317 F. Supp. 2d 77 | D. Mass. | 2004
MEMORANDUM
This is a civil action challenging the validity of the decision in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,
Plaintiffs
Background
In Goodridge, Defendant SJC addressed the question of “whether, consistent with the Massachusetts Constitution, the Commonwealth may deny the protections, benefits, and obligations conferred by civil marriage to two individuals of the same
Plaintiffs allege that, on and after May 17, 2004, “Defendants [Judy A.] McCarthy[, the City Registrar for the City of Boston,] and Town and City Clerks 1-350 will be required to issue [and, in fact, plan to issue] marriage licenses to same-sex couples ....”
On May 11, 2004, Plaintiffs filed with this court their amended complaint for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and a temporary restraining order.
Discussion
In deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction, this court is to weigh the following four factors: “(1) the likelihood of the movant’s success on the mer
At the outset, it is important to emphasize that this court has not been asked to judge, nor will it undertake to judge, “the wisdom of the decision by the Goodridge court that denying marriage licenses to same-sex couples violated the state constitutional rights of those individuals.”
Defendants argue that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to determine whether the SJC’s actions in connection with the Goodridge case contravened the federal Constitution’s guarantee of a republican form of government.
This court disagrees and holds that it does have subject matter jurisdiction over this action. First, as has already been pointed out, this court is not reviewing any substantive holding of the SJC with respect to the Massachusetts constitutional issues that were at the heart of the Goo-dridge case. Rather, it is determining whether certain of the SJC’s actions in
The heart of the inquiry as to whether Plaintiffs are entitled to the injunctive relief that they seek is whether they are likely to succeed on the merits.
First, the SJC did not “lack[ ] subject matter jurisdiction to ... hear the [Goodridge ] case,”
Implicit in that transfer of jurisdiction to the judicial branch is the transfer of authority to define the term marriage, as that terms appears in the Massachusetts Constitution. There can be no question that, if the judicial branch has jurisdiction over all questions involving divorce, alimony, affirmation, and annulment, it has the authority to determine whether there has been a valid marriage. And, in order to determine whether there has been a valid marriage, the judicial branch must have the authority to interpret, and if necessary, reinterpret, the term marriage. It is, therefore, immaterial that “there has been no statute or provision by the Legislature granting jurisdiction to the court to hear a case which concerns the definition of marriage in the Commonwealth.”
Second, the SJC did not usurp the power of the Massachusetts Legislature in violation of the Guarantee Clause, when it “reformulat[ed]” the term marriage to mean “the voluntary union of two persons as spouses, to the exclusion of all others.”
Of significance as well is the fact that, after it reformulated the term civil marriage, the SJC announced that the “[e]ntry of judgment shall be stayed for 180 days to permit the Legislature to take such action as it may deem appropriate ....”
Because “the ‘sine qua non of [both the preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order standard] is whether the plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits,’ ”
Conclusion
Plaintiffs seek to have this court declare that Defendant SJC usurped the power of the Massachusetts Legislature and, in so doing, violated the federal Constitution, both when it heard the Goodridge case,
Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and a temporary restraining order is, therefore, DENIED.
AN ORDER WILL ISSUE.
. 440 Mass. 309, 798 N.E.2d 941 (2003).
. Id. at 969.
. Id.
. Id. at 970.
. The following are the named Plaintiffs in this action: (1) Robert P. Largess, (2) Rep. Mark J. Carrón, (3) Rep. Emile J. Goguen, (4) Rep. Robert S. Hargraves, (5) Rep. Peter J. Larkin, (6) Rep. James R. Miceli, (7) Rep. Philip Travis, (8) Sen. Steven C. Panagiota-kos, (9) Rep. Christopher P. Asselin, (10) Rep. Edward G. Connolly, (11) Rep. John A. Lep-per, and (12) Rep. Elizabeth A. Poirier.
. See Am. Compl. for T.R.O., Prelim. & Permanent Injunctive Relief & Declaratory Relief ("Am.CompL”) at 2.
. The following are the named Defendants in this action: (1) Supreme Judicial Court for the State of Massachusetts, (2) Chief Justice Margaret Marshall, (3) Justice Robert J. Cor-dy, (4) Justice Judith A. Cowin, (5) Justice John M. Greaney, (6) Justice Roderick L. Ireland, (7) Justice Martha B. Sosman, (8) Justice Francis X. Spina, (9) Massachusetts Department of Public Health, (10) Christine C. Ferguson, Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Public Health, (11) Judy A. McCarthy, City Registrar for the City of Boston, and (12) City and Town Clerks 1-350.
. Am. Compl. at 2.
. See id.
. See Pis.' Renewed Mot. for Declaratory Relief, T.R.O., & Prelim. & Permanent In-junctive Relief ("Pis.' Renewed Mot.”).
. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 440 Mass. 309, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (2003); see also id. (noting that the issue is "[w]hether the Commonwealth may use its formidable regulatory authority to bar same-sex couples from civil marriage”); id. at 953 ("The larger question is whether ... government action that bars same-sex couples from civil marriage constitutes a legitimate exercise of the State's authority to regulate conduct, or whether ... this categorical marriage exclusion violates the Massachusetts Constitution.”).
. Id. at 948.
. Id. at 969.
. Id.
. Id. at 970.
. Am. Compl. at 6.
. Id.
. See id. at 2. On May 10, 2004, the initial complaint was filed. See Compl. for T.R.O., Prelim. & Permanent Injunctive Relief, & Declaratory Relief.
. Pis.’ Renewed Mot. at 1. On May 10, 2004, the initial motion was filed. See Mot. for Prelim. Inj.&T.R.O.
. Pis.' Renewed Mot. at 2. "[T]he [United States] Constitution's Guarantee Clause ... directs the United States to 'guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.' " New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 183, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (quoting U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4).
. Gately v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 2 F.3d 1221, 1224 (1st Cir.1993) (quoting Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Guilbert, 934 F.2d 4, 5 (1st Cir.1991)) (internal citation omitted).
. Id. at 1225 (quoting Weaver v. Henderson, 984 F.2d 11, 12 (1st Cir.1993)) (alteration in original).
. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bishop, 839 F.Supp. 68, 70 (D.Me.1993).
. Mem. of Law in Supp. of Pis.' Renewed Mot. for Declaratory Relief, T.R.O. & Prelim. & Permanent Injunctive Relief ("Pis.' Mem.”) at 1.
. See id.
. See id.
. Supreme Judicial Court & Justices’ Opp’n to Pis.’ Mot. for T.R.O. & in Supp. of Court & Justices' Mot. to Dismiss ("SJC's Opp’n”) at 1.
. Id.; see Mem. of City of Boston & Judy A. McCarthy in Opp’n to Pis.' Mot. for Prelim. Inj. & T.R.O. ("Mem. of City of Boston”) at 2-4.
. SJC's Opp’n at 4; see Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984).
. SJC’s Opp'n at 1; see Mem. of City of Boston at 2-4.
. SJC's Opp’n at 6 n. 7; see Mem. of City of Boston at 6-8.
. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 465 U.S. at 106, 104 S.Ct. 900.
. At the very least, the issuance of such an order would be the first step in redressing the constitutional injury that Plaintiffs have identified.
. 505 U.S. 144, 184, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992).
. Id. at 185, 112 S.Ct. 2408 (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 582, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964) ("[S]ome questions raised under the Guarantee Clause are non[-]justiciable.”)). The Court has also recognized that “Contemporary commentators have ... suggested that courts should address the merits of [Guarantee Clause] claims, at least in some circumstances.” Id.
. Gately v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 2 F.3d 1221, 1225 (1st Cir.1993).
. Pis.’ Mem. at 2.
. Id. at 13.
. Id. at 16.
. Id. at 13 (citing Mass. Const, pt. 2, ch. Ill, art. V).
. See id.
. An affirmation is a legal declaration that the marriage in question is valid. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 207, § 14 ("If the validity of a marriage is doubted, either party may institute an action for annulling such marriage, or if it is denied or doubted by either party, the other party may institute an action for affirming the marriage.... Upon proof of the validity or nullity of the marriage, it shall be affirmed or declared void by a judgment of the court.").
. Pis.’ Mem. at 13-14 (citing 1785 Mass. Acts 69; Mass.Rev.Stat. 76, §§ 3, 4 (1836)).
. Id. at 14.
. Id.
. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 440 Mass. 309, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (2003).
. Id. at 970.
. Gately v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 2 F.3d 1221, 1225 (1st Cir.1993) (quoting Weaver v. Henderson, 984 F.2d 11, 12 (1st Cir.1993)) (alteration in original).