1 S.W.2d 67 | Ark. | 1928
Appellant and appellee both claim to be the lawful widow of Charlie Lathan, deceased, who died intestate and without issue in Phillips County, Arkansas, in the month of February, 1926. Appellant was lawfully married to said Charlie Lathan on December 24, 1896, at Eupora, Mississippi, and thereafter lived with him as his wife there, and at Cleveland, Mississippi, until in 1909, at which time Charlie Lathan left appellant and removed to Phillips County, Arkansas. About two years later, appellee, who was also a resident of Cleveland, Mississippi removed from thence to Phillips County, and on July 31, 1913, she was married to Charlie Lathan. On June 8, 1917, said Charlie Lathan and appellee purchased the land described in the complaint which is sought to be partitioned in this action, taking the title thereto in their joint names, so as to create an estate by the entirety in them, if appellee was the lawful wife. Appellant brought this action to partition said land, charging that Charlie Lathan and appellee owned said land as tenants in common, and that she had acquired title to an undivided one-half interest therein from the collateral heirs of Charlie Lathan, and was therefore entitled to an undivided one-half interest therein. The court made a general finding of fact for appellee, entered a decree dismissing the complaint for want of equity, and quieted and confirmed the title to the property in appellee, from which is this appeal. *1039
Appellant has correctly stated the question for our determination as follows: "The appeal in this case raises the one question upon which the cause of the appellant must stand or fall. Was she the legal widow of the deceased, Charlie Lathan?" Let it be conceded, as heretofore stated, that appellant was lawfully married to Charlie Lathan in 1896. It is also true that he married appellee in 1913, four years after he had separated from his first wife. Appellant testified that she had not procured a divorce from her husband, and that, to her knowledge, no divorce had been granted him, although, according to Mr. J. M. Walker, a member of the Helena bar, she told him that she had been married to a man in St. Louis, evidently subsequently to her separation from Charlie Lathan. No divorce was procured by Charlie Lathan in Phillips County, as the records of the clerk of the chancery court fail to show it. Appellee testified that she knew appellant had been married to Charlie Lathan, but that he told her, prior to her marriage to him, that he had been divorced. Under this state of facts, what are the rights of the parties, and what is the law applicable thereto? Let us review some of the decisions of this court bearing upon this question, as well as decisions from other states.
In the case of Holbrook v. State,
"There was also a presumption that appellant's marriage with Jane Honeycutt was lawful, innocent, and not criminal. It is supposed that a man will not incur the built of felony and danger which attends it by marrying another woman during the life of one to whom he has previously been lawfully married."
And again, in the case of Cash v. Cash,
"It is in evidence that she married in due form of law John H. Cash. The court properly held that the presumption of law is that this was a legal marriage, and that the burden to show its illegality was upon the party attacking the validity of the marriage on the ground of *1040 illegality to show it by evidence. It is not presumed that the appellee violated the law. The presumption that the marriage was legal is stronger than the presumption that Miles Hankins, to whom she was first married, was living at the time of the second marriage. Her marriage is presumed to have been lawful, innocent, and not criminal."
Again, in the more recent case of Estes v. Merrill,
"So strong is the presumption and the law is so positive in requiring the party who asserts the illegality of a marriage to take the burden of proving it, that such requirement obtains, even though it involves the proving of a negative, and although it is shown that one of the parties had contracted a previous marriage, and the existence of the wife or husband of the former marriage at the time of the second marriage is established by proof, it is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of the validity of the second marriage, the law presuming rather that the first marriage has been dissolved by divorce, in order to sustain the second marriage."
And in the still later case, McGaugh v. Mathis,
In the case of Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Meredith,
"Counsel for appellee cite numerous cases of other courts, as well as decisions of this court, to the effect that there is a presumption of validity in favor of any marriage which is shown to have been solemnized, and that the burden of proving its invalidity rests upon him who questions its validity, and that this is true, notwithstanding it requires proof of a negative.
"Counsel for appellee correctly state the presumption of law, and the testimony in the case would have supported *1041 a verdict to the effect that this presumption had not been overcome; but, as the verdict was directed against the company, the question is whether the jury might not have found otherwise."
This case was reversed because not submitted to the jury. On the second appeal of this case, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Fountaine,
To the same effect see Bishop on Marriage, Divorce and Separation, 77, 956, 958. In the case of Chancery v. Whinney,
"Marriage will not be destroyed on presumption. The law is astute to preserve the sanctity of the marriage relation, and legitimacy of children and stability of descent and distribution, and therefore presumes innocence and virtue, in the absence of proof to the contrary. (Citing cases). In Haile v. Haile,
The case of Pittinger v. Pittinger,
"Appellee having been named as the beneficiary in the original certificates, and designated therein as the wife of deceased, she is presumed to be a legal one, and bear the relation to the insured designated (Knights of Honor v. Davis,
"This presumption applies with peculiar force in favor of one who is unable to prove affirmatively that the man with whom she entered into the marriage relation in good faith was divorced from a former wife. Appellee was not acquainted with deceased until she *1043
met him in Colorado, and, except for the presumption in favor of her innocence, there would be imposed upon her an unreasonable burden if she is required to show that, prior to her contracting marriage with the assured, be had been divorced. It is contended on behalf of appellant that, the marriage of deceased to his first wife having been shown, this is sufficient to overcome the presumption in favor of the legality of the marriage between deceased and appellee. While it is true that it is a presumption of law that a fact continuous in its nature, such as marriage, continues after its existence is once shown, yet this presumption is not sufficient in all cases to overthrow the presumption of law in favor of innocence. Klein v. Laudman,
From these authorities we feel justified in again stating the law to be that, where a second marriage is established in form according to law, a presumption arises in favor of its validity as against a former marriage, even though the husband or wife of the former marriage is living at the time, and that this presumption is not overcome by the presumption of law in favor of the continuance of the first marital relation, coupled with the testimony of the former spouse that he or she has not obtained a divorce, and has no information as to whether the other spouse had obtained a divorce, and the testimony of the clerk of the divorce court where the deceased spouse had some time lived, that no divorce had been granted such spouse in such court.
We cannot say therefore that the decree of the chancery court is against the preponderance of the evidence, and the judgment is accordingly affirmed.
HART, C.J., dissents. *1045