*1 = = = (Table 2, Guides, ed., 89) 4.75 1. 1. AMA 2d FVC at (Table 4, 6, 3.85 at FEVi (Table at 81.0% FEVi/FVC The for FVC is the table-derived value lower limit normal for FVC minus the 95% — = 1.12 Confidence Interval or 4.75 3.63 1. the table-derived value for lower limit normal minus the 95% FEVi FEVi — = Confidence Interval or 3.85 0.842 3.01 1. is the value lower limit normal table-derived FEVi/FVC FEVi/FVC — = minus the Confidence Interval 8.28 95% 81.0% 72.7%. they “The are spirometry patients results for black divided 0.9 before should be compared Guides, ed., predicted at 89. values.” AMA 2d CLAIMANT’S ADJUSTED SPIROMETRY RESULTS: = 3.89 1. 1./0.9) (3.50 FVC = (3.11 1./0.9) 1. FEVi = 89% (3.46/3.89) X FEVi/FVC CONCLUSION: ventilatory claimant’s function test range: results all within the normal Claimant’s values Lower limit normal 1.
FVC 3.89 3.63 1. 3.46 1. 3.01 FEVi 89% 72.7% FEVi/FVC LARGE, Appellant, Michael AND MANU
ACME ENGINEERING CORPORATION,
FACTURING
Appellee.
No. 66098.
Supreme Oklahoma.
April *2 AFL/CIO, Employee’s Local 275.
sociation collective-bargaining protected by employ- agreement between the Union and er. job.
Employee
injured
was
while on the
compensation claim and
He filed a workers’
a permanent
was
to have suffered
found
by a
disability. The award entered
partial
Compensation
judge
the Workers’
Court
subsequently
appeal
sustained
Compensation
three-judge Workers’
panel. Employer
then set-
employee accepting by
tled the matter
employer.
cash settlement from
finalized, em-
After the settlement was
exam-
ployer demanded that
ined
a new doctor to determine
regular
perform
his
physical
ee’s
fitness
in the
This doctor was
involved
duties.
original
compensation
employee’s
workers’
Contrary
opinion
of doctors
claim.
employee during
time
treating
compensation
was heard
above claim
courts,
em-
the new doctor determined that
physically
unable to
ployee was
that his
previous
his
duties and
employment as a machinist
continued
him-
only
a health hazard
stituted
self,
as well.
but to others
the new
basing its decision on
Allegedly
employer notified
report,
medical
option
exercising its
collective-bargaining agreement
under the
employee to other duties.
to transfer
to a
not covered
proposed transfer was
Howerton,
Kelly, Kelly &
Michael E.
agreement with
protected
the Union
Muskogee,
appellant.
for
pay
lower
rate with
employer and was at a
III,
Hall, Jr.,
B. Wolfe
D.
Frank
Carl
Upon being notified
fringe
no
benefits.
Fallis,
Nichols, Wolfe, Stamper, Nally &
transfer,
proposed
the conditions
Inc., Tulsa,
appellee.
for
filed
agree
employee refused
through
representa-
union
grievance
SIMMS, Justice.
sec-
in
This resulted
tives.
.the
change
order,
joba
at no
in ond transfer
retaliatory discharge
alleging
Action
Again, employee
loss
benefits.
seq.
pay
The- of
et
of 85 O.S.1981
violation
griev-
refused,
appropriate union
filed the
dispute.
are not
background facts
action
also
this
ances and
commenced
Large (here-
Plaintiff/appellant, Michael
court,
retaliatory, “con-
alleging a
district
at all times relevant
“employee”)
inafter
discharge.
structive”
employed
a machinist
case
responded to
Employer
Engineering and
defendant/appellee,
motion
a combined
(hereinafter
petition with
trial court
Corporation
Manufacturing
state a claim
for failure
member of
dismiss
Employee is a
“employer”).
12 O.S.
granted under
which relief
International As-
Metal Workers’
the Sheet
or,
2012(B)(6)
recognized
providing
Supp.1984
in the alterna-
these statutes as
remedy
tive,
for a “constructive”
summary judgment. Employer
al-
significant
It is
this case that the trial
leged
no termination as
that there had been
presented
showing
was not
with facts
seq.,
et
recognized under 85 O.S.1981 5§
*3
Here,
employment.
an actual cessation of
subject mat-
and that the state court lacked
significant thing that can
said
the most
jurisdiction
employee’s cause
ter
because
employee’s
employee’s
about
claim is that
action,
any,
pre-empted
of
if
Feder-
employment
form of
was to be altered
Employer attached numer-
al Labor law.
proposed
question.
transfer in
support
of its
ous affidavits and exhibits
motion. The trial court sustained
jurisdictions
There are
which have
summary judgment making
er’s motion for
discharge
theory
adopted constructive
as a
(1)
specific findings
that:
had not
recovery,
they
generally
have
limit-
of
but
contemplation
been
within the
application to the context of a
ed its
breach
(2)
seq.,
et
and:
employment
of 85 O.S.1981 5
contract context.
§
remedies,
any,
subject
employee’s
if
were
courts,
instance,
applied
Federal
procedures
to the
within the collective bar-
objective
deciding
when
wheth-
standard
were,
therefore,
gaining agreement and
discharge
er a constructive
occurs. The
pre-empted by
Employee
law.
now
federal
courts have said that
need
appeals
that determination
the trial
employer subjectively
not show that
court.
resign.
intended to force
'
discharge
is shown when the facts
Such
question
We find the determinative
person
that “a
of the case show
addressed is whether an
which must be
employee’s position
have felt
employee has a cause of action
Okla-
quit
he
forced to
because of intol-
that was
retaliatory,
homa law for a
“constructive”
discriminatory working
condi-
erable
tions.”
v. Nationwide Insurance
Watson
plaintiff
prima
A
make a
must
fa-
(citations omitted).
Co., supra, at 361
discharge by provid
retaliatory
case of
cie
Working conditions must be so difficult or
filing
evidence
which shows
person in
unpleasant that a reasonable
significant
a claim was a
factor
employee’s shoes would have felt com-
employment.
from
termination
pelled
resign.
v.
Garner
Wal-Mart
Forrest, Okl.,
(1987)
P.2d
Elzey v.
(11th Cir.1987)
Stores, Inc.,
A
isolated instance”
discrimina-
fore
address
issue
pre-emption.
mat-
tion has been held as insufficient as a
federal
finding
of construc-
ter
law to
Accordingly,
judgment
of the District
discharge. Glasgow Georgia
tive
Pacif-
Muskogee County
AFFIRMED.
Corporation, 103
P.2d
ic
Wash.2d
Cleland,
(1985);
Nolan v.
C.J., OPALA,
HARGRAVE,
V.C.J.,
Cir.1982).2
LAVENDER, J.,
BAILEY, Special
Justice, concur.
employee/plaintiff alleged
When an
discharge through an unfavorable
structive
DOOLIN,
HODGES,
ALMA WILSON
favorable,
other,
less
arguably
transfer to
*4
KAUGER, JJ.,
and
dissent.
recog-
job assignments,
the courts have
SUMMERS, J., disqualified.
employee’s obligation
nized an
to act rea-
sonably
respect
employer’s deci-
with
to the
Justice,
KAUGER,
whom
with
Garner,
court
to transfer.
In
sion
DOOLIN, Justice, joins, dissenting.
“[pjart
employee’s obligation
of an
to
said:
Today,
majority
held
has
that sum-
obligation
is an
not to as-
mary judgment
properly granted
was
in
worst,
jump
and
conclu-
sume
not to
to
In
Large’s
claim.
constructive
employer’s
regarding
too fast”
sions
ruled,
effect,
deciding, it has
that an
so
employee.
transfer the
Garner
decision
any retaliatory
employer may take
action
Stores, Inc.,
failed make as Engineering and Co. facie less, assembly Many much a retali discharge, department. worker its adopt including atory employees, one. We “construc Acme’s those in the refuse theory recovery assembly represented by department, as a were tive” presented in this As- the facts Sheet Metal Workers’ International Oklahoma under claim Local No. a labor Employee has failed state a sociation AFL-CIO case. recognized the exclusive organization granted. Neither for which relief employees. On genuine bargaining agent those employee demonstrated has on Large suffered an to the claim for December of fact exists as issue day he his The next job injury back. retaliatory “constructive” supervisor’s help sought temporary when it sustained trial court was correct 2012(B)(6) injury. Evident- finding physician his employer’s O.S.Supp.1984 in communica- summary ly there was a breakdown granted motion to dismiss and tion, employee continued employer. there- because the in favor of It judgment (8th Cir.1987). Hill, al., example al. v. et sufficient to 2. For an facts Schools, claim, et Public such see: Southside finding was made after the despite supervisor’s work failure to ob- This assistance, tain medical for another week. performing had been the full duties of his injury When the failed to heal his year injury. for over a since the intensified, discomfort he consulted chiro- all, has been examined practor January on doctors, only whom at least six three of by the After several weeks of treatment concerning a recommendation his made surgeon chiropractor, orthopedic he saw ability perform job. orthopedic his Two February apparently He was on surgeons found that he could return to full 14, 1984, May not to return to work until general surgeon duties and a found that He he released his doctor. when Large perform could not his current duty performed light for four weeks endangering without his health. On duty. August reported then for full On general surgeon’s basis of the conclusion an examination Large job, was unable to Large orthopedic surgeon disclosed that transfer to a Acme notified of his strain, dorsal had suffered a mild cervical plant purportedly clerical division of the permanent improving which was with no fringe pay with the same rate of bene- foreseen, disability grad- and that he could *5 employee fits on 1985. The as- June Apparently ually resume his full duties. fringe that the benefits were not serts employee consulted a doctor of the also previously identical to those he had en- medicine, found that general who they joyed, nor were included Acme’s permanent partial im- had sustained a 43% po- “package” transfer because the clerical Thereafter, body. the pairment to whole repre- removed him from the union sition under the employee the filed his third claim position bargain- to outside the Compensation Act for an on the sented one Worker’s 7, 1984, the trial job injury. ing promised compensate On November unit. Acme to judge permanent partial found a dis- Large pay during 25% rate of his at same body Although a ability to his as whole. training period only. Acme informed appealed the award to the review Acme transfer, accept Large that if he did not Court, panel Compensation the Workers’ discharged. Large did not he would be judge’s decision on which affirmed the trial position. report to the new On June 26, 1985, subsequently it settled March grievance the union filed a on behalf Large’s April claim on employee alleging that because he of the Qualifica- implemented Physical a job was transferred to a outside bar- pro- Program May 1985. This tions constructively gaining unit he had been developed determine gram allegedly was discharged/transferred in violation of a perform employee could whether provision “just cause” termination endan- job adequately and without his/her agreement. This is- bargaining collective safety health or or gering either his/her was submitted to arbitration on June sue 23, 1985, May after the others. On that of 13, 1986, 20, 1986, and on November 19 and filed in the agreement settlement grievance finding the arbitrator denied Compensation and under Workers’ Acme had not violated the collective that Qualifications Physical program the new agreement. bargaining Large be exam- place, Acme demanded that 21, 1986, filed a On June supplied that ined another doctor retaliatory discharge in the dis- claim for questionnaire regarding a doctor with asserting filing of a trict court that ability industrial triggered compensation claim had workers’ general surgeon, a work. This doctor was job fringe with less bene- his transfer to a orthopedic specialist whose consul- not the fits, prestige. protection, and less less tation had been used a motion to dismiss. Acme countered with compensation claim. Con- the workers’ finding granted the motion The trial court findings, trary orthopedic surgeon’s to the employee had not been general surgeon found that the contemplation of 85 O.S.1981 within the qualified for industrial work. ee was not 5;1 liability any any remedy ployers change in work- available § subject bargaining agree- any perceived slight conditions or for collective therefore, however, and, pre- employee. Conversely, controlled and ment empted ap- Legislature federal law. The could not have intended sub- pealed. ject compensa- employees who file workers’
tion claims to retaliation so severe
availing
employees
deter
from
themselves
I.
statutory protection
of the Act.
A
MAY BE A
TRANSFER
developed
legal
in numer-
standards
CONSTRUCTIVE
establishing the
ous decisions
doctrine of
DISCHARGE
most
discharge
effectively
constructive
balance,
Legis-
strike this
question presented is
The first
one
purpose
enacting
5. Acme con-
lative
§
from
impression
a transfer
first
—whether
depart-
tends that a transfer to a different
may,
a
to a non-union
under
union
discharge
ment is
5. The
case,
the facts of this
be construed as
employee argues
question
discharge
equivalent of
whether the transfer was
employment.
majority
termination of
question
of fact and should have been
recognizes the doctrine of con-
obliquely
jury.
to the
has
submitted
discharge,
structive
and that
can be
demonstrating
burden of
em-
equivalent
of a
O.S.1981
discharge.2
ployer’s actions constituted
However,
purposes.
it refuses
propounded
theories have
con-
recognition by
its
al- Two
been
breathe
life into
necessary to
cerning
proye
question here
left undecid-
what
lowing the
to be
*6
fact,
though
discharge;
employee
must
ed
even
structive
trier of
fact
the deliberateness of the
many
prove
material
issues of
there
action,
intolerability
working
reme-
and the
remain unresolved. Given the
which
statute,
conditions;3
employee
prove
must
“dis-
or The
dial nature of the
the term
working
fact
condi-
in a
to the trier of
charge” in
should be construed
5§
unpleasant that
pur-
difficult or
a
way
the manifest
tions were so
which effectuates
employee’s
pro-
person
reasonable
in the
shoes
pose
Legislature
to
compelled
resign.4
to
Ei-
retaliatory
have felt
employees
tect
from
actions
presents
question
a
of fact.5
Obviously,
Legislature
theory
did ther
employers.
indirectly
employer cannot do
what
subject
to
far
to
em- An
go
not intend
so
as
Dist.,
748,
Indep.
F.2d
provides:
v.
798
4. Jett Dallas
School
85
5
Title
O.S.1981
Flawn,
Cir.1986);
(5th
v.
761 F.2d
755
Kelleher
firm,
corporation
person,
partnership or
"No
1079,
(5th Cir.1985); Pittman v. Hatties
1086
any employee
discharge
the em-
because
may
Dist.,
1071,
burg
Separate
644 F.2d
Mun.
School
claim,
good
or has
ployee has in
faith filed
Cir.1981);
(5th
Bourque
Elec.
v. Powell
1077
lawyer
represent
in said
to
him
retained
claim,
61,
Co.,
Cir.1980);
(5th
Mfg.
Neale v.
617 F.2d
65
instituted,
in
to be
instituted or caused
1381,
Dillon,
(E.D.N.Y.1982)
F.Supp.
1390
534
faith,
provi-
any proceeding
good
aff'd,
Cir.1982);
(2nd
Seery
116
v.
714 F.2d
Statutes, or
of Title
of the Oklahoma
sions
85
532,
Conn.App.
Hosp.,
Haven
17
554
Yale-New
testify
about
in
such
testified or is
to
has
also,
757,
(1989). See
Baxter and
A.2d
761
employer
proceeding.
no
shall
Provided
Farrell,
Discharge—When
"Constructive
Qu
itt
any employee
required to
or retain
rehire
Fired",
Getting
Emp.Rel.L.J.
7
346
Means
physically
per-
unable to
is determined
who
(1981-82).
assigned
duties."
form
340,
(10th
Corp.,
Oil
196 F.2d
343
5. Derr v. Gulf
1251,
Press, Inc.,
Daily
v.
770 F.2d
Retreat,
2. Bristow
Cir.1986);
702 F.2d
Pena v. Brattleboro
1082,
Cir.1985)
(4th
cert. denied 475 U.S.
1255
Cir.1983); Vaughn
(2nd
v. Pool
Off
(1986);
Alicea
Co.,
(5th Cir.1982);
89 L.Ed.2d
Ali
shore
Santiago,
v.
562 F.2d
Rosado
Garcia
Santiago, see note
su
v. Garcia
cea Rosado
(1st Cir.1977);
Chefs,
Sky
willing
Bratcher
majority Is not
pra.
Because
(1989);
Mutual
Brock v.
application
Or.
783 P.2d
Inc.,
of constructive
dis
consider
(D.C.1979).
case,
Reports,
necessary
A.2d
charge
It is
theory in
not
these two
analyze
merits of
the relative
Press, Inc.,
approaches,
between them.
choose
Daily
note
see
3. Bristow
i.e.,
accounting
po-
to an
clerk
permitted
directly6
to do
make a was transferred
The Derr Court instructed the trial
purpose
transfer with the
and sition.
set
court on remand to follow the standard
forcing
employee
effect of
the transferred
Co.,
Bourque
Mfg.
forth in
v. Powell Elec.
quit
resign.7
(5th Cir.1980):
Dority Lingle employer’s The burden proffered reasons. 1)the retaliatory dis- employee’s claim for production of relevant and a burden of Compensation charge under the Workers’ evidence, persua- a burden of credible pre-empted by federal law may Act not be It is if the evi- sion. sufficient law claim is if the of the state resolution genuine issue of fact con- dence raises a of the collec- dependent on the terms retaliatorily cerning whether it 2) agreement; and a trans- tive-bargaining employer must set employee.22 discharge if a fer be a constructive through introduction of clearly, forth person the same condi- evidence, for the the reasons admissible resign. tions would feel forced explanation employee’s termination. The right employee contends that his justi- legally must sufficient provided way 5 in no sue under 85 O.S.1981 § entering judgment employer. for the fy bargaining agreement or flicts with the Labor Relations Act. with the National employer carries this burden If the employee’s claim for argues by raised production, presumption subject griev- wrongful discharge is rebutted, factu- case is and the prima facie procedures the col- arbitration ance and speci- to a new level of inquiry proceeds al bargaining agreement between lective production ficity. Placing this burden of and that it is therefore Acme and the union purposes serves two on the —it law. pre-empted federal prima facie case plaintiff’s meets the prove a claim of order reason for the ac- presenting legitimate employee must show: discharge, the issue with it frames the factual tion and 1) employment, the worker clarity provide sufficient demon- 2) opportunity fair job injury, with a full and on em- offered strate that the reason circum- receipt of treatment under ployer terminating notice put stances employment for a for the had been rendered not the true reason that treatment rather, was, pretext. injury, work-related decision but should be evalu- sufficiency of the rebuttal good faith or that it fulfills these instituted, extent to which instituted, pro- ated or caused to be Act, functions.23 ceedings under the 254, 1089, 248, 18, Burdine, 1094- 101 S.Ct. 450 U.S. Motors 21. Buckner v. General 999, 207, Forrest, (Okla. 95, (1981); Elzey McDonnell supra; P.2d 67 L.Ed.2d 802, 1987). 792, Green, Douglas Corp. v. 411 U.S. (1973); 1817, 1824, L.Ed.2d S.Ct. Corp., see note v. General Motors 22. Buckner Munson, Womack denied, Cir.1980) 101 S.Ct. cert. 450 U.S. (1981) VII cases L.Ed.2d 814 for Title Postal Serv. Bd. Gover- See United States reasoning. analagous Aikens, used which have 460 U.S. nors v. (1983); Dept. Texas 75 L.Ed.2d
1097 However, just the was petitioner the of the burden which of whether fired for nature cause, render law to the must be understood this does not the state shifts dependent upon the de- connection with the ultimate claim contractual in trial in case intermediate burdens. The ultimate termination.26 The court persuading any trier not hear evidence on the of the of fact did whether burden employer retaliatorily discharged filing was in retaliation for a transfer compensation exercising statutory rights claim. The dismis- employee for workers’ assumption Act at all with the sal was based on the the action under the remains times pre-empted by never federal It is the persuasion of law. employee. burden duty of the of facts to hear the evi- and the bears the burden trier shifts for and find the facts and not this Court persuasion given the reason dence of parallel appeal.27 burden Because state-law pretextual. termination was This per- remedy may independent in this be of of case merges with the ultimate burden collective-bargaining agreement, and suading the that he has been of The em- because construction collective-bar- victim this, directly agreement may required, not may gaining in either be ployee succeed retaliatory dis- discharge of persuading question court that the whether by charge pre-empted claim was decided significantly motivated retaliation is statutory indi- rights, prematurely.28 exercise for his of prof- rectly by showing that the CONCLUSION cre- explanation unworthy of
fered dence.24 premised, Acme’s motion to dismiss was sustained, apparently based on the
Purely pertain to questions factual finding that a is not a the con- transfer conduct of the 5, pre- the matter was do not and that and motivation of duct of law.29 The motion interpretation empted terms federal require court improperly agreement. granted It because collective-bargaining dismiss a a the transfer was Supreme to the issue whether the function of the Court not for fil- ques- retaliation an initial of fact make determination compensation claim was presented ing a workers’ properly which have been tions sufficiency appraising it.25 not determined considered. to the trial court but dis- petition not be petition, the state should Lingle, As stated to state claim unless consid- missed failure involve the same factual cause beyond plaintiff can appears doubt determination erations as the contractual 2012, 21, 23, Forrest, id.; O.S.Supp.1984 Elzey 12 a motion note see 29.Under 24. Note supra. for which to state claim dismiss failure granted be as a sum- can be will treated relief 820, (Okla. Gwaltney, 291 P.2d 824 Davis v. 25. petition mary judgment and matters outside I, 1955). also, supra. discussion in Part See provides perti- allowed. The statute will be part: Div., nent 770 v. Groen 26. Windfield Cir.1989). If, asserting the defense ... on a motion "B pleading to for failure ... dismiss Crowl, In re grant- upon which relief can state claim ed, presented Inc., (3rd pleading Cir. matters outside F.2d Berda v. CBS 25 court, 1989); Chrysler motion Corp., 879 F.2d Smolarek v. to and excluded Parsec, (6th Cir.1989); Dougherty summary judgment shall be treated as one also, (6th Cir.1989). See given op- parties and all shall Magnet Ill.2d People Chicago Wire perti- portunity present all material made (1989) N.E.2d 128 Ill.Dec. by the sum- motion rules for nent to such a — denied, -, U.S. cert. mary judgment_” (1989) (The Supreme Illinois L.Ed.2d also, Fraser, New Petition Under the "The See Pleading regulations did not OSHA found federal Code,” Okla.L.Rev. laws pre-empt the of state criminal enforcement (1985). employers concerning the work conduct place). *12 prove no of facts in set entitle him to relief.30
claim which could sustaining Acme’s
The trial court erred and the cause should be
motion to dismiss proceedings.
remanded for further pro- further
fact that I would remand for
ceedings mean that can does not he
recover. It does mean that should I note that if the day in court. would remanded, and if the trial court
cause were necessary in the determination of
found it discharge issue to con-
the constructive collective-bargaining agreement,
strue the discharge claim would
then pre-empted by federal law. OF THE AUTHORITY HOUSING NATION, Appellee,
SEMINOLE HARJO, Appellant.
Josephine
No. 67999.
Supreme Court of Oklahoma.
April House, supra; Munley Gibson, Fin. supra. See see note v. ISC see note Conley also, see note Corp., Motors Buckner General supra; Wilds v. Universal Resources
