7 Wyo. 464 | Wyo. | 1898
The plaintiff in error originally brought an action against the defendant; in error, claiming in the petition to be in actual possession of a certain tract of land, and that the defendant in error asserted an estate therein, and had trespassed upon the land, and threatened to continue the trespasses, that he was unable to respond in damages,. and prayed that the plaintiff might be adjudged the owner in fee simple of the premises free from all claims of an estate or interest therein of the defendant, and that the latter be enjoined from interfering with the possession of plaintiff, or from maintaining or continuing said trespass. The trespass was alleged to consist in going upon a portion of the premises and erecting a dwelling house thereon, and residing therein. A final judgment was rendered in that cause by the district court of Albany County, in favor of plaintiff, by the terms of which it was ordered, among other things, ‘£ That said P. A. Steinhoff, and all persons acting in aid of him, be perpetually enjoined and restrained from trespassing upon the said lands, and from interfering with or in any manner disturbing the plaintiffs or their assigns in the full and free enjoyment of said lands and the possession thereof.” The record shows that Steinhoff thereupon vacated the premises, and remained away from them for about seven years. His alleged interest in the premises was founded upon a homestead entry under the laws of the United States, it being his claim that they were unappropriated public lands and subject to such an entry. The plaintiff derived its title through an entry of a prior grantor under the desert-land act; and it seems there had been a cancellation or an attempted concellation
Seven years after the rendition of the judgment, Steinhoff made a final proof upon his homestead entry, showing that his continued residence upon the land had been prevented by the injunction, and a final receipt was issued to him by the proper land officer.
He again went upon the land, being advised and believing, as he testified, that he had a right to do so, and his last mentioned entrance upon the premises was in execution of an intention to live tnere.
The plaintiff thereupon filed a motion in the said district-court to have the defendant attached for contempt in violating the final judgment of injunction, which motion was supported by the affidavit of one Mads "Wolbol, who had become the grantee of the plaintiff, and was in undisturbed possession until the defendant committed the act of disobedience to the injunctional order complained of.
Defendant’s answer in the contempt proceedings alleged his ownership of the land under the final receipt above referred to, and that all claims and pretenses of the plaintiff and its grantees had been adjudicated 'by the land officers of the United States, and the only entry from which plaintiff claimed title had been cancelled and the defendant permitted to enter the lands, and that since his original entry in 1890 he had been entitled to the exclusive possession and title except as against the United States; that the judgment rendered by the court was and is void for the reason that the court had no authority to interfere with the right of the United States to dispose of said lands.
The reply admitted the issuance of the final receipt to defendant, but alleged that it was wholly based upon his entry of 1890 which was set forth in his answer filed during the original pendency of the cause. On the original trial the making of such entry by defendant was conceded.
The court thereupon made the following findings:
“1. The court finds that on the 19th day of May, 1897, the defendant, P. A. Steinhoff, against the will and over the objection of Mads Wolbol, the grantee of the plaintiff, and who was then in possession of the lands described in the final decree of the court in this action, went upon said lands and interrupted and interfered with the use and enjoyment thereof by said Mads Wolbol, and remained thereupon against the objection of said Wolbol.”
‘ ‘ 2. That said defendant on the 20th day of April, 1897, having made final proof upon his homestead entry of September 16, 1890, received a final receipt from the receiver of the United States Land Office at Cheyenne, Wyoming, and that he claimed the right to go upon said lands under said final receipt.
“ 3. The court, therefore, finds as a matter of law that said defendant did not have such intent in entering upon said lands as would make him guilty of contempt of court.” The court thereupon adjudged the defendant not guilty, and ordered him discharged. A motion for new trial was overruled, to which an exception was reserved, and error is prosecuted to this court from the judgment in the. said contempt proceedings.
The defendant in error moves that the proceedings in error be dismissed on the ground that the judgment of the district court in a matter of contempt is not reviewable, and although both the motion and the cause upon its merits were, by agreement of counsel, argued and submitted at the same time, the discussion, both on oral argument and in briefs of counsel, was largely confined to the points raised by the motion. On behalf of defendant in error the rule of the common law is relied on which denied the right of appeal in proceedings for contempt of
The authorities agree that in civil contempts the matter should be brought to the attention of the court by affidavit, which was the practice adopted in the case at bar, and they are in effect civil proceedings for the benefit of the adverse party, although denominated a contempt of court.
Section 2929 of the Revised Statutes, found in our code of Civil Procedure, provides as follows: “An injunction or restraining order granted by a judge may be enforced as the act of the court, and disobedience thereof may be punished by the court, or any judge who might have granted it in vacation, as a contempt; an attachment may be issued by the court or judge, upon being satisfied by affidavit of the breach of the injunction or restraining order, against the party guilty of the same; and such party may be required by the court or judge to pay a fine not exceeding two hundred dollars for the use of the county, to make immediate restitution to the party injured, and to give further security to obey the injunction or restraining order, and in default thereof he may be committed to close custody until he complies with such requirement, or is otherwise legally discharged.”
A final order which may be reviewed by an appellate court is thus defined by the code: “An order affecting a substantial right in an action, when such order in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment, and ato order affecting a substantial right, made in a special proceeding, or upon a summary application in an action after judgment, is a final order which may be vacated, modified, or reversed, as provided in this chapter.” Rev. Stat., Sec. 3126.
So far as the power to punish as a contempt a violation of an. order or decree of the court, is concerned, it is said
The statute is clearly remedial in character, and the order made in a contempt proceeding authorized by its provisions is one which affects a substantial right, and is made in a special proceeding and upon a summary application in an action after judgment, when it is made after and in aid of a final judgment or decree. The order is therefore a final one, expressly reviewable by authority of the statute.
Further than this moreover authorities and precedents are abundant sustaining the right of appeal in civil con-tempts. 4 Ency. Pl. and Pr. 811, 812. In the case of the People v. Diedrich, 141 Ill., 665, the supreme court of Illinois, in the course of the opinion say: “ Prosecutions for contempt are of two kinds. When instituted for the purpose of punishing a person for misconduct in the presence of the court, or with respect to its authority or dignity, it is criminal in its nature. When put on foot for the purpose of affording relief between parties to a cause in chancery it is civil — sometimes called remedial,” and further, “ It is to all intents and purposes, between the party insisting upon obedience to the injunction and the one charged with its violation. Though sometimes entitled in the name of the people ex rel, etc., it may
Under our statute it seems entirely clear that the primary object to be obtained by the authorized proceeding is the enforcement of the injunctional order, thus inuring more particularly to the advantage of the party in whose favor the injunction has been granted. Incidentally the authority and dignity of the court may be vindicated, but that is not the sole or the prevailing purpose of the proceeding. The maximum amount of fine which may be imposed is limited by statute to two hundred dollars regardless of the importance of the matters involved, or the injurious consequences attending a violation of the decree, which, together with the large authority given the court to compel restitution and prevent further acts of disobedience, renders quite manifest the remedial character of the proceeding. It follows, that the order is subject to review, and that the right to bring the matter to this court resides in the party aggrieved. It would be an absurdity to permit an appeal to the one whose acts are complained of in case of a conviction, and deny it to the party whose rights have been invaded, and for whose advantage the proceedings are authorized, if the judgment is against him. The motion to dismiss must accordingly be denied.
The district court found from the evidence that the defendant against the will, and over the objection of the grantee of plaintiff, went upon the lands and interfered with their use and enjoyment by said grantee, and remained thereon against the latter’s objection, and that the defendant claimed the right to enter upon said lands by virtue of his final receipt. The entry upon the lands and interruption of possession of plaintiff or his grantee was what the defendant was forbidden to do by the final judgment in the action. The finding, which, accords with the evidence, discloses that the violation was willful. The
The question of the motive or intent with which an in-junctional order is disobeyed does not alter or vary the responsibility for the violation. 2 High on Inj., Sec. 1418. Nor will the advice of counsel avail one charged with contempt for such violation, as a defense. Id., Sec. 1420. The rule in this respect is laid down as follows: “ Wherever the party charged has clearly and unequivocally violated a clear and unequivocal mandate of a court of competent jurisdiction, the mere allegation upon his part of bona fide motives and non-intentional contempt will not avail to purge the wrong committed.” 4 Ency. Pl. and Pr., 791, and cases cited. Such absence of evil intention, however, may be interposed and considered by way of mitigation of the penalty, which it is held may be on that account reduced to the payment of costs. Id., 792. The want of intention affecting the penalty for the offense against the court only, and under our statute, possibly the matter of the character and amount of security required for future obedience to the court’s decree, blit if restitution would seem to be demanded to afford the complaining party the due benefit of the injunction, we do not understand that the absence of wrong design as toward the court could be considered as at all affecting the right to demand or necessity of requiring such restitution.
It is a universal rule that where the court has jurisdiction to enter the judgment, it is no defense in a proceeding for contempt that it was erroneous. There can be no question but that, in the original cause, the court possessed ample jurisdiction to make the order.
Reversed.