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Larson v. Norkot Manufacturing, Inc.
653 N.W.2d 33
N.D.
2002
Check Treatment

*1 2002 ND 175 LARSON,

Mark V. Plaintiff Appellee,

v. MANUFACTURING, INC.,

NORKOT Industries, Inc.,

Western and James individually, Defendants,

Page, Third-

Party Appellants, Plaintiffs and

McGee, Hankla, Wheeler, Backes &

P.C., Third-Party Defendant Appellee.

No. 20020058.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

Nov. 2002.

Rehearing Denied Dec. Kirmis, Smith,

Lyle Zuger W. Kirmis & N.D., Bismarck, for plaintiff appellee. P.C., Norris, Norris, L. L. James James Houston, TX, defendants, plaintiffs appellants. *2 Firm, Page as a third- Storslee, complaint, Rexworks sued Law Storslee A.

Steven defendant, N.D., seeking indemnification Bismarck, third-party party de- P.C., for any damages for which contribution for appellee. fendant might Rapid be found liable to Rexworks WALLE, Chief Justice. VANDE City. complaint That was served 8, Feb- Page’s agent on 1996. On Inc., Manufacturing, Norkot 1996, 21, attorneys filed an ruary Inc., Industries, Page and James Western answer, counterclaim, seek- and crossclaim a district (collectively, “Page”) appealed in indemnity or contribution the South ing granting a and order court memorandum ¶ Larson, 2001 ND Dakota suit. summary for motion renewed A company 386. Texas 627 N.W.2d legal malpractice claims dismissing Page’s Maxigrinder purchased from Rexworks law firm Mark Larson and the V. Rex- by Rexworks sued Wheeler, manufactured Hankla, McGee, & Backes (“McGee”).1 in Texas for caused works P.C., conclude there are We fire. Rexworks Maxigrinder caught precluding material fact issues of genuine third-party complaint judgment, Page and we reverse served summary proceedings. for further 1996. April remand 26, 1996, Page and Rex- June [¶ 5] On I pay Rexworks would re- agreed works from a appeal This is the second full for Page payment amount to duced dismissing Page’s legal summary judgment agree- all due under the- amounts Larson and claims ments; indemnify Rexworks Page would by ground they on the were barred McGee manufac- products out of arising for claims of limitations. See Larson by Rexworks by tured Norkot and sold ¶ Inc., 103, 2, 627 Mfg., 2001 ND Norkot machine involved including the (specifically 386. N.W.2d and Rex- litigation); in the Dakota South of the McGee a member [¶ 3] While indemnify Page for losses works would firm, ne- represented law Larson by manufactured arising out of machines involving sale gotiating a business asset including the ma- (specifically Rexworks right to manufacture grinders and the litigation). in the Texas chine involved Inc., Rexworks, and drafted grinders to Larson and became involved and other asset litigation 1998: signed were on Febru- agreements, which ary provision No indemnification Larson sued liability from for protecting legal fees. On unpaid to recover by Maxigrinders manufactured answered and agree- in the sale Rexworks was included counterclaimed ments. in the sale contracts failing to include “any provision with Rexworks Maxigrinder A manufactured Norkot protеct contract from Rexworks purchased who Dakota, liability parties from City, City Rapid financially, as a injured, physically or caught destroyed. Rapid fire and any of the of the use of consequence City In a sued Rexworks. Inc., subsequently appeal entered Mfg., as an from 1. As in Larson v. judgment.” treat this consistent "[w]e 1 n. from Norkot to Rex- assets transferred claims are barred the statute of limi- tations. works.” Judgment accordingly was entered ¶ Page alleged at 4. he entered into an

Id. appeal this followed. *3 indemnity agreement with Rexworks on $379,316 plus June and “lost oth- II damages er Larson’s and the earlier appeal, we re legal malpractice.” Page McGee’s assert- summary iterated when judgment may be ed the same malpractice rendered: in third-party complaint. McGee 56, Under summary N-D.R.Civ.P. trial court granted [¶ 7] The motions judgment shall be if rendered there is Larson McGee for dismissal of genuine any no issue as to material fact Page’s legal malpractice claims on the party judgment entitled to as ground they were barred a matter of law. Summary judgment Page appealed. limitations. conclud- We dispose be issued to of a controver- genuine ed there was “a issue materiаl sy if party without trial either is entitled precluding summary fact judgment on the law, aas matter of if there knew, question of when or with rea- is no dispute as to either the material known, sonable diligence should have facts or the inferences to be drawn from cause, injury, its and the defendants’ facts, undisputed or if resolving factual ¶ possible negligence.” Id. at 13. We af- disputes would alter the result. firmed the dismissal of Larson’s claim Inc., 103, v. Mfg., Larson Norkot 2001 ND against Page, reversed the remainder ¶ 7, 627 N.W.2d 386. judgment, for remanded further appeal, earlier we proceedings. also reiterated the necessary elements discovery, After further McGee legal malpractice action and when a renewed its motion for summary judgment legal cause action for malpractice ac joined and Larson in the renewed motion. for a analysis: crues statute of limitations The district court Page’s ordered that le- legal The elements of a dismissed, gal malpractice claims be ex- professional action for negligence are plaining: of an attorney-client existence rela-

This Court finds that the statute of tionship, duty by client, limitations run commenced to when a breаch of that duty by the attorney, received the South Dakota third to the client party complaint proximately caused the breach of Constr., complaint placed duty. should have a rea- Dan Nelson Inc. v. Dickson, person sonable on notice of a Nodland & legal claim of malpractice. The issue of 608 N.W.2d 267. The two-year statute § indemnification under of limitations under 28-01- N.D.C.C. 18(3) reasonably] would have been discussed applies actions Tschider, Mr. Page attorneys against attorneys. between and his Binstock v. (N.D.1985). preparing a defense. Since the claims 374 N.W.2d “A cause were served of action for more does not years accrue, than two after the accrual of [a and the statute of limitations legal] malpractice run, case on does not commence to until the the Court concludes that damage.” client has incurred some Lewis, Again appeal, parties v. this Wall attention, (N.D.1985). have focused their and that of adopted a discov- We have court, limita-, trial question of when rule, tolls the statute of ery knew, or with reasonable malpractice actions until tions cause, injury, of his its knows, or with reasonable dili- attorneys’ possible negligence. and his know, gence should But, pаrties have not focused their possible neg- defendant’s attention, court, or that of trial on the Haugen, ligence. Jacobsen question sustained (N.D.1995). 882, 885 N.W.2d any. of his if attorneys’ negligence, result ¶ 9, Larson, N.W.2d 386. *4 2001 ND 627 $379,316 if Certainly, under his lost Nixen, 195, v. 6 Cal.3d 98 also Budd See 26, 1996, agreement June with Rexworks (1971) 849, 433, 491 P.2d 438 Cal.Rptr. of his he attorneys’ negligence, as result (“[T]he of action in tort does not cause damages may at that time. He sustained dam until the client both sustains accrue that if also have sustained before discovers, discover, his or should age, and paid attorney he incurred or fees necessi action.”). (1) Thus, for one to cause of attorneys’ negligence. tated his As the Nixen, attorney’s an court observed in v. 6 a cause of action for Budd Cal.3d have 195, 433, 849, Cal.Rptr. 98 491 P.2d 437 must be legal malpractice, there (1971): “If facts show that defendant’s caused proximately to the client pay negligence to incur or client; duty to the attorney’s breach 11, [attorney] fees on or September before (2) begin of limitations does not the statute 1965, years prior two institution of incurred run until the client has some suit, present action in plaintiffs then and alleged malpractice; from the damage now tort would be barred thе statute of (3) until of limitations is tolled Latts, limitations.” See v. 6 also Sirott knows, or with reasonable dili the client 923, 206, Cal.App.4th 8 209 Cal.Rptr.2d know, cause, injury, its gence should (1992) (“A client suffers when he neg attorney’s possible and the defendant compelled, as result of the “ ¶ Larson, ‘Any appreciable at ligence. 9. error, fees.”); incur attorney or pay harm from the attor flowing and actual Lucey Stouffer, v. Law & Pretzel Offices of ney’s conduct establishes a cause negligent Chartered, 349, 301 234 Ill.Dec. Ill.App.3d ” client sue.’ may of action (1998) 612, 473, (Incurring 703 N.E.2d 478 (N.D. Lewis, 471, 473 Wall attorney may trigger additional fees Nixen, 1985), quoting Budd v. 6 Cal.3d running of the if statute of limitations 849, 433, 195, Cal.Rptr. 491 P.2d 436 directly fees are attributable to former (1971). neglect.). counsel’s appeal, parties In the first have incurred attor- knowledge focused on when in ney fees with Larson’s as- connection January, in Dakota. negligence serted when he answered reversed, genuine We “there is a stating third-party complaint litiga- in the Texas summary issue of material precluding fact May tion or when he was served question- on the of when in that process litigation April knew, or with reasonable Page may paid attorney have or incurred But, earlier. to in- fees even answers possible said, Lar negligence.” terrogatories, Page defendants’ “I have never had son, or any correspondence 627 N.W.2d 386. conversations or attorneys cation in the any provision purchase else with between asset anything February agreement. 1996 and or involving the of Mark Larson conduct Larson, In 1992 Mark concerning Law Firm the As- the McGee an the time the law firm Agreement between Nor- set Purchase McGee, Hankla, Wheeler, & Backes February and Rexworks dated koi/Page (“McGee”) represented P.C. James 27, 2001, affidavit, In September 1993.” (“Page”) and Norkot Manufacturing, Inc. litiga- Dakota Page’s attorney the South (“Norkot”) Rexworks, in negotiations with 1996 communica- tion averred he had no (“Rexworks”) Inc. for the of all Page, Page’s tions with North Dakota at- intangible tangible assets owned subject torney, anyone or else “about the Page, who was the sole shareholder of any matter of claimed negotiations Norkot. The resulted claim, any or about potential malpractice purchase agreement asset between Norkot supporting factual basis such seller, Rexworks, Page, as pur claim, Mark Larson [or] chaser, 1993. Section 14.01 Hankla law firm.” the McGee agreement provided that Norkot *5 Page jointly and were severally and liable genuine conclude there are [¶ 14] We to Rexworks for indemnification of claims issues of material fact as to when by made party damages third for caused damages suffered as a result of Larson’s by maxigrinders by manufactured Norkot negligence, any, if and as to McGee’s prior closing pur date of the asset knew or with reasonable dili- agreement. chase purchase The asset gence should have of his however, agreement, did not contain an attorneys’ possi- and the defendant indemnification provision indemnifying negligence. ble for all arising claims out is reversed and [¶ 15] of the manufacture of maxigrinders by the matter is remanded for trial. Rexworks after the closing date of the purchase asset agreement. HODNY, S.J., F. [¶ 16] WILLIAM third-party Rexworks [¶20] served concur. 2, 1996, complaint dated on Nor- The Honorable WILLIAM F. [¶ 17] alleging designed kot that Norkot and S.J., HODNY, sitting place in purchased by a maxigrinder manufactured NEUMANN, J., disqualified. resale, Rexworks for which was the sub- ject by City of a suit brought Rapid

MARING, Justice, concurring specially. City against alleging Rexworks and Rex- appеal requires indemnity This our Court works was from Nor- entitled to any damages by Rapid to decide when the statute of limitations kot for sustained City to run in a action. begins maxigrinder. because of Norkot specially I I am concur because of the its counterclaim Rexworks dated 20, 1996, opinion legally damages February it cognizable claimed was entitled indemnity must have occurred before the statute of “to contribution from and/or Carlson, begins merely limitations run Plaintiff to and not Rexworks and/or damages. City City’s any, I am of if opinion Rapid damages, nominal also were negli- solely by must be caused Rexworks Carl- and/or gence attorney, allegedly, Da- here son.” This case was venued South (“the case”). attorney’s failure to include an indemnifi- kota Dakota any Dirt of the use of of the assets quence Texas Works Subsequently, case”) (“the Rexworks in Texas transferred from Norkot to Rexworks.” sued Texas claimed resulted from also served a it 9, 1998, on complaint February manufactured Rexworks. McGee maxigrinder third-party petition malpractice. alleging the same Rexworks served 20, 1996. Norkot served April Norkot on defendant, McGee, Third-party third-party peti- Rexworks’ an answer tо summary judgment brought a motion for May gener- which was dated tion July based on the statute dated allegations. ally denying all support In its brief in of limitations. 26, 1996, Norkot and June On summary judgment, McGee the motion agree- prepayment into a entered two-year that the statute position took the agree- Under the with Rexworks. ment began to run when of limitations pay Page ment, agreed to Rexworks read, signed, copies received $860,000 for all amounts payment full sales contracts between Rexworks agreement and under the due February In the Page/Norkot addition, consulting agreement. alternative, if position McGee took jointly agreed and Norkot of limitations did not start and hold harmless severally indemnify run in began run in it manu- relating product Rexworks January 1996, when Norkot was sued and sold Rexworks. by Norkot factured Dakota case. Rexworks the South applied specifically to This indemnification upon receiving Rex- McGee contended Dakota action. of the South the defense third-party complaint works’ the South indemnify and hold agreed to Rexworks *6 case, Page’s in person Dakota a reasonable any Page against and harmless Norkot placed inquiry would have position been manufac- maxigrinders relating regard purchase in to whether or not the subsequent to the date tured Rexworks agreement prepared required in 1993 Rex- agreement. closing purchase of the It indemnify Page works to and Norkot. Dirt applied to the Texas specifically This contended the actual outcome South that this Page alleged Works lawsuit. and the litigation Dakota was relevant foregoing in his agreement resulted litigation Dakota importance the South $379,318 origi- he owed under the that was placed Page that it on notice of indem- was consulting and purchase agreement nal nification issues between Rexworks and agreement. that differen- Page. McGee claimed 5, 1998, a verdict was June 23] On [¶ litigation tiation between the Dakota South of Norkot and Rexworks rendered in favor of limi- litigation and the Texas for statute Dakota case. in the South purposes tations was “inscrutable.” McGee, however, Page Lar- ulti- Mark noted On mately obligation had the Page for ser- concluded he son Norkot sued for the South Dako- Page responsibility to Norkot and while assume provided vices litigation ta under the terms of the 1993 employee of McGee. On Larson was Page and that served Norkot claiming obligation that he no such for alleg- and counterclaim by mail an answer therefore, and, litigation had to any provision include the Texas ing Larson “failed to prepayment agreement the 1996 negotiate in protect the contract to in freed from may be in- with Rexworks order be liability parties from who litigation. in the Texas financially, exposure a conse- further jured, physically or 20,1997, agreed-upon in also on a November terms the Asset Pur- McGee relied claiming that ‍​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌​‌‍it Agreement, letter written to Larson chase Norkot and now an intention to sue Larson for acknowledge indicated this lawsuit would regard to the South Dakota responsibility have been their even with- from lawsuit. The letter states: Prepayment Agreement. out the Prepayment Agreement provid- further we intended to handle a matter While party ed that the third brought defending Dakota that we are responsibility an action Texas would be the against and then commence Rexworks, you we cer- and that Rexworks would in- [Larson] McGee tainly demnify can be enticed to file our action Norkot and future than that. that might brоught against sooner lawsuits them, if any, on account of the units 20,1997, however, By November Texas manufactured Rexworks on account Dirt case had also been commenced Works of units manufactured after February brought and Rexworks had Norkot and In addi- petition. tion, prepayment agreement, [¶ It is clear that at the time 28] settled the indemnification issues between counterclaim and third-party complaint Rexworks, signed had been on were alleging legal malpractice served 26,1996. June the alleged malpractice was a failure to response Larson his to the pro- include an indemnification clause to summary judgment July motion for dated liability tect Norkot and from 28, 2000,joined arguments. McGee’s maxigrinders manufactured Rexworks. aAs result of the failure to include this July parties On all sub- clause, indemnification Norkot and Page joint pretrial mitted a statement purchased indemnification for claims aris- a stipulation court which included of facts. ing maxigrinders out of manufactured stipulated undisputed Those included: facts by foregoing Rexworks sum of Norkot, Page, 7. Prior to James $379,318 in the prepayment settlement entering into Prepayment Rexworks 26,1996. agreement of Junе *7 Agreement, third-partied Rexworks had I, appeal Norkot into two lawsuits. One related in Larson [¶ 29] On Norkot maxigrinder destroyed to a unit that Page argued appeal was their brief on in a fire in that “it South Dakota. Norkot was was the Texas Dirt Works case time, where, brought third-party very any into this lawsuit as a that for first in January liability maxigrinders by with Rexworks claim- for manufactured itself,” ing indemnification As- pursuant to the Rexworks manifested and “this Agreement. set Purchase The second Texas case involved for the first time an a brought against concerning maxigrinder lawsuit was lawsuit issue a manufac Works, by by Rexworks Texas Dirt Inc. in tured Rexworks which Rexworks partied Norkot third into Page Texas. was contended that Norkot and were lia in April damages by maxigrinder this lawsuit Rex- ble for caused claiming works indemnification for a manufactured Rexworks after the Feb faulty design. Prepayment Agree- ruary Page The Norkot and have 1993.” it provided Page continually ment would asserted was the failure to responsible pro for the South Dakota law- include an indemnification clause to suit, provided alleged maximum tect re- is the $250,000. sponsibility legal malpractice against Under Larson 40 during time the has appeal, first tolled its brief In

McGee. “Page injury. did argued also not sustained actual Norkot. damages caused Lar discover

not (1997). § Attorney 7 at Law 243 Am.Jur.2d April until after 1996 son’s receipt adopted following return This signed Court by Rexworks in petition regarding rule the time at which a cause of case.” also purposes Works for the of section the Texas'Dirt action accrues actually first time 28-01-18(3), “The asserted: N.D.C.C.: $379,318 (ap his. discovered period the best rule is that the limitation omitted) that.were caused pendix citation against malpractice commences to run was when negligence Larson’s malprac- act of action from the time the agreement with settlement signed is, by rea- resulting injury tice with 26, 1996 relative to the June Rexworks on be, sonable could discovered. (appendix citation case Texas Dirt Works omitted).” posi Norkot took the Page and Haugland, 303 N.W.2d Johnson (N.D.1981) of limitations could tion that Iverson v. Lancas (quoting (N.D.1968)). until and Norkot running ter, start 158 N.W.2d damages. had sustained “The of a elements are the professional negligence for exis determining when the statute relationship, an attorney-client tence of begins to run on of limitations client, duty by a breach attorney claim, appliеd dif- courts duty by attorney, of that ferent rules: proximately to the client rule that statute of general duty.” breach of that Larson v. Norkot run a cause begins to limitations ¶ Inc., Mfg., 2001 ND right prose- only after of action Constr., Dan Inc. v. (citing Nelson to a successful cute cause of action such Dickson, Nodland & to an ac- applies has accrued conclusion 267). has addressed N.W.2d Our Court attorney malprac- tion in a the issue of when the occurred tice .... cases. legal malpractice action several that a cause of action cases hold Some ac- against an involved a Binstock v. Tschider the client sus- the time has crues from malpractice action based on the damages.... tained option pur- inclusion of an erroneous cases, limita- the statute of some in land documents. chase sale transaction begin to run until the tions does not Court determined the earliest Our *8 should know of plaintiff knows or it date which could be said that the Bin- plaintiff and the attorney’s negligence injured option were was when the stocks harm. appreciable suffers actual and created, “thereby giving Kilzer the § 241 Attorneys 7 at Law Am.Jur.2d property. oр- The right (1997). that reduced the tion was an encumbrance right limited the of property, the statute of value of the

Under the view prevented Binstock or disposition, action limitations on im- Terry making from further plaintiff run until the Binstock begin does not of attorney’s provements property because knows know of the or should in- would loose their they actu- their fear that negligence and the suffers harm, in improvements.” vestments 374 N.W.2d appreciable al the statute is

41 (N.D.1985). reaching prepare agreements this deci- táined to trust 85 shel- sion, stated: tering personal liability our Court them from tax partnership income. The as- doctors determining when an action for that as a of attorney’s serted result is barred pas negligent of time, preparation agree- the trust recently we said in v.

sage of Wall (N.D.1985): Lewis, they personal liability ments incurred tax 473 partnership on their medical income. The two-year statute of limitations The trial court struck the attorney’s statute of 28-01-18(3), NDCC, is under Section defense, concluding limitations as a matter applicable brought to an action law, of the doctors had commenced a time- professional ly action because there was no Hаugland, v. malpractice. Johnson consequently curred and (N.D.1981). no actionable 533 The stat- N.W.2d claim until the when, federal district court issued run “plaintiff ute commences to summary judgment its knows, favor of the IRS reasonable (1) (2) know, on December 1981. Our Court stated: (3) possible defendant’s ... until the client apprecia- suffers an negligence.” Phillips Fur and Wool consequence ble harm as a of his attor- Bailey, 340 Co. v. N.W.2d ney’s negligence, the client cannot estab- (N.D.1983). malpractice. lish a cause of action for Prosser the proposition succinctly, states A legal malprac- cause action “It follows that the statute of limitations accrue, tice does begin does not to run negli- limitations does not commence to gence until damage action some has oc- run, until incurred the client has (4th (Prosser, curred.” Law Torts (Citations omitted.) damage. some 144.) ed.1971), § p. 30 at proposition succinctly stated in Budd Supreme California Court Nixen, Indeed, Cal.Rptr. having 6 Cal.3d once his at- discovered (1971): 849, 491 P.2d 433 torney’s negligence having suffered damage, some the client must institute ... apprecia- until the client suffers prescribed his action within the time consequence ble harm as a of his at- the statute of limitations or he will be torney’s negligence, the client cannot complaining barred from thereafter for mal- establish cause attorney’s his conduct. omit- [Footnote ... practice ted.] arises, however, The cause of action all, the client before sustains even I, Budd, (quoting 366 N.W.2d at 473 Wall greater part, occa- 436-37). We Cal.Rptr. 491 P.2d attorney’s negli- sioned his “Where, case, concluded: as in this .... gence Any appreciable and actual negligence allegedly act of has flowing attorney’s neg- harm from the the client to incur additional tax ligent conduct establishes cause liability, actual has been incurred *9 action which the client sue. imposed no later than when the IRS has a added). (emphasis

Id. at 84 thereby creating tax assessment an en Lewis, obligation against Wall v. 366 N.W.2d 471 forceable the client.” (N.D.1985), 473, 849, malpractice Cal.Rptr. involved doctors’ Id. at 98 491 P.2d 433 (citations omitted). against attorney, actions an who was re- We then concluded that 42 run action was com- injury their tions had before the sustained the doctors

although was argued entry menced. The that by September at Jacobsens least deficiency its tax judgment ‍​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌​‌‍injury the IRS issued an thе date adverse sufficient notices, was more than two and which or not for & action whether time that the doctors to the years prior anything paid judgment. had been on the against actions filed their agreed stating: Our Court of limitations did not attorney, “the statute We, however, agree judgment with the until, in to sus to run addition commence holding rule announced decisions injury, the Doctors taining actionable against judgment one whom a has been knew, diligence should or with reasonable relief, entered should able sue of its judgment paid, if not been even has 474, negligence.” Id. possible of Lewis’ (citations omitted) ... Such cases are 849, re-, 491 P.2d 433. We Cal.Rptr. 98 prior also consistent decisions concluding versed and remanded ' legal malpractice this court cases. should have discover the Doctors “[w]hen See, Lewis, e.g., Wall v. question possible negligence is ed Lewis’ (“Where (N.D.1985) ... the attor- 473 at a trial on the of fact to be determined ney’s negligence allegedly act of has Id. merits.” the client to incur additional tax Haugen, In Jacobsen liability, damage actual has been (N.D.1995), the Jacobsens N.W.2d 882 curred no later than when the IRS has action brought malpractice tax impоsed thereby assessment creat- attorney, Haugen. The their former Jean ing obligation against an enforceable attorney’s motion granted trial court Tschider, client.”); Binstock v. A a matter of law. bank judgment (N.D.1985) (injury N.W.2d 81 occurred ón in 1987 to recover sued the Jacobsens option unauthorized upon creation guarantees. personal various notes and land, which reduced the val- represented Hau- The Jacobsens were right limited the property, ue the bank’s gen, granted the trial court further im- disposition, prevented judgment January summary motion for property, rather than provements was entered on exercised). option when the 21,1988. engaged The Jacobsens entry money conclude that of a We summary judg- appeal other .counsel to judgment against the Jacobsens was suf- appeal, ment entered them. On legal malprac- ficient to sustain a could our Court concluded Jacobsens (although tice action it does not neces- that had not been raised not raise defenses sarily damages). define the measure of was issued at the trial court. Our decision The Jacobsens on November 1988. action commenced their run begins statute of limitations [T]he against Haugen September It when the cause of accrues.... action, the

At the trial of the conjunction damage wrong- is the that, trial court- concluded as a matter of ful of action for act creates cause law, legally no sufficient basis there was tort or contract. for a award because the Jacobsens (quoting Id. at Keller v. Clark 884-85 nothing judgment against on the paid (D.N.D.1979), Co., Equip. F.Supp. the Jacobsens were them and because (8th Cir.1983), negli- 'd, 715 F.2d 1280 Haugen’s aware in 1988 of aff denied, Therefore, cert. 104 S.Ct. the statute of limita- 464 U.S. gence.

43 (1984)). concluded, run only 176 We to when the client suffers actu- 79 L.Ed.2d discovers, discovery damage rule to the circum al applying through of action presented, that the cause use of stances reasonable should dis- cover, was entered accrued when the the facts malprac- essential them on when tice claim. of the Jacobsens knew their Bronkesh, Grunwald v. 131 N.J. 621 Haugen’s possiblé negligence. (1993) A.2d 494 (citing several other Id. at 885. states that have approach). followed this Lewis, In Wall v. [¶ requiring 38] The for actu rationale (N.D.1986), that in 758 we noted the first al before the statute limitations I, appeal, presentеd Wall we were with the legal for malpractice persua commences is of when the doctors had question incurred analysis sive. The first asks: does a When damage and we concluded it was the date cause of action for accrue? To deficiency the IRS issued its tax notices. typical establish a of action in a cause tort a We then remanded for determination case, plaintiff prove must tortious con began of limitations statute duct, injury and A proxdmate pri cause. I, discovery run under the rule. Wall ma facie of legal malpractice case consists we noted that “the focus is whether attorney-client existence of an rela plaintiff apprised has been of facts tionship, duty owed place person which would reasonable client, duty, the' breach of that and dam that a notice exists” ages proximately to the client that “the becomes one of law if the issue duty. breach of that Lar evidence is such that reasonable minds Inc., Mfg., son v. Norkot II, could draw but one conclusion.” Wall 627 N.W.2d 386. The critical elements are remand, depositions at 761. On were tak- negligence damage. plaintiff has undisputed testimony en and from the it allegedly no cause of action in tort if the attorney, clear that October of 1977 negligent damage. conduct does not cause Christensen, Douglas suggested possi- Supreme explained: The California Court bility of a action Lew- “If allegedly negligent conduct does Id. is. damage, generates it no cause cause jurisdictions Other have followed action in tort. The mere [Citation.] the rule that the statute of limitations on a duty, only of a professional causing breach action begin does not harm, damages, speculative nominal or the run until knows or should yet threat of future harm —not realized— attorney’s negligence know of the and the does not suffice to create cause plaintiff suffers actual and appreciable Hence, until negligence. [Citations.] for J.D., Dougherty, harm. Francis M. See the client harm appreciable suffers Annotation, When Statute Limitations consequence attorney’s negligence, of his to Run Begins Upon Against Action At- the client cannot establish a cause of action torney Malpractice, 32 A.L.R.4th Latts, malpractice.” Sirott v. 6 Cal. (1984 §§ 6 & Supp.2001). (1992) 206, 209 App.4th Cal.Rptr.2d Budd, 849, (quoting Cal.Rptr. P.2d Jersey The New Suрreme Court 436). held: has Therefore, discovery we conclude that the dis- applied [¶ 39] We have covery rule applies legal-malpractice rule actions and held actions: it begins limitations tolls the statute of limitations *11 knows, indemnify and hold harm- Page agreed to or until “the actions such know, arising all out of Rexworks for claims less reasonable by the defendant’s manufactured Norkot maxigrinders and the injury, its Larson, closing at the to Rexworks negligence.” and transferred possible ¶ 9, specifi- only 386. We there were 627 N.W.2d The record reveals date. that, addition, until the client has cally required maxigrinders. such three legal action for damage, the incurred some in set- Page prepayment and Norkot accrue and the stat- does not agreement dated June tlement to does not commence ute of limitations right of indemni- acknowledged Rexworks’ I, (quoting at 473 run. Wall in Dakota case and as- fication the South citing Supreme to the California Court and of that action. The sumed the defense 436). Budd, If at we were 491 P.2d ultimately re- Dakota action was South discovery rule without merely apply the 5, 1998, in by a verdict on June solved legally ascertainable prerequisitе The inclu- Norkot and Rexworks. favor of well- would undermine our damages, we provision requir- an sion of indemnification (1) damages are principles established indemnify and Norkot and ing element of a an essential maxigrinders hold harmless Rexworks (2) discovery rule mandates action and by prior Norkot clos- manufactured injury negligence. and Just estab- both purchase agreement was ing date of the enough. A stat- lishing negligence is claimed Norkot legal negligence not the run cannot commence to ute of limitations It and Page against and Larson McGee. If the injury has occurred. before interesting is that Larson McGee plead is not or estab- element claim for that there exists a sist lished, a cause of action for against them because subject to not actionable and is dismissal. indemnity agreement they included case, alleged present 14.01, in the seq., et provisions section failure to include an malpractice is the framing agreement and insist on purchase purchase in the indemnification clause action for him. Page’s Norkot and protect Page’s cause Even if Norkot and caused maxi- liability from and McGee could of aсtion Larson by Rexworks after grinders manufactured mal include claim for be construed to closing date. Larson and McGee con- 14.01, including seq., et practice for section third-party complaint tend that once the only injury agreement, in the was served on Norkot could damage which Norkot or case, had South Dakota Norkot would be their claim as result provi- notice of the lack of indemnification defending and costs incurred fees and, purchase agreement sions in the Dakota action. A verdict favor com- thereupon, the statute of limitations Norkot, ultimate Page, and Rexworks was However, at that running. point menced As ly entered in the South Dakota case. time, yet no been ac cause of suming arguendo, sustained result includes a tion Larson McGee third- alleged legal negligence. pro the indemnification including claim for party in the South Dako- complaint served visions, injury did not occur until maxigrin- ta that the clearly alleged case his answer and filed manufactured der involved had been complaint clear, under the terms counterclaim Norkot. It is also case. It would be in the South Dakota purchase agreemеnt, *12 have incurred attor those that are point Page would real substantial as (Citation significant opposed and not to ney’s speculative. fees that would be omit- ted.) context, do not know from In merely nominal. We the legal-malpractice any point damages this record if from the initial actual exist in may at the form of (Citation answer, omitted.) contact to the the fees an filing judgment. the of adverse Sirott, However, may became See 8 significant. Cal. a client suffer damages, (holding plaintiff fees, incurred Rptr.2d attorney’s the form of before a than when not later his court has its decision in fees announced the (Citation behalf); omitted.) on his counsel filed a demurrer underlying action. (hold Grunwald, A.2d at see also Grunwald, 621 A.2d at 464-65. ing “actual are those that are real damages Latts, In 6 Cal.App.4th Sirott v. opposed specula and substantial (1992), 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 206 the Court of tive”). legal that claim of Accordingly, Appeal presented of California was with malpractice would not be barred the the issue of when the client suffered actual statute of limitations. injury attorney’s alleged from the negli- However, al- gence. The facts the case are of similar in lege very of malpractice, different claim many respects facts of present the which is the of-Larson and McGee failure Sirott, case. the doctor-client decided purchase agreement to include the to retire from the practice medicine and demnification for Norkot' and for all sought attorney-defendant advice from the maxigrin- claims the sale of arising out of regarding purchase coverage the “tail” ders Rexworks after manufactured the malpractice. attorneys medical The agreement. close date of the Af- purchase advised the doctor that the doctor need not copy ter received a pay premium. Subsequently, the doc- complaint in the Dakota case on tor was malpractice. sued for medical The 9, 1996, January have doctor alleged purchased that had he upon consulting attorneys, with his subject insurance which was provisions status the indemnification legal given by attorneys, advice he and of Larson’s coverage would have had full for both the negligence. However, the statute of limi- any damages defense assessed malpractice, tations on this clаim of failure him the medial The malpractice action. provision include an indemnification success, attorneys without attempted, protecting Norkot and for. claims tail coverage. reinstate the doctor’s based on maxigrinders manufactured to retain required doctor was counsel to date, closing Rexworks after would defend the medical action at begun January to run either on expense. his own On or on February because $230,000 sum of paid doctor Norkot and not sustained settle the medical action. The negli- as a result of that doctor a result of claimed that as the attor- gence yet. ney’s negligence he sustained Jersey Supreme [¶ 43] The New Court $230,000. an ar- The insurer commenced has held: doctor, bitration proceeding

Legally-cognizable damages response occur when was filed behalf of the plaintiff detrimentally doctor on relies arbi- (Cita- negligent attorney. tration an award was rendered proceeding, advice of omitted.) concluding tion was not entitled to Actual are the doctor case, regard present tail In the to his the element rescind his decision obli that the insurer had no covеrage damage resulting from the alleged indemnify the doctor gation to defend malpractice, failure to include an indemni- Judgment action. the medical provision protecting fication confirming arbitration was entered arising from claims out Rexworks *13 7, January 1988. It should award on manufacturing maxigrinders of after the of Civil noted that the California Code date, purchase agreement close remained that the rule discovery provides Procedure until the speculative third-par- and remote the statute of limitations applies, but that ty petition Dirt in the Texas Works case time that the during the tolled 20, by Page April was received on 1996. injury. actual Cal.Code has not sustained time, that At Norkot and point (2001); Sirott, § 340.6 8 Cal. Civ. Proc. of knew have known the failure n. 2. The Court of Rptr.2d Appeal at 209 of of an Larson to include indemnification the concluded doctor suffered California provision purchase agreement in the cov- damage attorney’s he incurred fees when ering allegations the made Rexworks medical ac defending the third-party Norkot and the 20, 1987, January than when tion not later to petition. injury The actual attorney response his on his behalf. filed hоwever, May 10, Page, occurred on Id. at The court stated: client “[a] the date to Page’s of answer the third- damage compelled, suffers when he is as a party petition. Again, the record does not error, attorney’s result the to incur or of significant reflect if were fees Budd, pay attorney (citing fees.” Id. incurred service of before the the answer. 436). at Cal.Rptr. 491 P.2d The Court and counterclaim third- and Appeal also the of of California concluded party complaint legal malpractice, damage upon entry actual doctor sustained February served confirming of the the arbitration judgment 1998, respectively, would not be barred It that January award 1988. was at the if it statute of limitations commenced judicially it that point that was determined to run on and Page that date. Norkot malprac the was not entitled to tail doctor incur attorney’s to fees and in de- costs coverage tice com insurance he was fending petition. defending pelled expenses pay to incurred Substantial fees were no later action. In addi medical than when the answer to the third-party tion, fact the court determined that petition was filed in thе Texas Un- case. that suffered additional doctor case, I der facts of this am negligence attorney’s from the when he opinion that Norkot and suffered ac- $230,000 mal paid to settle medical they tual damage compelled when were to practice action on did incur attorney’s fees and costs to defend “[a]ny ap the result because change this action. The answer reason harm preciable flowing and actual from the they had do so was the failure to of Larson negligent conduct attorney’s establishes an hold- include indemnification and cause of action the client harmless in the provision agree- The ultimately sue.” Id. at 210. court very ment. The essence of indemnifica- the statute of limitations concluded tion hold-harmless is to legal malpractice commenced fees, attorney’s avoid costs of litigation, run on judg the date the ultimately, liability for a confirming ment was entered the arbitra damages. necessity incurring tion award. The at- s in defending genuine and costs i a torney’s [T]here fees issue of material directly a fact precluding summary judgment Texas lawsuit was result of the and, therefore, question knew, when or with allеged legal reasonable should have legally-recoverable damages. constituted opinion I and the defen incurring am not of the possible negligence. dants’ The focus of always satisfy fees will the actu- inquiry is when “apprised of an- was. damage requirement al facts which place would .a reasonable alyzing when the statute limitations be- person on notice that a gins to run case. Wall, exist[ed].” N.W.2d injury may entry occur of an The ultimate question [1986]. with re judgment, by having

adverse defend an to. gard action, triggering running being compelled enter a set- *14 statute of limitations is when did by agreement, incurring any tlement enough “know to be on notice a poten legally cognizable ‍​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌​‌‍damages. other Dam- tial however, legal malpractice. claim” for Schan ages, cannot be based on pure ¶ ilec, 165, 19, 1999 ND 599 N.W.2d 253. speculation. possibility, A mere or even probability, damages that will result from ¶ (foot 2001 ND 627 N.W.2d 386 wrongful conduct does not render that con- omitted). evidence, note The additional duct actionable. by remand, received the trial court after makes appropriate dismissal as a matter of Although Page additionally [¶ 46] law because the statute оf limitations had $379,318 when damaged he forwent run. him, contract amount due to I am of the I majority [¶ 51] take issue with the opinion already that he had sustained dam- and concurring opinions on two matters. ages May as of the date of First, what injury is an for purposes of Norkot’s answer determining when the statute of limitations petition litigation. in the Texas It would Second, starts to run. whether there is substantial, on that date that have been showing evidence as a matter of law nominal, merely attorney’s fees would had sufficient informa- have been incurred this case. potential malprac- tion to be on notice of a genuine There are of ma- [¶ 47] issues claim years they tice more than two before legally cognizable terial fact about when filed their suit Larson and the occurred knew or McGee Hankla law firm. should have known of negligence. Larson’s majority The opinion [¶ 52] reverses Therefore, I concur the reversal of the for a remands determi- summary judgment and the remand to the damages” nation of “when suffered trial court. and “when knew or with reasonable injury.” should'have known of his Mary Maring [¶ 48] Muehlen language perpetuates This the confusion interchangea- created the inartful and KAPSNER, Justice, dissenting. ble use this Court of the words “dam- respectfully I I dissent. would ages” “injury,” a confusion in which I affirm grant summary the trial court’s Constr., have participated. See Dan Nelson judgment. Inc., Dickson, v. Nodland & I, In Larson we reversed a sum- 608 N.W.2d 267. We should take this mary judgment, indicating: opportunity clarify that the focus of the period, certain circumstances toll that inquiry purposes

injury/damages cluding the harm occa- one which the has not limitations is statute of client, not the measure “actual injury.” sustained Cal.Code Civ. sioned Jordache, § compensation in the form of 340.6. In the California harm Proc. injury. sought Supreme development for the Court can be discussed concept injury since the Budd exacer concurring opinion decision. that the suggesting problem bates the Jordache, In the California court must be shown “damages” which necessary that: noted injury. flow from the are those “the concurrence states: appreciable [T]he existence of actual in-

paragraph jury plaintiffs which Norkot or does not on the injury depend only ability quantifiable as a would be their sum result attribute a Page could in de money damages. and costs incurred consequential fees Simi- rejeсted action.” larly, South Dakota Laird the claims that ac- fending the suggests injury the concurrence tual be defined mon- should paragraph sustain etary did not amount and that the limitations that Norkot is, from the absence of the if the period be tolled injury or way, This statement Adams indemnity agreement. *15 some remediable. rec- injury legal injury may existence of a ognized the actual consist confuses Further, diminution, the damages. impairment of of or as well with the amount as Latts, extinction, right v. 6 loss of a reliance on Sirott the total or or concurrence’s (1992) 923, Cal.Rptr.2d remedy. 8 206 Cal.App.4th “When results in interest, remedy, the decision of the loss or against right, measured has to be of in Supreme imposition liability, Court Jordache or in the the there California of Brobeck, Inc., Phleger v. & injury regardless has been Enterprises, actual of Harrison, 739, Cal.Rptr.2d may 18 Cal.4th 76 whether events the future affect (1998), 749, into permanency injury P.2d 1062 which calls 958 of damages is monetary whether the Sirott decision amount eventual- question of action. good ly law in incurred.” ques dealt with the specifically Jordache 750, 749, Cal.Rptr.2d at 76 958 18 Cal.4th having does a former tion: “When (citations omitted)(emphasis client— P.2d at 1070 mal attornеy’s facts of discovered added). practice injury actual so as —sustain The court specifically California an action of require commencement by rejected suggested the notion the con attorneys year?” one within currence that amount of must 749, 747, 76 958 Cal.Rptr.2d at 18 Cal.4th be decided the ultimate resolution of

P.2d at 1068. imposing liability the lawsuit on the in Jordache, 752, client. at jured law on the statute 18 Cal.4th 54] California 749, limitations action derives .2d at 1071. Cal.Rptr in a 76 958 P.2d The Nixen, 195, inju 98 court the actual interprets Budd v. 6 Cal.3d California from 849, (1971), the case ry requirement 491 P.2d 433 as whether Cal.Rptr. Lewis, any compensable this Court Wall has sustained harm upon

relied (N.D.1985). Following professional 471 366 N.W.2d Budd, enacted legislature negligence, though even the amount of the California yet not governs compensable damages might the commence be However, “Actual injury ment the limitation known. occurs period.

49 injury legally injury suffers loss or their “no later than” the date the client legal malprac cognizable as IRS issued its notice of assessment. The on the asserted errors or tice action based Wall, 474, Court stated a footnote at Jordache, omissions.” 18 Cal.4th at that whether the Doctors sustained actual P.2d at Cal.Rptr.2d 76 958 1065. See damages prior deficiency assess- Mix, 91 also Samuels v. Cal.4th ment question the IRS is a of fact (1999). P.2d 701 Cal.Rptr.2d merits, determined at a trial on the citing only are [¶ 57] We state Budd. expressed confusion about the use case, appreciable this harm “injury” “damages.” See Ronald Mal can inability indemnity include the to seek Smith, Jeffrey Legal Malpractice len & based failure to (5th ed.2000). §§ 22.11-22.12 The author clude a provision indemnity in the con- prevailing notes “the rule is that there tract. “The right loss or diminution of a only injury need be the fact of an rather remedy injury constitutes or damage. specific quantity than a if damage, even uncertainty Neither of amount nor difficul- significant damages not occur until ty proof injury speculative renders future, if all.” Jordache, or inchoate.” 18 Cal.4th at agree I cannot with the concur (citation omitted). 958 P.2d at 1066 The rence’s assertion that our cases are con specific harm or asserted in this trary. development law California case is exposure liability as a result of compatible prior with the formulations the contract attorneys drafted Court, quoted by majority. of this that harm appreciable or actual in (N.D. Lewis, Wall v. January 1996 because demand had been 1985), say: this did “A Court cause of made in that month on and Norkot. *16 legal action for malpractice does not ac crue, and the statute of limitations does dispute I [¶ 61] second have with run, not commence to until the client has majority and concurring opinion is the However, damage.” incurred some remand for of determination when Norkot quote Court went on to Budd v. Nixen: knew, Page and or with reasonable dili- arises, however, The cause of action be- gence injury. should have of their all, fore the client sustains or even the Norkot and served a ac- greater of the part, damages occasioned tion Larson and the McGee Hankla attorney’s negligence.... Any his .6, 1998, firm February alleging: law dated appreciable flowing and actual harm When Larson and prepared McGee attorney’s from the negligent conduct Agreement Asset Purchase and the Con- a establishes cause of action sulting Noncompetition Agreement and may the client sue. between Rexworks and Norkot and Indeed, having once discovered his at- Page, Larson and failed to in- McGee torney’s negligence having and suffered any provision clude the contract to damage, some the client must institute protect liability from his prescribed action within the time parties injured, physical- to who be the statute of or he limitations will ly financially, a consequence of the barred complaining from thereafter use of of the assets transferred from his conduct. Norkot to Rexworks.

Wall, (citations omitted). at 473 Wall, Wills, [¶ 62] The Court held Duncklee v. (N.D.1996), that the claimants had sufficient notice of N.W.2d we said: litigation in the Dakota plaint mal South of limitations The statute litigation ‍​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌​‌‍run when discussed commences practice actions knows, respond or with reasonable attorneys preparing plaintiff know, complaint, should to determine third-party neg 8, 1996, possible January and the defendant’s what date between Lewis, 393 N.W.2d 758 20, 1996, ligence. Wall v. between “discussions (N.D.1986). malpractice plaintiffs A attorneys about the indem- Page and his ordinarily question a is knowledge agreements” provisions nification rarely fact, summary judgment place. reasonably have taken should of when the the issue appropriate Thus, not clear whether the record is discovered there have run by limitations had the stаtute of Id., claim. was a his counterclaim. time served at 762. 393 N.W.2d Manufacturing, Larson v. Norkot Although plaintiffs ¶ 103, 12, ND 627 N.W.2d 386. fact, ordinarily question knowledge is information which The additional law, if the evi- question it becomes trial received after remand court reasonable minds could dence is such following: cluded Schanilec but one conclusion. draw 8, 1996, January 1. On Clinic, Ltd., Forks Grand Max complaint was served remand, This, after 253. Rosenberg, registered agent 1996, Norkot January is such a case. Norkot, in the Dakota action knew, reasonable dili- or with against Rexworks. known, the contractual gence should indemnification not include provisions did Rosenberg sent On Rexworks so as to Page by of Norkot Page. third-party complaint against Larson complaint render Page received 3. On two-year limitations outside McGee it third-party complaint and sent I, we stated: provision. In Larson attorney Douglas to his Christensen. the trial court ser- agree with We In the letter from Christen- third-party com- upon Page vice sen, agree- his part enclosed litigation Dakota *17 in the South plaint requested ment with Rexworks and discussions be- triggered “would attorney me.” to “Call attorneys about Page and his tween an- January 4. sent On provisions agree- of the indemnification other letter to Christensen. reasonably discussions ments.” Such in the letter he had read indicates knowl- Page with provided should have contract with Rexworks. The let- running of trigger edge sufficient states, discussed, I “As we ter also regis- limitations. the statute of believe rexworks is entitled to don’t third-party received agent tered lawsuit, include me this least Dakota litigation in the South complaint I not from what believed was Page’s attorneys January in the contract with an answer and counterclaim prepared them.” contribution, indemnity seeking later, days received a 5. A few par- 1996. The dated was certified letter from Rexworks dated our attention to not drawn ties have notifying Page “of showing was record evidence claims for indemnification.” com- several of the actually apprised copy tendered The letter from Rexworks Summons Dakota South litiga- Dakota litigation attorney Doug' defense to his Christen : tion to Norkot and notified Norkot 'sen. His letter states being of other claims made n I ENCLOSE A SUMMONS OR Rexworks, including the claim in REXWORKS, WHATEVER FROM demanded indem- Texas. Rexworks THE I COMPANY SOLD THE nification from both and Nor- GRINDER PRODUCT LINE TO. kot under the contract for both the NAMING A THIRD NORKOT PARTY litigation South Dakotа I DEFENDANT. AS READ THIS claim Texas. IT THING THAT APPEARS ONE OF 6. On Christensen THE GRINDERS NORKOT BUILT sent a letter to the for Rex- AND SOLD TO REXWORKS AS litigation works the South Dakota PART THE OF PACKAGE OF SELL- requesting an extension of time to THE ING WHOLE PRODUCT LINE third-party complaint. answer the IN WAS SOLD TO CARLSON ¶ 13, EQUIPMENT majority opinion fo IN MINNEAPOLIS by Page on the WHO THEN SOLD IT THE cuses assertions made TO CITY he had never had RAPID conversations his OF CITY SOUTH DAKOTA. attorneys alleged malpractice about the IT EVIDENTLY FIRE CAUGHT Larson or the McGee Hankla law firm. AND BURNED AND NOW THEY ap These assertions are irrelevant. “In CARLSON, ARE SUING REXWORKS plying discovery rule we have used an AND REXWORKS IS ENJOINGIN objective knowledge standard re I NORKOT. GUESS WE HAVE TO quirement; upon we whether focus ANSWER IT. appraised claimant has been of facts which place would a reasonable person notice FOR WHAT WORTH I ITS HAVE IN- exists, a potential without re PART CLUDED OF THE AGREE-

gard subjective to the claimant’s beliefs.” REXWORKS, MENT I HAD WITH Symington, BASF Corp. AND LIGHTED HIGH SOME PARTS (N.D.1994). “The focus is THAT MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE plaintiff apprised whether the has been SOME RELAVENCE. place per facts which would a reasonable on notice that a potential son claim exists. necessary It is I OF DENY THAT THEIR COURSE subjectively convinced that he has been WAS ANY BY DESIGN FAULT NOR-

injured and that KOT. WHAT WORRIES ME IS *18 Schanilec, negligence.” the defendant’s THAT REX IS GOING TO USE THIS ¶ 165, 13, N.W.2d citing AAS REASON NOT TO PAY ME ON Laboratories, Inc., Wheeler Schmid FEB.2, THE K PAY- ANNUAL 350 (N.D.1990). N.W.2d 133 MENT, THAT EVEN THOUGH OBLI- lawyers If 66] conversations with [¶ GATION IS TO ME PERSONALLY necessary, about were theoret AND NOT NORKOT. ically might the statute of limitations never ME CALL begin Page to run. he no asserts had 19, 1996, speсific malpractice. January conversations about in another [¶ 67] On However, Christensen, January Page attorney Page sent a letter to wrote: Plano, Rexworks discussed, City and the Texas. I don’t believe rex-

As we that Norkot knew these in this contends to include me is entitled works liabilities and problems resulting and the lawsuit, what I at not from believed least to Rex- problems did not disclose these in the contract works. warranty fact rexworks own In them. is the same as in the enclosures

as noted January spe- 69] [¶ suppose question I That is mine was. with his cific written discussions have to determine. judge will some the contract and whether Norkot about I read conversation as Further to our in suits under an indem- could be included rex, they cannot with- my contract with knew nity January claim. juris- competent unless a court making hold that Rexworks was claims for favor, point in their in arising found claims both demnity diction has include in a better feel for will have which we Dakota and in Texas. ... from rexworks weeks

the next two If it was for Larson encourage they could almost standpoint Hankla firm not to have or the McGee law simply in order to file a suit someone to in provision included a the contract for ... I me note paying avoid indemnify Page, Rexworks to personally, due me payments are January of its they were aware absence corp. norkot have filed suit they aware, 1996. Norkot and were 19, 1996, Rexworks aware, exposure On been of their should have Page notifying him as indemnity a letter to of Rexworks and sent to the claims Norkot, following: remedy against President of their lack of a contractual Pur- Rexworks. Article 14 of the Asset Pursuant by and between Nor- Agreement chase Schanilec, we “[t]o As said Co., Inc., Manufacturing Rexworks

kot running of the statute of limita trigger the Page, Rexworks is writ- Inc. and James tions, fully appreciate Schanilec need you of several claims for ing notify potential liability or even be convinced provided As section indemnification. injury; only enough of his he need know Agreement, Purchase the Asset 14.01 of potential be on notice of a claim.” Schani jointly are and James Norkot lec, 19. Like the fact situation indemnify Rex- obligated to severally Schanilec, this case is one where reason indemnification claims. works for such only can able minds draw conclusion Looking

drawn the trial court. at the specific negligencе by Page claims of made Norkot, above, know, quoted and based several customers you As record, to the in this when did design respect defect with evidence alleged a knowledge and Norkot have sufficient safety prevention. and fire You product legal malpractice? re- claim for are now involved machine built Nor- The trial court held garding fire on a knowledge City Rapid had such shipped kot and referring to the letter sent Chris City. other claims of defective Various being tensen on that date and on state and manufacture are also design *19 copy City. alleged ment that “Mr. Christensen had alleged by Rapid These agreement between not confined to this loca- the asset problems are early him has commenced or is Rexworks and since Litigation tion. with at Texas Dirt Works connection another case.”

being threatened undisputed evidence Under remand, Page and Norkot after developed

knew, reasonable or with prepared that the contracts

have indemnity provi- contained no

by Larson By receipt of the protecting them.

sions dated

letter of demand subject they knew were

Norkot and by Rexworks for indemnity demands Dakota and Texas.

claims both South If not to have it was indemnity provision, an action

included brought by

could been Larson and the McGee

Page against asserting legal malprac-

Hankla law firm to them in

tice the information known though even the amount ‍​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌​‌‍of indemnity liability, any, if would not

have been known. Norkot and

sufficient information of their years they

claim more than two before

commenced Larson and the McGee Hankla law Therefore, 28-01-18, N.D.C.C., §

firm. claim. I would affirm.

bars the SANDSTROM, J., DALE Y.

concurs. ND Dakota, Plaintiff of North

STATE Appellee, AUNE, Defendant

Milton Appellant.

No. 20020106.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

Nov.

Case Details

Case Name: Larson v. Norkot Manufacturing, Inc.
Court Name: North Dakota Supreme Court
Date Published: Nov 5, 2002
Citation: 653 N.W.2d 33
Docket Number: 20020058
Court Abbreviation: N.D.
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