191 P. 671 | Or. | 1920
In order clearly to understand the contention of the parties, it is necessary to go briefly into the history of the matters leading up to this litigation. On November 24, 1910, Vincent F. Wellner, the plaintiff in the habeas corpus proceeding here, was married to Evelyn C. Larson, at Minneapolis, Minnesota, and, with his wife, proceeded at once to his farm in Brule County, South Dakota. In the summer of 1911, the wife’s parents, John C. and Julia Larson, purchased a farm, which was located about a mile from that of Wellner, and took up their residence there. On December 14, 1911, early in the morning, Wellner’s wife ran across the fields from her home to that of her parents, complaining that her husband, in a fit of rage, had beaten, choked, and kicked her, throwing her out of the house, and tearing her clothing. She never re-' turned to her husband’s house, and shortly thereafter she began a suit for divorce, charging cruel and inhuman treatment at his hands, reciting, among other
“That the defendant is a man of extremely violent temper, and when he gets angry is in the habit of treating his wife with great cruelty; that at different times, from a short time after the date of their marriage until December 14, 1911, defendant without any justifiable cause became violently angry with the plaintiff, and called her by vile and degrading names, and on one of said occasions grabbed her by the arm and pushed her violently across the room, and on another occasion angrily wrenched a gasoline lamp pump out of her hand. That on December 14, 1911, without any cause, and over a trifling difference between them as to whether he should be permitted to read a letter which plaintiff had written before she mailed it, the defendant fell into a violent rage and made a physical attack upon the plaintiff, catching her by the hair and throwing her violently to the floor, and got her by the throat, and choked her so as to leave finger-prints upon her neck and throat, which were black and blue four or five days after-wards. At the same time he kicked her out of the house, leaving black and blue marks upon her arms and body, and in the course of his attack tore practically all of the button-holes out of her dress. That the plaintiff thereupon left the family home and has not since returned. That such treatment has endangered the life of the plaintiff, and she cannot continue to live with the defendant with safety.”
“Every guardian so appointed shall have the custody and tuition of the minor, and the care and management of his estate, and shall continue in office until the minor shall have arrived to the age of twenty-one years, or until the guardian shall have been discharged according to law; provided, however, that the father of the minor, if living, and in case of his death, the mother, while she remains unmarried, being themselves respectively competent to transact their own business, shall be entitled to the custody of the person of the minor, and to the care of his education.”
The concluding clause of the section quoted, consisting of the, proviso, is the portion thereof upon which defendant relies to support the contention that neither the trial court nor this court has any discretion in the matter, but is compelled, by the statute quoted, to award the custody of the boy to the father. The section quoted is found in Chapter X, Title XVI, L. O. L., which is devoted to the subject of prescribing the powers and duties of a County Court in the appointment and control of guardians of minors. It has no reference whatever to the powers exercised
“Of course, the court in the interest of the child may take it from the parents and make other provisions for it, but there must be some good cause for so doing.”
Each case must be governed by its own facts, the court having in mind, at all times, the welfare and interests of the minor. We conclude, therefore, that the trial court reached a proper conclusion, and the decree is therefore affirmed.
Affirmed. Rehearing Denied.