LASHEY HOPPING (FORMERLY ALMAGER) v. TIMOTHY SCARBOROUGH, JR.
No. CV-25-111
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISIONS II & III
May 13, 2026
2026 Ark. App. 303
APPEAL FROM THE BENTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 04DR-22-390], HONORABLE XOLLIE DUNCAN, JUDGE, REVERSED AND REMANDED
LaShey Hopping (formerly Amager) appeals two Benton County Circuit Court orders: one directing her to pay the attorney‘s fees of Timothy Scarborough, Jr., and one requiring her to pay an unequal amount of ad litem fees. She first challenges the award of attorney‘s fees, asking us to overrule Tiner v. Tiner, 2012 Ark. App. 483, 422 S.W.3d 178, and require the circuit court to provide a reviewable basis for attorney‘s-fee awards in domestic-relations cases. Alternatively, she also claims that the circuit court abused its discretion by requiring her to pay the entirety of Scarborough attorney‘s fees and costs. Finally, she asserts that the circuit court abused its discretion by ordering her to pay a majority of the ad litem fees. We agree the court abused its discretion in its award of ad
I. Factual and Procedural Background
This matter involves a child-custody dispute over Hopping‘s and Scarborough‘s eight-year-old son (MC). The two were not married at the time of MC‘s birth in September 2016, but Scarborough did execute an acknowledgement of paternity shortly thereafter. The parties then lived together until MC was approximately four years old; thereafter, Hopping had sole custody of MC.
In March 2022, the Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) filed a complaint for support against Scarborough. Scarborough answered the complаint and, shortly thereafter, filed a third-party complaint for paternity, custody, and visitation. In his third-party complaint, Scarborough claimed that an ex parte order of protection had been entered against him and that he had not had contact with MC in almost two years. He requested that the order of protection be modified and that he be awarded visitation.
Hopping responded, noting that the order of protection was a final order entered after a hearing in which Scarborough was present and had an opportunity to be heard. She argued that she should retain primary custody of MC and asked that any visitation awarded to Scarborough be supervised.
On October 7, Hopping and Scarborough entered into an agreed temporary order. The order established paternity in Scarborough and stated that Hopping would retain legal and physical custody of MC subject to Scarborough‘s right to supervised visitation. The order
On October 24, a temporary support order reflected that OCSE‘s “Support Complaint” had been set for a hearing on October 6, 2022, but that Scarborough and OCSE had reached an agreement on the issue of temporary child support. Other issues relating to OCSE‘s petition and the payment of child support, including retroactive support, were reserved for a final hearing on December 14, 2022.
On November 22, Hopping moved for the appointment of an attorney ad litem (AAL), and one was appointed a week later. The order appointing the AAL reflected that the parties had agreed to both the appointment of an AAL and the lawyer who would serve in that capacity. The custody and visitation matter was set for a final hearing on December 14. Before the hearing date, Hopping requested a continuance so the AAL would have sufficient time to complete her investigation. The court granted the motion, and the hearing was reset for April 17, 2023.
On December 9, 2022, Hopping‘s Legal Aid counsel moved to withdraw, claiming that Hopping was in violation of the client retainer agreement and that their relationship had become adverse and was irreparably damaged.1 The court granted the motion to
On April 11, Scarborough and the AAL filed a joint motion for a continuance. The AAL informed the court that she wished to evaluate MC‘s reaction to increased visitation with Scarborough before she made a complete recommendation and reрort to the court. Scarborough agreed with the AAL‘s request. The court granted the motion and reset the hearing for August 9.
On June 26, Scarborough filed an amended petition wherein he sought primary custody of MC. In the petition, he alleged that Hopping was restricting the activities he could engage in with MC during their visitations and interfered with his interactions with MC. In support of his request for custody, he relied on the AAL‘s recommendation that the frequency of his visits be increased and that supervised visits be relaxed. Hopping responded, generally denying that she had resisted increasing the frequency of Scarborough‘s visits and explaining that MC‘s illness had contributed to one missed visit.
On July 18, Hopping‘s counsel moved to withdrаw, citing a breakdown in communications. The court granted the motion to withdraw, and Hopping‘s new counsel entered an appearance.
On July 31, Hopping and Scarborough filed a joint motion to continue the August 9 hearing to allow Hopping‘s new counsel to prepare.
On August 8, the court ordered the parties to mediate the issues of custody, visitation, and incidental matters related thereto. The order stated that the parties had agreed on a
On October 27, 2023, the parties entered into an agreed order allowing the removal of MC from Scarborough‘s insurance and placing him on Hopping‘s husband‘s insurance instead.
On December 8, Scarborough filed a second amended petition. He alleged that Hopping had made several unfounded DHS reports and was actively impeding his attempts to have a relationship with MC. He again asked for primary custody of MC. Hopping denied the allegations.
On December 11, Hopping filed a motion for emergency hearing and custody alleging Scarborough had abused MC. She claimed that this alleged abuse had resulted in MC‘s acting out. Becаuse of MC‘s alleged disclosures, she involved law enforcement.
Scarborough responded, alleging that if MC had made such a disclosure, the disclosure was a product of Hopping‘s “intense psychological manipulation and emotional abuse of the child.” He further claimed that Hopping was engaging in a “studied, deliberate and relentless campaign” of alienation and that she was engaging in vexatious litigation and abuse of the legal system.
A hearing was held on January 11, 2024, after which the court entered a temporary order granting Scarborough primary custody of MC with Hopping having supervised visitation. The court stated that there was a “genuine danger to the еmotional and
A final hearing was held on October 17. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court announced its ruling, which was to maintain custody of MC in Scarborough with Hopping continuing to exercise only supervised visitation until she could “see her way clear to address these issues.” Child support was to be based on the parties’ affidavits of financial means. The court also granted Scarborough‘s counsel‘s request for permission to submit a рetition for his fees and for an unequal division of AAL fees.
The following day, Scarborough‘s attorney filed a petition seeking an award of $12,585 in attorney‘s fees pursuant to
Hopping objected to paying Scarborough‘s attorney‘s fees for several reasons. She stated that the billing statement submitted by his attorney included work performed for Scarborough in responding to the OCSE complaint, which was at a time she was not even a party to the litigation. She also stated she could not afford payment of his fees and pointed to the gross disparity in the parties’ incomes as reflected in their affidavits of financial means, and shе claimed the litigation had been protracted due to Scarborough‘s refusal to discuss resolution of the matter short of trial. She ultimately asked the court to deny his motion and require the parties to pay their own attorney‘s fees.
On October 25, the ad litem filed a motion for payment of her fees. She attached a fee schedule showing 38.8 hours of work performed at $200 an hour for a total of $7,760 plus costs.2 Scarborough responded to the motion, stating that the case should not have lasted for twenty-three months and that Hopping was at fault for the case lasting as long as it did. As such, he requested an unequal division of the fee amount. He argued that Hopping shоuld be responsible for the $5,500 in AAL fees incurred since September 21, 2023, the date the AAL first corresponded with DHS regarding the allegations of abuse, and 50 percent of the remaining amount plus costs—or $6,133 (less the $500 retainer). Hopping objected to
On October 28, 2024, the court entered its order from the October 17 hearing. It incorporated the court‘s rulings from the bench, ordered Hopping to pay $267 a month in child support, and took under advisement Scarborough‘s and the AAL‘s fee requests.
On Nоvember 12, the court entered an order requiring Hopping to pay $5,000 of the $6,766 balance in AAL fees and costs and requiring Scarborough to pay the remaining $1,766. The court provided no reasoning for the imbalance and ordered Hopping to pay the $5,000 within thirty days of the order.
On November 18, the court entered an order granting Scarborough‘s petition for attorney‘s fees and costs in its entirety. In doing so, the court considered Scarborough‘s petition, its supporting affidavit and detailed billing, and Hopping‘s response thereto. The court further stated that it had considered the petition for attorney‘s fees and costs in light of the factors for determining a fee award set forth in Chrisco v. Sun Industries, Inc., 304 Ark. 227, 800 S.W.2d 717 (1990), as modified for domestic-relations cases in Davis, supra. The court delayed payment of the $13,046.70 award until July 1, 2025, in light of the $5,000 AAL fee award previously entered. The court stated that, should Hopping fail to pay the sums as ordered, Scarborough could petition for a contempt finding and have the sums outstanding reduced to judgment.
Hopping has appealed, challenging both the circuit court‘s award of attorney‘s fees and costs and the unequal division of ad litem fees.
A. Attorney‘s fees
The first question before us is whether the circuit court erred in its award of attorney‘s fees. Hopping argues that the circuit court erred in ordering her to pay the entirety of Scarborough attorney‘s fees. She also argues that the circuit court should be requirеd to provide a reviewable basis for its attorney‘s-fees award. We agree, and to the extent that Tiner v. Tiner, 2012 Ark. App. 483, 422 S.W.3d 178, and its progeny suggest otherwise, we overrule them.
With respect to attorney‘s fees, Arkansas follows the American rule, which requires every litigant to bear his or her own attorney‘s fees, absent a state statute to the contrary. Crain v. Crain, 2025 Ark. App. 122, 708 S.W.3d 356 (citing Millsap v. Lane, 288 Ark. 439, 442, 706 S.W.2d 378, 379 (1986) (shareholder derivative action)); see also Bailey v. Rahe, 355 Ark. 560, 142 S.W.3d 634 (2004) (involving guardianship proceedings and
This distinction is of interest because our court in Tiner may have implied that the scope of and need for factual findings to support an attorney‘s-fee award is contingent on whether the court‘s authority to award those fees was statutory or inherent. Notwithstanding the implication, if it indeed exists, every decision awarding fees in a domestic-relations case, regardless of the basis on which the court is authorized to award it, should provide this court with findings sufficient to enable it to complete a meaningful review of the fee award. See Scott v. Est. of Prendergast, 90 Ark. App. 66, 204 S.W.3d 110 (2005). The order here does not do so; instead, it conclusorily states that the circuit court considered the Chrisco factors; the holding in Davis, 359 Ark. 33, 194 S.W.3d 197, which dealt with the financial disparity of the parties; and its award of ad litem fees before it awarded attorney‘s fees to Scarborough. It does not explain how the court‘s consideration of those factors resulted in the court‘s awarding Scarborough the entirety of his fees. Without such findings or reasoning, this court is unable to perform its judicially required task of determining whether the circuit court abused its discretiоn.
One of the fundamental purposes behind an award of fees is to place the burden of litigation expenses on the party who made it necessary. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Youngblood, 2020 Ark. App. 398, 609 S.W.3d 468; Ark. Game & Fish Comm‘n v. Gerard, 2018 Ark. 97,
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for reconsideration of the issue of attorney‘s fees. Because we are remanding this issue to the circuit court for a reconsideration of the court‘s award of fees, we also take this opportunity to revisit our decision in Tiner and to provide some guidance for the court‘s consideration on remand.
First, we reiterate that there is not an exhaustive list of factors the court must consider or expressly rule on in evaluating fee awards in domestic-relations cases. Domestic-relations cases can vary widely in the variety, type, and complexity of issues involved and the contentiousness of the parties; thus, there can be no fixed formula for determining what constitutes a reasonable amount of attorney‘s fees. What is clear is that the circuit court must consider the relative financial position of the parties. Beck, supra; Jablonski, supra. Depending
An exhaustive hearing on the issue of fees or strict documentation of the time involved and expenses incurred in the prosecution or defense of a domestic-relations action may not be required. Paulson v. Paulson, 8 Ark. App. 306, 652 S.W.2d 46 (1983) (stating that an exhaustive hearing is not required on the amount of attorney‘s fees because the court has presided over the proceedings and gained familiarity with the case and the services rendered
Finally, as a reviewing court, our task is to review the record to determine whether the circuit court abusеd its discretion in its award of fees. If the record does not reflect the reasons justifying the circuit court‘s award of fees, it is insufficient. While we do not require the circuit court to make specific findings on every factor to be considered, we do require that it provide a record sufficient for us to make a meaningful and intelligent review in order to properly analyze the court‘s decision. To the extent our decision conflicts with Tiner, we overrule it.
B. Attorney Ad Litem Fees
The final question before us is whether the circuit court erred in its award of attorney ad litem fees. There is a specific statutory scheme governing the appointment of attorneys ad litem and the payment of their fees and еxpenses.
The circuit court in this case failed to follow the foregoing statute in several rеspects. First, the circuit court failed to send a copy of its fee order to the AOC.7 It also required Hopping to pay the AAL‘s fees, not her expenses, in contravention of the plain language of the statute. Even assuming that the General Assembly intended for the court to have the ability to order payment of the AAL‘s costs and fees, the court failed to first seek payment of AAL fees and costs from the AOC fund.8
Furthermore, and most critical to the issue on appeal here, even assuming the statutes permit the court to order the parties to pay all or a portion of the AAL fees, the circuit court‘s order was completely devoid of any consideration of Hopping‘s ability to pay—a clear requirement under the statute.
Reversed and remanded.
ABRAMSON, VIRDEN, HIXSON, and MURPHY, JJ., agree.
GLADWIN, J., dissents.
ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Judge, dissenting. The majority holds that a circuit court must provide findings sufficient to enable this court to perform a meaningful review of fee awards in domestic-relations cases. Why? Because “[w]ithout such findings or reasoning, this court
Despite the circuit court‘s holding that it considered Scarborough‘s petition for attorney‘s fees—as well as his supporting affidavit and billing details—and the identified factors in Chrisco v. Sun Industries, Inc., 304 Ark. 227, 800 S.W.2d 717 (1990), and Davis v. Williamson, 359 Ark. 33, 194 S.W.3d 197 (2004), the majority contends that the circuit court failed to provide a reviewable basis for the awаrd. Considering that the circuit court went above and beyond what our appellate courts have required in domestic-relations matters for thirteen years, I must respectfully dissent. The majority has not, and cannot, demonstrate any error by the circuit court because it followed well-established precedent when it entered the order awarding Scarborough attorney‘s fees. Instead, the majority has chosen to ignore the longstanding presumption that the circuit court acted properly and made such necessary findings of fact to support its judgment, unless the contrary can be shown. See, e.g., Curry v. Pope Cnty. Equalization Bd., 2011 Ark. 408, 385 S.W.3d 130.
Additionally, while the majority insists that the order awarding attorney‘s fees dоes not “provide this court with any reasoning upon which the court‘s fee award can be effectively evaluated,” the majority does, in fact, evaluate—at length—the court‘s fee award. For example, the majority holds that
we are unable to determine why Hopping was ordered to bear the entire expense of this litigation during a time when Hopping was not a party and when the parties were working cooperatively toward a resolution of the pending issues. Even if the court considered Hopping to be a party who was responsible for unnecessary litigation and
expense, the record does not support the court‘s determination that Hopping should bear the entire expense of this litigation.
The opinion goes on to state that “it is unclear how the circuit court‘s consideration of the financial abilities of the parties resulted in its award of fees” and acknowledges that while Hopping was able to afford counsel, “it is not known where she obtained the funds to do so or that she would have access to such funds to pay Scarborough‘s fees.”
The majority has very clearly substituted its judgment for that of the circuit court. If, as the majority contends, the circuit court failed to “provide a record sufficient for us to make a meaningful and intelligent review,” then the proper result is to reverse and remand the fee award for proper consideration of the factors. See Stout v. Stout, 2011 Ark. App. 201, 378 S.W.3d 844. However, here the majority‘s disposition of reversing and remanding “for a reconsideration of the court‘s award of fees” is futile considering the majority‘s concurrent finding that the record “appears to actually militate against an award of fees.”
Furthermore, on remand, the majority provides what it terms “guidance for the court‘s consideration” and reiterates that there is no exhaustive list of factors the circuit court must consider or rule on when awarding attorney‘s fees in domestic-relations cases. However, in the same paragraph, the majority goes оn to discuss factors that the parties “must” consider, “should” consider, and various factors the circuit court “may” consider. If at this point our circuit courts are pondering what exactly is enough to justify an award of attorney‘s fees in domestic-relations cases, they are not alone; I, too, am perplexed.
Moreover, are we now demanding that before awarding attorney‘s fees, a circuit court must first ensure that both pаrties can afford the other‘s respective fees? What if one party heavily contributed to the complexity of the case, and that party‘s lack of cooperation caused another to incur significant legal fees? Rather than providing the circuit court “guidance” on remand—as the majority asserts—the plain language of the opinion clearly assigns the most weight to the financial ability of each party in making an award of attorney‘s fees.
However, disparity in income should not grant one party the opportunity to “manipulate the system” as the circuit court described Hopping‘s actions during this litigation. Here, the record reflects thаt Hopping filed no fewer than three false reports with the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) alleging abuse or neglect, and the circuit court noted that each time Hopping did not get what she wanted, the allegations to DHS
In conclusion, the majority opinion does not recognize the superior perspective of the circuit court, nor does it credit the circuit court‘s opportunity to observe the parties, their level of cooperation, and their obedience—or lack thereof—to court orders over the course of twenty-three months. Because the majority has substituted its judgment for that of the circuit court and has inevitably created confusion as to what exactly constitutes a “reviewable basis” for attorney‘s-fee awards, I dissent. Because Hopping failed to demonstrate how the circuit court abused its discretion, I would affirm.
Graves Law Firm, by: Josie N. Graves, for appellant.
Tara Ann Putnam, for appellee.