Larry Riel v. Electronic Data Systems CorporationLarry Riel v. Electronic Data Systems Corporation
This is a suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act,
I.
We take plaintiffs summary judgment evidence as true and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor.
Rosado v. Deters,
Electronic Data Systems Corp. develops, markets, and maintains computer-based systems for other compаnies. Typically, an EDS contract with a customer defines the customer’s requirements and the test and delivery dates for the computer system. Having defined the customer’s needs and timetable, EDS breaks the development and design of the system into small, discrete segments. EDS assigns each segment to an individual or group of its employeеs. Progressive segments of a project are generally built on the prior segments. As a part of this process, EDS sets completion dates for each segment, as well as intermediate (or “milestone”) dates. The completion dates for the segments are coordinated to insure that EDS meets the date for final delivеry to the customer.
Plaintiff Larry Riel worked for eight years in various positions at EDS. Most recently, Riel worked as a systems engineer. Riel has been a diabetic for decades. As a result, he experiences - vision and renal-system health problems. Riel alleges that his diabetes and renal problems also cause severe fаtigue, periodically interfering with his job performance.
As a systems engineer, Riel worked on various segments of EDS’s projects. In 1992, EDS assigned Riel to a computer project under a new supervisor. Later in the same year, Riel began suffering from fatigue. At that time, Riel did not know the fatigue’s cause. Riel began to miss certain “milestone dеadlines” in his particular project. His new supervisor attributed this failure to Riel’s tendency to socialize during work hours. Riel attributes these failures to the fatigue caused by his renal condition and diabetes. Whatever the cause, the parties agree that Riel never failed to meet the final deadline on any project; hе missed only the milestone deadlines. Riel claims that EDS adjusted milestone deadlines for other employees when it was apparent that a particular assignment was more burdensome than had been previously thought, or when the employee in question needed special accommodation.
In late 1992 and early 1993, EDS supervisors began trying to remedy Riel’s inability to meet the milestone deadlines. After two formal counseling sessions and a “below average” performance rating, the supervisors resolved to place Riel on a “Personal Improvement Plan.” The PIP included a series of several new milestone deadlines. When they implemented Riel’s PIP, the supervisors informed Riel that failure to meet any one of the new milestones could constitute grounds for discharge. However, Riel claims that in previous cases failure to meet milestone deadlines by other employees on PIPs did not result in discharge.
Apparently consulting with an internal officer familiar with the ADA, Riel’s supervisors
During the same month that EDS placed Riel on the PIP, Riel had an emergency appendectomy. During surgery, doctors discovered that Riel’s diabetes had blossomed into renal failure. Riel and his physician suggest that this renal failure caused his fatigue. When EDS learned of Riel’s health problеms, EDS asked Riel to see EDS’s doctor. Riel twice complied. In the midst of these physician visits, Riel’s direct supervisor spoke to Riel’s physician, and listed for the doctor the essential functions of a systems engineer; again, the list did not include meeting milestone deadlines.
Eventually, Riel missed a total of thirteen PIP milestone deadlines. Riel rеquested a transfer, but EDS refused and cited its policy against transferring employees on PIPs or with “below average” ratings. Then EDS fired Riel. The parties agree that EDS fired Riel for failing to meet the milestone deadlines. The parties dispute the extent of Riel’s progress at the time he was fired. Accepting, as we must, Riel’s version of the rеcord, Riel was within two or three days of completing all of his assigned tasks, and would have been able to complete all of them by EDS’s scheduled final deadlines.
Following his termination, Riel sued, alleging that EDS violated the ADA by failing to accommodate his renal failure and accompanying fatigue. The district court applied thе McDonnell Douglas framework to analyze Riel’s contention of discrimination. It found that Riel was not a “qualified individual with a disability” because he could not perform the essential function of meeting milestone deadlines, with or without accommodation, and granted summary judgment. In the alternative, the district court also found that the accommodations sought by Riel were not “reasonable accommodations” within the meaning of the act, which also justified summary judgment for EDS. Riel now appeals.
II.
The ADA provides that “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability....”
The ADA mandate that employers must accommodate sets it apart from most other .anti-discrimination legislation. Race discrimination statutes mandate equality of treatment, in most cases prohibiting consideration of race in any employment decision. In contrast, an employer who treats a disabled employee the same as a non-disabled employee may violate the ADA. By requiring reasonable accommodation, the ADA shifts away from similar treatment to different treatment of the disabled by accommodating their disabilities.
The terms “reasonable accommodation” and “undue hardship” often go hand-in-hand. Although the terms are separately defined,
see
§ 12111(9) — (10), the ADA provides that employers are liable for failing to make rea
Ultimately, the employer bears the burden of proof for both “undue burden” and “business necessity” because both are affirmative defenses under the language of the statute.
A.
Riel’s condition is a disability if he has “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of [his] major life activities.” § 12102(2). The ADA does not define “major life activities.” But EEOC regulations promulgated under the ADA define “major life activities” as “functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.”
The record contains ample evidence to support a finding of fact that Riel’s renal condition caused fatigue. Riel offered medical testimony supporting his motion for summary judgment that one symptom of his renal condition was fatigue. Riel also offered affidavits tending to show that the fatigue caused his inability to meet the milestone deadlines. As the parties agree that EDS fired Riel for missing the milestone deadlines, Riel has offered sufficient evidence to avoid summary judgment on this element.
B.
Riel must also demonstrate that he is a “qualified individual with a disability.” See §§ 12111(8), 12112(b)(5)(A). He must demonstrate that “with or without reasonable accommodation, [he] can perform the essential functions of thе employment position.” Id. at § 12111(8). The parties agree that Riel did not. meet the milestone deadlines. On the other hand, Riel’s evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to him, shows that he can meet final deadlines. The question is thus whether meeting milestone deadlines alone, without regard to final deadlines, is an essential function of thе systems engineer position.
Congress did not specify which job functions are “essential” under the ADA. It provided that whenever an employer gives written descriptions of the essential functions of a job, those descriptions are entitled to substantial deference.
(i) The employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential;
(ü) Written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; ...
(iv) The consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; ...
(vi) The work experience of past incumbents in the job; and/or
(vii) The сurrent work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.
We do not here hold that the absence of milestone deadlines from either list is conclusive. On the contrary, neither list included other obviously essential functions, such as regular job attendance. Meeting all deadlines might fall into this category of obviously essential tasks, absent other evidence. But Riel’s non-list еvidence is sufficient under the plain language of the statute to raise an issue of fact as to whether meeting milestone deadlines is essential to the position of a systems engineer.
C.
Given that Riel’s summary judgment evidence presents questions of fact on the first two issues, we still must address whether Riel has proposed a “reasonаble accommodation” to his disability. Reasonable accommodation is an element of a
prima facie
case of discrimination under the ADA,
Riel proposed two alternative accommodations to EDS: further adjustment of the milestonе deadlines and transfer to another position within EDS that does not have milestone deadlines. Riel’s summary judgment evidence tends to establish that he was capable of meeting final deadlines and that he had always met them in the past. In support of his proposed accommodations, Riel offered evidence in the summary judgment proceedings illustrating that EDS often transferred employees and that he himself had been transferred repeatedly. At least one job that Riel had previously performed, teaching new systems engineers, had no deadlines at all. Finally, Riel’s evidence suggests that EDS often relaxed milestone deadlines for other employees who ran into unexpected difficulty meeting them and that this caused no disruption to EDS so long as the systems engineers finished project segments by the final deadlines. These facts, put forward by Riel, meet his burden to propose “reasonable accommodations.”
EDS argues it may prevail on summary judgment by demonstrating that Riel’s prоposed accommodations were unreasonable. EDS contends that a relaxation of milestone deadlines would cause disruption in its working structure, but this is for the trier of fact. EDS also argues that it could not transfer Riel because of its policy against transferring employees on PIPs or whose ratings were “below average.” This contention turns the focus upon Riel’s specific circumstances. In so doing, it mistakes the burdens of proof allocated to the parties; Riel need only show an accommodation reasonable “in the run of eases.” The evidence of reasonableness “in the run of cases” and undue hardship will often be overlapping and resist neat compartmentalization. Nonetheless, they remain distinct inquiries even if asked of similar evidence.
REVERSED and REMANDED.