124 Ark. 346 | Ark. | 1916
Appellants, who are citizens and taxpayers engaged in various business pursuits in the City of Hot Springs, instituted this action in the chancery court of Garland County to restrain the enforcement of an ordinance of the city council requiring'those who desire to operate certain lines of business to procure a license and pay the fee therefor. The contention is that it amounts to an occupation tax which the city has no power to impose. On final hearing of the cause, the chancellor decided that the ordinance was valid and dismissed the complaint for want of equity.
It is not contended by counsel for appellee that the imposition was intended otherwise than as an occupation tax, and it seems clear from .a consideration of the terms of the ordinance that it was so intended and that such is its necessary effect. It is not really necessary, however, to determine that question, for there are occupations included in this controversy which the city council- is not empowered even to regulate or to license unless it is under the statute relied on by appellee, and the controversy here narrows to a decision of the question whether or not the statute mentioned has any general application so as to confer authority upon the city council of Hot Springs.
The three sections of the .statute read as follows:
1‘ Section 1. That in addition to the powers now conferred by law upon cities of the first and second class and incorporated towns that for the purpose of raising revenues to defray the expenses of additional police force and fire protection, they be and are hereby empowered to, by proper ordinance, require the payment of xa license from, all merchants, restaurant keepers, hotels, butcher shops, barber shops, ten pin alleys, and all other places of business within their limits where articles are kept for sale or exchange, or where any kind of game is indulged in and a charge is made therefor, and to provide penalties for the violation of such ordinances, as now prescribed by law for the violation of ordinances of a similar character.
‘ ‘ Section 2. That this Act shall apply only to Independence County , and any other county or counties that may desire to take advantage of the provisions of this Act.
‘ ‘ Section 3. That this Act take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”
However, the legislative form of affixing a title to a ■statute is a custom of such general" nature in American legislation that it has been always followed here regardless of any express requirement in the organic law. The title itself forms no part of the enactment, but in this instance it shows very clearly the legislative intent that the statute was meant only to apply to Independence County. Section 1 is couched in very broad language, but the next section was evidently intended either to explain, restrict or amplify the preceding section; and if any meaning be given to it at all it is that it was intended to put the statute into immediate operation in Independence County, whether it applied to any other locality or not. If it had been intended by the lawmakers to make the statute apply generally, section. 2 need not have been inserted at all,-so if we are to give any effect to that section we must construe it to mean that the Legislature intended to put the statute into operation in Independence County, as distinguished from its operation in other localities, and. leave it to the option of other counties whether or not the benefits of the provision -should be taken advantage of. It is argued that the' statute being one merely to delegate authority to city councils, the language in the last clause of section 2 was evidently intended to confer authority upon municipalities in other counties, and that such is a fair interpretation of the statute. This part of the statute was dealing, however, not with separate municipalities within a given territory, that is to say, with municipalities included within the territory of the county named, and it does not warrant the inference that the Legislature merely meant to say that the Act should be one of general application to be taken advantage of by the municipalities in any other county.
The Constitution recognizes a clear distinction between special legislation having only local effect and general legislation. There are certain requirements concerning such special legislation that are not imposed as to general legislation. Whether or not the Legislature has the power to embrace both classes of legislation in one enactment, we need not stop to inquire at this time, since we have reached the conclusion that the language of the statute now under consideration is only effective to put it into operation as a .special one in the particular locality named, and that it does not extend the operation of the statute to other localities. In reaching this conclusion, we do not attach any importance to the prohibition in the Constitution (Art. 5, Sec. 22) against reviving, amending or extending the provisions of the law by title only, for this is not an attempt to extend the provisions of the statute by reference to title. If the'Legisature had put into the statute a clear expression of the intention to make it one of general application, it would not have offended against the provision of the Constitution just referred to. Having reached the conclusion, however, that the language is not sufficient to extend the provision, it renders that part of the statute, which declares that it shall apply to other counties which may desire to take 'advantage of it, wholly inoperative. Wé recognize our duty to give effect to every sentence and every word in a statute if possible to do so in harmony with all of its provisions, but this statute presents a case where something must be rejected and we are of the opinion that if we give any effect at all to that part of the statute which makes it special in its application to Independence County, it necessarily results that the other language intended to be more general must be rejected as being without sufficient potency to accomplish what the lawmakers may have intended.
We have not overlooked, in our consideration of this question, the decision in Russell v. Board of Dir. of Red River Levee Dist. No. 1, 110 Ark. 20, and in Young, Admr. v. Red Fork Levee Dist., 124 Ark. 61, construing the Act of the General Assembly of 1905 (p. 143), which referred especially to the St. Francis Levee District, and we held that the statute was general in its application.' The language of that statute, however, was entirely different from the- statute now under consideration, and notwithstanding the fact that it mentioned a particular levee district, the remaining language was of sufficient force to extend the operation to all other districts in the State. The present statute only constitutes an attempt to make it apply to such other counties as may desire to take advantage of it, and as there is no provision made for manifesting a desire to so adopt its provisions, the language fails to he of any effect.
There being no statute in the State delegating to municipalities the authority to impose an occupation tax, it follows that the chancery court erred in not restraining the officials of the City of Hot Springs from undertaking to enforce the ordinance. The decree is therefore reversed, and the cause remanded with directions to enter a -decree in accordance with the prayer of the complaint.