj. Op. at 1186 (quoting this affidavit). But we have no idea what the [redactions] is, nor anywhere near the level of familiarity or experience with that course of business that would allow us to comfortably make presumptions about whether the output of that process is reliable. Cf. Bismullah v. Gates,
This is not to say that reports similar to the one at issue here are necessarily unreliable. Perhaps after careful scrutiny district courts will conclude that many are reliable. See, e.g., Khan v. Obama,
Nor am I suggesting that district courts should give no weight to sworn declarations by government officials that such reports are [redactions] because [redactions] Up to a point, the declaration does provide support for the Report’s reliability. For one thing, it suggests that the Report is in fact authentic, i.e., that it really is an interrogation summary. Relying on similar declarations, many district courts that have heard Guantanamo habeas cases— including the district court here—have adopted a presumption of authenticity for government records like the Report even while consistently rejecting a presumption that such records are accurate. See, e.g., Alsabri v. Obama,
But this court goes well beyond these modest conclusions—and well beyond what the government actually argues in its briefs—when it relies on the bare fact that government officials have incentives to maintain careful intelligence reports as a reason to require district courts to presume that such reports are not only authentic, but also accurate, despite circumstances casting their reliability into serious doubt. See Appellants’ Br. 30-31. (arguing in passing that the district court in this case erred by failing to give any weight to the general presumption that government officials carry out their duties properly but never urging adoption of a categorical, burden-shifting presumption of regularity); Appellants’ Reply Br. 22-24 (same). One need imply neither bad faith nor lack of incentive nor ineptitude on the part of government officers to conclude that [redactions] compiled in the field by [redactions] in a [redactions] near an [redactions] that contain multiple layers of hearsay, depend on translators of unknown quality, and include cautionary disclaimers that [redactions] are prone to significant errors; or, at a minimum, that such reports are insufficiently regular, reliable, transparent, or accessible to warrant an automatic presumption of regularity.
It is thus not at all surprising that our court has never before applied the presumption of regularity in Guantanamo Bay habeas cases despite numerous opportunities to do so. For instance, in Barhoumi, the government, seeking to establish that the petitioner was “part of’ an al Qaida associated militia, relied on an intelligence
We followed exactly the same playbook in Bensayah and Al Alwi, two cases in which we reviewed district court reliability determinations about the precise type of government intelligence document at issue here [redactions] Bensayah v. Obama,
And most recently, in Khan v. Obama, we reviewed the district court’s finding that the government’s informant reports were reliable. Again, rather than applying a presumption of regularity, we spent page after page carefully evaluating the reliability of the reports. In affirming the district court’s determination that the documents were reliable, we emphasized external indicia of reliability, such as photographs and items seized from petitioner’s home, as well as detailed government declarations explaining why the reports were reliable. Khan,
Our approach in Barhoumi, Al Alwi, Bensayah, and Khan reflects a careful and conscious balancing of the important interests at stake. While federal courts typically exclude hearsay unless it falls within a specific exception, see Fed.R.Evid. 803, we understand that in the context of enemy
To be clear, I make no claim that anything in Barhoumi Bensayah, Al Alwi, Khan, or any of our other Guantanamo habeas cases affirmatively rules out the possibility of applying a rebuttable presumption of accuracy to certain kinds of government evidence in some circumstances. My point is only that our cases, proceeding in the very common-law-like fashion that my colleagues describe, see Maj. Op. at 1185, have endorsed and applied a careful and fine-grained approach to the assessment of reliability. We have applied that approach to claims that a document was mistranslated (Barhoumi) and to claims that a document is insufficiently corroborated (Al Alwi, Khan)— two of the issues in this case. We have applied that approach to a (Bensayah, Al Alwi), and to government interrogation summaries (Al Alwi)—the same type and category of documents as the Report. Following that approach, we have both upheld (Barhoumi, Al Alwi, Khan) and overturned (Bensayah) district court findings that a government document is reliable. The only feature of this case not previously encountered is that here the government lost: the district court found the dispositive government Report unreliable and granted a writ of habeas corpus.
Moreover, the presumption discards the unanimous, hard-earned wisdom of our district judges, who have applied their fact-finding expertise to a wide array of government hearsay evidence. In doing so, they have developed a uniquely valuable perspective that we ought not so quickly discard. These judges, including the district judge in this case, have unanimously rejected motions to give government evidence a presumption of accuracy. See, e.g., Alsabri,
Brushing aside these district court rulings, my сolleagues think that those courts “may” have been denying a presumption of accuracy because they “[c]onfus[ed]” it for a presumption of truth, Maj. Op. at 1180, the difference being that the latter presumes the content of a report is true, whereas the former presumes that the government official filling out the report did so accurately—i.e., that in doing the interview, he correctly heard, translated, recorded, and summarized the content embodied in the report. The district courts have suffered from no such confusion, nor do I, for the core question presented in this case is whether the Report accurately reflects Latif s words. Unsurprisingly, my colleagues cite not a single case where a district court refers to a presumption of truth or, for that matter, a single instance in which the government argued for a presumption of truth rather than a presumption of accuracy. They cite Ahmed, but nowhere did the district court there say that “the requested presumption would go to the truth of ‘the facts contained in the Government’s exhibits.’ ” Maj. Op. at 1180 (citing Ahmed,
In support of a presumption of regularity, this court relies on the plurality opinion in Hamdi, which, applying Due Process analysis, states that “the Constitution would not be offended by a presumption in favor of the Government’s evidence” in enemy combatant proceedings for citizen detainees “so long as that presumption remained a rebuttable one and fair opportunity for rebuttal were provided.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
This court believes that our decisions in Alr-Bihani,
In sum, given how and where we typically apply the presumption of regularity, and given the balance this circuit has already struck on how to deal with hearsay evidence in Guantanamo Bay cases, and given the seasoned observations of our district courts about the reliability of such evidence, the question still unanswered to my satisfaction is “Why?” Wby does this court now require district courts to categorically presume that a government report—аgain, one created in a [redactions] near an [redactions] with multiple layers of hearsay, and drafted by unidentified translators and scriveners of unknown quality—is accurate? Whether the presumption can be overcome by a preponderance of the evidence or by clear and specific evidence— this court never says which—I fear that in practice it “comes perilously close to suggesting that whatever the government says must be treated as true,” see Parhat,
But the court’s assault on Boumediene does not end with its presumption of regularity. Not content with moving the goal posts, the court calls the game in the government’s favor. Instead of remanding to give Latif an opportunity to rebut the presumption of regularity, this appellate court engages in an essentially de novo review of the factual record, providing its own interpretations, its own narratives, even its own arguments, see Maj. Op. at 1185-99, and finds that “neither internal flaws nor external record evidence rebuts that presumption in this case,” id. at 1179. But see Pullman-Standard v. Swint,
II.
Rather than adopting a presumption of regularity, I would apply clear error review to the district court’s findings of fact just as we have consistently done throughout our Guantanamo cases. See, e.g., Almerfedi,
A
The starting point, of course, is the Report itself. See Awad,
“[F]actual errors” in the Report reinforced the district court’s concerns. Id. Specifically, although the Report states “that Latif said he had been to Jordan to accompany a friend who needed medical care for his hand[,] ... Latif has repeatedly told interrogators, and has provided evidence to show, that he went to Jordan for treatment of an injury to his own, not a friend’s, head, not hand.” Id. at 15. In addition, the Report erroneously states that “Latif is unmarried and has no children,” even though “a declaration Latif submitted for use in this litigation states that he is married and has a son.” Id. Lastly, in what even my colleagues concede
Also troubling the district court was the lack of “corroborating evidence for any of the incriminating statements in the [Report].” Latif, slip op. at 26. As the district court explained: “No other detainee saw Latif at a training camp or in battle. No other detainee told interrogators that he fled from Afghanistan to Pakistan, from Tora Bora or any other location, with Latif. No other type of evidence links Latif to A1 Qaeda, the Taliban, a guest house, or a training camp.” Id.
The district court properly weighed the cumulative effect of these subsidiary findings. See Al-Adahi,
All of the concerns just described are obviously relevant to evaluating the Report’s accuracy. It goes without saying that the circumstances under which the Report was produced and the evidence, or lack of evidence, of care taken to avoid mistakes when the Report was produced shed light on that question. Likewise, it is undoubtedly probative of the Report’s reliability that it contains factual errors, for the presence of a known error increases the likelihood that other information in the Report is inaccurate as well. And of course, it is also relevant that the government has offered no independent corroboration for any of the Report’s incriminating facts. After all, skepticism about the trustworthiness of uncorroborated confessions has deep, historical roots, so much so that a criminal defendant “may not be convicted on his own uncorroborated confession.” Smith v. United States,
Moreover, none of the subsidiary fact findings the district court made about the Report itself were clearly erroneous. As this court acknowledges, “the [district] court cited problems with the Report itself, including its substantial redactions, [redactions] its reference Latif s ‘hand’ instead of his head injury, its internally inconsistent statements [redactions] and the perceived lack of corroboration.” Maj. Op. at 1191. And this court agrees that “[t]he inconsistencies in the Report may suggest a document produced on the field by imperfect translators or transcribers.” Id. at 1188.
Nonetheless, this court insists, “[i]t is almost inconceivable,” id. at 1187, that the inculpatory information in the Report could have resulted from “poor translation, sloppy notetaking [redactions] or some combination of those factors,” Latif slip op. at 26. According to the court, there is too high a “level of inculpatory detail” in the Report for it to have resulted from such mistakes. Maj. Op. at 1187. And because the incriminating statements “are intertwined with other details in the Report that persist in Latif s current account of his travels,” the court believes, [redactions]
My colleagues’ interpretation of the evidence is undoubtedly plausible. Yet when one accounts for all of the Report’s various problems, the fact that admittedly true facts “are intertwined” with contested inculpatory ones also supports another plausible
Now imagine the game when, as may have happened here, [redactions] and the Report produced “[i]n the field,” with the assistance of “imperfect translators or transcribers,” Maj. Op. at 1188. And imagine further, as may also have happened here, that the “imperfect” translator may have misheard Latif s exact words, or the interrogator may have misheard the “imperfect” translation, or the “imperfect” notetaker may have failed to transcribe precisely what was “imperfect[ly]” translated, or that whoever wrote up a summary based on those notes, [redactions] may have failed to understand what exactly that “imperfect” notetaker had written, or that some combination of all those things may have occurred. This problem is all the more exacerbated when—again as may have happened here—the same [redactions] and fails to [redactions] until [redactions] As Latif s [redactions]—as so often occurs in the game of telephone And so, Latif s statement about a charity-worker named Ibrahim Al-Alawi from Ibb encouraging him to travel from Yemen may have become a reference to a jihadi recruiter; his statement about traveling to an Islamic Center in Kabul run by an imam named Abdul Fadel may have transformed into one about serving north of Kabul under an Afghan commander with the homophonous name Abu Fazl; and his statement about three teachers named Abu Bakr of the Arab Emirates, Awba of Kuwait, and Hafs of Saudi Arabia, may have turned into one about fellow Taliban soldiers with the similar sounding (or identical) names Abu Bakr, Abu Hudayfa, and Abu Hafs—just as his statement about a trip to Jordan for treatment of an injury to Latifs head became a statement about trеatment for his friend’s hand. Indeed, my colleagues nowhere disagree that all of the names and statements appearing in the Report sound similar to names and statements Latif later made. And, although only [redactions] that appear to have beer [redactions] are in the record and unredacted, both contain details that also [redactions] appear in [redactions], details which an [redactions] might have [redactions] if they were having trouble understanding [redactions] say [redactions] Obviously, moreover, we have no way of knowing whether the redacted [redactions] likewise contain [redactions] Given that the circumstances under which the Report was produced increased the probability of mistakes, given that the Report contains other “factual errors,” and given that the government has failed to corroborate any of the Report’s incriminating information, Latif, slip op. at 26, this explanation is at least plausible—the only question for us when reviewing fact findings, such as these, for clear error. See Awad,
B
The district court did not stop with the Report. It also “eonsider[ed] the explanation of events Latif has offered”—again in service of the critical question of whether the Report was “sufficiently reliable.” Latif, slip op. at 27. According to Latif, with the help of a charitable worker, he left Yemen in 2001 seeking free medical treatment for the lingering effects of a serious head injury suffered in a 1994 car accident. Although the government challenges Latifs claim that he left Yemen in 2001 seeking medical treatment, it never disputes that “in 1994, [Latif] sustained head injuries as the result of a car accident and [that] the Yemeni government paid for him to receive treatment” in Jordan at that time. Id. at 5.
Besides his own narrative, Latif also offered documentary evidence to corroborate his account. Three documents are particularly noteworthy. The first, “a letter, dated August 21, 1994, from a doctor at the Islamic Hospital in Amman, Jordan,” confirms “that Latif ‘was admitted’ on July 9, 1994 ‘following a head injury.’ ” Id. at 23 (quoting letter). The second, “a letter dated August 18, 1999 from Yemen’s Ministry of Public Health,” states “that ‘[w]e recommend that [Latif] return to the previous center outside for more tests and therapeutic and surgical procedures at his own expense.’ ” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting letter, which also states that Latif “is hard of hearing” and that “a wide circular hol[e] was detected in [Latifs] left eardrum”). And the third—the most important—is Latifs intake form dated December 31, 2001 (i.e., shortly after he was seized [redactions] Filled out when Latif was taken into United States custody, the intake form states that Latif was in possession of “medical papers” when seized traveling from Afghanistan to Pakistan. Id. at 23 & n. 12.
This documentary evidence, the district court found, “corroborated]” Latifs “plausible” story. Id. at 26-27. The district court also rejected the government’s contention that Latifs exculpatory account was a “cover story” and found the government’s “attack[s]” on the “credibility of [the] story ... unconvincing.” Id. at 26. This too was an obviously relevant evidentiary consideration. A petitioner’s version of events, should he choose to provide one, can be relevant when assessing the government’s evidence. After all, the more believable the рetitioner’s exculpatory account, the greater the reason to doubt the government’s inculpatory one. Cf., e.g., Al-Adahi,
Although agreeing that Latifs story is relevant, my colleagues nonetheless conclude that by describing it as “plausible” and “not incredible,” the district court never actually credited that account. But “reading the district court’s explanation in [such] a parsed manner that overlooks its meaning in context” is inconsistent with clear error review. United States v. Brockenborrugh,
The Court makes this ruling [i.e., about the accuracy of the Report] having taken into consideration the explanation of events Latif has offered. Latifs story is not without inconsistencies and unanswered questions, but it is supported bycorroborating evidence provided by medical professionals and it is not incredible. [The district court then rejected the government’s theory that Latif had told inconsistent stories over the course of his detention and was therefore telling a “cover story.” The district court reasoned that the government’s theory was based on just “two isolated statements,” one of which “does not contradict Latifs version of events.” Finally, the district court found the government’s] other arguments attacking the credibility of Latifs story ... similarly unconvincing. The smaller inconsistencies to which [the government] ha[s] pointed may be no more than misstatements or mistranslations; even if some details of Latifs story have changed over time, for whatever reason, its fundamentals have remained the same.
Latif, slip op. at 27-28. What else could the district court have meant other than that it found Latifs account convincing enough, plausible enough, consistent enough, and corroborated enough to give it at least some weight against the government’s evidence? And as we have held, “[m]erely because a particular piece of evidence is insufficient, standing alone, to prove a particular point does not mean that the evidence ‘may be tossed aside and the next [piece of evidence] may be evaluated as if the first did not exist.’ ” Salahi,
Given that the district court found Latifs story entitled to at least some weight and given that such a finding could properly guide its evaluation of the government’s evidence, the only remaining question for us is whether that finding was clearly erroneous. It was not. As this court itself acknowledges, Latifs story, on its own terms, is not “intrinsically] implausible].” Maj. Op. at 1193-94. And that observation is reinforced by corroborating evidence showing that Latif needed to leave Yemen for medical care in 1994, that Yemen’s Ministry of Public Health recommended he do so again in 1999, and that Latif had medical papers with him when seized crossing into Pakistan. That a trip abroad for medical care had been necessary, not once but twice, makes it more likely that Latif would have needed to travel abroad for medical care in 2001 as well. And the fact that Latifs condition was still serious enough to require such a trip in 1999, five years after he was first injured, increases the odds that the injury continued to be that serious two years later in 2001. Equally important, the most plausible reason for why Latif would have had medical papers in his possession when first seized is that his trip in fact had a medical purpose.
Attempting to cast doubt on the district court’s favorable assessment of Latifs account,
Rather than applying clear error review to the district court’s resolution of such discrepancies, this court suggests its own story—a story not found by the district court, never argued by the government, and based on its own review of the raw evidence—about how Ibrahim may have “promised Latif the medical treatment he needed to induce him to join the Taliban.” Maj. Op. at 1188. Exhibiting heretofore unknown expertise in al Qaida recruitment strategies, the court posits that “[s]uch a recruiting tactic (or cover story)” would make sense. Id. “Latifs medical records and his professed desire for medical treatment,” the court thus finds, “are therefore consistent with the Report, not inconsistent.” Id. at 1188. But see United States v. Microsoft,
C
The government points to several additional pieces of evidence that, it believes, buttress its argument that the Report is
First, consider the circumstances leading up to Latifs seizure by Pakistani authorities—circumstances to which the district court gave less weight than the government would have liked. Latif left Kabul in November 2001 and then traveled through Jalalabad before eventually arriving at the Pakistani border where Pakistani authorities detained him. According to the government, this path mirrors that of Taliban soldiers retreating from Kabul. Although not contending that this evidence is dispositive, the government argues that because Latifs admitted route is consistent with that of Taliban soldiers and with information in the Report, it is a helpful piece in the puzzle, bolstering its claim that the Report’s inculpatory statements are accurate.
Fair enough, but how helpful? If this route is commonly used by innocent civilians, then the evidence is not that helpful at all. To understand why, consider a simple hypothetical. Suppose the government were to argue in a drug case that the defendant drove north from Miami along 1-95, “a known drug route.” Familiar with 1-95, we would surely respond that many thousands of non-drug traffickers take that route as well. Given what we know about our own society, the 1-95 inference would be too weak even to mention. Cf. Almerfedi,
Based on nothing more' than a few anecdotes, this court suggests that Latifs route was akin to the country road. It asserts that the details of Latifs post-Kabul travels are “analogous” to those we found “strong[ly] suggestive]” of al Qaida membership in Uthman. Maj. Op. at 1197. But how analogous are they really? Uthman was captured “in the vicinity of Tora Bora” at a time when “most, if not all, of those in the vicinity of Tora Bora ... were combatants.” Uthman,
Second, consider the government’s argument that “Latif was recruited by an al Qaeda member” in Yemen, a theory the district court found the government had failed to prove. Latif, slip op. at 25. To support its theory, the government pointed to evidence allegedly showing that Latif s charitable benefactor, Ibrahim Alawi, is actually an al Qaida facilitator known as Abu Khalud, whose real name is Ibrahim Ba’alawi. Some of this evidence could certainly have led a reasonable factfinder to accept the government’s interpretation, including that “Ba’alawi” and “Alawi” have similar spellings and that the route Latif took to Afghanistan at Ibrahim’s urging was the same path reportedly taken by other detainees who, unlike Latif, admit to having taken that trip to fight alongside the Taliban and some of whom have also admitted, again unlike Latif, to being Abu Khalud-recruits. That evidence, however, hardly forecloses the district court’s contrary finding that the government had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Ibrahim Alawi was Abu Khalud. To repeat, although we have treated evidence that a petitioner reached Afghanistan along a “route similar to the paths of admitted al Qaeda members now in U.S. custody” as a plus factor in determining whether that petitioner was “part of’ al Qaida, Uthman,
The record contains ample additional evidence that supports the district court’s finding. Latif introduced expert declarations explaining that “Ba’alawi” and “Alawi” are distinct Arabic names and that both are common in Yemen. Latif, slip op. at 18-19. Notably, therefore, Latifs interrogation summaries all refer to some variation of the name Ibrahim Alawi but none include the “Ba,” and none mention Abu Khalud. By contrast, interrogation summaries for seven of the eight detainees mentioning the al Qaida facilitator named Abu Khalud refer either to “Abu Khalud” or “Ibrahim Ba’alawi” but never “Ibrahim Alawi,” id., and the eighth, who apparently used the name “Alawi,” is a detainee this very district court, in a different case, found not credible because his statements conflicted with those of several other detainees, id. at 19 n. 10 (citing Abdah v. Obama,
Next, consider record evidence that, according to this court, shows “that Latif stayed at al-Qaida guesthouses.” Maj. Op. at 1196. That evidence consists of [redactions] which the government claims include [redactions] The [redactions] contain [redactions] along with [redactions] Seeking to connect these [redactions] to [redactions] the government argues that the [redactions] the [redactions] and the [redactions] The government also points to an [redactions] Finally, the government contends that the fact that [redactions] buttresses its [redactions] given its theory that the [redactions] contain [redactions]
But the district court found that the [redactions] the government points to “is not [redactions] The district court based that finding on the differences between [redactions] and the [redactions] as well as the fact that [redactions] is not [redactions] The district court also noted Latifs innocent explanation for not having his passport—that he “gave it to Ibrahim to use in arranging his stay at a hospital.” Id.
Ample record evidence supports the district court’s factual analysis. At the most basic level as the district court noted, [redactions] Moreover, [redactions] explaining that even the apparent [redactions] between the [redactions] is misleading given that [redactions] Indeed, [redactions] implying [redactions] In addition, as [redactions]
This court nonetheless accuses the district court of overlooking the government’s expert evidence that [redactions] By that theory, Latif could be any [redactions] and maybe he goes [redactions] But the district court committed no clear error when, after considering the [redactions] it concluded that [redactions]
Finally, the district court’s reliance on Latifs explanation for not having his passport is plausible in light of other record evidence about the practice of at least one hospital, the Islamic Hospital in Jordan, of taking foreign patient’s passports “to guarantee that [those] patients will not leave the country before settling their bills.” Pet’r Trial Ex. No. 7. Moreover, although leaving behind one’s passport with an al Qaida operative at an al Qaida run guesthouse might suggest al Qaida affiliation, see Al Alwi,
D
The court groups many of its criticisms about the district court’s fact finding under the catch-all header of Al-Adahi. According
Absent some affirmative indication to the contrary, we “presum[e] that the district court knew and applied the law correctly.” United, States v. Mouling,
Al-Adahi’s ties to bin Laden “cannot prove” he was part of Al-Qaida and this evidence therefore “must not distract the Court.” The fact that Al-Adahi stayed at an al-Qaida guesthouse “is not in itself sufficient to justify detention.” Al-Adahi’s attendance at an al-Qaida training camp “is not sufficient to carry the Government’s burden of showing he was a part of’ al-Qaida.
Alr-Adahi,
This court uses Al Adahi to turn the presumption of district court lawfulness on its head. Rather than giving the district court the benefit of the doubt, it seems to assume that the district court considered the evidence in isolation and ignored key facts. Take, for example, the contention that the district court tossed aside and considered in isolation alleged inconsistencies between statements attributed to Latif in different interrogation reports. Maj. Op. at 1220. This argument fails to recognize the leeway we have afforded district courts to resolve discrepancies among various accounts in other Guantanamo cases. In Al-Madhwani, we found no error in the district court’s decision to credit two different detainees’ interrogation summaries even though the detainees’ statements contradicted each other in certain respects, reasoning that the “task” of “resolving” such discrepancies “quintessentially” belonged to the district court. Al-Madhwani,
The only affirmative indication this court identifies allegedly showing that the district court took an unduly atomized approach to the evidence relates to the circumstances of Latifs capture and to [redactions] The court makes much of the fact that in weighing the former, the district court employed language similar to the language used at one point by the district court in Alr-Adahi—specifically that “the timing of [Latifs] departure ... is not sufficient to create an inference that he was involved in fighting.” Latif, slip op. at 27 (emphasis added). The court, however, neglects to mention that this sentence appears in the middle of a paragraph evaluating the credibility of Latifs account, which itself appears in the middle of an extended assessment of the combined impact of multiple pieces of evidence on the Report’s reliability. This “pars[ing]” of the district court’s words “overlooks]” what those words “mean[ ] in context,” an approach that is, again, inconsistent with clear error review. See Brockenborrugh,
As for the district court’s decision [redactions] my colleagues offer no convincing explanation for why the district court should have considered evidence that it found does not implicate Latif—unless, of course, that finding was clearly erroneous, something they never claim. Suppose, for example, that a witness in a burglary case testifies to having seen a man with a similar build as the defendant walk away from the site of the crime. If the factfinder concludes that the person the witness saw was not the defendant, then surely the factfinder can reasonably set aside the witnesses’ testimony in assessing whether the defendant was the burglar. So too here. Once the district court had determined that [redactions] did not implicate Latif, it was entirely proper for it to put them aside when evaluating the rest of the evidence.
The remainder of the court’s Al Adahi critique rests entirely on the claim that the district court “ignorefd] relevant evidence.” Maj. Op. at 1193. Not so. The district court expressly considered virtually all the evidence this court points to— including every single item of evidence the government claims is of primary or even secondary relevance. Compare id. at 1193-95 (“correspondence” between names appearing in the Report and names Latif later mentioned to interrogators), with Latif, slip op. at 15-16 (discussing same); compare Maj. Op. at 1194-95 (Latifs travel route from Yemen to Afghanistan), with Latif, slip op. at 10-11 (discussing same); compare Maj. Op. at 1195-96 (purported inconsistencies in Latifs statements), with Latif, slip op. at 27-28 (discussing same); compare Maj. Op. at [redactions] compare Maj. Op. at 1197-98 (circumstances of Latifs departure from Kabul and subsequent
To determine, as this court apparently does, that an experienced district court judge has totally ignored relevant evidence and so committed legal error because his twenty-seven page opinion omits mention of a handful of tertiary items plucked from thousands of pages of record evidence not only ignores the presumption of district court lawfulness, but also imposes on that court a virtually impossible burden. As the First Circuit put it, “[t]he district court could have written a 200-page decision on this case, but the far more compact assessment it made was entirely adequate under Rule 52(a).” Addamax Corp. v. Open Software Foundation, Inc.,
The district court’s opinion is by no means perfect. But clear error review demands a good deal less than perfection. See Microsoft,
III.
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the grant of the writ of habeas corpus.