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Larry Plunkett v. W.J. Estelle, Jr., Director, Texas Department of Corrections
709 F.2d 1004
5th Cir.
1983
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*1 ineq- potential the existence is clear that are appropriate rules generalized 416.1185 application § due to uities concerns, also and purposes its over- form the basis for cannot in this case determina- of individual difficulties there- decision. We Secretary’s turning increments marginal outweigh tions and Tenth Circuits First and join congression- fore precise effectuation in deem- determining whether in expected might be decide that they which al concern is child to the parents income ing produce. 1382c(f)(2), a under U.S.C. inequitable § Supreme at 2476. While 95 S.Ct. Secretary adjudication by case-by-case con- with a concerned Weinberger was in required. is deter- individual judgment gressional reasons, judgment foregoing the con- For the in undesirable and were minations REVERSED, and court is statute, district the First Circuit text of a different affirm directions to Weinberger REMANDED the rationale in case has found and to dismiss decision Secretary’s determina- of individual justified the lack Harris, v. and action. 1382c(f)(2). complaint Kollett tions under § Cir.1980). The (1st n. 4 619 F.2d issue of circuit to consider

only other under determinations

individual ra- Kollett has found 1382c(f)(2)

§ the Secre- holding that persuasive, is tionale valid, and is on 416.1185 tary’s reliance § PLUNKETT, Petitioner-Appellant, an indi- 1382c(f)(2) does not require that § deeming is v. determination vidual Harris, 656 F.2d 582 v. Faidley inequitable. ESTELLE, Jr., Director, Texas W.J. Secretary (10th Cir.1981); Hammond Corrections, Department of Welfare, 646 F.2d Health, and Education Respondent-Appellee. Cir.1981). 455 (10th No. 82-1096. Kollett, Faidley The decisions support Appeals, from further States Court gain United Hammond Panthers, Grey Fifth Circuit. decision Supreme Court Weinberger the rationale of supra, where 22, 1983. July implement- Secretary’s applied ing regulation: Rehearing En Banc Rehearing 30, 1983. Sept. con- Denied of administration principles

Sound Congress authorized our view firm spouses. of income between

“deeming” public assistance

The administration not inher- use of on the formula

based Salfi, arbitrary. Weinberger Cf. ently 2457, 2474, 749, 781, 95 S.Ct.

422 U.S. There (1975). on welfare. spend resources to

are limited individual determinations require

To factfinding would mandate costly

need resources dissipate that would

procedures needy. spent could have been at 2476. at 95 S.Ct.

Id. the limited 2642. Given be may which 416.1185

grounds Supreme holdings

overturned and Panthers, Grey Weinberger

1006 *2 Plunk- jury indicted grand Pinto

PaloA two counts ett, charging in 8th Plunkett, or about A.D.1975, and before January, day of indictment, said of this presentment and there State, then *3 did County and knowingly cause intentionally and Pe individual, April Dawn of an death Tex., Worth, for Burns, Fort Danny C. hands; with his her striking ters, by petitioner-appellant. aforesaid, Jurors the Grand And Hexamer, Gen., Maury White, Atty. Mark aforesaid, further do oaths their Tex., respon- for Austin, Gen., Atty. Asst. or to said in and present dent-appellee. A.D., January, of day the 8th about to and anterior county and state said in indictment, Larry of this presentment recklessly there then and did individual, April and HIG- of an BROWN, the death GOLDBERG Before his her striking with Peters, by Judges. GINBOTHAM, Dawn Circuit hands; ... HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit E. PATRICK 1 of mur- upon Count was convicted He Judge: fifty to same by the and sentenced der I. was af- His conviction prison. years a denial without from appeal is an This Ap- Texas Court firmed prisoner’s a state hearing of evidentiary an State, 580 S.W.2d peals. the murder Convicted petition. habeas Dis- United States The (Tex.Cr.App.1979). brings child, petitioner year-old aof two recommendations Court, adopting the trict of constitu- assertedly two errors this court federal Plunkett’s denied magistrate, of a merit, re- we Finding dimension. evidentiary an without petition habeas verse. convic- that his he contends Here hearing. April Dawn year-old two autopsy An for unconstitutionally obtained bruising over virtu- extensive Peters found First, argues that he reasons. two had suffered body. entire She ally her to convict allowed the charge heart, Her to her skull. fracture y-shaped indict- charged in the an offense severely had been liver, spleen pancreas de- he was Second, argues he ment. injuries or the head abdominal Either torn. prosecutor trial when aof fair prived death; oc- fracture have caused closing the uncharged offense argued abdominal one hour before about curred case. than twen- were less The bruises injuries. provide: statutes pertinent The hours old. ty-four if he: an offense commits person A(a) Plunkett, April’s with who lived causes knowingly intentionally or (1) April time, was with from time mother individual; of an the death had that he explained He she died. when bodily inju- cause serious (2) intends lying in April found thump heard clearly dan- act and commits an ry her bed and feet on bedroom that causes to human life gerous He described floor. the carpeted head on individual; ... an death resuscitate, includ- his efforts extensive judge The trial 19.02. Code § Tex.Penal accomplished massage, heart ing direct pages his five opening paragraph hands to application forceful jury: told the charge lapse explain He did chestwall. com- a person provides law Our injury the head time of from one hour know- intentionally or if mits injury. suffering of abdominal to individual, ingly causes the death an or The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ap- bodily injury intends to cause serious plied its contemporaneous objection rule dangerous an clearly commits act to hu- and confined its review to “fundamental man life that causes the death of an error.” 580 S.W.2d at 821. Reversing itself individual. on its own motion for rehearing, it found the charge did not allow later stated: convict on non-charged offense. In its Now you find and believe from the view, while erroneous, there beyond evidence a reasonable doubt that was no fundamental error. In affirming January, on or 8th day about the conviction, the Court of Ap- Criminal Texas, in Palo Pinto County, the defend- peals conceded Plunkett’s contention that ant, Larry Plunkett, or did allowing conviction for an offense not knowingly cause the death of an individu- charged in the indictment would be funda- al, Peters, April striking *4 by Dawn mental law, error under Texas but found hands, with his as set forth in indict- that it did not occur. ment, then will find you the defendant guilty charged of murder as in the indict- The state court having reached the ment. merits of challenge Plunkett’s to the you beyond Unless so find a reasonable charge, there is no bar Wainwright under doubt, if you or have a reasonable doubt 72, 97 Sykes, 433 U.S. L.Ed.2d thereof, you acquit will the defendant (1977), present to its review. Even if it guilty and find him not of murder and argued could be that our standard of review consider guilty whether he is of the lesser is confined to that by exercised the Texas offense involuntary manslaughter. court, our review of claimed error in jury You are instructed that to be guilty of instructions state judges is similar to murder, a defendant must have acted in- that employed by the Court of Criminal tentionally or knowingly causing in in Appeals inquiry its into fundamental er death of the deceased. He must have ror. “An erroneous instruction will support intentionally or knowingly caused the a collateral attack on the constitutional va death, or he must have intended to cause a lidity of state court’s judgment only if the bodily serious injury and have committed ailing so infected the entire trial an act clearly dangerous to human life resulting conviction violates due that caused the death of deceased. Un- process.” Tyler v. Phelps, 643 F.2d less defendant so acted intentionally or (5th Cir.1981). It follows that or knowingly with intent to cause serious of objection impact absence has no in this bodily deceased, injury to the he cannot case on our review. be convicted of murder.

Therefore, you find from the evi- dence beyond a reasonable II. doubt that the defendant, Plunkett, did cause the The Texas Appeals Court of Criminal in April death of Dawn Peters by striking charge its review the found: hands, her with his you a rea- charge abstractly, defined murder [T]he sonable doubt that the defendant did in- applied and then this definition to tentionally or knowingly cause death or Paragraph Although facts in 3A. a theo- he intended April to cause Dawn ry alleged the indictment is includ- Peters serious bodily injury, then you will 3A, ed Paragraph it is important acquit murder, the defendant of and will note that this is a converse paragraph consider or not he is guilty of charge, directing acquittal and considera- involuntary manslaughter. offense, tion of the lesser included objection made no Thus, directing finding guilt. Para- allowed the to convict for a graph 3A did not a conviction authorize violation of 19.02(a)(2). 19.02(a)(2), Tex.Penal Code provided § under Sec. no finding without ed for jury’s find- for the guidance affirmative caused knowingly or guilt. ing only intended child’s death Id. at 822. On at 817-18. 580 S.W.2d bodily harm. 539, 101 Mata, In Sumner reached the banc, court rehearing en the Su- (1981), itself, the reversing In opposite conclusion. requirements interpreted preme scope altered the substantially Texas court there 2254(d). The Court U.S.C. The court looked focus. analytical of its no distinction 2254(d) drew noted that § and, language only aof determinations the factual between found, ambiguous, it to be considering while appel- of a state those court and state trial that the language, parsing aby aided to “a determina- it when referred late court to inten- confined properly had been merits of on the hearing tion after focus, the its narrowing In homicide. stated: The Court issue.” factual closing view the put from court as such case particularly This is true refusing did this It prosecutor. de- its court makes this where federal argument because prosecutor's consider record on the identical based termination objected to. was not appel- the state was considered reason no there was and where late court the Texas company partWe court consider the state trial point. Appeals to raise failed respondent issue because contemporane Texas application *5 that level. issue at the closing objection prosecutor’s rule ous 769. 547, 101 at at Id. unexceptionable. jury is the argument to us. Wain before error is not claimed That of correct “presumption the With 2497, 72, 97 S.Ct. 433 wright Sykes, v. U.S. Mata in v. in Sumner explicated as ness” follow, how not It does 594. 53 L.Ed.2d the that Texas mind, we conclude prosecutor ever, that the per not charge the did determination consideration in the ignored be can for a non-indicted to jury mit convict the indisputably reserved point, Plunkett’s main record. by the supported is not offense jury was al the Whether our review. for of Crimi to the Court due deference With violating for to lowed convict opposite the precisely we reach nal Appeals, not offense was when that 19.02(a)(2) part a we consider essentially because result in the context be decided must charged consider. declined to record that charge must only Not by the the entire trial. guided reading Our whole, it must be laid as a attention be read pay “careful Supreme Court. We all the props ..., scene with courtroom actually spoken to words nothing Had his there existed. scenery has been a defendant accorded charge, conceded way rights depends occurred else constitutional been ambiguous, in to juror Texas court have a could reasonable which prose The agree. inclined to terpreted instruction.” Sandstrom we be 2450, 514, 510, 99 Montana, jury, 442 however: U.S. cutor told the we are 2454, (1979). Finally, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 this paragraph first The interpretive we fail to heed the wary lest pri- And there is murder. case defines jury single to rule “a murder, per- a definitions marily two isolation, but judged in artificial may be he murder if son commits overall viewed in the context of must be an death of knowingly causes U.S. Naughten, Cupp charge.” plot, plan, I can That means individual. 146-47, 94 S.Ct. somebody, know- and shoot and wait lay (1973). them, that’s intentionally shoot ingly and bodily murder, serious intends or opinion, the Texas In its first danger- clearly act an commits injury and jury concluded that Appeals Criminal the death caused life that ous to human convict- be allowed instructions Id., of an individual. That’s the definition S.Ct. at 400. We ease, applies to this doing an act have declined to find fundamental error clearly dangerous health that re- when there was no evidence support [sic] an death, sults in it’s just assuredly most offense erroneously added a jury charge. murder. See, e.g., United v. Thetford, States

F.2d (5th 180 n. Cir.1982). claimed error is was allowed When inflicting Plunkett was to convict Plunkett of non-charged of- injuries photograph to April We disagree fense. with the Texas Court Peters, Dawn beating when Appeals' refusal to look beyond girl, when he caused the skull fracture to ambiguous charge in answering this head, her something did he do that caused question. something death? Did he do murder, caused her para- death? That’s III. one,

graph cause serious bodily injury and commit an act clearly dangerous to hu- Having concluded that Plunkett was tried just man life is bigger than a in a manner that allowed the con- goose. If it looks like a duck and walks vict of distinct crime that the state had duck, well, like a duck and quacks like charged, we turn to consequences it’s just you, duck. Thank ladies and the error. We describe the standard gentlemen. review, then return to the trial scene for its application. given With the court having charge which was subject at least to a con already noted, As we have a state struction that intent to bodily cause serious prisoner seeking federal habeas relief for sufficient, injury explicit explana erroneous instructions faces a heavy prosecutor to the without jury, burden: court, intervention of the makes the conclu must be established not merely that ‘[I]t inescapable. sion reading A of the entire undesirable, the instruction errone- [was] record firmly supports the conclusion that *6 ous, or “universally condemned,” even the jury allowed to convict the right that it violated some which was non-charged theory of murder. guaranteed to the by defendant the Four- We share the view the dissent that we Amendment,’ teenth ‘the ailing and that must chary be of simply reading the same itself so the infected entire

record in a way different than did the state resulting trial that the conviction violates emphasize court. We our that difference due process.’ with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Watkins, 1346, 1369 Washington 655 F.2d v. does not flow from reading a of the same denied, 949, 102 456 (5th Cir.1981), cert. U.S. Instead, record. the Texas court declined 2021, 474 (1982). S.Ct. to consider a the part of trial record which right implicated The constitutional we are persuaded must be considered. In- here is basic: deed, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals process principle procedural No due is the reached same conclusion as this court than clearly more established that notice when it considered the entire record. It charge, specific of the and a chance to be was when it refused consider prose- heard a trial of the issues raised cutor’s that court concluded that ... charge, among are the constitu- permit did not rights every accused ... convict of an offense not charged. The Supreme Cupp Court in Naughten Arkansas, 196, 201, v. coun- v. 68 Cole 333 U.S. S.Ct. 514, 517, seled that claimed instructional error (1948). can- 92 L.Ed. 644 Denial of this not be viewed in emphasized isolation. It right has driven federal habeas relief in process See, “... of instruction itself is e.g., Tarpley numerous cases. v. Es- but one of several components telle, (5th Cir.1983); the trial.” 703 F.2d 157 v. Gray

1010 have convicted Plunkett could Cir.1981); juror Watson able (9th Raines, 569 662 F.2d was not which he crime with a distinct Cir.1977). (6th Jago, v. F.2d charged. should that we suggests The state more than a no we have described have con So far could conclude that in an indict not contained of conviction risk non-charged offense Plunkett of victed right had no Plunkett constitutional his ment. given 19.02(a)(2), under § of murder constitutional indictment. His The state inquiry. proper ais defense. This “to be right Amendment Sixth right non- is for convictions posed by legal issues cause of the nature and informed in terms addressed may be charged offenses Wain v. Spinkellink ...” accusation and indictment between of a variance Cir.1978), (5th 609 n. 32 578 F.2d wright, context, have refused we In this proof. denied, 99 S.Ct. 440 U.S. rt. a feder review of on direct proffered error ce (1979). L.Ed.2d 796 “in the the reason al prosecution upon which of evidence absence nothing in argue and state does The not con ground on a have convicted might conclusion supports record reasonable indictment, the defendant’s tained might be ever aware he that Plunkett In not be reviewed. shall killing conviction not of convicted evidence, inad the court’s absence of such injure her child, intending to con the instruction vertent addition indict- caused death. blow that Unit ‘trivial ...’” in the is understanding tained of Texas read with an ment n. Thetford, 676 F.2d ed Un- States notice. opposite gave precisely law - denied, U.S. Cir.1982), cert. (5th law, 19.02(a)(1) 19.- § § der Texas (1983). -, 74 L.Ed.2d 996 crimes. separate 02(a)(2) are distinct specific application prove here is approach (a)(1), Our the state had Under § ques kill; (a)(2) “plainly teaching intended to § Sandstrom could juror requirement a reasonable is whether dispense[s] 517, 99 This resulting death.... have so concluded. actor intend no be- there is evidence obvious distinction at 2455. Where significant variance, 19.02(a)(1), one is a offense, or 19.02(a)(2) and non-charged tween § Lugo-Lugo to the Sandstrom in his answer murder statute.” long way ‘intentional’ (Tex.Cr.App. State, 72 at 88 inquiry. 650 S.W.2d banc) (Clin- en 1983) (opinion rehearing used that he had denied ton, J., concurring). any intent the child with force on any be- differences note that the Finally, we his ef he admitted injure. While pecu- were of murder types the two used tween might forts to resuscitate *7 It takes these facts. tension under have, liarly ex his than he should greater force cal- decisional to see the imagination to the little injuries other severe planation for with confronted juror head, of a reasonable was a culus child, the blow to her such as have in- may that he defense Plunkett’s although Yet Plunkett’s fall from a bed. so intend to do did not child any jured blow defense no concession of involved if conviction permitting kill, with not and injure intent if he injury even serious intended the Plunkett still have found juror reasonable could indicted state death. The intend did not of mind. former but the latter state not It was intending death. Plunkett have been jurors may not Specifically, the if it offense to a fail-back ever entitled intended persuaded that subjec- was that to convince death failed decided may kill child but actually theory sporting It is not a bodily tively intended. a serious he did to inflict intend is at stake we describe. More justice to her clearly dangerous injury by an act be- difference card. The ill-played than an sum, case where In we face a life. effect obviously these offenses tween argument and with the charge read notice It is basic preparation. reason- the defensive such at trial are the evidence

10H which was denied. We cannot find that (1983), 794 is a fresh reminder denial to have been harmless. The denial that the Courts of Appeals are not free to was unconstitutional and prejudiced the de- second-guess determinations made state fendant. The writ must issue. The denial courts. In case, this Court had re of the petition for habeas corpus is re- versed the district court granted and habeas versed. The case is remanded with instruc- relief to a petitioner who claimed he was tion that the district court set a reasonable mentally incompetent to have stood trial. time within which Texas may try Plunkett Fulford v. Maggio, 692 F.2d (5th 354 Cir. again. 1982). The issue had earlier been raised

REVERSED before AND court, trial REMANDED. which had found the defendant competent. The Louisiana Su JOHN R. BROWN, Circuit Judge, preme dis- Court upheld that finding on appeal. senting: Summarily reversing this Court’s decision, Supreme I Court had respectfully “not the slightest dissent. The majority re- hesitation in saying cites but ignores then trial recent teachings conclusion as to Fulford’s United States Supreme competency was Court. It ” ‘fairly repudiates supported by the record.’ carefully considered - findings U.S. at -, 103 Texas S.Ct. Court at Criminal L.Ed.2d Appeals and 799. impermissibly substitutes its own judgment for that of the state court. This unaccepta- In its decision on rehearing in this case, ble approach leads the majority to the the Court of Criminal Appeals pointed out wrong result. portion of the instructions which Clearly, a jury could referred find beyond a rea- non-indicted crime were sonable doubt phrased in such indictment fairly way as to direct acquittal, described Plunkett’s brutal crime. It is un- consideration of the lesser offense of disputed that the indictment manslaughter, constitu- the jury did not find cer- tionally adequate. The sole tain beyond issue facts is wheth- a reasonable doubt. Be- er the court’s charge to the cause funda- was instructed to return a mental error. The Texas verdict Court of guilty Criminal only if they found that Appeals found that it was not. This deter- did “intentionally or knowingly mination deserves far more than insub- death” of victim, the instruc- stantial deference shown it by panel tion did not authorize the jury to return a majority. guilty verdict on the nonindicted offense. In Sumner v. Mata, [T]he defined abstractly, then applied this L.Ed.2d 722 definition (1981) the Su preme facts ruled Paragraph that a 3A. Although state court’s fac theo- tual ry not alleged determinations in the must be indictment is accorded a includ- ed in “presumption of Paragraph 3A, it is correctness” under important U.S.C. note 2254(d). As paragraph recently a converse stated charge, in Marshall v. directing acquittal Lonberger, and considera- - U.S. -, -, tion of lesser offense, L.Ed.2d included “ 646, 657 (1983), directing a Sumner finding of guilt. calls for a Thus, ‘high Para- ” measure of graph deference’ 3A did not “requires that authorize a conviction a federal habeas *8 under court more See. 19.02(a)(2), than simply provided no disagree with the state affirmative court reject guidance before for the jury’s find- ing its factual ing of guilt. Instead, determinations. it must conclude that the state court’s find Plunkett v. State, 580 S.W.2d (Tex. ings lacked even support’ in the ‘fair[] rec Cr.App.1979). ord.” The conclusion by reached the Court of The Supreme Court’s decision in Maggio Criminal Appeals is fairly supported by the v. Fulford, - U.S. -, actual language of the jury charge majority Yet the whole. as a record

the America, interpre- STATES its own UNITED record give chooses to Plaintiff-Appellant, high properly to accord failing By tation. findings deference measure of majority Appeals, of Criminal Court LESS, LAND, OR MORE OF ACRES 33.90 Sumner, Lon- clear lesson overlooks the COUNTY, BEXAR IN SITUATED Fulford. berger, M. Schae and John TEXAS OF STATE majori- so, disagree I Even more Defendants-Appellees. al., fer, et closing prosecutor’s that the contention ty’s . No. 82-1215 acceptable otherwise elevated argument of fundamen- realm jury instruction Appeals, United States aof of the absence Because error. tal Fifth Circuit. objection, propriety contemporaneous 22, 1983. July is not before prosecutor’s majority question The sole Court. —as the instruction acknowledges —is circumstances

itself, context on the trial, a conviction authorized majority acknowl- offense.

unindicted arguably, least that at

edges I any such verdict. authorize did not

alone thesis that majority’s accept

cannot acceptable instruc- constitutionally into fundamental was somehow turned remarks. prosecutor’s

error in the Court nothing

I find suggest opinion en banc

Appeals’ a different result reached

would have charge in placed the it had

only That argument. prosecutor’s

context language considered autho- it did not concluded

charge and I offense. for non-indicted

rize-conviction finding. uphold fundamentally, constitu- more

But of an errorless acceptability an the words of advocate

charge cannot due process into a denial

be transmuted courts.

by the Texas

Case Details

Case Name: Larry Plunkett v. W.J. Estelle, Jr., Director, Texas Department of Corrections
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date Published: Jul 22, 1983
Citation: 709 F.2d 1004
Docket Number: 82-1096
Court Abbreviation: 5th Cir.
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