18 S.E. 946 | N.C. | 1894
The action was against the defendant Caleb Roper, administrator of H. E. Lassiter, and the other defendants as his sureties, for a breach of the administration bond.
The defendants in their answer, after denying the allegations of the complaint as to the breach of the bond, alleged as follows:
"That since the final account and settlement of said estate and the institution of this suit the time elapsed is sufficient in law to bar a recovery against these defendants or either of them, and they and each one of them pleads the statute of limitations in bar of plaintiffs' recovery in this action."
The following issues were submitted to the jury:
"1. Is defendant Roper, as administrator of H. E. Lassiter, indebted to plaintiffs, and if so, in what sum?
"2. Is the cause of action as to said Caleb Roper barred by the statute of limitations?
"3. Is the cause of action as to said defendants, Henry Roper and T. D. Pendleton, sureties on the administration bond, barred by the statute of limitations?" *13
The plaintiffs objected to issues two and three, relating to the statute of limitations, upon the ground that they were not relevant and proper under the pleadings. (18)
The defendants asked to amend their answer so as to plead the statute of limitations if it was not already properly pleaded. This the court refused, and defendants excepted.
The court submitted the issues objected to, but reserved the right to set aside the verdict as to these and strike out the issues if he should hold with the plaintiffs.
The jury responded to the first issue, "Seventy-nine dollars and sixty cents and interest from 3 February, 1884." To the second "No," and to the third "Yes."
The court, before judgment was signed, set aside the verdict as to the issues objected to and withdrew them; to which defendants excepted, and upon judgment being rendered against all the defendants the defendants excepted and appealed. In Bayard v. Malcolm, 1 Johnson, 453, Chief Justice Kent remarked: "I entertain a decided opinion that the established principles of pleading, which compose what is called its science, are rational, concise, luminous and admirably adapted to the investigation of truth, and ought consequently to be very carefully touched by the hand of innovation." It was but in keeping with the spirit of these views that our present system of civil procedure was framed and enacted, and we find this Court very shortly after its adoption repudiating the idea that loose and uncertain pleading would be tolerated.
In Crump v. Mims,
In accordance with the foregoing principles the court held (20) that a complaint "which merely states a conclusion of law (that is, that the defendant is indebted to the plaintiff, and that the debt has not been paid) is demurrable both at common law and under The Code." Moore v. Hobbs,
It must be manifest that according to the above authorities the plea in the present case is fatally defective. The plea is as follows: "That since the final account and settlement of said estate and the institution of this suit the time elapsed is sufficient in law to bar a recovery against these defendants or either of them, and they and each of them pleads the statute of limitations in bar of plaintiff's recovery in this action." This simply amounts to the plea in Pope v. Andrews, supra which was held to be defective. It contains no facts whatever, but is a simple allegation of law, and nothing more. There are no facts in the other parts of the answer which lend any aid to the plea, and from which any legal conclusions can be deduced. Indeed, it is remarkable that there is but one date in the entire pleading, and that is simply as to the death of the intestate. It would introduce inestimable uncertainty and confusion and bring merited reproach upon our present method of procedure were we to uphold the plea in this case. It is a very simple requirement of The Code as well as the common law, that the facts constituting a cause of action or defense shall be plainly set forth. This has not been done by the defendants, and we are therefore of the opinion that the ruling of his Honor must be
Affirmed.
Cited: Farthing v. Carrington,
(22)