The parties were divorced on May 2, 1979. They agreed to joint custody of their two minor children. Plaintiff wаs granted physical custody of the children for 42 weeks each year. Defendant was granted рhysical custody for the 10 weeks of summer vacation.
The judgment of divorce provided under the hеading of "Child Support” that plaintiff pay defendant $30 per week per child during those periods in which physical custody of the children was with defendant. Defendant was not ordered to pay any child support. The judgment further provided under the rubric "Medical and Other Expenses” that plaintiff pay all medical expenses of *128 the children. Additionally, it was ordered that each party assume responsibility for clothing and other expenses of the minor children during those periods in which a particular party had physical custody of the children.
On June 4, 1980, the court heard oral arguments on рlaintiffs’ petition to require defendant to pay child support. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court gave the defendant the choice of paying $15 per week per child fоr 52 weeks or $20 per week per child for 42 weeks, thereby crediting defendant for the time in the summer when the children stayed with her. Ultimately, an order dated August 4, 1980, was entered which required defendant to make support payments in the amount of $15 per week for each child. It is from this order which defendаnt appeals as of right.
Defendant first asserts that the trial judge erred by ordering a change of support without requiring proof that a change in the circumstances of the children justified the same. On the facts of this case, we find no error.
Generally, support provisions may not be modified аbsent a change of circumstances.
Andris v Andris,
Defendant argues that the divorce decree in the *129 present сase did require her to pay support, and the above cases are therefore distinguishable. As noted above, the provision in the decree entitled "Child Support” did not order defendant to pay support for the time the children resided with their father. Plaintiff specifically relies on the provision in the decree entitled "Medical and Other Expenses”, however, which required hеr to pay for the clothing and other expenses of the children during those periods when they were in her physical care and custody.
In our opinion, this provision does not constitute supрort. Support generally encompasses payments made by the noncustodial parеnt to the custodial parent for the support of the children. The noncustodial parent tyрically pays the children’s expenses during visitation. However, assuming,
arguendo,
that the provision entitled "Mediсal and Other Expenses” is correctly construed as a requirement of child support, our result would be no different. We agree with Judge Brennan’s dissent in
Ballard v Ballard,
Defendant also asserts that the trial court erred in basing the support order on the weekly income figure reported to be her earnings in the Friend of the Court’s recommendation. Defendant argues that an evidentiary hearing should have been conducted аnd other factors considered in determining the support figure.
Defendant does not assert that her earnings were less than that reported by the Friend of the *130 Court nor that an express request for. an evidentiary hearing was denied. Consequently, we believe the following excerpt from Ebel, supra, 710, is applicable:
"Further, in that nо change of circumstances need be shown where the court is involved with a decree of support not specified in the original divorce decree, the record need only indicate that the circumstances of the parents and the welfare of the child require supрort. Ballard v Ballard, supra, 42 (Brennan, J., dissenting), West v West, supra, 686. We do not feel an evidentiary hearing is necessary as would be the case if modification of an existing support order were the case. See Stolberg v Stolberg,41 Mich App 305 ;200 NW2d 110 (1972), Ewald v Ewald,14 Mich App 665 ;166 NW2d 49 (1968), Bowler v Bowler,351 Mich 398 ;88 NW2d 505 (1958). However, where there has been one requested, the court should so grant. Here there was an express request for such a hearing.” (Emphasis in original.)
Of course, nothing in this opinion precludes defendant from seeking a modification of the support award and an evidentiary hearing.
Affirmed.