29 N.W.2d 8 | Minn. | 1947
Lead Opinion
The questions for decision are: (1) Whether, where eight days after an employe sustained an accidental injury the employer filed with the commission a written report of the accident and about two months after the accident occurred the employer filed with the commission a final receipt for compensation paid to the employe for temporary total disability caused by the injury, a proceeding commenced about 11 years after the filing of the receipt to recover further compensation for permanent partial disability caused by the injury is barred by §
The facts giving rise to these questions are that on May 8, 1934, the employe, while employed as a mining foreman, sustained a fracture of the upper third of his left arm between the wrist and the elbow; that he received hospital and medical treatment for his injuries; that he was disabled until June 24, 1934, a period of six weeks and four days; that the employer paid him $134.56 compensation; that he then returned to his work as a mining foreman; and that on July 6, 1934, he executed a final receipt on a form prepared by the commission. The employer filed with the commission on May 16, 1934, a report of the accident, and on July 9, 1934, it filed the final receipt and a certificate by a physician concerning employe's injuries. The final receipt was processed by the commission. There was correspondence between employe and the commission and an examination of employe by a neutral physician, who found that there was a good union of the fracture; that employe had a useful left arm; and that there was no limitation of either elbow or wrist movement. Thereupon, the commission notified the *399 employe that the report filed on July 9, 1934, to the effect that there was no permanent disability, "apparently is confirmed."
In the report of the accident and the physician's certificate filed with the final receipt, the injury in question was described as a fracture of the upper third of the left forearm (the radius). In the claim petition for further compensation for permanent partial disability, the injury is so described and the disability as "30 percent loss of use of left hand including wrist movements."
The case was heard by a referee. No oral medical testimony was taken. In lieu thereof, the parties stipulated that medical reports prepared by their respective physicians, Dr. J. Arnold Malmstrom for the employe and Dr. Robert L. Bowen for the employer, "will be used for the cause [purpose] of deciding what medical disability, if any, the employe has." The reports were substantially the same, except as to the extent of the resulting disability. Dr. Malmstrom reported that employe complained of pain in the neck, shoulder, and elbow regions radiating down into the hand; that he had a fracture of the left radius; that he had a slightly smaller than normal measurement of the muscle in the upper left arm; that his shoulder and elbow movements were normal; and that he had a definite bowing of the left forearm. His conclusion was that employe sustained a "possible loss" of approximately 35 to 40 percent of the use of the left hand and 10 to 15 percent loss of use of the lower left forearm, or a total permanent loss of use of both of approximately 25 to 30 percent. Dr. Bowen found that employe had sustained some loss of grip (of the hand) and limitation of motion of the left forearm and estimated "the disability at approximately 25 percent of the hand and wrist." There was no evidence showing disability to the left arm as a whole.
At the hearing before the referee, employe was permitted to testify, over the employer's objection, for the purpose of giving a brief history of his injury as to the facts concerning the accident and his injury in which he referred to the injury as one to his left arm or arm. He was permitted to demonstrate to the referee "how much" he could move his hand, how much he could twist his arm, *400 and how he could raise his hand to his head. These movements were accompanied by such remarks as "I can do that much, see," "that much," and "like that"; but the record contains no other statement of what the demonstration showed.
The position taken in the dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Thomas Gallagher that the question whether employe's whole arm was injured was litigated by consent is untenable. When employe in answering a question was about to state facts concerning his injuries, the following occurred:
"By Mr. Gillette: The injury is admitted here.
"By Mr. Bouschor: We'll just let him give a brief history ofthe injury." (Italics supplied.)
It is plain that Mr. Gillette intended to object to Mr. Bouschor's going into any matters covered by the stipulation; that Mr. Bouschor not only so understood, but realized that Mr. Gillette's intended objection was a valid one; and that, to obviate further objection, Mr. Bouschor by his statement that he intended only to elicit a brief history of the injury not only intended to assure Mr. Gillette that he did not intend to offer any evidence subject to the latter's objection, but that any evidence that might be given would be entirely consistent with the stipulation and not subject to the objection.
The referee found that employe had sustained a 25 percent permanent and partial disability of the left arm, and concluded "that the employer herein shall pay 50 weeks of compensation at $20.00 a week — being the sum of $1,000.00 by reason of a 25% permanent and partial disability of the left arm, together with interest to March 1, 1946 in a sum of $674.42 and further interest for the period following March 1, 1946, until all compensation due in this matter has been fully paid." (Italics supplied.) The employer appealed to the commission from the referee's decision on questions of law and fact. The case was heard by the commission upon the record made before the referee. No reference was made in the commission's decision to employe's demonstration of his injuries at the hearing before the referee. Adopting the reports of the physicians introduced by stipulation of the parties as a basis for determining the nature and *401 extent of permanent partial disability, the commission affirmed the referee's decision both as to his findings concerning the nature and extent of the disability and the allowance of interest.
1. Under §
2. The dispute as to whether the employe was entitled to compensation for disability of the whole arm or of the hand and wrist movement or the hand and lower forearm is to be determined by the application of the statute to the facts of the case. The compensation act contains a schedule of specific injuries for which it provides specific awards of compensation. Section
(12) For loss of a hand not including wrist movement during 150 weeks;
(13) For loss of a hand including wrist movement during 175 weeks;
(14) For loss of an arm during 200 weeks;
"(15) Amputation of the arm below the elbow is considered the loss of a hand, including wrist movement, if enough of the forearm remains to permit the use of an effective artificial member, otherwise it is considered the loss of an arm;"
The findings that employe's percentage of disability is 25 percent and that he was entitled to $20 per week are not questioned here. If the disability was limited to the hand and wrist movement or to the hand and lower forearm, he was entitled to an award of $875 compensation, and if the disability affected the whole arm he was entitled to $1,000. While the dispute as to the amount of compensation involves only $125, that is no reason why it should not be decided correctly.
Where a workmen's compensation act contains a schedule of specific injuries for which specific awards of compensation are provided, the award of compensation for a specific injury included in the schedule must be the particular one therein set forth. The schedule fixes specific compensation for specific injuries, and the commission lacks discretion to make another or different award. Sheldon v. Gopher Granite Co.
"* * * If there were no injuries except to the hand and forearm, we think the court should have awarded compensation based upon a percentage of total disability to the hand."
We held further that whether the injury was one or the other was a fact question.
3. It is too well settled to require citation of authority that the workmen's compensation act should be liberally construed so as to afford coverage of all cases reasonably within its purview. The provisions of §
4. While an employe is required to prove his claim by competent evidence, an affirmative duty rests upon the commission to see to it that an award or settlement conforms to the act by affording to the employe the maximum coverage intended to be given him by the act. In so doing, the commission may by disregarding procedural technicalities adapt the relief to the facts of the particular case, but it must always act fairly and judicially. Where a claim is litigated upon a claimed set of facts and the proofs fail to establish those facts, with the consequence that the employe would not be entitled to compensation under his theory of the case, but the proofs do establish a different situation entitling the employe to compensation or to greater compensation than that claimed by him, it is the duty of the commission to order litigation of the issues arising from the facts thus developed at the hearing and, where necessary, to order a continuance in order to afford the parties opportunity to prepare for such litigation, and, if the proofs should sustain a recovery or a greater one than claimed, to make an award accordingly. For example, in Kallgren v. C. W. Lunquist Co.
5. The commission is the finder of the facts in all cases coming before it on appeal from a referee's decision, regardless of whether the appeal is heard upon the record made before the referee or upon such record and additional evidence taken by the commission. Nelson v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co.
6. On this record, a finding of disability of the whole arm rather than of the hand and wrist movement or of the hand and lower forearm was not permissible, for the reasons (a) that the evidence to be considered under the stipulation showed disability only of the hand and wrist movement or of the hand and forearm; and (b) that the record fails to disclose any disability to the arm as a whole.
(a) When at the opening of the hearing before the referee the parties "agreed" that the statements of the doctors "will be used for the cause [purpose] of deciding what medical disability, if any, the employe has," they in effect stipulated that the statements constituted the evidence to be considered in determining the nature and extent of the employe's disability. Holmberg v. Southern Minnesota J. S. L. Bank (D. C.)
The parties may stipulate as to what evidence shall be considered by the trier of fact. G. N. Ry. Co. v. Becher-Barrett-Lockerby Co.
A stipulation as to what evidence shall be considered by the trier of fact in deciding a particular question excludes the consideration of other evidence. Shaw v. Henderson and Holmberg v. Southern Minnesota J. S. L. Bank, supra. The plain purpose of such a stipulation is to state the evidence without producing it in the ordinary way. Where there is no intention to circumscribe the trier of fact, the common practice is simply to read the stipulated evidence into the record. But where, in addition, as here, the parties agree that the stipulated evidence is to be used for the purpose of deciding a particular issue of fact, an intention is manifested that the decision shall be based exclusively upon the stipulated evidence. Otherwise, the stipulated evidence would not be used for such purpose. Unless stipulations are enforced, they are apt to prove a trap for even the most wary and circumspect, and that is precisely what would be the effect of the stipulation here if the commission could disregard it in deciding the question of the nature and extent of employe's disability.
As long as a stipulation remains in effect it is binding not only on the parties, but on both the trial and appellate courts. Amundson v. Cloverleaf Memorial Park Assn. and Shaw v. Henderson, supra; Bingham v. Board of Supervisors,
The rules governing stipulations apply in workmen's compensation cases the same as in others. Worwa v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co.
True, the commission may for cause set aside a stipulation. Worwa v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co. supra. In certain cases it is the duty of the commission to do so, as where it appears that the effect of the stipulation is to deprive the employe of compensation to which he is entitled under the act. While the commission has undoubted power to reject a stipulation of the parties, that fact does not affect the rule that a stipulation is binding until set aside. Princeton Min. Co. v. Earley,
"The authority to reject the whole of an agreement must logically include the authority to reject a part [a stipulation as to fact]. * * * This does not affect the rule that a stipulation is binding unless withdrawn or set aside. Of course the board cannot permit a stipulation to stand and then find contrary to it. By permitting it to stand the board in effect approves it. If it is to be rejected the parties are entitled to know it and to have an opportunity to marshall their evidence on the point."
Consequently, the stipulation here was binding on the parties and on the commission. The commission did not reject it or set it aside. In affirming the referee's decision, the commission bottomed its decision on the stipulation, thereby showing that it deemed the stipulation to be in effect. But it misconstrued the effect of the stipulation. While the evidence to be considered under the stipulation in determining the nature and extent of the disability showed, according to one doctor, a 25 to 30 percent disability of the hand and lower forearm and according to the other approximately 25 percent disability of the hand and wrist movement, the commission found a 25 percent disability of the whole arm. Thereby, it found disability in excess of that for which there was any basis in the evidence which it was entitled to consider. Cases like Kruchowski v. Swift Co.
It does not appear that either the commission or the referee intended to set aside the stipulation, but the fact is that their decisions entirely ignored the legal effect of it. If the intention was to set aside the stipulation, it should have been done by express order. If the commission was of the view that the employe might be entitled to compensation for disability of the whole arm, it should have so informed the parties and permitted them to litigate the issue as to whether that was the fact. It could not decide the issue without affording the parties such opportunity.
(b) Aside from any effect the stipulation might have in circumscribing the commission's power to find the facts as to the nature and extent of employe's disability,4 employe's demonstration of his injuries before the referee was not part of the record and therefore could not be considered by the commission. As has been pointed out, the commission made its own findings upon the record made before the referee without taking additional evidence. The commission did not see the demonstration. It had no better opportunity than we have of knowing of what the demonstration consisted or what it disclosed. See, Rikstad v. Dept. of Labor and Industries,
The commission's finding of the facts on appeal upon the record made before the referee is analogous in this respect to findings made by the appellate court under the old chancery practice where the case was tried de novo upon the record. In such cases, evidence not made part of the record could not be considered, even though such evidence was before the trial judge. Blease v. Garlington, 92 U.S. (Otto) 1,
The rule is different on an appeal where the appellate tribunal, as the commission did here, tries and decides the case upon the record made before a trial tribunal, from what it is on a writ of error or so-called appeal which is in the nature of a writ of error. Under the former, because the appellate tribunal makes its own findings, only the record can be considered. The plaintiff has the burden of proof in the appellate court the same as in the trial tribunal. Devore v. Adams,
Where the review is by writ of error or by an appeal governed by the same principles, the presumption is that the evidence supports the findings, even though the evidence is incompletely preserved in the record, as in the case of the demonstration here. Presumption supplies in such a case what the record fails to show. Donnelly v. Lehigh Nav. Elec. Co.
7. Interest for approximately 11 years subsequent to the filing of the final receipt until the commencement of this proceeding to recover further compensation for the permanent partial disability should not have been allowed, for the reason that there was neither contractual obligation to pay it nor default in paying it when due. There is no pretense that there was any agreement by the employer to pay interest. The workmen's compensation act contains no provision requiring interest to be paid on compensation payments. Bourdeaux v. Gilbert Motor Co.
It logically follows that there can be no liability for interest where there is a liability to pay money, but no express promise to pay interest thereon, no statutory obligation to do so, and no default consisting of failure to pay the money when due. Lund v. Larsen,
Where the amount of a liability has not been ascertained, there is no liability for interest thereon prior to the time of its ascertainment. County of Redwood v. Winona St. P. Land Co. supra5; Brainerd v. Champlain Transp. Co.
The employer here was not in default, because through inaction of the employe during the more than 11 years in question the employer's liability, including the amount and extent thereof, had not been established and could not have been ascertained by a computation according to any known standards. It seems rather clear that the workmen's compensation act provides for liability on the part of the employer to pay compensation beginning one week after the date of injury where the disability is for less than four weeks and from the date of injury where the disability is four weeks or longer (§
Not only is it discretionary to set aside an award or settlement evidenced by a final receipt, but so is it as to the making of a new award upon rehearing, because it involves deciding by forming an estimate of the percentage of the disability sustained by the employe. This can be, and as a matter of practice is, done by taking evidence and considering it in substantially the same manner as is done in a personal injury case in awarding damages for physical disability sustained as a consequence of defendant's wrong. Interest is never awarded on such unliquidated liabilities. Grand Forks Lbr. Co. v. McClure Logging Co.
"* * * On the other hand, interest has not been allowed where the damages claimed were not only unliquidated, but could not be ascertained by reference to any generally recognized standard, or were, or any part of them, prospective or contingent, or the amount thereof depended in whole or in part upon the discretion of the jury."
For the same reasons, no interest should be allowed here.
The principles just stated have been applied by other courts in cases like the instant one upon the theory that a creditor is not entitled to interest where he fails to have the amount of the liability ascertained and the liability is contingent and not computable by established standards by what amounts to arithmetical operation. *416
Bushing v. Iowa Ry. Light Co.
By providing in §
In the Second and Third St. Passenger Ry. Co. case, the company failed to pay in full certain taxes because of a misunderstanding of the true basis of assessment. The city treasurer gave a receipt in full for the taxes. The company was held not liable for interest upon *417
the amount of taxes which by mistake it omitted to pay. The court said (
"The rule seems therefore to be this, that when a mutual mistake occurs between the payer and receiver of a sum of money, by which the whole has not been paid, or too much has been received, interest is not recoverable on the sum so withheld or received, unless it has been unjustly withheld or unjustly received. The party retaining the money by mistake, may well rely on the acquittance received or given, until the injured party, makes known his claim and demands correction and payment. After such demand, if it be refused, and it turns out that there was money due which ought to have been paid, it will bear interest from demand until paid."
So it is here.
The case of Bourdeaux v. Gilbert Motor Co.
Since the employer here had done all that was required of it, it was not in default, Neither the employe, the physicians called into the case, nor the commission could find, until 11 years had elapsed after the employer had fulfilled its entire duty under the act, that there remained anything further on its part to be done. What should be required of an employer? Should he be compelled to offer to pay compensation where the employe admits none is due, and *418 where the employer, the employe, the physicians in the case, and the administrative agency charged with the enforcement of the act at the time are aware of no basis for further liability? If so, where are tenders of compensation admittedly not due to stop? Of course, law and common sense compel the conclusion that there is no default in such a case and no liability for interest.
8. In view of the fact that the employer has prevailed on this writ, this court cannot under §
Our conclusion is that on this record the employe was entitled to an award of compensation of $875 for 25 percent permanent partial disability of his left hand and wrist movement or of his left hand and lower forearm — it makes no difference which it is — but not of the whole arm, together with interest thereon from the date of the filing of the claim petition to recover the same as further compensation, and not from the date of the final receipt. If the commission has any basis for setting aside the stipulation for "deciding" employe's disability upon the medical statements, it may do so upon notice to the parties and grant a rehearing: but so long as the stipulation remains in effect it cannot make any award not consistent with such medical statements.
Reversed and remanded with directions to proceed in accordance with opinion.
"* * * To render a person chargeable with interest there must be a promise, express or implied, to pay it, or some default of duty on his part in not sooner paying the money. Sibley v. County of Pine,
Concurrence Opinion
I concur in the opinion of Mr. Justice Peterson except as it holds that under the petition and evidence the commission's finding that employe suffered a 25 percent permanent partial disability in his left arm is not sustained. As to this issue, I am of the opinion that *419 the evidence properly submitted and received is sufficient to sustain the commission's finding thereon.
Dissenting Opinion
At the outset it may be noted that the compensation act (§
2. At the opening of the hearing before the referee, counsel for employe stated:
"Mr. Gillette and I have agreed that we will submit the medical statements of Dr. Malmstrom, who examined the employe, and also of Dr. Bowen of Hibbing, and these will be used for the cause of deciding what medical disability, if any, the employe has."
Nothing therein manifested the intention of the parties that the medical reports alone were to form the basis of any disability finding here. Rather, it seems apparent that it was intended thereby to eliminate the need for the personal presence of these two medical witnesses. Notwithstanding this, it is urged in the majority opinion *420 that such language in effect (1) limited to such reports alone the evidence on the issue of disability; (2) bound the commission to determine such issue exclusively on such reports and the conclusions therein; and (3) compelled a finding of disability limited to 25 percent of loss of use of the left hand and wrist movement.
Neither counsel herein proceeded upon such a theory. Both recognized the right to present additional evidence on the question of disability. Both agreed to the submission thereof without objection. Neither urged upon the commission that the foregoing statement limited the trial herein or the commission as above described.
Thus, employe was permitted to testify without objection in substance that a chunk of ore had struck his left arm and knocked him off the bank on which he was working; that thereafter this arm was carried in a sling; that thereafter this arm pained and still pains him; that his left arm bothered him in 1935 and has been bothering him all the time.
He was requested to stand and demonstrate before the referee the limitation of movement in his hand and arm, and he did so without objection. In his demonstration he showed how much he could move his hand, how much he could twist his arm sideways, and, finally, he was requested to and attempted to put his left hand to his head. It is quite obvious that in making this demonstration he was obliged to bring into use his entire left arm, not merely his left forearm. Certainly it would be difficult for him to twist only the lower portion of his arm sideways or to raise his hand to his head by bending his forearm only. It is clear therefrom that the referee had ample opportunity to observe the extent of employe's disability and to determine whether it extended to his entire left arm or was limited to only the left hand and wrist.
Physical demonstrations in court are permissible and regarded as valid evidence for consideration by the triers of fact, even though the actual demonstration cannot be incorporated within the record any more than can a jury's authorized view of the locus of an accident or its view of other stationary physical objects in litigation. Hatfield v. St. Paul Duluth R. Co.
3. Additional evidence on the question of disability in the form of an X ray of employe's left arm, taken on June 11, 1935, which formed part of the commission's file herein, was offered and received by agreement of counsel. It was viewed and considered by the referee, and with reference thereto he stated:
"It shows a pretty good healing at that time, but a fracture of that nature healing that rapidly in a man of his age would be a little unusual. It is possible, but it's pretty rapid."
Also, in the commission's file thus received in evidence, by agreement of counsel there were (1) a letter from the commission to the insured; (2) a medical report from Dr. O.E. Saarf, of Buhl, Minnesota, to the commission; and (3) a certificate signed by Dr. R.P. Pearsall on the reverse side of the "final receipt," all of which bore on the question ofemploye's disability.
4. It is clear from the foregoing that, regardless of the original statement of counsel, both parties herein waived any limitation therein and adopted a course of conduct at the trial manifesting a procedure under which the commission in arriving at its decision might well consider the additional evidence thus received.
Section
"The commission, or a commissioner or a referee, in making an investigation or conducting a hearing under this chapter, shall not be bound by common law or statutory rules of evidenceor by technical or formal rules of pleading or procedure, except as provided by this chapter; and shall make such investigation or inquiry or conduct such hearing in such manneras to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties. All findings of fact shall be based only upon competent evidence." (Italics supplied.)
I feel that the construction in the majority opinion placed upon the opening statement of counsel is formal and highly technical and thus in direct conflict with the foregoing statutory provisions and the broad, liberal construction in favor of the employe contemplated *422 by the act in matters relating to pleading, procedure, and evidence.
5. But even accepting the construction placed by the majority opinion on counsel's statement, an examination of the medical reports in question indicates that therein there is ample evidence to sustain the commission's finding that employe had suffered a 25 percent loss of the use of his left arm. Certainly nothing therein would compel a determination limiting the disability to the left hand and wrist. Dr. Malmstrom, in his report of April 14, 1945, states that employe at the time of the examination described his inability to rotate his left hand in supination; that the pain in his neck, left shoulder,and left elbow region radiated down to his hand; that there was loss of strength in his left forearm and hand; and that there was a tendency to feel the effect of heat and cold therein. Thereafter, the report indicates a finding by Dr. Malmstrom of a slightly smaller musculature of the left upper extremity, with definite bowing of the left forearm "ventrically," causing a deformity of about one-half to three-fourths of an inch horizontally, occurring at the junction of the proximal middle third of the forearm; disability of the left hand, wrist, forearm, and elbow; and a grating of the middle portion of the left forearm. From such examination and by reason of the foregoing, he concluded that employe had sustained —
(1) 35 to 40 percent loss of use of the hand; (2) 10 to 15 percent loss of use of lower forearm; (3) 25 to 30 percent loss of use of both (hand and lower forearm).
There is no finding therein of 25 to 30 percent loss of the use of hand and wrist movement as related in the majority opinion, and there is no specific provision in the act which covers loss of the use of the hand and forearm, as found by Dr. Malmstrom.
These findings were for the most part confirmed by the medical report of Dr. Bowen, who found the left arm measurements smaller than those of the right arm; moderate bowing of radius of the left arm; loss of one-third of grip of left hand as compared with right; *423 and arthritic lipping at the left elbow, which accounted for the pain. It was his conclusion that employe suffered a 25 percent loss of the use of the hand and wrist.
If I understand the majority opinion correctly, it is held therein that this latter finding must form the basis of the referee's determination herein. It is to be noted that under Dr. Malmstrom's estimates the statute provides payment as follows:
40 percent loss of use of hand .................. $1,200 35 percent loss of use of hand .................. $1,050 30 percent loss of use of both hand and wrist (if the final finding may be thus construed) ..... $1,050
Each of said figures exceeds the amount allowed by the referee. Only the minimum figure arrived at by Dr. Malmstrom, together with Dr. Bowen's estimate, equals the maximum which can be found due under the majority opinion.
6. Further, I do not concur in the doctrine expressed in the majority opinion that before disability may be found as to employe's entire arm some evidence of actual trauma above the elbow must be shown. It is obvious that paralysis, arthritis, and like ailments which sometimes follow an injury may attack only the forearm. Can it be doubted that their effect may be felt on the entire arm, or that they may affect or limit the use thereof? The correct rule governing such a situation is expressed in Olson v. Griffin Wheel Co.
"* * * It has been repeatedly held by this court that it is the actual disability resulting from an industrial accident, and not the nature or location of the specific injuries, that determines the extent of compensation under our compensation act." (Italics supplied.)
See, also, State ex rel. Kennedy v. District Court,
In the Kennedy case, the evidence disclosed that the bones of the hand were crushed and the ligaments of the wrist and forearm torn. The only evidence of injury above the elbow was that muscles in the shoulder were strained. Nevertheless, the case was remanded to the trial court with directions to make findings on the question of disability of the entire arm. Therein we stated (
"We think the trouble arises largely, if not wholly, with the attempt of the trial court to separate the injuries into two units, those to the hand, and those to the arm. The record doesnot leave it entirely clear whether the court intended to finda permanent partial disability in the arm above the elbow. The evidence shows that the bones of the arm that were crushed and the ligaments that were torn were wholly in the wrist and in the forearm, but there is some evidence that muscles in theshoulder were strained. * * * We think that injuries between the elbow and the wrist should be considered injuries to the hand. * * * If there were no injuries except to the hand and forearm, we think the court should have awarded compensation based upon a percentage of total disability to the hand. Ifthere were permanent injuries to the arm above the elbow, thecourt should not have attempted to separate these injuries fromthose to the hand, but should have found the percentage oftotal disability to the arm as a whole, and should have awarded compensation accordingly. * * *
"We are unable to say what percentage of total disability thetrial court would have found if it considered the disability ofthe arm as a whole, or if it had found a permanent partial disability to the hand alone, and the evidence does not warrant us in fixing the proper compensation. The case must go back to the trial court for new findings in line with the views we have expressed." (Italics supplied.)
In the instant case, where the evidence discloses disability and pain to the left shoulder, arthritic lipping at the leftelbow, a smaller musculature of the left upper arm, and other disabilities relating to *425 the entire arm, it was well within the province of the commission to make a finding of disability to the entire arm.
7. It cannot be questioned that under the act the ultimate determination of disability is a question of fact for the commission. This rule is expressed in Gurtin v. Overland-Knight Co.
"Three physicians, all of whom were competent and straightforward, were the only witnesses. They fixed the impaired ability at 25 per cent. The injured man was before them, and they as witnesses described his injuries and gave their opinions. They could not conclude the commission by theirtestimony. Whether the physicians have a standard by which they determine the extent of permanent partial disability does not appear; but in any event the statute does not prescribe a ruleor method of determining the extent of disability. It is leftto the judgment of the trier of fact. The testimony of physicians is useful. * * * But the amount of disability is a question of ultimate fact for the commission." (Italics supplied.)
See, also, State ex rel. Globe Ind. Co. v. District Court,
8. It is urged that the foregoing rule has no application here in view of the limitations placed upon the commission by virtue of the petition and opening statement of counsel. I have previously indicated that this action was not tried on the basis of any limitations expressed therein. I have likewise directed attention to §
1. The general principles governing interest, as expressed in the majority opinion and as embodied in the above summary, were entirely applicable when this court on three prior occasions considered the subject in relation to workmen's compensation. Reese v. National Surety Co.
In the Reese case, this court stated (
"The compensation act provides for the time at which payments of compensation shall commence. The award of the commission is somewhat akin to a judgment for damages for breach of contract. In such cases interest is recoverable where the amount does not depend upon any contingency. Dunnell, Minn. Dig. § 2524." (Italics supplied.)
In the Brown case, these doctrines were expressed as follows (
"* * * Compensation in this state is a liability arising outof the contract of employment, and the compensation act becomes a part of every contract of employment. * * *
"Here was a contract debt due at the times when thecompensation instalments should have been paid under theprovisions of the act, and we see no reason why it should not,like any other debt, bear interest at the legal rate when it issubsequently decided that the debt existed. * * *
"* * * it seems more logical and more just that interest should be allowed at the legal rate on sums that the contract of employment by implied inclusion of the statute made due and payable of a date certain. That the commission or court doesnot act upon the controversy until a subsequent date should notalter the liability for interest." (Italics supplied.)
This rule was followed in the Bourdeaux case. There, the employer served notice of discontinuance of compensation, and the employe acquiesced therein. Ten and one-half years later, the commission awarded further compensation, but denied interest thereon, on the ground of laches. Subsequently this court reversed the commission and awarded interest on the additional compensation then found due, but from its original due date under the compensation act. Therein we stated (
"While it may be true that, where interest is given as damages, there may be cases where laches may bar recovery, * * * this is not such a case. * * * We are here concerned with aconsideration of employer's obligation under our workmen'scompensation act, which we have held should be construed liberally in employe's favor. Under that act, it is made theduty of employer to commence payment of compensation at thetime and in the manner prescribed by the act without thenecessity of any agreement or order. * * *
"Thus, even though it may be said that payment of interest here is by way of damages, the requirements of the act being infused into the contract, the duty to pay interest arises byreason of the statutory obligation to make the compensationpayments at the stipulated *428 times. When the employer suspended payments, by reason of which it had the use of the money which should have been paid at intervals to the employe, it did so at the peril of being required to pay interest on these payments should it subsequently be decided that such payments were improperly suspended. The duty to pay such interest arises impliedly, as amatter of law, from the contractual obligation to makecompensation payments at the stipulated times required by thestatute.
* * * * *
"* * * No claim is made by respondents that laches should bar the recovery of the principal payments of compensation. Under a statute of this kind it seems inconsistent to us that laches should not bar the recovery of the principal payments of compensation and yet bar the interest." (Italics supplied.)
2. It is contended, however, that the "final receipt" in the instant case distinguishes it from the Bourdeaux case, and that here such receipt terminated liability for interest until the commission at the rehearing had determined that additional compensation was due.
When this "final receipt" was delivered, employe protested that his recovery was not complete. He was assured by his employer's foreman that, if so, the execution thereof would make no difference. The receipt acknowledged "settlement and satisfaction of all claims for compensation or damages,subject to review as provided by Law," thus indicating that it did not mark final termination of employer's liability. Thereafter, employe several times made written protests to the commission of his continuing disability. On one such occasion a medical examination was ordered, but thereafter no further allowance was authorized. The commission's order therein was never reduced to judgment, nor had certiorari ever issued from this court for its review prior to the rehearing.
3. Section
Neither of such methods alone results in a final termination of such liability. The employer must be held cognizant of the provisions of §
Section
4. It is further suggested in the majority opinion that interest was allowed in the Bourdeaux case because the employerwrongfully discontinued making payments upon mere notice,without having *430 first obtained an order under §
5. As previously indicated, interest was allowed in the Bourdeaux case because of employer's improper discontinuance of or default in making compensation payments due by virtue of thecontract which the compensation act infuses into every employment agreement. The impropriety of the discontinuance wasthe default in the contractual obligation, and not the failureto obtain an order under §
6. There is no logical basis for applying a rule in the instant case different from that applied in the Bourdeaux case. The facts are substantially the same, and the principles applicable should be identical. In each case, the employer sought to terminate liability by one of the statutory modes prescribed in §
In my opinion, there is no consistency in the principles applied in the two cases. If the Bourdeaux case is correct, it should be followed here. If it is not sound, it should be overruled. It cannot logically be distinguished.
7. The allowance of interest on past-due payments in compensation cases has been upheld in many jurisdictions. Brownfield v. Southern Amusement Co. (La.App.)
For the reasons expressed, I dissent from the majority opinion.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE LORING, having been on the pardon board when this case was heard, took no part.
