Larson v. StateLarson v. State
OPINION
Aрpellant was questioned pursuant to a murder investigation. He brought suit against the state and county claiming the law enforcement officers’ conduct during the investigation was outrageous and their comments to a reporter slandered him. Claims against the county were settled out of court. The state moved for summary judgment on the grounds (1) the claims were barred by the statute of limitations, (2) the alleged defamatory statements were true and not defamаtory as a matter of law, and (3) the state’s conduct was not outrageous as a matter of law. The trial court granted the state’s motion, and appellant appeals.
FACTS
Scriver Olson was found murdered in his home in rural Kandiyohi County on Febru
Interviews with appellant took place over the phone, at appellant’s hоme, in the victim’s home, at the cemetery where the victim was buried and at the Holiday Inn in Willmar. On two occasions, in February and March 1983, authorities requested, and appellant consented to give them, several items of clothing and personal property to be sent to the BCA lab for testing. Appellant alleges that on September 27, 1983, in the presence of a reporter, BCA agent Si-gafoos slandered appellant by stating he was the “number one suspect” in the case, and that most of the BCA file on the case contained information about appellant. Appellant further alleges that the authorities harassed him by their phone calls night and day and by telling him “the spirit of Scriver Olson would haunt him forever unless he confessed.” Appellant also claims the tactics of the authorities were “designed to prey on his mental weaknesses,” a mental fragility evidenced by appellant’s temporary commitment in 1981 to the Will-mar State Hospital.
Pursuant to
Appellant filed a certificate of readiness in January 1987, and, upon a court order, filed a more definite statement setting forth the allegеd defamatory statement and the date upon which it was uttered. The case was transferred from Ramsey County to Kandiyohi County in June 1988. In September 1988, the trial judge ordered the parties to proceed with discovery. Appеllant’s deposition was taken on October 17 and November 25, after which respondent moved to amend its answer in order to plead the statute of limitations. The court granted the motion and discovery was continued.
Respondent’s motion for summary judgment was heard on February 15, 1989. The trial court granted the motion on all claims, and appellant brings this challenge.
ISSUES
I. Did the trial court err in holding appellant’s tort claims were barred by the two year statute of limitations period set forth in
II. If the statute of limitations does not bar appellant’s claims, did the trial court err in granting respondent’s motion for summary judgment because it found no facts in dispute on the issues of defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress?
ANALYSIS
On appeal from summary judgment it is the function of the reviewing court to determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the trial court erred in its appliсation of the law.
Betlach v. Wayzata Condominium,
Actions for “libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment, or other tort, resulting in personal injury” shаll be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues.
Appellant contends the statute of limitations does not apply because (1) it was tolled by appellant’s mental disability and (2) the notice рrovision of the Minnesota Tort Claims Act acts as a statutory bar to the suit. Appellant also argues the trial court erred in allowing respondent to amend its answer in December 1988 to assert the statute of limitations defensе.
A plaintiffs insanity, if “existing at the time when a cause of action accrued or arising anytime during the period of limitation, shall suspend the running of the period of limitation until the same is removed.”
[I]nsanity means substantial inability, by reason of mental defect or deficiency, to understand one’s legal rights, manage one’s affairs, and prosecute the claim. As a corollary to this rule, we conclude that short, temporary occasions of mental illness are sufficient to toll the statute on the basis of “insanity” only if such short occasions substantially impair the general ability of the plaintiff to understand her rights, manage her affairs, and prosecute the claim. This determination of substantial impairment depends upon the duration of the mental illness or defect as compared to the time within which suit must be brought.
Harrington v. County of Ramsey,
Despite the fact that appellant was committed to the State Hospital for a short time in 1981, Dr. Andrеw Leemhuis concluded in September 1988 that “[f]rom a routine neurologic standpoint [appellant was] entirely normal.” Dr. Leemhuis said tests revealed appellant was under considerable stress and exhibited “a parаnoid tendency with delusions and emotional instability,” but there was no confirmation of appellant’s assertion that he was or is insane so as to toll the statute of limitations.
Nor does the notice provision of
[Ejvery рerson ' who claims compensation from the state * * * shall present to the attorney general * * * and any state employee from whom the claimant will seek compensation, within 180 days after the alleged loss or injury is disсovered, a notice stating the time, place and circumstances thereof, the names of any state employees known to be involved, and the amount of compensation or other relief demanded. Aсtual notice of sufficient facts to reasonably put the state or its insurer on notice of a possible claim complies with the notice requirements of this section. Failure to state the amount of compensаtion or other relief demanded does not invalidate the notice, but the claimant shall furnish full information available regarding the nature and extent of the injuries and damages within 15 days after demand by the state. The time for giving the notiсe does not include the time during which the person injured is incapacitated by the injury from giving the notice.
Id.
This notice requirement “provides the government with an early opportunity to investigate claims, facilitates settlement without litigation, allows the government to correct defects revealed before further injury occurs and protects against stale and fraudulent claims.”
Naylor v. The Minnesota Daily,
Appellant argues it is inconsistent to allow respondent to invoke the statute of limitations defense when it did not complain about appellant's non-compliance with the 180 days notice provision. According to
Naylor
and
Glassman v. Miller,
Finally, appellant argues that respondent’s motion to amend its answer late in 1988, three years after commencement of the action and nearly two years after appellant filed a certificate of readiness to stand trial, in order to include the statute of limitations defense, was merely a delay tactiс that should not have been allowed by the trial court.
Under Rule 15 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure a party may amend pleadings after a responsive pleading has been served only by leave of court or thе written consent of the adverse party.
Whether leave should be given in a particular case depends upon a number of factors, including, in particular, prejudice to the adverse party, (citations omitted) Prеjudice to the adverse party can be weighed against prejudice to the moving party if leave is denied.
Wilson v. City of Eagan,
Appellant makes no showing of prejudice following the court’s order allowing respondent’s amendment of its answer. In addition, the court continued discovery for two months and rescheduled the hearing on the motion for summary judgment in an effort to lessen the possibility of prejudice to appellant. We find no error by the trial court.
Aрpellant’s tort claims are clearly barred by the statute of limitations-in
DECISION
The trial court did not err in finding that neither appellant’s mental disability nor the notice provisiоn of the Tort Claims Act tolled the statute of limitations on appellant’s claims for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court also properly granted respondent’s motion to amend its answer after a responsive pleading had already been served. We affirm the trial court decision.
Affirmed.