| The Superior Court of New York City | Jan 24, 1851
It is not pretended in this case that there was any fraud in putting the drafts in suit into circulation. On the contrary, it distinctly appears that they were applied to the very use for which they were intended by the parties. They were drawn and accepted for the sole purpose of talcing up the note held by Bancroft; hence the question whether they were received by him in satisfaction of his original debt, resulting from the sale of goods, or merely as a collateral security for its payment, is not at all necessary to be decided. It is wholly immaterial. It is fully settled that, where there is no fraud, the holder of an accommodation note or draft, which was delivered to him merely as a security for an antecedent debt, has the same title to maintain an action for its recovery against the accommodation drawer, acceptor, or endorser,- as if he had paid, in consideration of its transfer, its full amount in cash. It is not necessary that he'should have parted with value to render the transfer valid. It is sufficient that it was founded upon a good consideration, as between the parties, and this consideration is proved by proving the existence of a debt that was meant to be secured.
The cases of the Portland Bank v. Buck (5 Wend. 66" court="N.Y. Sup. Ct." date_filed="1830-05-15" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/bank-of-rutland-v-buck-5513450?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="5513450">5 Wend. 66) and Grandin v. Le Roy (2 Paige Ch. 509" court="None" date_filed="1831-08-02" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/grandin-v-le-roy--smyth-5547894?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="5547894">2 Paige 509) are express, and we think decisive authorities
The learned counsel for the defendants, we think, has misapprehended the import and effect of the decision of the Court of Errors in Strother v. McDonald. That case has no reference to accommodation paper, nor, in reference to any negotiable paper, does it establish the doctrine for which the learned counsel eon-
The judgment at special term is reversed. There must be a new trial, with costs to abide the event.
Vide also Hall v. Clark, 2 Sand. S. C. R. p. 105.