742 A.2d 840 | Conn. Super. Ct. | 1999
On July 27, 1999, the plaintiff, Lisa Laspina-Williams, filed the present action seeking visitation with the biological daughter of the defendant, Cheryl Laspina-Williams, pursuant to General Statutes §
The child was born September 9, 1994, and the plaintiff was present at the birth. When the child was approximately eleven months old, the plaintiff quit her full-time employment to care for the child. She and the child developed a close and loving emotional bond; the child referred to the plaintiff as "mommy." Over the course of the child's life, the plaintiff claims to have contributed to the child's financial support including health insurance premiums, clothing, schooling, private lessons, vacations and other recreational activities. In 1997, the plaintiff was appointed coguardian of the minor child by the Madison Probate Court on application of the defendant. *167
In October, 1998, the parties' personal relationship deteriorated and the plaintiff moved out of the joint residence. For a time, visitation was being worked out between the parties but in March, 1999, the defendant refused to allow the plaintiff to visit with the child. The defendant petitioned the Madison Probate Court to terminate the plaintiff's coguardianship pursuant to General Statutes §
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the present action on August 23, 1999, on the following two grounds: (1) that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff does not meet the threshold requirements of Castagno v. Wholean,
"Jurisdiction of the subject-matter is the power [of the court] to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Roe,
The sole issue on appeal in Castagno v. Wholean,
supra,
The court finds the foregoing arguments of the defendant unpersuasive. Under §
In dicta, the Supreme Court recognized that "current sociocultural definitions of `family' are so fluid as to create myriad factual circumstances to which [the] statute . . . may apply . . . ." Id., 352 n. 15. The Supreme Court has "also recognized that, for purposes of third party custody and visitation determinations, [t]raditional models of the nuclear family have come, in recent years, to be replaced by various configurations of parents, stepparents, adoptive parents and grandparents, and we should not assume that the welfare of children is best served by a narrow definition of those whom we permit to continue to manifest their deep concern for a child's growth and development. Michaud v. Wawruck,
[
Several Superior Court decisions have also recognized other relationships within the context of third party visitation cases. See Antonucci v. Frances-Cameron,
Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. FA9804207S (March 3, 1999) (
The court agrees with the reasoning and conclusions of the aforementioned cases and concludes that, based on the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint and the affidavits presented, the plaintiff has standing giving the court subject matter jurisdiction. Section
The defendant next argues that the case should be dismissed because the plaintiff can seek visitation in the Probate Court under §
The defendant cites Hubbard v. Hubbard,
The motion to dismiss is denied.