The Court of Appeals, under provisions of Code 1940, T. 13, § 88, submits to this court the question of whether or not Section 54, Title 14, Code 1940, is in violation of the Constitutions of the State of Alabama or of the United States.
In submission to this Court, the Court of Appeals recites that it is of opinion that said section is subject to the same vice as section 3447 of the Code of 1923, held void by the Supreme Court of the United States in Thornhill v. State,
The statute in question was incorporated in Michie’s Code of 1928 as § 3447, and came from the Acts of 1921, p. 31, § 1. The section is now codified as Code 1940, T. 14, § 54, and was approved by this court in Bankers’ Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Sloss et al.,
Several questions have been considered by the state and federal courts, to the effect that the phrase, “without a just cause or legal excuse for so doing,” as employed by the statute before us and as employed in the affidavit in the case of Lash v. State,
To a right decision of the question before us, it will be noted that, this expression used in the complaint or affidavit in this causé and appearing in the statute means “unlawfully.” Bankers’ Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Sloss et al.,
In Greek-American Produce Co. v. Illinois Central R. Co,
To this end this court has declared that in construing statutes, each section, paragraph and clause thereof must he construed as standing in pari materia and as a whole system, when they have the same general purpose; and this is necessary to determine the legislative intent. Shaw v. Kinney,
There are many decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States to the effect that the construction of a statute by its highest court in a state affords to a federal court an interpretation of its scope and meaning, and from which the validity of the statute in question, under the Constitution of the United States, is to be considered and determined in its application or administration. Smiley v. Kansas,
It may not be out of place to advert to the rule of a criminal conspiracy which is that a distinct and substantive offense is committed when the unlawful agreement is entered into, Smith v. State,
The foregoing authorities likewise establish the proposition that such unlawful community of purpose entered into as a conspiracy need not be proven by positive testimony. It is rarely so to be shown. It must be determined by the triers of fact from the conduct of parties and all the relative testimony (Morris v. State,
It may be further noted that when a prima facie conspiracy is established to commit an unlawful act, the several acts or declarations on the part of any of the conspirators in connection with and in furtherance of the common purpose, before the commission of the offense, may be shown in evidence, Abingdon Mills v. Grogan,
With this view of the decisions in this and other jurisdictions, we consider the immediate decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States touching the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, holding that it does not destroy the power of the state to duly enact proper police legislation as to subjects with
*54
in the control of the state. Standard Chemical & Oil Co. v. City of Troy, supra; State v. Goldstein, supra; Davis v. Massachusetts,
In the recent case by this court of Carter et al. v. Knapp Motor Co., Inc.,
“Our decisions are to the effect that the right to conduct one’s business without the wrongful interference of others is a valuable property right which will be protected, if necessary, by injunctive process. Bowen v. Morris,219 Ala. 689 ,123 So. 222 . And the enjoyment of the good name and good will of a business is likewise a valuable property right subject to like protection. Bankers’ Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Sloss,229 Ala. 26 ,155 So. 371 . One’s employment, trade or calling is likewise a property right, and the wrongful interference therewith is an actionable wrong. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Millonas,206 Ala. 147 ,89 So. 732 ,29 A.L.R. 520 . * * *
“And as observed by the United States supreme court in Jones v. City of Opelika,316 U.S. 584 ,62 S.Ct. 1231 , 1237,86 L.Ed. 1691 ,141 A.L.R. 514 :
“ ‘* * * courts are competent to adjudge the acts men do under color of a constitutional right, such as that of freedom of speech * * * and to determine whether the claimed right is limited by other recognized powers, equally precious to mankind.’
“And again the same Court in Carpenters and Joiners Union of America v. Ritter’s Cafe,315 U.S. 722 ,62 S.Ct. 807 , 809,86 L.Ed. 1143 :
“ ‘Whenever state action is challenged as a denial of “liberty”, the question always is whether the state has violated the “essential attributes of that liberty.” ’ ”.
It follows from the foregoing cases and others not to be cited, that it is recognized under the Constitutions, state and federal, that a person’s business is property and if lawfully conducted is entitled to protection from unlawful interference. Truax et al. v. Corrigan,
It follows that where the protection of the Federal Constitution is sought to overthrow legislation of this character by the state, the fundamental question arises:
“* * * is this a fair, reasonable, and appropriate exercise of the police power of the state, or is it an unreasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary interference with the right of the individual to his personal liberty, or to enter into those contracts in relation to labor which may seem to him appropriate or necessary for the support of himself and his family? Of course the liberty of contract relating to labor includes both parties to it. The one has as much right to purchase as the other to sell labor.
“This is not a question of substituting the judgment of the Court for that of the legislature. If the act be within the power of the state it is valid, although the judgment of the court might be totally opposed to the enactment of such a law. But the question would still remain: Is it within the police power of the state? and that question must be answered by the court.” Lochner v. New York,198 U.S. 45 , 56, 57,25 S.Ct. 539 , 543,49 L.Ed. 937 , 3 Ann.Cas. 1133.
See, also, Graves v. Minnesota,
In the late case of Truax et al. v. Corrigan et al.,
In these well-considered cases it is held that the Fourteenth Amendment leaves to the states an ample discretion in dealing with manifestations of force in the settlement of industrial conflicts. Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc.,
The demurrer as attacking the affidavit in question is a challenge of the constitutionality of the statute before us, Code 1940, T. 14, § 54, and it was applied in Bankers’ Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Sloss,
The trial court indicated such a construction by the overruling of the demurrer and the holding that the statute was a constitutional enactment of the state in the exercise of its police power. When so construed and administered, the statute is within the due exercise of the police power of the sovereign state and rightly enacted and administered for the lawful purpose of protecting the property and the rights of a person in his lawful business, and his right to conduct that business free from the unlawful acts of others condemned by the'statute. That is to say, it is an enactment which operates in the due administration thereof to the protection of the property rights and it does not offend the federal or state constitutions. Local Union No. 313 v. Stathakis,
We have indicated that the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States does not destroy the power of the state to enact proper police legislation as to subjects within the control of the state, and that a person’s business is his property so long as it is lawfully conducted and is entitled to protection from unlawful interference. Bankers’ Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Sloss et al.,
When the statute is so construed and applied and administered, it does not come within the influence of Thornhill v. Alabama,
The opinion of the majority, in the Drivers’ Union case, supra, clearly indicates that the Thornhill case, supra, has no application to the unlawful acts of the defendant declared and charged in the indictment under the statute duly directed to an unlawful conspiracy, combination or agency to hinder or interfere
unlawfully
with the carrying on of
any lawful business.
This is clearly stated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc.,
“The supreme court of Illinois sustained an injunction against the Milk Wagon Drivers Union over the latter’s claim that it involved an infringement of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Since this ruling raised a question intrinsically important, as well as *56 affecting the scope of Thornhill v. Alabama,310 U.S. 88 ,60 S.Ct. 736 ,84 L.Ed. 1093 , and Carlson v. California,310 U.S. 106 ,60 S.Ct. 746 ,84 L.Ed. 1104 , we brought the case here.310 U.S. 655 ,60 S.Ct. 1092 ,84 L.Ed. 1419 .
* * * * *
“The starting point is Thornhill’s case. That case invoked the constitutional protection of free speech on behalf of a relatively modern means for ‘publicizing, without annoyance or threat of any kind, the facts of a labor dispute’.310 U.S. 100 ,60 S.Ct. 743 ,84 L.Ed. 1093 . The whole series of cases defining the scope of free speech under the Fourteenth Amendment are facets of the same principle in that they all safeguard modes appropriate for assuring the right to utterance in different situations. Peaceful picketing is the workingman’s means of communication. [Italics supplied.]
“It must never be forgotten, however, that the Bill of Rights was the child of the Enlightenment. Back of the guarantee of free speech lay faith in the power of an appeal to reason by all the peaceful means for gaining access to the mind. It was in order to avert force and explosions due to restrictions upon rational modes of communication that the guarantee of free speech was given a generous scope. But utterance in a context of violence can lose its significance as an appeal to reason and become part of an instrument of force. Such utterance was not meant to be sheltered by the Constitution.”
We are of opinion and declare that the statute in question is not a violation of the provisions of the state or federal constitutions.
Notes