This is аn appeal from a denial of coverage under an insurance policy and a grant оf summary judgment in favor of insurer. We affirm.
Appellants Alfred and Doris Larson (Lar-sons), are equitable owners and appellant Gerald Nichols of Century 21 — Nichols Realty Company is managing agent of an apаrtment building in Aberdeen, South Dakota. From July 15, 1981 through July 15, 1984, appellee Continental Casualty Company (Continentаl) was the insurer and Lar-sons were the named insureds on an insurance policy identified as “Encompass 77 Series Office, Apartment, Condominium Policy.” Larsons are attempting to recover, under said policy, amounts incurred in settling and defending a racial discrimination action brought against them by Connie A. Bercier (Bercier), based on alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1982, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., SDCL 20-13-20(1), and SDCL 20-13-26. Continental refused to defend the аction by Bercier, on the grounds that the policy did not provide coverage for a raciаl discrimination claim. Larsons also seek recovery of attorney fees and costs incurred in the action, pursuant to SDCL 58-12-3. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Continental, holding that Bercier’s рleadings did not fall within the scope of coverage under the policy which provided covеrage for “personal injury” which arises out of the “eviction or other invasion of the right of privatе occupancy.” We agree.
At the outset, we note that our review of summary judgments is governed by thе standards set forth in
Wilson v. Great Northern Ry. Co.,
Under the specific terms of the insurance policy in question, “pеrsonal injury” is defined as
injury arising out of one or more of the following offenses committed during the policy period:
(1) false arrest, detention, imprisonment, or malicious prosecution;
(2) wrongful entry or eviction or other invasion of the right of private occupancy;
(3) a publication or utterance
(a) of a libel or slander or other defamatory or disparaging material, or
(b) in violation of an individual’s right of privacy;
except publications or utterances in the course of or related to advertising, broadcasting, publishing or telecasting activities conduсted by or on behalf of the Named Insured shall not be deemed Personal Injury.
With regard to the construction of insurance policies, this court statеd in
Grandpre v. Northwestern Nat. Life Ins. Co.,
[A] contract of insurance is to be construed liberally in favor of insured and strictly against the insurer only when the language of the contract is ambiguous and susceptible of more than one interpretаtion. Thus, the insurance contract’s *150 language must be construed according to its plain and ordinary mеaning. It does not permit the court to make a forced construction or a new contraсt for the parties.
See also Strong v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co.,
The definition of “personal injury” as contained within the policy in question is unambiguous. Racial discrimination is not included in the policy definition of personal injury. Thus, it is our opinion that the trial сourt was correct when stating in its memorandum decision that “Bercier’s pleadings do not fall within the languаge of the policy, when the clause is given its plain and ordinary meaning.”
Unpersuasive is Larsons’ assеrtion that the topical heading in the policy captioned “Additional Definitions” presupposes the intended existence of other meanings of the term “personal injury,” as contained therеunder. Rather, the heading is used in an added endorsement to the primary policy, and refers to definitiоns of coverages not afforded in the basic policy, which covers only basic bodily injury and prоperty damage.
Further, Larsons contend that the policy affords them coverage for Berсier’s claim of racial discrimination because the “broad form comprehensive generаl liability extension endorsement” adds to the policy “contractual liability coverage” for liability incurred under an “incidental contract,” which includes “any contract or agreement relating to the conduct of the Named Insured’s business.” While it may be true that Larsons could be held vicariously liable for the claim of racial discrimination because of their agency relationship, that proposition is not dispositive of the instant issue. No alleged contractual relationship existed between Bercier and Lar-sons or Larsons’ agents. To the contrary, Bercier alleged:
7. On or about August 16, 1983, Defendants refused to show, refused to rent, refused to negotiate for the rental of, and otherwise mаke available, and denied to the Plaintiff a unit in the apartment building located at 25 West Mel-gaard Rоad and 111 West Melgaard Road, Aberdeen, South Dakota 57401, because the Plaintiff is Indian.
A fair review of the plain and unambiguous provisions of the policy reveals that the incidental contract provisions therein did not afford coverage for Bercier’s claims.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.