Lansing Schools Education Ass'n v. Lansing Board of Education

Lansing 349 v Bd LSEA of Ed LANSING SCHOOLS EDUCATION ASSOCIATION BOARD LANSING OF EDUCATION (Calendar 3). 13,2010 Argued April July Docket No. 138401. No. Decided 31, 2010. Association, Lansing The Schools Education and four of its MEA/NEA alleged they physically by member teachers who were assaulted grade brought Ingham students in or six above an action in the against Lansing Circuit Court Board of Education and the sought declaratory judgment School District. Plaintiffs a regarding parties’ rights legal and relations under MCL 380.1311a, physical by grade which concerns assaults students six against by person employed engaged or above a as a volunteer or sought a contractor school board. Plaintiffs also a writ of manda- ordering expel, suspend, mus to defendants rather than the students permanent injunction prohibiting and a violating defendants from court, J., Brown, granted statute in the future. The L. Thomas summary disposition defendants, ruling for that the board school has physical discretion to determine whether a assault occurred meaning concluding within the and statute that the court disciplinary should not oversee the individual of a decisions local appealed. school Appeals, C.J., hoard. Plaintiffs The Court of Saad, Fitzgerald JJ., affirmed, plaintiffs and holding and Beckering, had standing required not established the elements of constitutional (2001). Comm’rs, under vLee Co Bd Macomb 464 Mich 726 (2009). App Supreme Mich granted plaintiffs’ appli- The Court (2009). appeal. cation leave opinion joined by In an Justice Chief Justice Cavanagh, (in part) Supreme Kelly and Justices Weaver Hathaway, Court held'. adopted doctrine Lee a lacks basis in the Michi- gan Michigan’s Constitution ap- inconsistent with historical proach standing. Therefore, progeny Lee its are overruled and Michigan standing jurisprudence limited, is restored its historical prudential approach. case, In this have because they have substantial interest the enforcement of MCL detrimentally 380.1311a that will be affected in a manner different citizenry large from the if at the statute is not enforced. 487 Mich 349 limited, prudential Standing developed Michigan as 1. vigorous advo- to ensure sincere and doctrine that was intended law, provided cacy by litigants. a cause of action was not Where litigant discretion, Court, whether a had in its would consider right special injury or interest standing on a or substantial based detrimentally from affected in a manner different that would be statutory because, citizenry large, in the of a the at or context standing Legislature scheme, to on the had intended confer the litigant. necessary the in to the merits of case It was not address standing. order to address Michigan support the 2. is no in either the text of There adoption by Michiganjurisprudence in for the Lee Constitution or standing requirement, progeny as a or for and its of constitutional standing Michigan adopting Unlike the the federal doctrine. Constitution, the the constitution enumerates cases and federal extends, judicial power and the to which the federal controversies case-or-controversy largely standing is from this doctrine derived express

requirement. Michigan The Constitution lacks an basis for Further, requirement strictly importing into this law. interpreting judicial power Michigan of courts to be identical the judicial power the does not reflect the fact that to federal court’s power counterparts. their state courts hold broader than federal standing legal litigant 3. A whenever there is a cause of has Meeting requirements MCR is sufficient to action. the of 2.605 standing declaratory judgment. seek a Where a cause establish to law, should, discretion, provided not at a in its of action is court litigant standing. litigant may have determine whether a has A special injury litigant right, in this context if the has interest, detrimentally that in a or a substantial will be affected large statutory citizenry the at or if the manner different from implies Legislature intended on scheme to confer litigant. Appeals. and remanded to the Court of Reversed majority opinion except Justice Weaver concurred all of part pertaining separately to stare decisis. She wrote to state progeny its defied and fairness that Lee and common sense imposing unprecedented ignoring Michigan Constitution and judge-made regard to the With to restrictions on access courts. decisis, past precedent generally be stare she stated should followed, deciding wrongly prece- decided but when overrule law, dent, be serve the rule of each case should looked judicial through individually of on its facts and merits the lens own restraint, sense, common and fairness. LSEA Bd Ed fully majority opinion Justice concurred with and Hathaway agreed sepa- with Justice of Lee. criticisms She wrote Weaver’s rately principle policy state her that stare and view decisis is subject particularized a rule or not law to a test in all circum- approach depend stances. The taken will on the facts and circum- presented. special justifications compelling stances The and overruling overwhelming Lee are case. Young joined by Justice Justices dissent- Corrigan, Maekman, ing, Appeals, would stating affirm the decision ofthe Court of that the majority’s granting standing decision to the court- to seek expulsion ordered of students from their schools untenable because 380.1311a(l) right not MCL does create an enforceable teachers process rights and because the students’ constitutional due cannot be protected parties since are the students to this collateral suit. majority’s thereby overruling decision to also overrule at least Lee— eight significant ignores standing requirements other cases— judicial power constitutionally define the and thus are based and powers integral separation tripartite system to the in a inherent government. acknowledged judi- Lee the constitutional restraints on power adopted followingpractical, cial workable test that has successfully Michigan many jurisdictions: used been other plaintiff legally protected must have an suffered invasion of a interest (a) (b) particularized, imminent; is which concrete and and actual or injury there must be a causal connection between the and complained of; likely injury conduct and it must be that the bewill majority’s redressed a decision favorable of the court. The amor- phous approach standing, contrast, new unprincipled, to is opportunistic, aggregates power limitless in the courts. In over- Lee, ruling majority damages further rule of law because it disregards by failing analyze the doctrine of stare decisis to its any overruling precedent. decision under consistent standard for The majority’s positions regard standing with and stare decisis are also directly contrary past, to its own views in the when members of the majority against overruling precedent adopted current advocated binding. majority’s test the Lee as correct and decision will create instability throughout Michigan encourage spurious law and law- suits. Standing. — 1. Actions litigant standing legal

A has whenever there is a cause of action. Standing Judgments. - - Declaratory 2. Actions Meeting requirements of MCR 2.605 is sufficient to establish declaratory judgment. to seek a 487 Mich Opinion op the Court Standing. — 3. Actions should, law, in its a provided at court action is a cause of

Where litigant determin- has discretion, whether establish injury right, aor special or litigant has ing whether detrimentally in a affected interest, be that will substantial large citizenry whether from the different manner Legislature to confer intended implies statutory that the scheme litigant. standing on the Chiodini, (by P.C. Schneider, & White, Young Lorenz), for Lampinen and Dena Shoudy M. Michael plaintiffs. Hackett), for M. Firm, (by Margaret PC. Law

Thrun defendants.

Amici Curiae: Federation. National Wildlife for the Kagan

Neil S. D. Grande-Cassell (by PLC David Hill Clark Bellar) Manufacturers Michigan for the B. Kristin Association. Association A. Banasik for

Brad Boards. School teach case is whether in this J. The issue CAVANAGH, failing board for sue the school standing to

ers have who expel students statutory duty with its comply We those teachers. assaulted allegedly physically have in Lee v Ma adopted standing doctrine hold that NW2d 900 Comm’rs, Co Bd comb cases, as Nat’l such in later (2001), and extended Co, Iron v Cleveland Federation Cliffs Wildlife Michigan in the (2004), lacks a basis 608; 684 NW2d his Michigan’s inconsistent with and is Constitution Therefore, overrule standing. we to approach torical Michigan that and hold progeny its Lee and LSEA BD OF Ed V LANSING Opinion op the Court jurisprudence limited, be pruden- should restored to a tial approach Michigan’s long- that consistent with approach standing. historical Under the doctrine, proper standing we further hold that Court of Appeals erred in that determining plaintiffs lacked standing. Therefore, we reverse and remand to Court Appeals parties’ remaining address issues, including whether meet the require- to bring ments an action a declaratory judgment under MCR 2.605.

I. AND FACTS PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiffs are the Lansing School Education Associa- (LSEA), tion and National Education (MEA/NEA), Associations and four teachers who are employed by defendants, the Lansing School District Board of Education. Each of four teachers alleges they physically were assaulted aby classroom grade student who was in or six higher, and each of the incidents was reported to a school administrator.1 The students suspended were but not expelled. Plaintiff Filonczuk Penny alleges assaultive student was returned to her building, but not classroom, her and none of the other alleges teachers that the student was returned to the same classroom or school. suit,

Plaintiffs filed alleging that defendants failed to comply with mandatory duty their under MCL 380.1311a(l) to expel students who physically assault a 1 Cathy alleges grader Stachwick that a seventh threw a leather spikes back, wristband with metal her towards and the wristband bounced off Penny the blackboard and struck her in the head. allege Filonczuk and grade Ellen Wheeler that students sixth or higher intentionally alleges threw chairs at them. Elizabeth Namie grade higher a student six intentionally slapped her back. 349 487 Mich Opinion the Court and declara- They a writ of mandamus sought

teacher.2 action, three of support relief. In the tory injunctive they believe that stating that the filed affidavits teachers a assault teacher expel physically who failing to students and threatens of other assaults the likelihood increases Plaintiff Filonczuk environment. safety the of the school the felt due to student’s that she discomfort further stated teachers stated and the other two building, to her return if the students who would have felt unsafe they that buildings. returned to their them had assaulted summary arguing disposition, moved for Defendants does not create standing, the statute that lack plaintiffs action, as a claims fail private plaintiffs’ a cause of district did not abuse law the school matter of because determining that none of authority its discretionary an .The trial the had committed “assault.” students motion, court reasoning that granted court authority to the school district’s supervise lacked the its exercise of discretion. Appeals the Court of af-

Plaintiffs appealed, on grant summary disposition firmed trial court’s Ass’n, Ed v Sch grounds. Lansing different MEA/NEA Ed, 165; 772 App Bd NW2d Lansing (2009). lacked The Court concluded that reach the case’s merits. under Lee and did not standing application for leave to granted plaintiffs’ This Court (2009). appeal. 485 Mich

II. ANALYSIS case The issue in this is whether Lee/Cleveland a doctrine majority adopting erred Cliffs 380.1311a(l) part pupil provides “[i]f a in relevant enrolled MCL against grade physical person assault at school a 6 or above commits board,” employed by engaged as volunteer or contractor school school, reported then the school board “shall and the assault permanently expel pupil .. . .” from the school district LSEA Bd of Ed Opinion of the Court departed dramatically Michigan’s from historical approach standing. We hold they did and that Michigan’s doctrine should restored be to an approach limited, that is consistent with prudential approach historically. used approach, Under this plain- tiffs do not standing. lack A. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

OF MICHIGAN’S STANDING DOCTRINE The purpose of the standing doctrine is to assess a litigant’s whether interest in the is issue sufficient to “ensure sincere and vigorous advocacy.” Detroit Fire Fighters Detroit, 629, Ass’n v 449 Mich 537 NW2d (1995). Thus, 436 the standing inquiry focuses on whether a a litigant proper “is party request adjudi- to cation of a particular issue and not whether the issue justiciable.” itself is Allstate Ins 442 Hayes, Co v Mich (1993) 56, 68; 499 NW2d 743 (quotation marks and omitted). citations This deep doctrine has roots in Michigan law, and, it although has been used with increasing frequency modern jurisprudence, before it limited, Lee remained a prudential doctrine. Historically, doctrine out grew of cases parties where seeking were writs of mandamus to compel a public officer a perform duty. See, statutory e.g., ex People Ayres Auditors, rel v Bd State 42 422, Mich of 429-430; 4 (1880); NW 274 People ex rel Drake v Univ of (1856). Regents, 98, Mich 4 Mich 101-102 Standing was a prudential limit, is say which that the court’s decision to invoke it was “one discretion and not of law.” Ayres, also, 42 Mich at See, McGinn, 429. Toan v 271 28, Mich 33-34; (1935); 260 NW 108 v Thompson Secretary of State, 192 512, 522; Mich (1916); Drake, 159 NW 65 4 atMich 103. The general rule was court that a would not a citizen, hear case where “an individual who only 487 349 Mich Opinion the Court the state with all other citizens of interested in common public a suing was subject complaint,” [the] matter of Drake, 4 Mich duty. legal a entity compliance to force with Generally, the exercised its discretion at 101-102. court individual interest a if the citizen had “some hear case common which is not subject complaint [the] matter of This Id. at 103. was of the state ....” to all citizens or specific injury as special a sometimes articulated Bd, 374 v Pub Sch Retirement Employees interest. Inglis (1964); Ed v 10, 13; Bd Hastings Mich 131 NW2d (1916); Gilleland, 276, 278; Brophy Mich 157 NW 609 (1901). 341, 347; 85 NW 1114 Schindler, in other cases where eventually applied This rule was a a without sought public right enforcement of party law, including clear action where cause of under against a state plaintiff seeking injunction an was were agency agency’s on the basis that actions Comm, Home Co v R unconstitutional. Tel (1913). also, 223-226; See, 140 NW 496 Gilleland, 278, listing Mich at to which remedies Notably, only rule these cases had been extended. no cause action was discussed the doctrine when clearly deciding under the Court provided law and was whether, discretion, party its to allow the to within the of an cause of bring despite express claim the lack Further, the distinct from standing inquiry action. was Thus, although the the case. the Court some- merits of concluding merits despite times reached the of a case it a the Court did not find party standing, lacked had necessary party’s determine a claim to whether had party merit order to determine whether a standing. more standing frequent

References became Michigan’s jurisprudence, modern and the doctrine was developed extensively prudential more but remained a LSEA v Bd of Ed 357 Opinion of the Court could, limit that discretion, within the Court’s ign be Further, ored.3 the fact that there a cause of was action law, Legislature under or the expressly conferred stand ing, was sufficient to Where standing.4 party establish a relief, seeking was declaratory repeatedly the Court held that meeting requirements of the court rule governing declaratory actions was sufficient to estab lish standing. Speaker Governor, 560, House v 443 Mich 572-573; (1993); Allstate, 506 NW2d 190 442 Mich at 69-70; Hts, v 288, 294-295; Sloan Madison 425 Mich 389 (1986). See, also, NW2d 418 East Rapids Grand Sch Kent Bd, Dist v Co Tax 381, Allocation 415 Mich 392-395; 330 7 (1982); NW2d Workman v Detroit Auto Exch, 477, Inter-Ins 404 Mich 492 1;n 274 NW2d 373 (1979); General, Shavers v Attorney 554, 402 Mich (1978). 588-592; 267 NW2d 72 The Court also reaf firmed “[standing not does address ultimate merits of substantive claims of the parties.” Detroit Ass’n, Fire Fighters 449 Mich at (opinion by 633 J.). Weaver, Co, See also Eide v 431 Kelsey-Hayes Mich 3 City Mayor, 670, 10; See Detroit Council v Detroit 449 679 n Mich 537 (1995) (stating reaching NW2d standing 177 that the was Court not parties it); issue People Kevorkian, because the did not brief raise or v (1994) 436, 1; (opinion by Cavanagh, C.J., Mich 447 n 527 NW2d 714 JJ.) (noting addressing standing Brickley it was Griffin, parties it); because the had not raised Auto Club v Ins Ass’n Frederick & Herrud, (After Remand), 358, 371-372; Inc 443 Mich 505 NW2d 820 (1993) (noting split subrogees that federal courts had on whether had sue permit under a federal but act would Court subrogee public policy”); to sue “as a matter of Blue Cross & Blue Shield (1985) Governor, Mich v 422 Mich (opinion 103 n 367 NW2d 1 J.) (deciding give a regardless decision on merits of whether Levin, plaintiff litigation had pending because “this has been years decision”). Legislature number people and the and the need a 4 See, Dev, generally, Inc, 16, 45; v Nemeth Abonmarche (1998) (Cavanagh, J., dissenting) (discussing NW2d 641 the historical importance validity protection environmental act’s citizen-standing see, provision); also, Ackley, Walterhouse v 459 Mich 924 (1998); (1996). Nehls, 171, 177-178; Frame NW2d 349 487 Mich

358 Opinion Court of the (1988) Griffin, (opinion n 427 NW2d 488 50 J.) as that was distinct (treating standing inquiry an remedy was requested the from whether available). the purpose to serve the doctrine continued

While advocacy” by litigants, ensuring vigorous “sincere was satisfying requirement this over time test rights, the involving public In further cases developed. standing by demon- litigant held that a established Court be detrimen- interest will strating [that] a “substantial citizenry from the at affected in a manner different tally at 572 marks (quotation Mich House 443 large.” Speaker, omitted). however, Additionally, the Court and citations expressly grant if a did not that even statute recognized implied it from duties created law. standing, could be Comm’r, Wayne v Co Drain City See Romulus Treasurer (1982) 728, 741; 152 (stating Mich 322 NW2d 413 “standing in which was not expressly there were cases granted by standing implied by [but] statute was stated)”. Thus, expressly obligations duties and that were expressly grant standing, a did not this where statute the Legislature consider whether nonethe- Court would standing plaintiffs.5Bradley intended to confer on less Ed, 285, 296; 650 Bd NW2d Saranac standing Although splintered how to when on articulate Court expressly grant implied statutory a scheme does not could be from issue, major pre-Lee addressing Fire last case Detroit Ass’n, opinion general prin Fighters lead articulated Justice Weaver’s ’n, Fighters ciples approach. Fire consistent the historical Detroit Ass with Further, key at 633. statement issue Justice Mallett’s any right, injury, plaintiff special is can “whether demonstrate law,” protections zone of interest that deserves the consistent J., concurring Id. in the with the historical doctrine. (Mallett, Riley’s concurrence, however, conflating only). erred result Justice statutory inquiries plaintiff has under distinct of whether implied statutory an cause of Id. at scheme and whether there is action. 644-645. LSEA v Bd Ed

Opinion of the Court (1997); v Arder, 23, 42; Bowie Mich 490 NW2d 568 (1992); 231, 235; Girard Mich Wagenmaker, 437 (1991); Shavers, NW2d 372 at In a 587. case the involving private rights, explained Court that the litigant should have “some real interest in the cause action, legal title, or a or equitable right, or interest in the subject matter the controversy.” Bowie, omitted). at 42 (quotation marks citation summary, In standing historically in developed limited, as a Michigan prudential doctrine that was intended to “ensure sincere and vigorous advocacy” by If a litigants. party law, had a cause of action under then standing was not an issue. But where a cause action law, Court, was not provided discretion, at the its would a litigant consider whether had based standing on a special injury right or or substantial interest that would be detrimentally affected in a manner different from the citizenry large, because, or in the context of a statutory scheme, Legislature the had intended to confer standing on litigant. It not necessary was address the merits of the case in order to address standing.

B. THE CLIFFS LEE/CLEVELAND STANDING DOCTRINE Despite consistency of the historical development of the standing doctrine in Michigan, Lee and its progeny abruptly departed from precedent and radi- cally changed the standing doctrine. This doctrine’s many. flaws are

1. OVERVIEW OF THE CLIFFS LEE/CLEVELAND MAJORITY’S APPROACH TO STANDING Lee, In a majority determined, of the Court for the first time in Michigan jurisprudence, that re- was quired by Michigan and, further, Constitution, 487 Mich 349 Opinion op the Court be doctrine should abandoned

Michigan’s standing United adopted standing doctrine favor of the con the context of federal Court Supreme States Lee, expanded reasoning presented stitution. Michi is essential to Cliffs, in Cleveland Lee, See Mich at doctrine. gan’s powers separation majority explained 735. The Lee/Cleveland Cliffs grants federal III, § Article 1 of the federal constitution III, § Article 2 limits power” and only “judicial courts to certain “Cases” “Controversies.” judicial power Lee, 735. Constitution Although 464 Mich at require include “Cases” or “Controversies” does not ments, majority concluded that the Lee/Cleveland Cliffs federal analogous is to the Michigan the Constitution it the expressly requires separation constitution because judicial the powers grants only power. and courts of Lee, 615; Mich at Cliffs, 471 Mich at 464 Cleveland the cor majority The further determined that 737-738. case-or-controversy the judicial power nerstone the of majority The thus requirement. Id.6 Lee/Cleveland Cliffs the con Michigan adopt federal concluded should v standing Lujan stitutional test from of Defenders 2130; 2d 555, 560; 112 Ct 119 L Ed Wildlife, 504 US S (1992), minimum 351 as the “irreducible constitutional standing... of 7 6 judicial Michigan power the “the Lee caselaw to define as cited older parties, power between and to and determine controversies adverse hear questions litigation,” authority and “the to hear and decide controver Lee, sies, binding judgments respecting them.” and make orders and 381, (1859), 738, quoting People, 464 Mich v 6 Mich 388 Daniels omitted). (1884) Hoyt, (emphasis Mich 611

Risser 53 18 NW majority, however, only cited federal caselaw The Cleveland Cliffs “[pjerhaps support most of contention that the critical element its controversy ‘judicial requirement genuine power’ has been its of a case or Cliffs, parties Mich between . . . .” Cleveland 471 at 615. (1) plaintiff injury-in-fact, requires an mean The show test (a) ing legally protected which is concrete and the “invasion of a interest Ed LSEA v Bd of Opinion of the Court also majority held that Lee/Cleveland Cliffs litigant must Lujan standing meet the requirements regardless of the Legislature expressly whether created a cause action litigant or conferred on the because, although Legislature has the power to actions, create causes of it does have power not expand judicial authority granted to the courts Constitution. See Mich Citizens Water Conservation v Inc, Nestlé Waters North America (2007). 280, 302-303; 737 NW2d 447 The Court also held that a litigant Lujan’s must meet require in order bring ments a declaratory action. Associated & Builders Contractors v Dep’t Consumer & Indus Dir, 117, 124-127; Servs NW2d (2005). Thus, after Lee its progeny, little remained limited, prudential the historical approach to stand and the ing, doctrine significantly was expanded.

2. CRITICISMSOF THE CLIFFS LEE/CLEVELAND MAJORITY’S APPROACH TO STANDING The flaws approach are Lee/Cleveland Cliffs .8 many Perhaps most egregiously, however, majority dramatically distorted Lee/Cleveland Cliffs Michigan jurisprudence to invent out whole cloth a constitutional basis for the standing then, doctrine and perplexingly, determined that Michigan’s doc- (b) particularized, imminent, conjectural or hypotheti- actual (2) cal”; causality, meaning injury “fairly that the is tracefable]” the (3) conduct; challenged redressability, meaning “likely” and that it is Lee, injury. favorable decision would “redress” the 739 Mich at omitted). (quotation marks and citation 8 Only legal the fundamental error most relevant to the stare decisis analysis be thoroughly will reviewed other because criticisms have been opinions discussion, addressed in various of this For Court. further see, however, e.g., Cliffs, 651-675, (Weaver, J., Cleveland 471 Mich at Conservation, concurring); Mich Water Citizens 479 Mich at 310-322 for J., dissenting). (Weaver, [July- Mich Opinion op the Court with the federal essentially coterminous be trine should between the differences doctrine, significant the despite by the powers respective the held and two constitutions in either the text of support no There is systems. court Michigan jurispru- or in Michigan the Constitution however, standing as a dence, recognizing for constitu- standing federal adopting for the requirement tional doctrine. with, Michigan no basis the there is textual begin

To standing is constitution- concluding Constitution are differences be- ally important and there required, Michigan the two constitutions. Constitution tween legisla- of between the provides separation powers for the tive, and vests the courts and executive branches judicial, 2;§ 1. 3, 6, § Const art art judicial power. with the similarly judicial the power The federal constitution vests III, § Const, Michigan US art 1. Unlike the courts. Constitution, however, the federal constitution enumer- the judicial ates cases and controversies to which extends, largely doctrine power the federal is case-or-controversy III require- from this Article derived at 560 Lujan, (stating See 504 US “the core ment. unchanging is an of essential component case-or-controversy Article part requirement III)”. Additionally, strictly interpreting judicial power the federal courts to be identical to courts’ judicial power does reflect the held power broader only powers Whereas federal courts have the state courts. Constitution, in the United States the states enumerated US government. retain not ceded to federal powers Const, Cliffs, Am X. See also Cleveland (KELLY, J, stated, concurring). As this Court has 683-684 Michigan, legislature legislative “[w]hile obtains judicial by grant receive in the power power courts Constitution, power reposing the whole such State granted except may to those as it sovereignty bodies LSEA 363 Bd v of Ed Opinion of the Court Washington- be restricted the same instrument.”9 Moore, Detroit Theatre Co v 673, 680; 229 NW (1930). 618 Given that of the text Consti Michigan tution lacks an for express basis the federal importing case-or-controversy law, into requirement Michigan justification so, for doing found, if one can be must lie elsewhere.

The Cleveland majority dismissed lack of Cliffs textual case-or-controversy requirement in Michigan as Constitution irrelevant it because held that the case- or-controversy requirement is a limitation inherent in the judicial However, power.10 assuming arguendo even the judicial power implicitly only extends to cases or controversies, there is no for rejecting basis the under Michigan courts traditionally power had of this to instead it give the same it meaning very has in the different of context the federal constitution. This conclu certainly sion is not required law, federal as the United States Supreme “recognized Court has often that constraints Article III apply courts, of do not state accordingly the state courts are bound the limita tions of a case or controversy other federal rules of Kadish, ASARCO Inc justiciability____” US 490 617; (1989).11 109 S Ct 104 L Ed 696 2d There also 9 As noted in Justice Weaver’s Cleveland concurring opinion, Cliffs case, discussed in adopting standing her concurrence in this as a potentially may separation constitutional doctrine even violate the powers Cliffs, doctrine under the Constitution. Cleveland 471 Mich at 668-669. 10 The Cleveland majority dismissed the cases-or-controversies Cliffs requirements III, § merely explain art of the federal constitution as ing types of cases and controversies over which Court had jurisdiction, case-or-controversy than require rather as the source of itself, ment it grant judicial which considered to be inherent in the power III, § 1. art 471 Mich at 626-627. notes, As the adopt dissent some of our sister states have chosen Lujan But, course, doctrine similar to the test. other states’ Opinion the Court Michigan law, long this Court as doing

no so basis judicial power to Michigan courts’ explained that ago the United broader than controversies was decide Article III interpretation Court’s Supreme States judicial power on the federal limits case-or-controversy powers inherent sovereign possesses a state because Washington- not. federal does government that the Co, 249 Mich at 679-680.12 Detroit Theatre binding or interpretations constitutions are not even of their own courts’ Michigan necessarily regard interpretation of the to our instructive with adopt Furthermore, many have declined to the states either Constitution. See, e.g., Dep ’t standing apply exclusively. Kellas v Lujan test or not it do of (2006) Oregon 471, 478; (noting Corrections, “[t]he 145 P3d 139 that 341 Or declining provision” and contains or ‘controversies’ Constitution no ‘cases’ Oregon justiciability analysis regarding “import law into our to federal litigation rely to and it fabricate constitutional barriers Constitution on to history Oregon’s support charter the text or of of with no either Adequacy Fairness in School government”). See also Coalition & for 1996) 400, 403 (Fla, (holding Chiles, that a Funding, citizen Inc v 680 So 2d taxing standing challenge legislature’s exercise of its and taxpayer has to the stating demonstrating special injury that spending power a and “in without Florida, standing system, has not unlike the federal the doctrine of been 26, (Ill, followed”); Hosp, *52 rigidly v Mem 2010 Ill LEXIS Lebron Gottlieb 2010) required (explaining law “[t]his that is not to follow federal on court rejected standing, principles expressly of stand and has federal issues of 2010) (Md, Co, 210, ing”); Montgomery n 3 v 2010 Md LEXIS *8 Nefedro Lujan standing apply it “is (explaining the doctrine did not because not that courts”); Equity applicable to state Tax Alliance Massachusetts v for (1996) Revenue, 708, 714; (explaining 423 Mass NE2d 504 Comm’r of right doctrine,” standing “public has a citizen to that under Massachusetts’s compel duty performance to of a relief in the nature of mandamus the “seek Electric, law”); Co, required Inc v Essex 197 NJ A2d Jen (2009) that, Jersey, (explaining “[sjtanding of in New is a creature the given ruleQ” and a because “overall we have due common law” “liberal interest, justice, along public weight to the of individual with interests always bearing throughout sweepingly our we have been mind that law just expeditious rejecting procedural in favor of determina frustrations omitted). merits”) (quotation ultimate and citations tions on the marks delegates Michigan quotations Con The dissent from to the offers judicial power support position its stitutional Convention to only setting Even aside whether there extends to cases or controversies. truly logical of the use a distinction the dissent’s criticisms is between LSEA Bd Ed Opinion of the Court however, only Most importantly, not does the federal law, standing jurisprudence Michigan have no basis it contrary above, Lee, to explained it. As before doctrine was treated as a constitutional requirement Michigan is, jurisprudence; Court never concluded that a lack equated of a controversy the lack for necessary the invocation judicial power Michigan under the Constitution. discussed, Lee, As before from the doctrine’s inception this Court has at times addressed case’s merits despite concluding parties lacked standing. And, more generally, Lee, before was “controversy” never interpreted, as it is under Lujan, only refer party instances where the suffered concrete particularized injury caused directly challenged Thus, conduct. Constitution does not compel adoption of the standing doctrine, federal there is no support doing so in this Court’s historical jurisprudence.

Indeed, the the majority, and Lee/Cleveland Cliffs case, dissent in this make or, unsupported logical, rather, illogical, leaps. They expend significant energy explaining that Michigan law historically has required case or a controversy See, to invoke judicial power. the e.g., Cleveland Cliffs, 471 Mich at Then, citing 626-628. only cases that stand for that and proposition, limited without distinguishing overruling the volume of precedent discussed in this opinion, they that conclude simply because this Court has stated that judicial the legislative history interpret delegate’s to a statute and its use of a preenactment impressions text, interpret of constitutional text to that quotations provide support any delegate these no that believed standing requirement. They merely was a constitutional demonstrate delegates judicial power certain believed that the extended to cases controversies, which, time, and interpreted at that had never been to incorporate standing requirement Michigan. as a constitutional in 487 MICH

Opinion of the Court controversies, standing to cases and power extends Constitution and Michigan the required by therefore standing the federal doctrine equivalent must be fail to They utterly Lujan. Id. 628-629. adopted however, Michigan decades of why explain, the altar of the be sacrificed on jurisprudence must of the interpretation Supreme United States Court’s the case-or-controversy despite requirement, federal understanding caselaw for Michigan lack of support same, circum- “controversy” only to exist the limited with despite conflict explained Lujan stances standing. Michigan’s approach historic DECISIS C. STARE In that the Constitution’s light of fact inherently judicial power to the does reference case-or-controversy require incorporate federal fact, ment, and, in is incon importing requirement this view of its own sistent with Court’s historical doctrine, powers scope as Court con arises to whether this should question Under apply tinue to doctrine. Lee/Cleveland Cliffs decisis, longstanding “principles doctrine stare deliberately and decided a court of law examined competent jurisdiction lightly departed.” should not be Comm, Brown Manistee Rd Co (1996) NW2d 215 marks and citations omit (quotation ted). decisis doctrine is well importance stare for, stated, established, Alexander Hamilton as “ courts, in the it is arbitrary ‘avoid an discretion indispensable should be bound down [courts] precedents which serve to define and strict rules duty every case that comes point particular out their Magna Corp, before them ....’” Petersen v 484 (2009) 300, 314-315; (opinion by 773 564 NW2d Kelly, LSEA v Bd of Ed 367 Opinion of the Court C.J.), (Alexander quoting 78, Federalist No. p 471 Hamilton) (Clinton 1961). ed, Rossiter As the United States Supreme Court stated, has the doctrine “pro- motes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent de- velopment of legal principles, fosters judicial reliance on decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity judicial process.” Payne Tennessee, v 501 808, US 827; (1991). 2597; S Ct L115 Ed 2d 720 Despite its importance, stare decisis is neither an command,” “inexorable Texas, Lawrence v 539 US 558, 577; 123 2472; S Ct L156 Ed 2d (2003), nor “a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision,” Hallock, v Helvering 106, 119; US 60 S (1940). Ct 84 L Ed 604 Ultimately, it “attempts to balance two competing considerations: the need of the community for stability legal rules and deci sions and the need of courts to correct past errors.” Petersen, C.J.). 484 Mich at 314 (opinion by Kelly, To reflect balance, while there is a presumption in favor of upholding precedent, this presumption may be rebutted if there special is a or compelling justifi cation to overturn precedent. Id. at 319-320. In determining whether a special or compelling justifi exists, cation a number of evaluative criteria may be relevant, id.,13 but overturning precedent requires more than a mere belief that a case was wrongly decided, see Brown, 452 Mich at 365.14 Kelly Petersen, In provided Chief Justice a nonexhaustive list of may considered, criteria that be but none of the criteria are determina tive, they only need Petersen, be evaluated if relevant. See 484 Mich at 320. firing In addition to my its impugning standard shot commitment to decisis, today doctrine of stare justices the dissent also claims that the adopt of this approach Court must a uniform to stare decisis and applying “minority” criticizes me for approach rather than Robinson Detroit, (2000). 464-466; 613 NW2d 307 As discussed in 349 487 Mich

368 Opinion Court special a or case, is whether there is In this the question to overrule the justification LeelCleveland compelling from dramatically depart to majority’s decision Cliffs hold standing doctrine. We deeply rooted Court’s is. there be deference with, may given a case less begin

To longstanding from abrupt departure it was an when Adarand a constitutional basis. lacks precedent Constructors, Peña, 231-234; 115 S Inc v 200, 515 US Ct (1995). cases, “[b]y L 2d 158 In such 2097; 132 Ed then, precedent], to erroneous we refusing [the follow law; it.” the fabric of the we restore depart do not from however, justices by and Justice Justice concurrences Weaver Hathaway, varying Indeed, may approaches United take to stare decisis. States single “commonly applied Supreme has one strict standard or a Court not test,"post 449, considering accepted... decisis issues and at when stare has example, approaches, year. applied within the For various even same Louisiana, 2088-2089; 2079, Montejo 778, _; 173 L v US 129 S Ct Ed 556 (2009), Scalia, 955, opinion authored the Court 2d 967 in an Justice proved is explained that “the that a decision has ‘unworkable’ a fact ground overruling stated that other traditional it.” Court also precedent, antiquity inter factors of the the reliance relevant include “the Yet, stake, at and of course whether the decision was well reasoned.” ests Callahan, 223, 233; 808; (2009), v 129 S Ct 172 L Ed 2d 565 Pearson 555 US Alito, opinion by Justice the Court stated that in an unanimous authored “[r]evisiting precedent appropriate departure particularly where... expectations, judge-made upset precedent of a rule would not consists courts, recently improve operation adopted of the that was to shortcomings.” experience pointed up precedent’s has Ironically, very approach claims doctrine that the dissent vehemently faithfully applied by today adhere to was not so members Indeed, past. dissent the members of the dissent have of the Robinson, see, lip e.g., paying caselaw overruled without even service 436; (2006), Anstey, engaging People 476 NW2d after v Mich 719 579 or they fidelity cursory, limited, analysis of the factors that claim in a 75, 13; see, e.g., Comm, today, 91 n Weschev Mecosta Co Rd 480 746 (2008); 280, Ctr, 297 n 847 v Detroit Med 477 Mich NW2d Al-Shimmari Wilkes, 661, 8; 10; (2007); v 470 Mich 667 n 685 NW2d 731 NW2d Neal Hickman, 6; (2004); People 602, v 470 Mich n 684 NW2d 267 (2002). (2004); Detroit, 203 n Mack v 649 NW2d LSEA Bd of Ed Opinion op the Court progeny discussed, Id. As 233-234. Lee and its de- parted dramatically jurisprudence from historical Michigan, text, and the bounds the constitutional they interpreted when the Michigan Constitution to compel standing essentially doctrine that is cotermi- with Thus, nous the federal doctrine. reinstating precedent the decades-old from which Lee departed, restoring, departing we are from, the fidelity fabric law and this Court’s to the Michi- gan Constitution.15 regardless

Further, of the level of deference due Lee justification compelling and Cleveland there is Cliffs, standing adopted to overrule the doctrine in those I cases. find relevant, several evaluative to be criteria (1) including: proven “whether the rule has to be (2) practical workability”; intolerable because it defies overruling “whether on the reliance rule such that it (3) special hardship inequity”; would cause a and upholding likely “whether the rule is to result in serious (4) prejudicial public detriment interests”; to and prior abrupt largely “whether the decision was an and unexplained departure precedent.” Petersen, from Mich at 320.16 15 Contrary mewling dissenters, to the who would enshrine their years jurisprudence, disembowelment of 10 to 50 this of Court’s in Lee many cases, majority’s and other reversal of their recent activist simply brings Indeed, quo efforts this Court to back the status ante. the protestations dissenters’ stare decisis should like taste ashes in their Although paid absolutely

mouths. the dissenters no heed to stare decisis they denigrated as predecessors, the wisdom of innumerable the dissent wrap ers would now its themselves in benefits save to their recent precedent. Kelly suggested by other The criteria Chief Justice Petersen are applicable example, perhaps not this case are neutral. For because recently decided, the was principles case there are no related of law significant have the changed eroded rule there no are facts or Further, noted, jurisprudence circumstances. as from other states Opinion of the Court weighs slightly in favor of affirm-

The first criterion standing ing because, doctrine the Lee/Cleveland Cliffs applica- although arises over the confusion sometimes of factors, does rise to the level test tion of the workability. defying practical strength reliance on the criterion, the of The second overruling weighs rule, favor of Lee Cleveland unlikely potential future it seems because Cliffs government, including have defendants, been vio- assumption lating it could not on the basis of laws standing party challenged have no would be because such interests to do To the extent that under Lee so. they type exist, that this are not the ofreliance interests protect. Court seeks weighs heavily in favor over-

The third criterion likely ruling because the doctrine is result Lee purpose public detriment to the interest. serious always has been to doctrine advocacy.” vigorous But “ensure sincere expense is, at the doctrine LeefCleveland Cliffs purpose public be- interest, than this broader may prevent litigants enforcing public cause from it rights, despite presence interests and adverse Legislature parties, regardless in- whether the and of right part private of tended of enforcement be scheme. As noted Chief the statute’s enforcement concurrence, Justice Cleveland Cliffs Kelly’s standing a self- doctrine “creates Lee/Cleveland Cliffs serving prevents the Court from inflicted wound” that justice protecting public interest. and Cleveland many Further, Mich at as commentators Cliffs, 471 689. standing has effect noted, have the federal doctrine jurisdictions it is based distinct and has limited value because on and, regardless, jurisprudential history constitutions, there are and rejected Lujan there that it. have followed are states have states that 371 LSEA Bd of Ed v Opinion of the Court encouraging a case merits of to decide the courts of plaintiff merely deciding guise of under the using “standing standing, the court to slam thus lacks against plaintiffs to full are entitled who house door Valley merits.” claims on the of their consideration Sepa College Forge United v Americans Christian 490; Ct 102 S State, 454 US & ration Church of (1982) (Brennan, dissenting) J., L Ed 2d 700 752; 70 omitted).17Thus, the (quotation and citation marks overly standing is broad doctrine Lee/Cleveland Cliffs purpose compared and de doctrine’s historical to the unjustifiably velopment the courthouse “slams present legiti controversies on numerous door” mately parties and interests. adverse heavily weighs

Finally, in favor of criterion the fourth overruling precedent above, because, as discussed constitutionally required Lujan adopting test as a casually displaced majority de- doctrine, the precedent ad- notice or without of inconsistent cades abrupt implemented equate explanation an and thus precedent. departure insufficiently explained from light considerations, that Lee and we hold In these of progeny should be overruled.18 its 17 3315; 737, 782; See, Wright, 82 L Ed 2d e.g., US 104 S Ct Allen v (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting), quoting com numerous academic has noted that explain “[m]ore than one commentator mentaries standing inquiry is no more than component Court’s the causation underlying poor disguise view of the merits for the Court’s example Indeed, perhaps this than the no better there is claims.” which, case, apply dissenting opinion the Lee in this order plaintiffs’ claims test, voluminously the merits of each of addressed also they sought. availability the remedies and the extending applying and Cleveland include: Lee The cases Cliffs (2007); 336; Sch, NW2d 158 479 Mich Rohde v Ann Arbor Pub Conservation; Chiropractic Council Comm’r and Mich Water Citizens for (2006). Servs, NW2d 561 Fin & Ins Office of 126-127, Contractors, Further, 472 Mich at Builders & Associated 487Mich 349

Opinion of the Court D. THE PROPER STANDING DOCTRINE 1. OF THE TO OVERVIEW PROPER APPROACH STANDING question standing The then becomes what doctrine adopt this Court should in lieu of Lee/Cleveland Cliffs. standing jurisprudence Wehold that should prudential limited, be to a restored doctrine that is longstanding Michigan’s with consistent approach historical standing.19 approach, to Under this a liti- gant standing legal has whenever there is a cause of litigant Further, action. quirements whenever a meets the re- 2.605, of MCR it is sufficient to establish standing declaratory judgment.20 seek a Where a provided cause of law, action at then a court litigant should, in its discretion, determine whether a standing. litigant may standing has A have in this litigant special injury right, context if the ahas or detrimentally interest, substantial that will be af- citizenry fected in a manner different from the large statutory implies or if the scheme that Legislature intended confer on the liti- gant. required litigant overruled to the extent it to establish the standing requirements bring

Lee/Cleveland in order to an action Cliffs under MCR 2.605. Little-esque impending The dissent’s Chicken stampede wails of the today’s ignore to the that will courthouse result from decision that we do nothing approach more than restore an is consistent approach with the this Court followed for decades without courts being litigation with before Lee was decided a overburdened a flood of years ago. mere nine pre-Lee/Cleveland standard, incorporated which also was Cliffs Contractors, Associated Builders & into require remains: “The essential controversy’ ment of the term ‘actual under the rule is that ‘plead prove facts necessitating which indicate an adverse interest ” sharpening Contractors, the issues raised.’ Associated Builders & 126, quoting Shavers, 472 Mich at 402 Mich at 589. Lansing Bd of Ed LSEA Opinion the Court TO THIS CASE THE STANDINGDOCTRINE 2. APPLICATION OF case, whether, plaintiffs in this is question The next judgment, a declaratory Plaintiffs seek a standing. have hold that mandamus, and relief.21We injunctive writ at some of their standing pursue least have plaintiffs claims. with, to stand- proper approach

To under the begin if declaratory judgment may seek a ing, plaintiffs are met. We remand to in MCR 2.605 requirements meet the plaintiffs to decide whether Appeals Court of did not previ- of MCR 2.605 because it requirements address this issue. ously

Further, plaintiffs decide whether have we must the rest of their claims because standing pursue Code, not create seq., School MCL 380.1 et does Revised standing cause of action or confer express expressly an We hold provisions.22 on to enforce the act’s plaintiffs they that, case, standing in this have because MCL a interest in the enforcement of have substantial 380.1311a(l) affected in a detrimentally that will be if the citizenry large different from the manner statute is not enforced. law, that, organization disputed an has It under is not if the members for the interests of its members advocate Unlimited, See, e.g., Muskegon- have a sufficient interest. Trout

themselves Cloud, 343, 348; Chapter App 195 Mich 489 NW2d White River v White (1992). Thus, standing, plaintiff-teachers hold that the have because we plaintiff- plaintiff-teachers disputed that the are members of the it is not organizations, plaintiff-organizations as well. have dicta, Appeals suggested in this case that there In the Court of decision implied private of action to enforce the Revised School Code.We is no cause however, issue, plaintiffs are not not reach the merits of that because do See, damages. generally, seeking private Lash v a cause of action for 180, 196-197; (2007), City, explaining Traverse 735 NW2d monetary damages, party may such as declara a seek remedies other than 2.605(A)(1), governmental tory against relief under unit without MCR right having implied private action. that a statute has an to demonstrate 487 Mich 349 Opinion Court begin with,

To the text of MCL 380.1311a itself suggests that plaintiffs have substantial and distinct requires interest. It that a qualifying student be ex- pelled for physically assaulting employee an school, which is defined to include the plaintiff- teachers. Given the students are expelled for assaulting school, employees of the and not the citi- zenry at it large, apparent from the statute that the plaintiff-teachers have a substantial interest in the enforcement of provision distinct from the general public. The general members of the public might never school, and, be in a are, even for those who an assault on those members would not necessarily lead to the expul- sion of the assaultive student.

Moreover, the legislative history to the 1999 legisla- 380.1311a(l) tive amendments that adopted MCL into the Revised School Code make clear that the purpose of the section is to create a safer and, school environment even more a specifically, safer and more effective work- ing environment for teachers.23 The enrolled analysis of the public act adopting the amendments explained suggests The dissent apply that the using same limitations that to legislative history interpret applied to a statute should be determining to party whether a has a substantial and distinct interest in the statute’s enforcement standing. that is sufficient disagree. to establish We If the Legislature unambiguously expresses an intent standing to confer through text, certainly statute’s then it would be sufficient to confer standing. inquiry party But the into whether a has substantial and distinct interest in the enforcement of the statute is a much broader inquiry legislative history may for which Indeed, he instructive. before Lee, legislative this Court history would sometimes consider in determin ing party See, standing. e.g., whether a Nehls, had 171, Frame v 176-180; (1996); Girard, 550 NW2d 739 Further, 437 Mich at 244-247. analyzing legislative while party intent is attempting essential if a to Legislature demonstrate that the intended to confer or create a private right party enforce, that the would have this Court historically analysis has not legislative found an necessary intent for a party party to demonstrate that the has a substantial interest in the LSEA Bd of Ed Opinion the Court Michigan, “[i]n is that for their enactment the rationale and, although an concern,” ongoing is an safety school of school aspects act “addresses several public earlier remain,” particu- “[i]n and violence, concerns additional expelled should be that students lar, suggested it has been assault verbally or they physically when suspended Legisla- school personnel...Senate teachers or other 4240, 4241, HB 206, HB and SB SB Analysis, tive arguments that the 21,1999. analysis explains July are “additional measures included that favor of the act educational envi- and maintain a safe necessary to create “[tjeachers to student subject who are because ronment” teach, who feel pupils effectively cannot assaults added.) It further (Emphasis cannot learn.” endangered an disrupt one miscreant can just explained “[s]ince atmosphere ruin the classroom, and a handful can entire school, promote these individuals will removing of a learn, as protect and to as well efforts to educate and students” and school safety personnel physical State comprehensive “[a] by explaining concluded deter future violence should toward student approach problems.” (Emphasis disciplinary assaults and other added.) words, history of the act legislative In other 380.1311a(l) MCL the intended purposes indicates that suggest based on exactly are common sense would what make the school and classroom statutory text: to protect general specifically safer environment effectively ability and their physical safety teachers’ assisting deterring by removing miscreants teach affidavits indicate plaintiff-teachers’ future assaults. alleged that, purposes, with these consistent public right relating that is distinct from to a enforcement of a statute Bd, See, public. e.g., Speaker general House v State Admin that of the (1993). 547; 495 NW2d 487 Mich 349 Opinion of the Court failure of the school board to comply with the statute increases the threat to their safety.

In of light purposes, these and the plaintiff-teachers’ affidavits, it is even more clear that teachers have a substantial interest in the enforcement of MCL 380.1311a(l) that is distinct from that of general public. The legislative history specifically contemplates that the statute is intended to not only make the general school environment safer additionally but specifically protect teachers from assault and to assist them more effectively performing jobs. their These hardly are interests that are shared by general public.24 Thus, teachers who work in a public school have significant a interest distinct from that of the general 380.1311a(l). public the enforcement of MCL that, agree

We by dissent, as stated the issue in this case is whether “a teacher sue a [can] school board for its failure to expel student allegedly who assaulted 24Indeed, this, plaintiffs’ having because of claim to a more substantial general public greater interest than that than that of the plaintiff-firefighters Fighters case, in Detroit Fire Ass’n. In Justice opinion explained that, view, lead firefighters in her did not Weaver’s have a substantial funding interest the effects of reduced for the fire department sufficiently that was general public distinct from that of the because, although firefighters subject greater were to a risk of harm if the firefighters reduced, number of total public was members of the who trapped burning subject were greater houses were also to a likelihood and, injury, thus, segments society greater “[b]oth are at risk when fighters.” there Fighters Ass’n, is a dearth of fire Detroit Fire 449 Mich at omitted). (quotation justices, marks and citation including Other myself, firefighters would have sufficiently concluded that the did have a standing. But, distinct interest regardless, apparent to establish it is plaintiffs’ interest in this case is even more distinct than that of the firefighters. dissent, likely As noted a teacher is more be at school,just firefighter likely as a is more to be at a fire. But whereas all public being members of the are at building may risk of in a catch fire, public necessarily all members of the are they in schools so that being or, are at risk of they assaulted in a classroom even if are in a school, being teaching affected a less effective environment. LSEA Bd of Ed Opinion the Court of erroneous many at 390. In its Post teacher[.]” that today, holding are what we statements about blanket have answered assume that we seems to the dissent contrary, To the “yes.” definitive with a question that if held that only have however, not. We we have failing allegedly board for sue the school teacher cannot is not the 380.1311a(1), standing MCL comply with summary disposition, In their motion why. reason why plain arguments as raised several defendants standing, besides the school board tiffs cannot sue of failed to a cause plead have including plaintiffs fail as a matter law.25 their claims action and Because the Court those issues. appealed Plaintiffs alone, standing the case on the basis Appeals decided issues, remand to that did reach the other we issues.26 remaining to address the Court discussed, right party’s and their to the the merits of a claims As analysis standing frequently in the requested intertwined remedies were Indeed, perfectly erroneously adopted in the dissent in this case Lee. But, proper troubling aspect of that decision. under models this sufficiently plaintiffs standing, have approach the issues of whether requested remedies are pleaded and are entitled to the a cause of action Indeed, standing inquiry. raises independent the issues the dissent regarding rights if a court decidedto would be violated whether students’ hearings discretionary disciplinary decision review the schoolboard’s injunction expelling the plaintiffs to an found that were entitled point. certainly premature at this students are test, cries that the historical Just as the dissent’s ignore stampede that we are general, lead to a to the courthouse will old, only years cries reversing is nine the dissent’s a decision that specific stampede regarding that will result from of lawsuits yet predated ignore Lee and that the Revised School Code case Lee. The cases before were not overburdened with similar courts self-evident, certainly as lack of lawsuits is reason for this case, including winning only prevailing on the in a not the hurdle to noted, holding implied cause of there is an we are not merits. As Thus, damages School private under the Revised Code. action for 380.1311a(l) seeking must plaintiff-teachers enforcement of MCL action, such as a writ requirements for some other cause meet the 487 Mich Concurring Opinion Weaver, J. summary,

In plaintiffs we hold that have standing because have a substantial interest in the 380.1311a(l) enforcement of MCL that is detrimentally affected a manner distinct from general that of the if public the statute is not enforced.

III. CONCLUSION We overrule the standing adopted test in Lee and its progeny and restore Michigan standing jurisprudence to be consistent with the doctrine’s longstanding, prudential roots. We reverse the Court of Appeals judgment and remand to that Court to determine whether plaintiffs meet the requirements of MCR Further, 2.605. because we hold that plaintiffs have standing pursue their remain- claims, ing we also remand to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the issues that it did not previously reach. II[C]) C.J., and WEAVER (except

KELLY, part for HATHAWAY, JJ., Cavanagh, concurred with

WEAVER, J. (concurring). I concur in sign all of majority opinion 11(C), except part entitled “Stare Decisis.”

I write separately to expand on footnote 8 of the majority opinion by providing some of the additional criticisms of Lee v Macomb Co Bd Comm’rs, 464 Mich of 726; 629 (2001), NW2d 900 and its progeny mentioned in that footnote.

IAs stated in my dissenting opinion Mich Citizens Water Conservation v Nestlé Waters North America Inc, (2007): 280, 311; 737 NW2d 447 declaratory of mandamus under MCR 3.305 or a action under MCR 2.605(A)(1). analysis indicates, may As the dissent’s these be difficult hurdles to clear. LSEA Bd of Ed Concurring Opinion Weaver, J. Comm’rs, Lee v Macomb Co Bd Beginning with of establishing pru- Michigan precedent majority overruled legal of stand- standing as the traditional doctrine dential pruden- place Michigan’s doctrine of ing Michigan. In erroneously adopted standing, majority tial standing the federal based on constitutional doctrine standing, Lujan v as stated in courts’ doctrine Defenders Wildlife.[1] I further stated:

standing posed Before Lee, Michigan no a constitutional case had issue. ^[2] held that Nor did any the issue of case hold subject Michigan’s judicial branch was same judicial case-or-controversy imposed federal limitation on the Constitution.[3] under article III of the United States branch Lujan fact, from was not even In article III derived parties in Lee. On its own an issue raised or briefed initiative, majority Lujan’s test of four raised standing Michigan into erroneously transformed question. [Id. 312-313.] constitutional 2130; Wildlife, 119 L Ed Lujan 504 US 112 S Ct v Defenders of (1992). 2d 351 2 Lee, Michigan standing requirements based on were Before See, constitutional, generally, prudential, House rather than concerns. (1993), Bd, 547, 559 20; Speaker 441 Mich n 495 NW2d539 v State Admin Detroit, Fighters v concurrence in Detroit Fire Ass’n and Justice Riley’s (1995). 629, 643; 537 NW2d 436 449 Mich 3 my in concurrence in Lee: As I wrote Speaker is bound to In we stated that “this Court not House standing,” pointing regarding “[o]ne cases out

follow federal standing analysis is between federal and state notable distinction 1963, advisory opinions. power Const art of this Court issue constitution, 3, § Article III of the federal federal courts 8. Under only may versy.” opinions an actual case or contro- issue where there is 559, including Speaker, n [House at] 441 Mich 20. Justice Kadish, Kennedy,writing in v 490 US for the Court ASARCOInc 2037; (1989), acknowledged: 605, 617; L 109 S Ct 104 Ed 2d 696 recognized of Article III do “Wehave often that the constraints courts, accordingly apply the state courts are not to state the limitations and controversy of a case or or other federal hound [Lee, justiciability 2.] . ...” 464 Mich at 743 n rules of 380 487 Mich 349 Concurring Opinion Weaver, majority After the in Lee created a constitutional standing Michigan, test for the same “majority of four” (former Justice TAYLOR and Justices CORRIGAN, YOUNG, and questioned “next the Legislature’s abil- Markman) ity to confer on citizens through the use of granting statutes alleges when citizen specific wrong.” Id. at 314-315. As I further stated Nestlé-. In Nat’l Co, [Federation v Cleveland Iron Wildlife Cliffs 608; (2004)], majority

471 Mich NW2d of four Michigan attacked Act, [the Environmental Protection (MEPA)] seq. by stating length, MCL 324.1701 et at inall dicta, Legislature grant that the standing. cannot citizens majority argument based this premise on the that the Legislature taking away would be power to enforce laws, component power,” an essential of the “executive giving power judicial majority branch. The proudly proclaimed “resisting expansion that it was an power everyday an occurrence in the annals of modern —not go Unfortunately, that statement was not vernment.”[4] accurate, majority because the judicial showed its lack of by compromising restraint Legislature’s constitutional duty protection to enact laws for the of the environment enlarging capacity the Court’s to overrule statutes guise majority’s self-initiated, under the erroneous standing.[5] [Nestlé, “constitutional” doctrine of 315.] As Justice majority opinion this case CAVANAGH’s 9, states at footnote I described in Nat’l how Wildlife the Lee standing doctrine separation violated of powers under Constitution. In Nat’l I Wildlife, stated: Wildlife, (emphasis original). Nat’l 471 Mich at 639 judicial judicial “[F]aux restraint obfuscation.” Fed Election Comm Right Life, Inc, 7; Wisconsin 551 US 499 n 127 S Ct (2007) (Scalia, J., L concurring part Ed 2d 329 concurring in the

judgment). Ed Bd of LSEA Concurring Opinion Weaver, “judicial power,” the ma pretending to limit its

While judicial standing in this jority’s application of Lee’s test judiciary actually expands power of the at the case by undermining Legisla expense Legislature authority [Nat’l .... to enact laws ture’s constitutional (Weaver, J., concurring).] Wildlife, 471 Mich at 654 making standing a judicial power by In expanding concern, four” took “majority constitutional Legisla- legal standing of the hands of the the area out placed exclusively people [the ture and the it majority mercy. four’s] To make a constitu- Michigan tional concern when our Constitution is com- pletely regarding government’s silent which of the power grant standing represents judicial branches has objectionahle [Rohde activism of the most sort.” v Ann (2007).] Sch, 336, 373; Arbor Pub NW2d Lee and its defied sense and progeny clearly common fairness, ignored Michigan’s as those cases Constitution imposed “unprecedented, judge-made restrictions on . . . access to the courts.” Nat’l 471 Mich at Wildlife, (Weaver, J., concurring). The Lee doctrine represented unprecedented expan an and unrestrained judicial power sion of that dishonored our Constitution and decimated the rule of law and there it I Accordingly, fore must be reversed. for the reasons (9) nine Lee given years have over the last since was decided and for the reasons in Justice CAVANAGH’s case, I majority opinion vote to overrule Lee and its progeny. decisis, my of stare regard policy

With view generally should be but that past precedent followed law, in deciding wrongly to serve the rule of whether overruled, decided should be each case should precedent individually through be looked at on its facts and merits restraint, sense, judicial the lens of common and fairness. recently expressed by I with the sentiment Chief agree 382 487 Mich 349 Concurring Opinion by Weaver, J.

Justice Supreme Roberts of United States Court his concurrence to the decision Citizens United v Fed Comm, 876, 920; Election 558 130 S Ct 175 L US _, _; 753, (2010), Ed 2d 806 he said when command,” stare neither decisis an “inexorable Texas, 558, 2472; [123 Lawrence v. 539 U. S. S Ct 156 577 (2003), 508] L Ed 2d nor “a mechanical formula of adher decision,” Hallock, Helvering ence to the latest v. 309 U. S. (1940).... 444; were, [60 119 S Ct 84 L Ed 604] If it segregation legal, wage would be minimum laws would be unconstitutional, wiretap and the Government could ordi nary suspects obtaining criminal without first warrants. Plessy Ferguson, 1138; See [16 v. 163 U. S. 537 S Ct 41 L Ed (1896), by Education, 256] overruled Brown v. Board 347 686; (1954); [74 U. S. 483 S L Ed 873] Ct 98 Adkins v. C., Hospital 394; [43 Children’s 261 U. S. 525 S Ct 67 of D. (1923), by L 785] Ed overruled West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 578; (1937); 300 U. S. [57 S Ct 81 L Ed 703] States, 564; Olmstead v. United U. [48 S. 438 S Ct 72 L (1928), by States, 944] Ed overruled Katz v. United 389 U. S. (1967). 507; [88 S Ct 19 L Ed 2d 576] Chief Justice Roberts further called stare decisis a “principle policy” and said that it “is not an end in itself.” 920; Id. 130 S Ct at L at _; 175 Ed 2d at 807. explained

He greatest “[i]ts purpose is to serve a constitutional ideal —the rule of law. It follows that the unusual fidelity circumstance when to any particu lar precedent does more to damage this constitutional it, ideal than to advance we must be more willing to depart from that precedent.” Id. 130 S Ct at at _; L175 Ed 2d at 807.6 appears agree It the dissent in this case does not with Chief by

Justice Roberts. The dissent refers to cases that have been overruled past dissenting justices may this Court in the 18 months. While the feel aggrieved by overruling cases, amongst this Court those those cases were egregious examples judicial great some of the most activism that did people Michigan. harm to the Those decisions were made Lansing Bd of Ed LSEA Concurring Opinion Weaver, J. that stare decisis is agree

I with Chief Justice Roberts doctrine. I chose not to and not an immutable policy lead in Petersen v opinion Chief Justice KELLY’s sign 300, 316-320; 773 NW2d 564 Magna Corp, (2009), it to create a standardized test proposed because Likewise, sign majority I do not for stare decisis. it decisis in this case because opinion’s stare section no need for this Court to Petersen. There is applies In test stare decisis. adopt any regarding standardized fact, many There are factors to impossible it is an task. or not to overrule deciding consider when whether the of such factors often importance and precedent, s.7 case-by-case a basi changes on four,” justices, “majority including dissenting guise under the the “judicial ideologies the such as “textualism” and traditionalism.” One of dissenting justices, expressed apparent contempt his Justice Young, article in Texas common law and common sense in his 2004 Politics, Young stated: Review of Law and where Justice my Consequently, I here on the embar- want to focus remarks presents ought present that the law rassment common —or —to judicial a conscientious traditionalist. . . . my feelings subject, give graphic I To illustration of on drunken, think of the as a toothless ancient tend to relative, common law prominently sprawled in a of nature and state on settee genteel garden party. Grandpa’s presence is in the middle of one’s undoubtedly only host. But since a cause of mortification to the guests enough to on most ill-bred of would be coarse comment condition, simply try ignore Grandpa’s presence and all concerned law, [Young, judicial A the common him. traditionalist confronts (2004).] 299, L Texas Rev & Pol 301-302 decade, past principal by this to decide Over the tool used Court precedent guidelines the set of that was when a should be overruled is 463; (2000), Detroit, out in Robinson v 613 NW2d 307 laid signed by opinion an written former Justice Justices Corrigan, TAYLOR, myself, Markman and and that I have used numerous times. and Young, “be-all, By guidelines a no means do I consider the Robinson end-all test” precedent to be used whenever this Court that constitutes of this Court merely providing overruling precedent. as considers I view Robinson legal analysis pertinent. guidelines in its when to assist Court 487 Mich 349 Concurring Opinion by Hathaway, J. end,

In the the consideration of stare decisis and wrongly whether to overrule decided precedent always includes service to the rule of through applica- law an restraint, judicial sense, tion exercise of common justice a sense of for all. fairness — In serving the rule of and applying judicial law restraint, sense, common and a sense of fairness to the hand, case at I agree join with and the majority opin- holding ion’s that Lee and progeny its are overruled. I (concurring). fully concur with Justice HATHAWAY, analysis conclusion this matter and I CAVANAGH’s support Lee v overruling Comm’rs, Macomb Co Bd of (2001). Further, 629 NW2d 900 I agree with the additional criticisms of Lee articulated Justice thoughtful concurrence. write sepa Weaver’s I rately to express my thoughts on the doctrine of stare decisis. amongst

Given debate justices of this Court concerning what proper constitutes stare decisis analysis, I find it insightful to review how our United States Supreme Court has treated the doctrine. Stare decisis is a principle policy judicial commands respect for a court’s earlier decisions and the rules of they law that embody. States, See Harris v United 545, 556-557; US 122 2406; S Ct L153 Ed 2d 524 (2002); Hallock, v Helvering 106, 119; 309 US 60 S Ct (1940). 444; L Ed 84 604 “Stare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes evenhanded, predict- able, and consistent of development legal principles, decisions, fosters reliance on judicial and contributes to perceived actual and integrity judicial pro- Tennessee, cess.” Payne 808, 827; 501 US 111 S Ct (1991). 2597; L Ed However, 115 2d 720 when balancing the need to from depart precedent with the need to LSEA v Bd of Ed 385 2010] Concurring by Opinion Hathaway, adhere to established it is to bear precedent, important in mind that is neither an “inexorable stare decisis Texas, Lawrence v command,” 558, 577; 123 539 US S (2003), “a 2472; Ct 156 L Ed 2d 508 nor mechanical decision,” Helvering, formula of adherence to the latest legal, would be were, segregation 309 US at 119. “If it unconstitutional, minimum laws would be wage ordinary suspects Government could criminal wiretap obtaining Plessy Ferguson, without warrants. See v. first (1896), 1138; S Ct 41 L Ed [16 256] U. S. 537 Education, Brown v. Board by overruled 347 U. S. 483 Adkins v. Children’s (1954); L 686; S Ct 98 Ed [74 873] C., D. Hospital 394; 261 U. S. 525 Ct 67 L Ed [43 S Parrish, overruled West Coast Hotel Co. v. (1923), by 785] Olmstead 578; (1937); 300 U. S. 379 S Ct 81 L Ed [57 703] States, v. United 564; [48 277 U. S. 438 S Ct 72 L Ed 944] States, (1928), Katz v. United overruled 389 U. S. 347 (1967).” Citizens United v S Ct 19 L Ed 2d [88 Comm, Fed Election 876, 920; 130 S Ct US _, _; (2010) L 2d (Roberts, C.J., Ed concurring). I too believe that stare decisis is a principle policy. As stated in Helvering: recognize important

We that stare decisis embodies an policy. represents law, continuity social It an element of psychologic satisfy and is rooted in the need to reasonable expectations. policy But principle stare decisis is a not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest deci sion, questionable, however recent and when such adher prior ence involves collision with a doctrine more embrac ing scope, intrinsically sounder, in its and verified experience.[1]

I agree any do not with to stare decisis that approach suggests that it is a “rule” or implies subject “law” Helvering, 309 US at 119.

386 487 Mich 349 Concurring Opinion by Hathaway, J. be in all circumstances. test to used particularized decisis, the one Any approach to stare such as particular Detroit, 439; taken in Robinson v 462 613 NW2d (2000), precedent” 307 is not “law” or “established overrule, reject modify us or its require would decisis, analysis. approach just The Robinson to stare as 300; Magna the one taken Petersen v Corp, (2009), among many varying 773 NW2d 564 is one itself, approaches, particular approach, and no in and of inherently superior any policy is to another. As with determination, approach any given taken in case depend presented. will on the facts and circumstances Historically, the United States Court Supreme has many decisis, utilized different stare approaches to such including approaches involving as those a “com justification,”2 “special justification,”3 and a pelling determination that a case was decided.”4 Each “wrongly of these is valid and approaches offers different **However, nuance to stare decisis consideration.5 be consideration, cause stare decisis is a policy which must case-by-case basis, be considered on a the particular analytical differ from approach will case to case. Most importantly, analysis the critical should be on the regarding change rationale whether or not to precedent. worthy only It is also to note that not has the United Supreme historically States Court not taken one single approach decisis, to the application of stare the Court 2 247, 280; 1456; Pyett, See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v 556 US 129 S Ct (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting). L Ed 2d 398 203, Rumsey, 212; 2305; Arizona v 467 US 104 S Ct 81 L Ed 2d 164 (1984). Florida, 1114; Tribe Seminole Florida 517 US 116 S Ct (1996). L Ed 2d 252 5 Any approaches depending of these to stare decisis can be valid on the However, any issues before the court. the factors used of these tests may may applicable any given be case. Lansing Bd Ed LSEA v Dissenting Opinion Corrigan, decisis in all cases compelled has not felt to discuss stare Many landmark precedent being when overturned. precedent cases that overruled well-established did not phrase discuss or even mention the “stare decisis.” For example, Plessy, thereby ending seg Brown overruled schools, in regation public mentioning our without decisis,” much and fol phrase articulating “stare less lowing particularized Similarly, test. Gideon Wain 335; 792; (1963), L Ed 2d wright, 372 US 83 S Ct indigents which established the to have coun rights offenses, cases, merely sel in all criminal not capital 1252; Brady, overruled Betts v 316 US 62 S Ct (1942), L Ed 1595 “stare again mentioning without Instead, decisis” or a particularized test. both of these important policy cases focused on the considerations weighed overruling in favor of precedent.6 mind, these principles any analysis With stare impact of decisis must focus on individual case Thus, and the reason for the rea- overruling precedent. overruling paramount any sons for Lee are articulated special justifications test and the compelling do so I overwhelming agree are this case. As with the well- articulated expressed by reasons Justice CAVANAGH Justice I them repeat will here. WEAVER, I In J. dissent. one fell (dissenting). swoop, CORRIGAN, majority permits unlimited interference courts process the local educational and rewrites the entire constitutionally legal governing based doctrine stand- Supreme By Decisions, Subsequent See Court Decisions Overruled <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/constitution/pdf2002/048.pdf> available at (accessed July 28,2010), partial Supreme for a list of United States Court 2001) (covering period precedent. cases from 1810 to that overrule examples Numerous additional can be found on this list of cases that do phrase despite not mention or discuss the “stare decisis” the fact that the precedent. case overrules 487 Mich 349 Dissenting Opinion by Corrigan, decision, Contrary majority’s to the

ing Michigan. correctly plaintiff courts concluded lower to demand the statutory right teachers here have no children, four expulsion particular permanent children, all innumerable other from Michi- potentially gan any meaningful standing, schools. Under test locally cannot enlist the courts to compel elected boards to students under the cir- expel school here. presented cumstances majority rulings, reverses the lower courts’

however, by creating vague new “test”— really which is no test at all—that violates the consti- separation powers gives tutional mandate and courts unbounded discretion to overturn the decisions of other In government. branches of its haste to overrule this Court’s standing jurisprudence, addressing instead of by the issues framed the the parties, majority asks and a question solely making: answers of its own whether Comm’rs, 726; Lee v Bd Macomb Co 464 Mich 629 of (2001), so, doing 900 decided.1 In correctly NW2d was the majority jettisons years binding precedent of on the basis of four current the justices’ public estimation that would be better the opening served courts to all manner of to acts challenges legislative of the cases, executive branches. In overruling numerous majority question analyses throws into and results eight significant, no than precedent-setting fewer Gill, 637; Manuel disputes including: v 481 Mich 753 (2008); Sch, NW2d 48 Rohde v Ann Arbor Pub 479 Mich 1 parties only majority The addressed this issue after the directed them granting plaintiffs’ application to do so in this order Court’s for leave to (2009). appeal. Lansing Ed, v Sch Ed Ass’n Bd 485 Mich 966 of indeed, inception Before this order from the of this case—the issued — parties agreed authority; governing legal that Lee was the each side affirmatively argued urged supported that Lee controlled and that Lee its position. Lansing Bd Ed LSEA v of 389 Dissenting Opinion by Corrigan, 336; (2007);Mich 158 Council v Chiropractic 737 NW2d 363; Servs, Fin & Mich Comm’r Ins 475 Office of (2006); Builders & Contrac 716 NW2d 561 Associated Dir, tors v Consumer & Indus Servs 472 Mich Dep’t of 117; (2005); 693 NW2d 374 Mich Citizens Water for Inc, Conservation v Nestlé Waters North America 479 280; (2007); Mich Nat’l Federa NW2d Wildlife Co, 608; tion v Cleveland Iron Cliffs Serv, (2004); Civil Dep’t NW2d Crawford (2002); and, course, 645 NW2d 6 Lee itself. Moreover, in concluding have here, majority illustrates the fundamental problem approach: adopts with its it no limitations meaningful binding for a doctrine that civil lawsuit applies every brought opens this state. Here it the courthouse any teacher, volunteer, doors for school contractor or student to demand that a court children from expel their though schools even a local school board has concluded that expulsion inappropriate. major- was ity thus only prov- authorizes courts not to invade the inces of school districts and the state board of educa- tion, but also to deprive rights public children of their education without affording any them due process protections Indeed, or legal representation. none of the targeted children are expulsion even named as parties in this suit. It is unfathomable that a court nonetheless has the power permanently expel them yet majority from so holds. school— Critically, overruling body Michigan’s entire existing standing jurisprudence, majority eschews understanding “judicial clear held power” the framers of our state constitution. It also eliminates workable, test, principled standing our which mirrors that of the federal and many courts state courts with in constitutions similar to our own. Indeed no state 487 Mich by Dissenting Opinion Corrigan, lan- controversy” “case or incorporates explicit union constitution, many explicitly states guage yet into its in is rooted the tradi- employ the federal test —which we controversy requirement tional case or —that in Lee. adopted

Finally, effecting unprecedented changes in these standing jurisprudence, majority ig- Michigan’s paying of stare decisis while lip. nores the doctrine majority inexplicably service to it. The concludes that decided, and that “Lee and its clearly wrongly Lee was dramatically jurispru- from historical progeny departed dence,” although majority each member of the current during who served on this Court the relevant time Chief Justice period —Justice CAVANAGH, KELLY, Lee as correct adopted Justice test some WEAVER— point past.2 reasons, vigorously

For each of these I dissent. I would affirm the decision of the Court of which Appeals, faithfully and the law of this state appropriately applied concluding did not have action. pursue

I. THE PRESENTED QUESTION case, This four teachers and brought union, originally straightforward their presented can a question: teacher sue a school board for its failure expel allegedly a student who assaulted that teacher? clear, this public To be case does not ask whether the teachers; has an interest in the welfare of its our desire safety indisputable. for their Nor does the case ask Code, § whether 1311a of the Revised School MCL 380.1 Builders, J.); Lee, See Associated 472 Mich at 126-127 (Weaver, J., J.); dissenting, joined Detroit Fire Mich at 750 (Kelly, Cavanagh, (1995) Detroit, Fighters 629, 651-652; Ass’n 537 NW2d 436 J., dissenting part concurring part). (Cavanagh, Lansing Bd LSEA Ed Dissenting Opinion by Corrigan, J. expel et a school board to a student who seq., requires physical against person “commits a assault at school a employed by engaged by as a volunteer or contractor board,” 380.1311a(l); MCL the do not parties school dispute unambiguous language provision. of this Further, the defendant school board and school district do not argue they may ignore despite this mandate their following disciplinary pro- conclusion a student a ceeding physical student committed a assault as by Rather, defined the code. the parties dispute whether intervene, have by way of a suit, they collateral civil when disagree with defen- dants’ decision that underlying the acts of the students did physical issue not constitute assaults for pur- poses of applying mandatory expulsion provision of 380.1311a(l). MCL

Accordingly, specifically case asks whether the may decide, teacher, courts at the particular behest of a that a school permanently expel board must a particular any student without notice to the student par- or his ents. The teachers plaintiff argued they should be empowered to seek a court order directing permanent 380.1311a(l). expulsion students under MCL holds, majority agrees and under its broad new stan- dard, that plaintiffs have to proceed. holding contrary

This both to settled principles of law regarding party statutory when a has and constitu- claim, tional standing bring a as well as to the result demanded particular facts and circumstances of clearly this case. The school code itself establishes that 380.1311a(l) mandate MCL is to be enforced locally state executive branch and the elected school Moreover, boards. it is for the school districts —not the courts or individual teachers —to decide whether particular student an requiring committed assault ex- 487 MICH349 Opinion by Dissenting Corrigan, justification judicial Plaintiffs offer no pulsion. these which are usurp powers, specifically branch to government. to other branches of delegated Finally, plaintiffs have never described how analysis Their fails successfully courts could intervene. for the fact that a board’s decision to expel to account only disciplinary proceeding student occurs after a rights protected where the student’s constitutional are careful, and where the board must make discretion- ary, concerning factual decision whether the student had the intent to commit a assault” requisite “physical According as defined the school code. to the Boards, 100,000 more Association School than such occur in disciplinary proceedings Michigan each school Yet seek intervene year. after the fact represented, asking case where the students are not and Court to revisit overrule innumerable decisions of Moreover, the elected school boards. plaintiffs never explain why including other enforcement mechanisms — only enforcement explicit statutory provisions, but also negotiations with school board under their bargaining agreement collective inadequate to en- —are appropriate applicable sure enforcement of the statute. Thus, courts, I like the lower cannot conclude that teachers have standing compel- to obtain court orders ling expulsion of students in contravention of a school decision that require board’s the students’ acts did not expulsion. Perhaps significantly, by choosing most overrule this Court’s constitutional doctrine sua sponte, majority gives courts carte blanche decision-making to invade the school board’s province, their depriving constitutionally those boards of del- egated responsibilities depriving students of their rights public affording education without them due process. absolutely This case thus illustrates the unten- LSEA v Bd of Ed Dissenting Opinion by Corrigan, majority’s able nature of the approach ap- new —an that, proach unfortunately, is characteristic of the ma- jority’s assault on the rule of law.

A. LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICTS AND THE REVISED CODE SCHOOL

1. GENERAL POWERS AND DUTIES OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS Code, The 1976,3 Revised School originally enacted describes “rights, powers, and duties” of school 380.11a(3). districts. MCL The and duties powers origi- nate Michigan Constitution, from the which established the “legislature shall maintain and support a system of public elementary free and secondary 1963, schools . . 8, § . .” Const art 2. Consistent with mandate, Legislature enacted the school code provided school districts would be governed by (7). locally 380.11a(5), elected school boards. MCL constitution also vested “[Leadership general su- pervision public over all education” in the elected members of the state board of education. Const 8, § art 3.

Significantly, both the constitution and the school code make plain that school districts’ purposes central are the education and protection of students. Const 8, 2,§ art requires system a of free public schools and states simply: “Every school district provide shall for the education of pupils its without discrimination as creed, to religion, race, color or national origin.” The code, turn, school defines district functions to include “[ejducating pupils,” 380.11a(3)(a), MCL “[provid- ing for safety and welfare pupils while at school or a sponsored activity school or while en route to or from school or a sponsored activity,” school MCL 380.11a(3)(b). A district’s regard functions with to PA

3 1976 451. 349 by Corrigan, Dissenting Opinion however, contracting “[h]iring, center on employees, terminating employees, for, or scheduling, supervising, out school contractors, carry and others to independent 380.11a(3)(d). MCL powers.” district OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS 2. DISCIPLINARY POWERS AND DUTIES regard and duties with to powers School districts’ subject vary- measures disciplinary students include employees. the board and its ing degrees by of discretion suspend or a district has discretion example, For misdemeanor or “guilty gross a student who is expel if, in the school judgment disobedience persistent applicable, or its as the interest of designee, board expulsion. or MCL suspension school is served” 380.1311(1). A must permanently expel4 school board circumstances, including posses- student under certain arson, weapon (subject exceptions), sion of a to some MCL grounds. criminal sexual conduct on school 380.1311(2). however, circumstances, Even under these parent may petition the student or his for reinstate- up education to 180 public period ment to when 380.1311(5). days has after his MCL elapsed expulsion. case, statutory The at issue in this MCL provision 380.1311a(l), was added to the school code including in 1999 as one of several Legislature bills— law, PA the safe schools and communities 23— safety school and student addressing discipline.5 safety 1999 bills mandated a statewide school informa- collaboratively adopted by Super- tion to be policy Instruction, General, Attorney intendent of Public generally may expulsion Permanent means that a student not attend may eligible any public Michigan. expelled But students be school programs discipline and strict academies or attend alternative education 380.1311(3). to receive in-home instructional services. MCL PA 23. 1999 PA 102 to LSEA Bd of Ed Dissenting Opinion by Corrigan, Department the director of the of State Police. MCL 380.1308(1). The bills also guidelines enacted for stu- discipline dent under various circumstances and estab- discipline academies, lished strict 380.1311b, MCL particular students, including expelled those from their (c). regular public schools, MCL 380.1311g(3)(b) 380.1311a(l) MCL requires permanent expulsion pupil “[i]f a grade enrolled in 6 or above commits physical assault at against person school employed by or engaged as a or volunteer contractor school board” and the is properly reported assault to school purposes section, officials. For “physical assault” “intentionally causing means attempting or to cause physical harm to another through force or violence.” 380.1311a(12)(b). MCL

3. ENFORCEMENT The school code’s provisions are enforced several First, mechanisms. members, school board school offi- cials, any “other person neglects who or refuses to perform do an code, or act” required by or “who violates or knowingly permits or to a consents viola- code, tion” of subject is to misdemeanor prosecu- Second, tion. MCL 380.1804. under MCL 380.1806, a “may school board from employment dismiss and cancel a superintendent, contract of principal, or teacher neglects who or comply” Third, refuses to with the code. because the members of school boards and the state board of officials, education are elected their acts and policies regularly are accepted reviewed —and rejected by the electorate. —

It also significant that the Legislature has enacted a comprehensive, carefully monitored scheme to ad- safety dress within our schools. For example, state- safety wide school information policy requires school Dissenting by Opinion Corrigan, to en- law various school incidents report officials to MCL investigation. for agencies forcement (3). 380.1308(2)(a) require reporting Incidents that and by members of the are defined this section under ac- 380.1308(1), “taking into branch, MCL executive and the circumstances intent of the actor count the 380.1308(2)(b). incident,” MCL School surrounding the reports to that state are submit required boards during year and the expelled each number of students 380.1310a(l), list and for MCL expulsion, reasons violence,” crimes, “involving physical those including 380.1310a(2). These schools, reports MCL committed at intended, policymakers, to ultimately part, help are communities, and law enforcement districts, school safety issues con- “identify pressing officials most communities,” campus “enhance fronting their school through strategies,” and intervention safety prevention . . a crime and violence and. assure “prevent further MCL learning every pupil.” environment for safe 380.1310a(2)(c) (d). it Finally, noteworthy and empowered are to law many school districts now create systems. their MCL enforcement within school agencies 380.1240. B. TO SUE UNDER TEACHERS’ STANDING OF REVISED CODE

SECTION 1311a THE SCHOOL 1. STANDING AND GROUNDS FOR COURT INTERVENTION Legislature’s comprehensive system, Despite dis- through which executive branch officials local responses and monitor evolving policies tricts set ask safety, plaintiff teachers here the courts school dictate District’s Lansing to intervene and School innu- responses past potentially to four incidents —and involving misbehav- merable future student incidents — was plaintiffs alleges ior. Each of the named she LSEA v Bd of Ed Dissenting Opinion Corrigan, J. by physically and, assaulted middle school student6 therefore, court should order permanent expul- 380.1311a(l). sion each student under MCL Plain- tiffs further asked the to: permanently enjoin court defendants from MCL violating 380.1311a in the fu- ture; find school officials and board guilty members violating misdemeanors for code school under MCL 380.1804; and cancel the contracts the superinten- any dent principal failing comply with the school code under MCL 380.1806. sought

Plaintiffs requesting relief a declara- tory 2.605, judgment under MCR permits which court the rights “declare legal other relations of an interested party seeking a declaratory judgment.. . .” 2.605(A)(1). MCR They sought also a writ of mandamus 3.305, under MCR which requires plaintiff a prove to “it has a legal clear to right performance specific duty to sought compelled be and the defendant has a legal duty clear Baraga vCo State perform such act.” Comm, Tax (2002) 466 264, 268; 645 NW2d 13 omitted). (quotation marks and citations Defendants moved for summary dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint, arguing plaintiffs did not standing have to seek either remedy. 6 allege Plaintiffs that one student threw a leather wristband with spikes, metal hit a which bulletin board “about two inches” from the plaintiff head, bounced, teacher’s and hit the teacher in the face. allege Plaintiffs separately plaintiff further that two students hit teach with ers Each chairs. teacher suffered bruises as a result. A fourth allegedly slapped plaintiff student enough a teacher on hack with stinging pink force to cause and to leave a mark. Plaintiffs state that each properly of these reported incidents was to school officials and each suspended expelled.

student was parties agree but not apparently defendant school board concluded that none of the four complaint students “physical named committed assaults” as by and, therefore, expulsion defined the code was not mandated MCL 380.1311a(l). 487 Mich 349

398 Opinion Dissenting Corrigan, standing apply principles Traditional Builders, 472 relief, declaratory Associated seeking mandamus, Fire 125, e.g. Detroit writs Mich at or NW2d Detroit, 629, 449 Mich Ass’n Fighters (1995). Build- in Associated explained As this Court actions: ers, addressing declaratory subject have matter “[I]f a court would otherwise or, it the issue is not jurisdiction the issue before if over genuine, live justiciable it not involve a because does asserting controversy persons adverse interested between existing definitively claims, can affect the decision which rights relations, may legal a court not declare Builders, [Associated it.” obligations parties before 125, Hayes, 442 Mich quoting Ins Co v Mich at Allstate (1993).] 56, 66; 499 NW2d held, in an Accordingly, explicitly Associated Builders WEAVER, the test by Justice opinion authored Lee, governs standing enunciated here, and, in actions declaratory actions as where alleged statutory right but plaintiff seeks to enforce an by its own terms. the statute does not confer Therefore, Builders, 472 Mich at n 16. Associated establishing today, plaintiffs bore the burden of until following elements of order each of jurisdiction: court invoke

First, “injury in plaintiff must have suffered an legally protected interest which is invasion of fact”—an (a) (b) particularized, and “actual immi- concrete and ” Second, nent, ‘conjectural’ ‘hypothetical.’ or there not injury between the and must be a causal connection injury “fairly. be .. complained of—the has to conduct defendant, challenged of to the action [able] trace independent action of some th[e] [of] . result not.. Third, “likely,” must be party before the court.” it third merely “speculative,” injury opposed to that the will be as by [Lujan v “redressed a favorable decision.” Defenders of 555, 560-561; 119 L 2d 112 S Ct Ed Wildlife, 504 US Lansing Bd LSEA v of Ed Dissenting Opinion by Corrigan, (1992) (citations omitted); Lee, quoted adopted by 739; quoted declaratory applied 464 Mich actions Builders, 126-127.] Associated 472 Mich at plaintiffs Here have a legally not established pro- in, to, tected interest or legal right clear expulsion 380.1311a(l). under students MCL Plaintiffs have also not shown that defendants had a legal duty clear expel the under students the facts presented or that plaintiffs’ can by interests be addressed a favorable Therefore, court decision. they cannot establish stand- ing against to seek relief the school board under MCL 380.1311a(l).

2. THE ALLEGED RIGHT TO RELIEF ASSERTED BY PLAINTIFFS 380.1311a(l) Plaintiffs argue the text of MCL creates an enforceable right teachers and a corre sponding duty by owed school districts to To teachers. plaintiff determine whether a has a created statute, begins by court considering statutory “the language to determine legislative All intent.” Miller v Co, (2008). 601, 610; state Mich Ins 751 NW2d 463 As an initial matter, many of the cases cited plaintiffs point on this inapposite are they because address a whether statute creates implies a for right action against damages a private party.7 inquiry is differ when, here, governmental ent as a agency involved. governmental Because agencies generally are immune 290, (1987) E.g., Wood, 312-314; v Gardner 414 NW2d 706 (finding implied private against violating no a party cause action for a provision Liquor Act, 436.26c); Pompey former Control MCL Gen (1971) 552-553, 560; Corp, (permit Motors 385 Mich 189 NW2d 243 ting against private employer suit for violation of the statutorily rights); Ctrs, Inc, Learning created civil Lane v KinderCare (1998) 695-696; App 689, (finding implied 588 NW2d 715 no against private party violating cause of action the child care act, organizations seq.). MCL 722.111 et 349 487 Mich

400 by Opinion Dissenting Corrigan, J. act, liability tort governmental under the from suit may governmental sue a 691.1407,8 a plaintiff MCL only Legislature expressly damages for when agency 180, Mich 479 City, v Traverse so Lash authorizes. 186, (2007); Detroit, v 467 Mich Mack NW2d 628 735 (2002). not cases do 195-196; 649 47 These NW2d of infer cause may private a plaintiff that a establish agency. against governmental a damages for action agency, a governmental a Rather, against in a suit may only injunctive declara- generally seek plaintiff plaintiff particular upon showing relief tory particular clear, right that legally enforceable has Lash, Mich at 196. protect. to 479 duty had a defendant clearly relief requested Some of the to they ask court improperly because unavailable to and the school district the executive branch require a particular manner. discretionary decisions make of may exercise Although plaintiff compel seek mandamus, he may a writ of through discretion “in man- a particular the exercise discretion compel Sch, Community Bd Ed v Lake Houghton ner.” State (1988) 666; 425 (emphasis NW2d added). the school empowered require Courts are not fading an contract for employee’s board to cancel Rather, MCL 380.1806 with the school code. comply an clearly establishes that a decision to terminate these circumstances lies within employee under the statute states that board’s discretion because violating an for the code. “may” employee board dismiss “may” in this A word context statute’s use members, district, employees generally and A its board its school (2) (estab 691.1407(1) qualify governmental immunity. See MCL lishing “governmental agency” and board that a its members 691.1401(b) liability); generally employees are immune from tort MCL (d) "political (defining “governmental agency” to include a subdivi defining “political to include school the state and subdivision” sion” of districts). Bd LSEA of Ed Dissenting Opinion Corrigan, J. conveys act; require discretion to it does not the act. See Council, City 326, 332; Warda v Flushing (2005). NW2d 671 a court has no Similarly, power to guilty find individual officials misdemeanors under in power MCL 380.1804 this civil case. “The to deter- mine to charge [with whether a defendant a criminal what charge brought offense] and should be is an exclusively prosecu- executive which vests power, Gillis, 105, 19; tor.” v 474 Mich 141 n People 712 NW2d 1963, 3, (2006); Indeed, § 419 Const 2.9 only art case, this a civil but failed to name any defendants, individual so potentially no liable individu- against are parties may sought. als even whom relief be only relief Accordingly, sought obtainable by their plaintiffs depends argument they on have a clear, legally protected right to the expulsion of four and, complaint students described in the potentially, to They innumerable future students. stress that MCL 380.1311a(l) specific, addresses assaults on a circum- group scribed of people any “person by employed — engaged by as volunteer or contractor the school board” —that includes teachers like themselves. But nothing suggests the code that the statute therefore in, creates an right duty to, enforceable or a this group above, people. explained As the text of the 1999 statutory amendments is aimed at creating compre- hensive, statewide program of student discipline gov- by erned the state board of education and the local districts. There is no of a legislative indication intent to 9 (2003): Chavis, 84, People See also 94 n 658 469 NW2d invariably prosecutor always great “It is the case that the has discretion deciding charges. power whether to file Such executive branch is an part prosecutor’s pow of our established constitutional structure.” regard tempered “systemic protections by ers in this are afforded by “elections, defendants” incident to criminal trials which call all office holders to account to their constituents.” Id. Mich 349 Opinion by Dissenting Corrigan, J. explicit beyond in teachers their rights

create new statutory rights.10 contract entertained courts cite two cases which

Plaintiffs interpretation of sought teachers who brought by suits Teachers v Federation Detroit provisions: code school (1976) 220; 240 NW2d Bd Mich Detroit Edof re the 1976 predated former code that (addressing the Dist, 122 Valley Sch code), Chippewa and Roek v vised (1982). In Federation NW2d Detroit App 76; 329 the circuit court’s Teachers, agreed this Court with stating that the defendant board declaratory decision written, contract with each enter into a individual “shall in its because written qualified’ employ” teacher ‘duly MCL were former required with teachers contracts erred 340.569, that the lower courts but we concluded would directing kind of contract individual teachers Roek, the Mich at 226. In Court resolved receive. 396 380.1236(2), in MCL dispute language over parties’ the of facts the concluding undisputed on the basis law, as as matter of a teacher em qualified, a plaintiff days during more as a teacher for 120 or substitute ployed right given first year and thus had the basic to be a school accept reject a contract under certain to opportunity of App at 78-79. Neither these circumstances. here. claim for supports plaintiffs’ cases seeking teachers These cases were concerned with Thus, to teacher contracts. regard action with judicial to as direct germane addressed issues teachers the cases employment relation- statutorily specified parties Moreover, the the defen- because cases involved ships. context, employment to teachers dants’ duties only authority plaintiffs support cited to their oft-stated conclu 380.1311a(l) specifically protect employee intended to that MCL was sion safety But PA 230 did not HB which 2000 PA 230. is became 380.1311a, incorrectly as assumed. enact MCL LSEA Bd Ed of Dissenting Opinion by Corrigan, matter subject directly fell scope within the of specified district functions with regard employees, 380.11a(3)(d). which include “contracting.” MCL More importantly, Teachers, Detroit Federation in particu- lar, significant is most for what Although it did not do. Detroit Federation Teachers confirmed the manda- tory requirement for written contracts under the school code, it reversed the circuit court’s writ of mandamus “directing the kind of contract teachers particular would receive.” 396 Mich at 224. It concluded “right protected by the code right is the to a written contract evidencing employment relationship, to a particular kind of contract.” Id. at 227. Accordingly, the court had no power govern the details parties’ contractual powers duties, which stat- ute left to be determined through their bar- collective gaining process or grievance procedure provided by their bargaining collective agreement. Id.

The case before us does not arise from the parties’ request for the interpret, court to a law, as matter of mandatory statutory language addressing teacher con- Rather, tracts. parties agree the statutory language unambiguous needs no further inter- pretation. Instead, plaintiffs asked the court to a revisit school discretionary board’s decision it re- as factual lates to a disciplinary scheme governing defendants’ responses to student behavior in student disciplinary proceedings. Thus, instead of supporting plaintiffs’ ar- gument, the holdings of Detroit Federation Teachers depend Roek on contrasting facts and illustrate that this case does not involve statute clear creating right in plaintiffs duty or a clear on defendants’ as part their employer.

Crucially, plaintiffs’ reasoning is no by means limited to Upon teachers. accepting plaintiffs’ claim they

Dissenting Opinion Corrigan, 380.1311a(l), MCL right an under have enforceable mentioned every person majority establishes chal- has to statutes now student disciplinary a expel to declining a of a school board lenge decision As dis- previously student who is accused of assault. 380.1311a(l) mea- cussed, disciplinary addresses MCL school em- with to students who assault regard sures 380.1310(1), volunteers, MCL and contractors. ployees, turn, disciplinary “pupil measures when addresses physical commits a assault grade enrolled in above are another The two against pupil.” provisions at school and, therefore, conclu- similarly majority’s worded to here applies sion that the teachers have sue equal only employees, force not to other school with contractors, every but to student who volunteers and alleges he assaulted another student. physically was Legis- indicates nothing Yet in the school code that the right to in all school lature intended create a new contractors, volunteers, or students to com- employees, students, flood- opening thus pel expulsion gates overwhelming for—and courts with— litigation person collateral whenever one such dissatisfied resolution of a disci- with board’s student reasons, For plinary proceeding. plaintiffs simply these Legislature have not met their burden to show that the legally right intended to create a teachers protected 380.1311a(l). when it enacted MCL 3. PLAINTIFFS’ REMEDIES primarily Plaintiffs’ claims fail above reason: Code clearly legal the Revised School does not create compel under rights expulsion teachers students 380.1311a(l). MCL But have failed to also Legislature private show intended authorize 380.1311a(l) MCL or that the other suits enforce LSEA V LANSING Bü OF Ed 405 Dissenting by Opinion Corrigan, statutory enforcement mechanisms are not exclusive under these circumstances. latter These failures inde- pendently plaintiffs’ defeat claim that is judicial relief available to them this case. regard plaintiffs’

With complaint, mandamus re- lief only is available if “the has law established no specific duty for a remedy” by created Houghton law. Sch, 430 Mich 667. The cited by plaintiffs cases that, similarly hold a right duty when imposed is statute, “the remedy provided for enforcement of that right by the statute for its violation and nonperfor- mance is exclusive.” Pompey, 385 Mich at 552. As already discussed, Legislature clearly vested en- forcement of the code and its provisions the executive branch, through prosecutions misdemeanor under MCL 380.1804, districts, and local school which have discre- tionary power employees to terminate and officials who code, violate the terms of MCL 380.1806. With regard to safety, school the code an provides additional layer local and executive branch monitoring enforcement through the statewide school safety infor- 380.1308, mation MCL policy, and reporting require- ments, Thus, MCL 380.1310a. the code’s express terms provide particular remedies applicable MCL 380.1311a. This should end the inquiry; these remedies generally should be deemed exclusive.

Plaintiffs argue, nonetheless, may they still seek declaratory or mandamus relief if the statutory rem- edies are inadequate. This Court has never accepted the argument may that courts new create remedies for the violation of statutory duties on the a party’s basis of claim that existing statutory remedies are inadequate. Lash, In argument this Court rejected the is —which rooted dictum from Pompey, 385 Mich at 552 n 14—that an additional remedy might be permitted to

406 Mich 349 Dissenting Opinion Corrigan, J. remedy statutory if the remedy statutory supplement dubious we noted inadequate”; “plainly any majority been cited “has never since principle with inconsistent “appears of this Court” opinion Lash, Mich at 192 n 19. caselaw.” subsequent was suggest principle nonetheless Plaintiffs Lane, Mich case, App Appeals in Court of followed Commu Long v Chelsea 696, Pompey cited which (1996), NW2d 157 nity Hosp, that cause action can be inferred “a of proposition the adequate no provides that the statute from fact its Yet Lane itself provisions.” of enforcement of means suit in bring part could not plaintiff that concluded organizations care act at child because the issue—the for provides act, seq. “adequately MCL 722.111 et — through simi provisions” provisions of its enforcement code, including crimi in the school present lar to those by instituted the Attor proceedings penalties nal Lane, Notably, at 696. ney General. in this case are remedies available comparable statutory opinion. majority ignored event, certainly have not shown that any plaintiffs In inadequate. mechanisms are the available enforcement mechanisms discussed statutory In addition to the to the fact that school board in addition above—and officials, members, to public as elected must answer why never address policies plaintiffs their acts and — to inadequate bargaining process contractual their Indeed, plaintiffs concede safety address concerns. their in- with defendants bargaining agreement that their safety its workplace to of provisions protect cludes Thus, acknowl- with code’s members.11 consistent plaintiff expressly their union “has Plaintiffs affirm in brief agreement Defendants-Appellees bargained language with in its master safety workplace its protect the of members.” LSEA Bd Ed of Dissenting Opinion by Corrigan, edgment relationship contract-based between teacher district, appears school it clear plaintiffs only an have enforcement mechanism at hand but —as with Detroit Federation Teachers of regard to the non-justiciable may contract terms — make use their bargaining process grievance procedure alleged address alleged violations their rights workplace safety. reasonably Defendants also argue are clearly empowered to protect themselves reporting alleged student assaults to their prosecutor local investigation. for criminal

Finally, light of the broad powers the code school establishes executive branch officials and local school boards, permitting individual plaintiffs to enforce MCL 380.1311a could violate both the terms of the code and the Michigan Constitution. Although Court contin- ues to debate the constitutional of our ramifications standing doctrine, we do not disagree about the consti- tutionally mandated separation powers among our three government: branches of person “No exercising powers one branch shall powers exercise properly belonging to another branch as except pro- expressly vided in 1963, 3, th[e] constitution.” § Const art 2. Thus, it clear that the courts cannot exercise powers expressly allocated to other branches of government. Here, the expressly constitution granted the to power supervise create and public schools to the state board of education, 1963, 8, 3,§ Const art and the Legislature, 1963, 8, Const 2,§ art delegated which has governance in part schools to the local boards, school MCL 380.11a(5) (7). Accordingly, the constitution itself supports the that may conclusion courts not compel acts of the local school boards without express, constitutionally sound authorization to do so. The trial court made this very in its point decision granting summary disposition:

Dissenting by Opinion Corrigan, this Court in some Basically, premise here is that the right the to look behind the exercise fashion another has or I District. think by Lansing School don’t of discretion any right [sic] to than we have to we more do that have City [sic] is Lansing City Counsel Council. government. prerogative. not our It’s another branch something for the Court to do. That’s not not —that’s EFFECTS REDRESSABILITY AND THE ON 4. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS STUDENTS’ no plaintiffs offer significant point, On a related their by which a court could enforce workable means students under MCL alleged expulsion rights 380.1311a(l) had power if the court some even relief or a mandamus through declaratory intervene regard failure in informs and order. Plaintiffs’ this strengthens that the statute does conclusion in, to, rights plain- create enforceable duties legally tiffs at all. entirely on their alle- complaint depends

Plaintiffs’ “physi- committed gation that the four named students tacitly by cal as defined the code. Plaintiffs assaults” allegation undisputed if or could be proceed as were contrary, To the parties agree decided the court. a com- factual determination whether student code mitted a assault for the school physical purposes board. no discretionary Although is a one the school a appeal teacher has authority suggests with to a disciplinary regard a school decision board’s student, concluded particular Appeals Court of has decision, “in appeals such a review- when student administration, ing orders of school disciplinary by that administra- of this state are bound courts they so are findings long supported tion’s factual as Birdsey material and evidence.” competent, substantial Sch, 130 Mich Community App v Grand Blanc Lansing Bd Ed LSEA v 409 Dissenting Opinion by Corrigan, J. (1983). 723-724; 344 NW2d 342 Thus the courts have imported the highly applicable deferential standard agencies 1963, 6, § administrative under Const art 28. Strickland, Id. at relied on Birdsey 723. also Wood 308, 325; 992; (1975), 95 S Ct 43 L Ed 2d 214 which US concluded a court is bound to school accept a finding administration’s of fact if there is any evidence in the record to it. support Despite this deferential decisions, standard for direct appeals administrative both plaintiffs majority and the would no accord deference in a appeal collateral to the school board’s apparent determination the four named students did not physical commit assaults as defined MCL by 380.1311a(12)(b). we as

Although accept by true the a alleged facts plaintiff in a complaint for of a purposes defendant’s motion summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8), 169, Kuznar v Raksha Corp, 176; (2008), plaintiffs’ NW2d characterization of each as a “physical event assault” as defined MCL 380.1311a(12)(b) is a conclusion drawn from the statu- tory terms —not a fact.12 Accordingly, court cannot simply accept that, this as or allegation presume true if 12 Compare Detroit, App Davis v 379 n 711 NW2d 462 (2006) (“Plaintiffs allegation complaint reliance on her her that the city engaged proprietary activity was only is unwarranted because conclusions, allegations, legal factual are to be taken under as true 2.116(C)(7) (8).”). Moreover, although plaintiffs MCR have not properly placed determinations, in issue the school board’s I that the note acts, alleged opinion, unquestionably students’ see 6 of note do not physical 380.1311a(12)(b), constitute assaults under MCL as simply presume. Particularly statutory “physi because the definition of specific causing cal “intentionally assault” includes a intent element — harm,” 380.1311a(12)(b) attempting physical cause MCL finder —the disciplinary proceeding conclude, of fact at a could on the basis mental surrounding state of the student or the circumstances each assault, affirmatively physical that the student did not intend to cause harm to her his or teacher. 487 Mich 349 Dissenting Opinion Corrigan, J. favor plaintiffs’ it can resolved in

the be proceeds, case Rather, allegation has by finder of fact at trial. the a contrary by to the the already been resolved apparently the forum —the proper concede is entity plaintiffs that circumstances, plaintiffs board. Under these school show, first, only can that the they achieve relief if could it determined its discretion when school board abused did not physical the four acts constitute that students’ second, and, power the court has the to assaults board erred and then to overturn the conclude the in teachers. But brought by board’s determination a suit never or the court could plaintiffs explain whether how in or overturn the board’s determinations stu- review long that have since con- disciplinary proceedings dent cluded, way by let alone of this collateral suit which at are even represented. the students issue not Indeed, aside, plaintiffs’ all other issues claims with to the named moot in regard appear any four students disciplinary proceedings event because the concluded years January ago. alleged assaults occurred 2006, 2006, September May and October 2005. if the are still enrolled in the Even some of students district, authority suggesting no plaintiffs provide now, expelled be had been at they expelled they could incidents, now of them could by the time the each to un- petitioned public have for reinstatement school 380.1311a(5)(b) (a petition a may grant der MCL court days for the beginning reinstatement after date of expulsion).13 students, regard not

With to future do declaratory judgment requiring how a defen- explain injured Further, plaintiffs, because it was students’ behavior that plaintiffs’ prayer regard for relief with to the four named students simple injuries appears alleged untenable reason that the were by expel failure caused students assaults. defendants’ after LSEA Bd of Ed Dissenting by Opinion Corrigan, 380.1311a(l) comply any dants to with MCL would have effect whatsoever. Whether a student a committed physical case-by-case assault is determined on a basis particular on depending facts and accordance with rights. Therefore, the student’s constitutional most a court could do be redundantly would repeat undisputed terms the statute “If a pupil itself: grade 6 or enrolled above a physical commits assault against person employed school engaged as , volunteer or contractor . school board . . then the school board. . . shall expel the from the pupil school district permanently, subject possible rein- 380.1311a(l) added). statement . . . .” MCL (emphasis Plaintiffs’ relief supports claimed thus sug- defendants’ gestion plaintiffs that what really desire is for the court —or the plaintiffs themselves —to determine a “physical whether purposes assault” occurred for 380.1311a(l). MCL applying noted,

Finally, as permitting plaintiffs’ complaint to proceed permits here any person alleges who he is victim of student misbehavior to independently sue board when the board concludes that the student’s acts qualify did not suspension for mandatory expulsion. is, That under the majority’s analysis, any employee, volunteer, or contractor of may the school now collater- on ally sue allegations basis assault under MCL 380.1311a(l). any sue, And may student seeking sus- pension or of a expulsion student, fellow on the basis of 380.1310(1). allegations assault under MCL And these may suits be filed although the student disciplinary proceeding is and although over the accused student’s rights are not represented because he not a party the lawsuit.

Crucially, neither the majority nor plaintiffs ever rights address the of the accused students. Students Mich 349 Dissenting Opinion Corrigan, to public in their entitlement interest property have a away “taken for misconduct cannot be education that re- procedures the minimum adherence to without Fourteenth Due Process Clause quired by [the 419 US Const, Lopez, Am Goss v Amendment],” US XIV (1975);14 also L Ed see Ct 2d 725 574; 95 S Goss). Accord- at 726 App (applying Birdsey, of stu- certainly expulsion cannot seek ingly, plaintiffs are the students dents in the where present proceeding, no to contest and have represented opportunity not Goss, them. 419 US allegations against plaintiffs’ majority permits plaintiffs proceed, 579. Yet brought by the rendering thereby additional lawsuits — rights— of their claiming violation expelled students inevitable. CLEARLY LACK STANDING 5. CONCLUSION: PLAINTIFFS TO THE CONTRARY AND THE MAJORITY’S CONCLUSION ITS NEW APPROACH THE FATAL PROBLEMS WITH

ILLUSTRATES TO STANDING to show that Plaintiffs have not borne their burden applicable requirements they satisfy any correctly Lee, as both courts standing under lower MCL have not shown that concluded. Plaintiffs 380.1311a(l) and redressable legally protected creates a may provide which the courts interest in teachers for involving only in a case teachers relief, particularly district, at issue. school but the students Further, discussion shows that foregoing satisfy meaningful standing could test. any not not even Indeed, standing could assert plaintiffs cites with majority approval. under the former tests the essentially agree that Significantly, parties Const See Goss Goss, 1963, applies 419 US art 8, because at § 2, 574. Michigan maintains requires children attend, public MCL 380.1561. school system, LSEA v Bd of Ed Dissenting by Opinion Corrigan, outcome would here be the same whether is analyzed Lee, under Fire Fighters, Detroit 449 Mich 629, Governor, Speaker House 443 Mich (1993). First, NW2d 190 We agree. above, as discussed we see Legislature no indication that intended to create a right or “substantial interest” in plaintiffs, see House Speaker, by enacting at MCL 380.1311a(l). Further, to the extent plaintiffs refer to their general interest personal safety their while at work, this interest separate is and independent from discipline student provisions of the Revised School Code; plaintiffs can protect this through interest all the channels, normal including contract negotiations and complaints to local Second, law enforcement. plaintiffs’ general interest a safe school environment analo- gous safety to the interests claimed Detroit Fire Fighters, where agreed Justice WEAVER the plaintiff firefighters and their collective bargaining unit did have not challenge an alleged violation of the Detroit City Charter. Detroit Fire Fight- ers, 449 at 631-632. Justice WEAVER concluded did firefighters not have a “substantial inter- est” that be detrimentally “will affected in manner different the public from large” although at they claimed that lack of funding firefighters additional subjected them increased injury, among risk of other J.). things. (opinion Id. at 633 Specifically, WEAVER, she opined that the plaintiffs could not “injury show distinct general from the citizenry” a lack because firefighters also threatened injury to members general public who occupied buildings catch fire. Id. at The Legislature’s 638. purported interests ensuring safe and learning effective environments simi- larly public large. schools, benefit the Safe and the removal of violent appropriate, students when benefit only all employees, volunteers, contractors and Mich 349 by Dissenting Opinion Corrigan, J. families, other any

students, also parents, but to enter a occasion public the who has member of a Indeed, community supports that the entire school. safety: safe has interest” school system “an school who fund all taxpayers, benefit school environments every not member Although aspects of school functions. environments, school equally by is affected public not clearly Fighters-, true in Detroit Fire the same was finds himself at every public frequently member of the building, clearly firefighters burning risk inside burning buildings more often find inside themselves citizens.15 than other individual test this Court’s majority rejects Yet the concludes, of the school any examination without for constitutional code the ramifications students’ all by necessary analogy, rights, plaintiffs and, — contractors, and fellow volunteers employees, school As the standing. explained, I have students —have the replete with clear indications that school code right did intend to create a of action Legislature not 380.1311a(l) and under MCL intended teachers MCL the school code to be enforced under 380.1804 concludes otherwise majority and MCL 380.1806. by “suggests that MCL 380.1311a simply observing and distinct inter- have a substantial added.) Then, without citation and (Emphasis est.” statutory to the essential tenet contrary most departs from majority expressly interpretation, that, statutory although text and states an in- Legislature unambiguously expressed has not standing, may a court confer tent to confer critically, provisions disciplinary name school code Most contractors, just teachers, employees, stu but all volunteers and statutory language suggests Legislature nowhere dents. The public bring individual for all these subclasses of their intended concerning proceedings complaints disciplinary boards’ school courthouse. LSEA v Bd of Ed Dissenting Opinion Corrigan, standing by consulting legislative history will.16This assertion is indisputably proper erroneous. The inter- of a pretation begins statute with the always unambigu- statutory ous text. As this recently Court affirmed in unanimous opinion authored Chief Justice KELLY, “first step” the in the of the discerning Legisla- intent ture “is to the language review of the statute.” Briggs Service, Schools, 69, Tax Detroit LLC v Public 485 Mich (2010). 76; 780 NW2d “[W]e 753 consider both the plain “ meaning of the critical or phrase word as well as ‘its ” placement and in purpose statutory scheme.’ Sun Ward, 230, 237; Foods Co v Valley 460 596 NW2d (1999) (citation omitted). If statutory language unambiguous, is we presume Legislature in- the meaning tended expressed the statute. Briggs Service, Tax 485 Mich at 76. as Accordingly, Justice CAVANAGHhimself stated in In re MCI Telecom Com- 396, plaint, 411; (1999), 460 Mich 596 NW2d 164 “judicial construction is required neither nor permis- added.) (Emphasis Further, sible.” there has simply any that, never been to question determine whether the Legislature intended to confer under a par- statute, employ ticular we statutory the normal rules of proceed interpretation “analyzing] by the statu- Miller, tory language.” 607, atMich 610.

Therefore, as in all requiring cases interpret us to an unambiguous statute, legislative resort to history inappropriate. Question In re the United Certified from States Court Circuit, the Sixth Appeals 468 Mich (2003). 109, 115 n Further, 659 NW2d 597 even when reference to legislative history is appropriate, staff analyses created within legislative branch “are judicial entitled little consideration” because no “[i]n way ‘legislative can analysis’ officially be said to 16 See ante at 374 n 23. Dissenting by Opinion Corrigan, have been of those who intentions

summarize participants be by the Constitution designated and the members of the House legislative process, Indeed, legislative Id.17 and the Senate Governor.” analysis “This was states: analysis expressly cited here by Senate for use staff nonpartisan prepared an not constitute in its deliberations does Senate Legisla- Senate intent.” legislative statement of official tive 4240, 0183, 0206, HB and HB SB SB Analysis, added). 4241, July (emphasis di- Thus, the majority grants text and without derogation Legislature’s of the rect stake, at rights and remedies attention the actual any unrepre- rights include the constitutional which of its majority’s vague application sented students. the test’s nature unprincipled test demonstrates new opinion This Court’s far-reaching consequences. precisely avoiding consequences such Lee was aimed do have unfettered acknowledging that courts will, but grant deny standing to at should discretion A standard to a common standard. common adhere judicial beyond its expansion power prevents which, turn, in both protects constitutional bounds of the other separate purviews of citizens and the rights government. branches

II. LEE WAS CORRECTLY DECIDED AND ITS ARTICULATION A NECESSARY OF STANDING IS COMPONENT OF THIS STATE’S CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE courts, in federal Relying developments on decades of in set forth Supreme Lujan United States Court to the of what is needed concept three elements so basic clearly means constitutional Further, comparable pre-enactment contrary convention, to statements to the which statements majority’s made I reference below. characterization by of a official, voting delegates legislative staffer are of such analyses, to by our no LSEA Bd of Ed Dissenting Opinion Corrigan, any party bring to a it lawsuit labeled this standard the “irreducible minimum” constitutional standing jurisprudence. federal at Lujan, US 560. First, party wishing a to a suit must bring have suffered Second, a concrete and actual or imminent injury. there fairly must be a traceable causal connection between injury third, the defendant’s conduct. And legal decision must party likely favor be to redress the harm. Id. at aBy unani- nearly 560-561. vote, mous this Court’s decision in expressly Lee incor- porated this “irreducible constitutional minimum” into Lee, our state’s existing standing jurisprudence, an effort 740, identify when the courts the authority have judicial “[t]he exercise power of state,” § Const art 1963, 1. Because the doctrine of standing every touches civil lawsuit brought state, it ais doctrine of importance, the utmost with serious constitutional and practical implications.

Unfortunately, none of these considerations has de- terred the majority this case from Michi- reducing gan’s standing clear, from requirements developed standards articulated in progeny Lee and its to a broad and amorphous principle promises to be nearly impossible society in a apply that operates under the rule of The majority law. does so by relying argu- on legal ments and theories that have been considered and rejected as Michigan’s inconsistent with constitutional requirements. majority also does so notwithstand- ing progeny provided Lee its with clear, well-understood framework that clari- fied the law for the better identifying the proper scope of judicial authority. The majority today upends and reverses this entire body Michigan law in vindi- cation of the personal justices, views of the majority but to the detriment of this state’s constitutional jurispru- dence. 349 Opinion Dissenting Corrigan, J. IN MICHIGAN A REQUIREMENT

A. STANDINGIS CONSTITUTIONAL pow- both Michigan separates Constitution The and limits government ers the various branches of of to hear cases when judicial of the branch power a constitutional Thus, is disputes actual exist. “[t]he Constitution vests requirement. Because the in one of exclusively state .. . court judicial power of the 6, 1, boundary and 1963, § art the source justice,” Const Lee nature. therefore power of this is constitutional standards re- held that federal constitutional properly Michi- may serve as benchmark garding standing gan. the most fundamental doctrine American

Perhaps of thought separation and constitutional is political government tripartite system. into a This powers of incorporated Michigan’s has principle explicitly been of distribution of importance power constitutions.18 The Constitution, is in our current explicitly reaffirmed are powers government which states: “The divided judicial. legislative, into three branches: executive one shall exer- exercising powers No branch person branch ex- powers properly belonging cise another in this constitution.”19 Const cept expressly provided as 3, doubt, then, § 1963, art 2. There can be no is created and judiciary’s power both scope by Michigan’s constrained Constitution. (“The 4, See, e.g., 1908, powers government § art are Const judicial.”); departments: legislative, into three The executive divided (“No 4, person belonging department § 2 to 1 shall exercise the id. at art another,

powers properly belonging except expressly in the cases constitution.”). provided in this provides explicitly Legisla that the Constitution also state, 1963, 4, “legislative power” ture Const art is to exercise the 1, 5, power,” 1963, § art is to exercise the “executive Const Governor “judicial 1963, judiciary power,” § Const art exercise 1. 6, § Ed Bd of LSEA v by Opinion J. Dissenting Corrigan, constitu- this newly did not create

The Lee Court to the Contrary cloth. out of whole principle tional majority’s to the belief, and inconvenient majority’s acknowledged consistently conclusion, Michigan has- judicial power limits the constitution the state’s that controver- cases or involving actual disputes hearing is of principles this most basic Understanding sies. state’s doc- what, this defining precisely, imperative is a because there “standing” should be regarding trine and the doctrine of link between the clear Supreme The United States of powers. separation 737; 468 US Wright, clear in Allen v made this Court (1984): 3315; L Ed 2d 556 Ct 104 S component standing ... has a core requirement of . directly the Constitution. .. from derived single basic Art. Ill is built on law of [T]he ... powers. . separation of .. idea of idea —the standing inquiry [Qluestions. .. relevant . . . by to the Art. Ill notion reference must be answered resort, only “in the last may power exercise federal courts only adjudication is “consis necessity,” and when and as a dispute separated powers [the system of tent with a traditionally thought capable of resolution to be one] 751-752, quoting process.” through judicial [Id. at 345; Wellman, 12 Ct 143 US S Chicago & G T R Co 83, 97; (1892), Cohen, 392 US 400; and Flast v 36 L Ed 176 (1968).] 1942; 20 L Ed 2d 947 88 S Ct Casey, in Lewis v principle The Court reaffirmed (1996), 2d L Ed 343, 349; 116 S Ct 518 US a constitu- standing [is] of that “the doctrine stating from under- courts of law prevents principle tional In branches.” assigned political to the taking tasks in the as articulated principles these applying Constitution, explained: previously we have 487 Mich 349 Dissenting Opinion Corrigan, part preserve separation

As of this endeavor to powers, judiciary must to the confine itself exercise of “judicial power” “judicial power” and the alone. “Judi- constitution, power” phrase cial undefined is an our but we noted in Nat’l Wildlife “ judicial traditionally been power [t]he has defined combination of considerations: the existence a real dispute, controversy; or or deciding case the avoidance of hypothetical plaintiff questions; the has suffered who real harm; genuinely parties; existence adverse case; ripeness maturity sufficient eschewing of a any stage litigation; cases that are moot at of their the ability proper party; issue forms of effective relief to a questions the political non-justiciable avoidance of or other controversies; unnecessary the avoidance of constitutional issues; emphasis upon proscriptive opposed the as prescriptive making.” [471 decision Mich at 614-615.] litany We went on in Nat’l to distill of Wildlife arising from proper considerations the exercise of the “judicial power,” and we determined “the most critical requirement genuine element” is “its of a case or contro- versy parties, real, between the one in which there is a hypothetical, dispute.” Waters, [Nestlé 479 Mich at 292- (brackets original).] Moreover, basic principles these have been affirmed time and again by Michigan courts, as this Court traced in Lee: maintaining Concern separation powers, with the as courts,

in the federal has years caused this over Court the vigilant preventing to be judiciary the from usurping the powers on, political Early great branches. the con- stitutional scholar Justice THOMAS M. COOLEY discussed the concept separation powers declining in the context of against to issue a mandamus the Governor Sutherland v (1874): Governor, 320, 324 29 Mich government “Our is powers one whose have been care- fully apportioned departments, between three distinct which from people, powers emanate alike have their LSEA v Bd of Ed Opinion by Dissenting Corrigan, J. constitution, equal by are of defined alike limited and spheres action respective dignity, and within their laws, applies another equally independent. One makes cases, the third must see in contested while laws accepted as a This division is the laws are executed. very apportion- governments, necessity free in all to be a power department to one is understood ment of by the others. The prohibition of its exercise either of by judicial power forbidden to exercise executive is upon the courts to take implication same which forbids duties.” themselves his iteration of the position followed from the even earlier

This Campbell when, speak- in 1859 standing doctrine Justice Court, ing for this he said:

“By judicial power generally understood of courts controversies between power to hear and determine questions litigation.” [Daniels parties, adverse (1859) added).] 381, (emphasis People, 6 Mich Later, 185, 193; Hoyt, Mich 18 NW 611 in Risser v (1884), explained: this Court authority judicial power referred to is the to hear

“The controversies, binding and to make orders and and decide judgments [Emphasis respecting added.] them.” Lines, Inc, recently, Freight More Johnson v Kramer Bros (1959), 98 NW2d 586 reaffirmed this [Lee, portion concept quoting this of Risser. (brackets original).] in

737-738 certainly And not exhaustive. For history of separation in 1920 this Court relied on the example, in declar- development judicial power and the of powers con- a statute that would have ing unconstitutional jurisdiction standing upon ferred citizens invoke of actual con- the courts “not the determination wrongs been invaded and rights troversies where have to all who done, but in the of advice giving have been Co, 211 Mich R may Anway Rapids seek it.” Grand (1920). 592, 606; explained: The Court 179 NW 487 Mich Dissenting Opinion Corrigan, This court by- and the court from which this case came appeal power draw their from the power Constitution. The given to both under judicial the Constitution was power.... powers judicial This act confers requires performance non-judicial of acts in character. For these entirety. reasons it is void in [Id. its at 622.] Following the decision Anway, Legislature amended the act to remove the offending provisions that had allowed courts to exercise powers outside of the case and controversy context, and this Court upheld the revised act in Washington-Detroit Theatre Co v (1930). Moore, 673; 249 Mich 229 NW 618 Notably, the significant Court found that the act had been amended ” to apply “only to ‘cases actual controversy.’ Id. at It 676. concluded that “[t]here must be an actual and bona controversy as to which the judgment will be fide res adjudicata. Such a case requires that all the inter- ested parties shall be before the court.” Id. at 677.

In House Speaker v State Bd, Admin 547, 556; (1993), 495 NW2d 539 this Court again recognized the indisputable relationship between standing and the separation powers, holding that “[i]t would be impru dent and violative of the doctrine of separation of powers to confer standing upon legislator simply for failing the political process.” More recently, Fed Publications, erated City Inc v Lansing, 467 Mich 98; 649 NW2d 383 (2002), we reaffirmed and explicitly declared that the “principal duty of this Court is to decide actual cases and 112, controversies.” Id. at citing Anway, 211 610, Mich at and In re Midland Publishing Co, Inc, (1984). 152 n 362 NW2d history As this clear, makes Michigan has consistently acknowledged that our state constitution limits the judicial power to hearing cases involving actual cases or controversies. Ed 423 LSEA v Bd of Corrigan, Opinion by Dissenting explicit lack of an notwithstanding

This is true Michigan in the controversy” requirement or “case “case or Indeed, general to the exceptions Constitution. have been judicial power on limitation controversy” itself, Constitution in the text of our made explicitly controversy case or the rule that a thereby recognizing Const art 1963, 9, example, For required. otherwise is of the state” “any taxpayer confers upon 32, § the Headlee bring provisions suit to enforce 11, 5, “any § empowers art Amendment. Const mandamus injunctive or bring citizen of the state” the state. the civil service laws of to enforce proceedings 3, 8,§ 1963, art allows Const Perhaps significantly, most request Legislature of the either house on the “constitutional- advisory opinion issue an Court ity legislation.” section, this last

Indeed, discussion of delegates’ Convention, at the Constitutional it was ratified when understanding about the framers’ any eliminates doubt directly confirms judicial power In judicial power.20 interpretation Court’s the Lee the power the Court should have considering whether proceed- in nonadversarial advisory opinions to issue government, of other branches ings request at the on clearly premised entire discussion was delegates’ judicial power, assumption the unquestioned controversy require- rooted a case generally, was outset, explicitly Harold Norris Delegate At the ment. “Does that to the section: regard proposed asked with concerned, do they far as this committee mean that as when, appropriate constitutional convention debates It is to consult “ recurring explanation here, thread of in the debates a as ‘we find ” concept.’ v Mich binding together Studier the whole of a constitutional 642, 656; Bd, 698 NW2d 350 Employees’ 472 Mich Pub Sch Retirement 52, 60; Regents Michigan, (2005), quoting Univ of (1975). NW2d 487 Mich Dissenting Opinion by Corrigan, J. preserve wish to the traditional notion that there be a controversy must case or presented the court before may judicial exercise its power!” Record, Official Constitutional p Convention 1544 (emphasis added). When the question was raised whether power to issue an advisory opinion equivalent would be to the courts’ preexisting power to issue declaratory judgments, Delegate Eugene Wanger similarly specified that the courts’ preexisting power, even the arena of declaratory judgments, distinctly required “an actual controversy between individuals . ...” Id. at 1545. Del- egate Raymond King may have expressed the under- standing most clearly when he remarked:

We are indeed contemplating very change serious I history what think to be justice and the tradition of country. Wanger pointed this Mr. has out the troubles that supreme got Massachusetts court they into when allowed themselves to theory leave the case and contro- of added).] versy. (emphasis [Id. at 1546 Indeed, even with regard to the limited expansion21 of judicial power represented by the proposed advisory opinion provision, delegates were expressly concerned that it would “adversely the separation affeet[] of powers doctrine ....” Id. at 1545 (Delegate Wanger); see also id. at 1546 (Delegate Jack Faxon indicating that the convention “should be wary any of violation of the delegates agreed advisory that opinion provi the constitutional unique very sion was and intended example, Delegate to be limited. For Wanger emphasized by observed: “It everyone has been supporting the advisory opinion practice restraint, that the they courts will exercise very will be every question careful not to answer merely that is asked but very, very to answer those which are of a Record, vital nature.” 1 Official 1961, p Constitutional Delegate Convention 1548. Robert Danhof ex pressed concern, advocating a similar language provision that the of the supreme should include “an admonition to the court that it is desirable particular power very sparingly and, just be exercised as we mean, only upon upon very the most solemn important occasions questions of law.” Id. at 1549. Lansing Bd of Ed LSEA Opinion by Dissenting Corrigan, King (Delegate id. at 1547 powers”); separation through “I have established stating: think we thereto a law and our adherence English common powers justice, system separation system of itself, very I to be ought and think we proven which has new.”). try something this time to reluctant at points these reinforces The framers’ discussion on judicial power understanding Lee Court’s here I problems express the critical presaged —which in the by my colleagues expressed and which have been beyond its judicial power past expanding —with conclusion, in our limit. It also reinforces traditional Wildlife, Nat’l Michigan, through their people the extent that

[t]o constitution, upon judiciary to confer have chosen potentially beyond the traditional specific three authorities unlikely people “judicial power,” that the intended it seems authority simply could any such nontraditional that other “judicial power” by simple incorporated part of the a be as majority Legislature. [471 625.] the Mich at sum, Michigan’s that framers of In it is clear believed, first, judicial power is constitution controversy by the case or generally circumscribed and, second, way expand to only requirement or contro beyond the traditional case judicial power amendment of through limitation was affirmative versy accord, has held that the In this Court the constitution. not test articulated Lee must standing constitutional expressly otherwise judicial power be to limit applied Coa Michigan in the Constitution. See Mich conferred v Mich Civil Serv lition State Unions Employee (2001). 212, 217-219; Comm, 465 Mich 634 NW2d of the Lee, several members Yet, since the decision that, the view because majority current have advanced use expressly Constitution does Michigan 487 Mich 349 Dissenting Opinion Corrigan, words “case” and like “controversy” the federal consti- tution, Michigan has no constitutional re- quirement. argument fundamentally This misunder- Michigan stands both the and federal constitutions and misapprehends the constitutional In theory. Nat’l explained we the provisions of the Wildlife federal describing constitution the limited “cases” “controversies” that federal courts have the power hear provision give

is not a definitional meaning that seeks to “judicial Rather, power.” III, § provision art 2 is a defining judicial power judiciary, the limited of the federal judicial plenary power contrast to the of the state judiciary. respective legislative The articles of the two analogous judicial constitutions are to the articles: the legislative article of the Constitution does not (for purport authority to define the Legislature of its example, nothing concerning authority is said therein its marriage, divorce, custody, over support, child child ali- mony, care), or legislative foster while the article of the affirmatively federal constitution authority does confer upon Congress, I, judicial § article power, 8. The state legislative as with the power, plenary, state requiring no grant authority affirmative in the state Constitution. judicial power, hand, federal on the other as with the legislative power, federal power is limited. Such is exclu- sively function, creation, or constitution, of the federal and, therefore, affirmatively must be set forth. In similar fashion, judicial power the federal must also be affirma- tively forth, function, set creation, for it is also a Thus, Const, III, federal constitution. § US art 2 does not “judicial power;” rather it part defines what define the “judicial power” belongs within the United States judiciary, the federal remaining with the part belonging exclusively judiciary. III, to the § state variously That art employs the terms “cases” or “controversies” is not to particular confer a meaning upon “judicial power,” the but merely employ necessary is to syntax words that are to the allocating “judicial power” of the between the federal and Ed BD OF LSEA V LANSING Opinion by Dissenting Corrigan, J. would con- governments. state concurrence/dissents definition, and would power with its the of a fuse allocation in the narrow- “judicial power” thereby the federal define limiting through reference alone it possible manner est perspective the of a “case.” Even from to the existence of concurrence/dissents, permanent no more is there the pertain to a power” that it aspect “judicial than of the “case”? Michigan fact, “judicial power” in the Constitu the

In [explicitly in tion, exceptions enumerated with the several Constitution], “judicial power” as in the the same “judicial power” constitution, and it is the same federal federal and state practice of both that has informed principles were judiciaries centuries. These historical Lee, to adhere to them recognized by and we continue 626-628.][22] today. Wildlife, 471 Mich at [Nat’l party Waters, rejected argument when a In we further Nestle it, statutory argued Legislature on which that the had conferred party not meet the basic strictures he sufficient even if the could should standing. of constitutional We stated: argument persists in that the textual Justice Weaver her and our state consti- differences between the federal constitution “judicialpower” prove the doctrine of that the exercise of tution something powers radi- separation cally argument ently constitution means our under the federal constitution. This different than it does separation powers be understood differ- should Michigan because the words “case” in the Constitution suggests “controversy” to us that are not in our constitution fundamentally the doctrine of misunderstands Justice Weaver powers. accept is a separation She refuses to there authority expand Legislature’s constitutional limit on response, “judicial standing. power” in area of In we stated

Nat’l Wildlife clear, duty makes “[a]s the Constitution and, doing, ‘judicial power,’ judiciary in so is to exercise the general proposition, respect separation powers. as a While obligate judiciary ‘judicialpower’ proper will exercise of the Legislature it is the give the words of the faithful effect to —for judiciary ‘legislativepower,’not the latter that exercises the —such given properly to do so would contravene cannot be when effect judicial branch owes Just as the the constitution itself. 487 Mich 349 Dissenting Opinion by Corrigan, J. argument Yet this that Michigan does not have a consti- tutional basis for its test —based on “caricatured textualism” that has handily been rejected persists — nonetheless.23 In particular, Justice WEAVERhas cham- pioned theory, this dubious given Chief Justice which — Kelly’s and Justice CAVANAGH’srecent metamorpho- ses on the issue of standing, and Justice HATHAWAY’s election to the presents argu- convenient Court — ment as majority the grasps straws to explain why Lee and its progeny should be overruled. The fact remains that in neither the majority opinion legislative ‘legislative deference the power’ branch when the is exercised, being legislative so too does the branch owedeference to judicial ‘judicial the branch power’ when the exercise of the is implicated. acquiescence legislative Even with the of the branches, judicial executive arrogate branch cannot to itself governmental authority beyond scope ‘judicial that is of the power’ approach under the constitution. The ‘textual’ [Justice textualism, Legislature is a caricatured in which the Weaver] empowered beyond authority to act conferring powers upon its beyond other authority.” branches that are [Nat’l also their Wild (citations life, omitted; emphasis Mich at 637 original).] Waters, [Nestlé 307-308.] 479 Mich at 23 majority Washington-Detroit The Co, cites Theatre for proposition long ago explained Michigan that “this Court courts’ judicial power to decide controversies was broader than the United States Supreme interpretation Court’s case-or-controversy of the Article III judicial power limits on the federal sovereign possesses because a state powers government inherent precisely the federal does not.” This is correct, way majority applies but not in fact, actually it. In it majority’s undermines the majority conclusion. The here either fails to willfully ignores understand or the fact that the federal “case or contro versy” requirement only range may limits of controversies that be courts, heard in federal requirement and that this is distinct from the controversy that an actual place. short, case or exists in the first In types Michigan may of controversies courts decide that the courts federal authority lack to decide does not mean that has no constitu bring controversy. plaintiff tional may threshold when a such a Lee/Lujan standing govern types test does not what of cases/controversies may brought, only case/controversy be whether a exists in the first instance. Lansing Bd of Ed LSEA Dissenting Opinion by Corrigan, case, justices’ concurring any majority nor cases, has a member dissenting opinions prior to these response articulated a sufficient majority ever greater significance This case has serious criticisms. cases, however, majority pro- than because prior in order to remove understandings ceeds on these false the limits our Constitution. altogether imposed courts are limited an proposition Michigan The beyond or is re controversy requirement actual case is Michigan’s controversy requirement case or proach. controversy” language, from the federal “case or drawn Michigan’s but rather the limitations in parallel imposed recognized by own constitution. This fact has been more caselaw, century than a worth of and thus it Michigan in formed the basis for this Court’s decision Lee to incorporate reality. test that reflected this need majority’s only opinions author read his own Richmond, realize as much. For in v example, People recently this Court reaffirmed that “it is the ‘princi duty of this Court... to decide actual cases and pal ‘ is, judicial power... controversies’ That is the “[t]he right arising to determine actual controversies between in litigants, duly proper juris adverse instituted courts of ’ ” Richmond, 29, 34; diction.” 782 People (2010) J.) (majority opinion by NW2d 187 Cavanagh, (citations omitted, emphasis added, and brackets ellipsis Publications, original), citing Federated 467 Mich 610, 616.24 Anway, Mich at These 24 Richmond, majority In three members of the current held that moot, prosecutor’s present case was and therefore did not an actual case and controversy, although prosecutor appealing had an interest the trial evidentiary voluntarily dismissing rulings court’s adverse before charges. Here, plaintiffs recognized separate no from that of have interest Thus, private right general public, and no of action to vindicate. ironically, majority parties proceeding to block certain from is content other controversy” grounds, allowing parties based on “case and while Dissenting Opinion Corrigan, J. apply ensuring with as much force

principles cases, this Court does not hear moot or controversies yet ripe.25 generally, that are not More one has to majority may wonder whether the also wish to overrule rely precedent all cases that on federal involv- ing standing’s ripe- sister doctrines of mootness and not, If majority intellectually ness? is left in the position defending inconsistent those bodies of case- law, which have the same constitutional foundation regarding justiciability as the ar- standing principles in Lujan Indeed, ticulated and Lee. these doctrines are based on the exclusively very controversy case or re- quirement, Michigan Constitution, in the implicit majority here rejects. proceed although they legal pattern have no interests. I can discern no majority method other than that the wishes to use these cases as vehicles to precedents disagrees, overturn with which it or that it seeks to assist certain parties achieving political Neither, course, legitimate. their ends. explained Chiropractic As this Court in Mich Council: seeking judiciary usurp In to make certain that the does not

power government, only of coordinate branches of and exercises ‘judicial power,’ both this Court and the federal courts have developed justiciability doctrines to ensure that cases before the appropriate judicial courts are action. These include the standing, ripeness, doctrines of and mootness. standing Federal courts have held that doctrines such as and constitutionally jurisdictional nature, mootness are derived and in satisfy implicates because failure to their elements the court’s authority only ‘judicial power’ constitutional to exercise and adjudicate only Likewise, actual cases or controversies.. . . our justiciability affecting case law has also viewed the doctrines of as ‘judicial power,’ judiciary the of absence which renders the consti- tutionally powerless adjudicate the claim. . . . Thus, questions justiciability we reiterate that concern the judiciary’s jurisdiction adjudicate constitutional cases contain- ing genuine controversy. Chiropractic Council, [Mich 475 Mich at (emphasis original).] 370-374 Lansing Bd of Ed LSEA v Dissenting Opinion Corrigan, rejected Lee, courts have Like this Court other overly regard- majority’s imprecise analysis and broad standing ing basis for on similar the constitutional grounds. example, Napolitano, in Bennett v For recently Supreme Court stated: Arizona Constitution, judicial Article the Arizona VI of article, specific controversy does not contain the case or But, requirement of the U.S. Constitution. unlike the separation powers federal constitution in which the principle implicit, our state constitution contains an executive, mandate, legislative, express requiring that the government among judicial powers of be divided and separately. three branches and exercised This mandate requirement that as a matter of sound underlies our own jurisprudence litigant seeking relief the Arizona courts Napolitano, [Bennett to sue. v must first establish (2003).] 520, 525; Ariz 81 P3d 311 analysis majority’s allows it flawed constitutional dichotomy to advance the false that this state’s stand- ing jurisprudence prudential on must be based either underpinnings, or on constitutional but not concerns analysis demonstrates, however, both. As above separation powers explic- constitutional constraints itly provided Michigan’s give constitution rise to standing requirements, minimal constitutional which may augment prudential additional, this Court when interpretation Michigan’s Thus, concerns arise.26 particular, explicit constitution—in its limitations on judicial power requirements of an actual case or Co, 185, 196; Travelers Ins Co v Detroit Edison Cf. (2001) (“Justiciability NW2d 733 doctrines such as ‘relate in idea, part, though overlapping ways, and in different to an which is more rigorous explicit theory, than an intuition but less than a about the unelected, prudential powers limits constitutional of an ”), Allen, unrepresentative judiciary government.’ quoting in our kind of O’Neill, 14, 26-27; quoting Jagt App 468 US at Vander 226 US DC (1983) J., (Bork, concurring). 699 F2d 1166 487 Mich 349 Dissenting Opinion by Corrigan,

controversy provides applying a direct basis for — prudent and federal well-defined test.

B. LEE AND ITS PROGENY: CREATING CERTAINTY IN MICHIGAN JURISPRUDENCE

Although the concept “standing” every touches state, civil action filed in this prior adoption in Lujan standard this Court had only produced general description of the principles govern- ing standing. The most recent description garnered from a support majority of this Court is found in House Speaker v State Admin which stated: Bd,27

Standing legal is a term used to denote the existence of a party’s litigation interest in the outcome of that will ensure vigorous advocacy. However, sincere and party evidence that a engage vigorous advocacy, by itself, will in full and is insuffi- standing. Standing requires cient to establish a demonstra- tion that the substantial interest will be detrimen- tally affected in citizenry a manner different from the at large. Speaker, [House 554.] 441 Mich at Unsurprisingly, general such a proposition for a doc- important trine as and far-reaching as proved difficult to apply. This fact all became too obvious in Fire Fighters, Detroit when this Court next examined Michigan’s standing doctrine. Detroit Fighters Fire re- in split sulted decision in majority which no could be found explain what elements were essential to stand- ing Michigan.28 Indeed, in although all opinions four cited the boilerplate same language from House Speaker of their support respective positions, the justices did Speaker House was decided this Court before the United States Lujan. Supreme opinion Court released its J.) (lead Fighters, Detroit Fire (opinion by 449 Mich at 631 Weaver, opinion); J., joined J., id. concurring part (Cavanagh, Boyle, id. at 641 dissenting part); J., joined by C.J., (Riley, Brickley, J., and id. at 661 concurring); joined by J., concurring (Mallett, Levin, only). the result Lansing Bd LSEA of Ed Dissenting Opinion by Corrigan, J. agree not on such fundamental as what questions standing Michigan, govern is what test should stand- ing, plaintiffs standing and whether the had case.29This particular hodgepodge disparate opinions compelled the Court to reach the merits of the case question without a clear consensus on the threshold bring whether the even had the plaintiffs standing case.

This formed the background context which Court again standing principles confronted this state’s where, one, by Lee a vote of six to this Court adopted incorporated into our Lujan standing jurispru- dence. As we stated then: view, Lujan

In our the test has the virtues of articulat- ing establishing clear and of criteria the burden of demon- Moreover, strating ap- these elements. its three elements pear standing; to us to be fundamental the United States Supreme establishing Court described them as the “irre- standing. ducible agree. constitutional minimum” of We [Lee, 464 Mich 740.] Consistent with this Court’s obligations, constitutional nearly majority unanimous in Lee correctly noted the Lujan provides test a practical and workable framework for addressing what previously was an amorphous and often difficult In concept. its most basic form, the doctrine of can standing properly be reduced to the Lujan factors. What is if requirement that a plaintiff either has suffered or is in aptly Lee, among opinions As this Court summarized in the various Fighters, in Detroit Fire plaintiff [s]ome focused on whether could an establish

injury public, distinct from that of the others on whether the statutory were in the zone of interest or consti- provision designed regulate. Perhaps tutional at issue is template who, clearest was set forward Justice Cavanagh, along adopting with Justice advocated the United States Boyle, Lujan [Lee, Supreme 739.] Court’s test. 464 Mich at 487 Mich Dissenting Opinion by Corrigan, harm, an actual that the danger suffering imminent defendant, and that the allegedly harm is caused wrong of the court’s action can redress the result are not injury? While the federal and state constitutions track, coterminous, on a they developed parallel have may and the of federal constitutional law interpretation they law when share com- inform state constitutional Although majority mon elements. has littered its this state’s opinion repetitions with instinctive majority standing jurisprudence “prudential,” explain imprudent cannot what is about the “irreduc- and traditional doc- description ible” trine articulated in Lujan.

By objective an framework based on introducing well-developed readily three and understandable fact, causation, injury redressability— in and criteria — simplified the Lee decision and made more practical in standing doctrine of this state. As is evidenced on this could not justices previously agree how Court what, in exactly, standing Michigan about meant under Speaker, House the Lee framework certainty. The of Lee bear this provides progeny out: cases, Michigan a decade’s worth of trial and appellate and consistently appropriately applied courts have Michigan’s standing Indeed, doctrine.30 this time during changed. Only the doctrine itself has not the personal justices only views of on this Court —and those who now overrule a decade’s worth of cases—have changed. Lee, (incorporating standing See 464 Mich at 739-740 the federal Lujan analysis Michigan standing jurisprudence); Nat’l articulated in into Wildlife, (organizational standing legislative Mich at and 628-629 Waters, authority grant standing); 295-296, Nestlé citizen 479 Mich at Rohde, authority (legislative grant standing); 302-303 citizen 479 Mich at Council, Chiropractic (taxpayer qui standing); Mich tam 354-355 and Contractors, (standing Associated Builders & Mich 472 Mich 117 2.605). necessary declaratory judgment pursuant in order to seek a to MCR Lansing Bd LSEA Ed Dissenting Opinion by Corrigan, simple prudence proper As a matter of exercise of authority, this Court’s constitutional this Court is em- powered easily to create clear rules that are accessible ensuring in the Aside from applicable future. only courts hear cases and controver- genuine constitutionally judi- sies in accord with its mandated powers, adopting cial the well-defined test Lujan pro- vides the additional benefit of ensuring Michigan’s standing by clearly doctrine is articulated and guided rules. A well-understood and well-developed practical test serves to uphold separation powers In- promote justice. the sound administration of deed, only such a framework can ensure that courts will law, governed by be the rule of itself ensures which equality Inexplicably, of treatment under the law. that, majority apparently Lee, celebrates Michi- prior gan’s standing doctrine suffered from inconsistent ap- and, cases, plication, analyzed some was not at all.31 applied Unfortunately, majority’s test can promise future; no better this is true particularly since, terms, explicit its can now be deter- mined at the “discretion” of trial courts.

Notably, did supplant Lee or “sacrifice” this standing jurisprudence, majority Court’s as the in this Eather, erroneously adopted case states. it the Lujan holding test as a means of “supplementing House Speaker [441 as well as this Court’s earlier 547], Lee, standing jurisprudence, e.g., Daniels and Risser.” added). 464 Mich at 740 (emphasis majority today is not so kind. Characteristic of its reckless treatment of this precedent willingness Court’s its to rewrite entire letting develop areas of the law rather than them over time, majority today jettisons a decade of this state’s caselaw, nearly century which itself was based on See ante at 357 n 3. 487 Mich 349 Dissenting Opinion Corrigan, J. United States developed by

rules and principles And A Court. it does so favor of what? Supreme “prudential” articulation of general, paragraph one proved utterly so unworkable a mere under House 443 Mich 560. years ago Speaker, fifteen from their Michigan highest citizens deserve better court.

Reliance on the accessible and well-understood fed prudent eral test course of action for proper was Indeed, this Court to take Lee. this Court has often it principle questioned affirmed the is not that the ... are modeled after “powers Michigan’s judiciary judiciary the federal ....” Charles Reinhart Co v Wini (1994) emko, 579, n 444 Mich 513 NW2d 773 J.); (opinion by Wildlife, see also Nat’l Riley, at 627-628. This is true in particularly the context of standing where “Michigan previously courts have relied authority federal upon deciding standing ques when Speaker, tions.” House Mich at 560 n 21. And judicial powers is not alone. Because states’ limited, are plenary judicial power whereas federal no state in this has an country explicit “case or contro versy” in its requirement analogous constitution to that Nonetheless, of the federal constitution. nearly half the states adopted Lujan equivalent have test or its as their own accordance with their state constitutional requirements regarding standing.32 Like this Court in 32 E.g., following explicit states do not have an “case or contro versy” requirement constitutions, yet adopted in their have or relied on Lujan. the federal test as articulated in Alabama —Stiff 2003) Beverage Bd, 1138, 1142 (Ala, Alabama Alcoholic Control 878 So 2d (applying Lujan standing); Chenega Corp test for v Exxon Alaska — (recognizing Lujan)-, 1999) Corp, (Alas, 991 P2d Arizona - Bennett, that, (noting although “[a]rticle 206 Ariz at 525 VI of the Constitution, judicial article, specific Arizona does not contain the controversy Constitution,” requirement case or of the U.S. “federal case separation powers principles [is] law instructive” due to and as a LSEA v Bd of Ed 437 Dissenting Opinion by Corrigan, J. Lee, these states realize the behind the federal wisdom jurisprudence”); Gay “matter sound of & Lesbian Law Connecticut— Trustees, 453, 10; Students Ass’n v Bd 236 Conn 466 n 673 A2d 484 of (1996) “[tjhere (stating that is little material difference between what we required Supreme Lujan have and what the United States Court in plaintiff standing”); demanded of the to establish Delaware—Dover Society Comm, 1103, 1111(Del, CityPlanning Historical vDover 838 A2d 2003) “[tjhis (noting recognized Lujan require that Court has that the establishing standing bring ments for under III an Article action generally determining federal court are the same as the standards for standing controversy Delaware”); bring a case or within the courts of Georgia Advertising, City Roswell, State Outdoor Inc v 283 —Granite of (2008) 417, 418; (recognizingLujan appropriate Ga 658 SE2d 587 as the standing noting “[i]n test for and that the constitutional addition to requirements standing, ‘prudential’ standing for there is a subset of requirements developed Supreme that have been the United States Court”); Court, Disciplinary Supreme Hawaii—Akinaka v Bd ofHawai’i (1999) 51, 55; (utilizing comparable 91 Hawaii 979 P2d 1077 a test to the Lujan caselaw); Young City test derived from federal v Idaho— of Ketchum, 102, 104; (2002); State, Godfrey 137Idaho 44 P3d 1157 Iowa— 2008) 413, (Iowa, (noting standing 752 418 NW2d that “our doctrine on parallels doctrine,” Lujan applying the federal and in the context of a claim); Co, public Mississippi interest Kelly, _ So Sand Inc v 3d —Clark 2010)* (Miss, _; (utilizing Lujan test); 2010 Miss LEXIS 94 New (NM Powell, 368, 375; Mexico—Forest Guardians v 130 NM P3d 803 2001), App, quoting United Food & Commercial WorkersUnion Local 751 Inc, Group, 544, 551; 1529; v Brown 517 US 134 L S Ct Ed 2d 758 (1996) (quoting applying standing federal law and the same criteria used Lujan), through and John Does I III v Roman Catholic Church of Fe, (NM Inc, 307, 311-314; Archdiocese Santa 122 NM 924 P2d 273 App,1996) (noting enough standing “[i]t is not to establish that an injured,” citing identifiable interest has been the federal definition of “injury fact,” concluding although the “New Mexico Consti- speak Controversies,” tution does not of Cases or “we are aware of no concluding requirements basis for that those are stricter than those Constitution”) (citation imposed by omitted); the federal North Foundation, Foods, Inc, Carolina —Neuse River Inc v Smithfield (2002) 110, 114; App (quoting Lujan test); NC 574 SE2d 48 Carnahan, 818, 824; App Ohio—Bourke v 163 Ohio 3d 840 NE2d 1101 (2005) (citing Lujan prong test); for the three Oklahoma —Cities Serv 1999) ¶ Corp, 16, 3; (Okla, (citing Co v Oil 1999 OK 976 P2d 545 Gulf test); Lujan South Pines Carolina —Sea Ass’n Protection Wildlife, Dept Resources, Inc v South Carolina Natural 345 SC (2001) (stating “Lujan 550 SE2d 287 set forth the ‘irreducible ” standing,’ adopting Lujan constitutional minimum of stan- Dissenting Opinion Corrigan, J. it provides practical test and how within the operates framework that workable separation similar constitutional bounds of their those re- by giving meaning to powers requirements Moreover, highest no state’s court has quirements. only the federal test as its own adopted later, decide, years to abandon the doctrine few short and prior amorphous parties and return to a test that apply. Although difficult to Justice the courts found calls the test established Lee repeatedly WEAVER majority’s it is the decision “unprecedented,” clearly precedent. Lee—that defies today —not only decision redounds Ultimately, majority’s today the to the benefit of those who wish to use courts —the politically government least accountable branch of —to ¶ dard); State, 8, 22; South Dakota—Benson v 2006 SD 710 NW2d 131 2006) (SD, (recognizing Lujan standing); as the test for Tennessee - 2006) Darnell, (Tenn, (citing ACLU v 195 SW3d Tennessee of Lujan applying standing); and the federal test for Vermont—Parker v (1998) Milton, 74, 77-78; (noting Town 169 Vt 726 A2d 477 of adopted Lujan)-, has the test for articulated in West Vermont Virginia Findley Co, 80, 94; v State Farm Mut Auto Ins 213 W Va — (2002) Woods, 29A, (citing Lujan); Wyoming SE2d 807 v 2009 WY —White 2009) ¶ 20; (Wy, (stating Lujan 208 P3d 597 established “the standing” adopting irreducible constitutional minimum of and it as the test). states, Additionally, following state’s whose constitutions also controversy” requirement, employ explicit lack an “cases or a test that is substantially Housing similar to the federal test. Illinois—Greer Illinois (1988) Auth, 462, 492-493; (citing Dev 122 Ill 2d 524 NE2d 561 federal determining that, standing, caselaw and in order to have “the claimed (1) threatened, injury, palpable; whether actual or and must be: distinct (2) (3) fairly actions; substantially likely traceable to the defendant’s and relief”) prevented grant requested to be or redressed (citations omitted); Bremby, Co Kansas—Sumner Bd Co Comm’rs v of (2008) 745, 761; (requiring person 286 Kan 189 P3d 494 that “a must cognizable injury demonstrate that he or she suffered a and that there is injury challenged conduct”); a causal connection between the and the Virginia (statutorily adopting Code Ann 62.1-44.29 the same three —Va claims). prong test in the of context water-related ing), * Withdrawnand ^[60] So 3d (Miss, substituted, 2011) — Reporter. Clark Sand Co, Inc v Kelly (On Rehear Lansing Bd Ed LSEA v Dissenting Opinion by Corrigan, J. legislate regulate increasingly larger spheres of Michi- life and In gan politics.33 regard, quite this we are sure suffers from a majority opinion typographical error when it states that hold that Michigan standing “[w]e limited, should be restored to a jurisprudence pruden- doctrine,” today tial because what the us majority gives anything Indeed, but a “limited” doctrine. with case, majority overrules those and rules principles that ensured that the doctrine would articulated have meaningful Michigan. limits in Writing Court in Wildlife, Nat’l Justice MARKHAMforeshadowed the unfortunate turn of events altering Michigan’s standing jurisprudence today has come to pass:

By their diminishment of a traditional check and bal- upon “judicial power,” ance the exercise [CAVANAGH, concurring/dissenting KELLY, Justices would, position WEAVER] if their gain were ever to majority, injury upon system inflict considerable our separation powers and the rule of it law that has produced. Wildlife, [Nat’l 471 Mich 628.] Justice HATHAWAY has now provided justices those with vote, their fourth and with it surely will come the inevitable breakdown of the rule in of law the domain of only Lee and its progeny had stood athwart.

III. THE MAJORITY’S SELF-SERVING AND INCONSISTENT TO THE APPROACH DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS Finally, the far-reaching, impact deleterious majority’s in decision this case is inherent equally its methods for overruling significant, precedential opin- ions of this majority’s Court. The claim that it has good reason to overrule progeny, Lee and its contravention decisis, of the doctrine of stare is and self- bankrupt See, generally, Nat’l Wildlife, 471 Mich at 617-623. 487 Mich 349 Dissenting Opinion by Corrigan, Lee, significantly, jettisoning Most the four serving. majority apply any fail to justices constituting change test to examine whether this law agreed-upon only commonality clear is their shared justified. is clearly wrongly that Lee was decided. This conclusion mystifying directly because it is counter to conclusion of three members of the current past positions the case contro- who Lee—and majority, supported Lee—in cases. versy requirement underpinning previous overruling determination that Finally, majority’s circular, public depends entirely Lee will benefit the on self-serving reasoning; majority simply concludes serve the preferred regime public its would better any without attention to the actual desires of the in the public expressed, example, —as Michigan Constitution —or to the conclu- commonplace throughout sion of courts the nation that the test in Lujan articulated well serves the nation’s courts and citizens.

A. THE MAJORITY’S STANDARDLESS APPROACH TO OVERRULING PRECEDENT Detroit, In Robinson v 613 NW2d 307 (2000), this Court articulated several factors for consid- eration a court should pre- before overrule established question, course, cedent. “The first should be wrongly whether the earlier decision was decided.” Id. at 464. But “the mere an fact that earlier case was wrongly overruling decided does not mean it is invari- “[cjourts ably Rather, Id. at 465. appropriate.” should also review whether the decision at issue defies ‘practi- workability,’ cal whether reliance interests would work hardship, changes an undue and whether in the or law no longer justify questioned facts decision.” Id. at 464. LSEA Bd Ed Dissenting Opinion by Corrigan, majority’s conclusion that Lee was wrongly

decided is untenable. The test Lee enunciated loyal is Michigan Constitution, is consistent juris- with our prudence, and has been adopted and successfully ap- plied throughout the nation states with constitutions Next, similar to our own. there is no indication that the ” Lee test ‘practical “defies workability,’ that “reliance interests would work an undue hardship,” or that “changes longer law facts no justify” it. Robinson, 462 Mich at 464. To the contrary, stan- dardizing factors for standing throughout the state based on the test, well-established and federal accepted Lee created a predictable analytic It tool. thus enhanced workability for courts and parties protected parties’ interests from potentially unanticipated discretionary courts, decisions of individual which did not have the concrete, benefit of guiding principles before Lee. In jettisoning this Court’s constitutional jurisprudence, however, Justice CAVANAGH chooses not rely Instead, on the Robinson factors. he cites Chief analysis Justice in Petersen v Magna Corp, 484 Kelly’s (2009). There, 773 NW2d 564 the Chief Justice expressed disapproval her of Robinson.34 Pe tersen, 484 Mich at 316-317. She thus articulated her standard, own preferred albeit while “neglecting] even to apply her new stare decisis standard to determine whether Robinson itself should be overruled.” Id. at 388 n 42 (Markman, J., dissenting). Only Justice CAVANAGH concurred the Chief Justice’s stare decisis analysis Notably, Chief Justice Kelly concluded that “Robinson is insuffi ciently respectful precedent” modify and indicated that she “would it by shifting precedent.” Petersen, the balance back in favor of 484 Mich at allegiance precedent remarkably 316-317. This absent in this case despite majority’s reliance on Chief Justice Petersen formu Kelly’s lation. 487 Mich 349

Dissenting Opinion Corrigan, J. expressly joins Justice Petersen, only the Chief and Petersen here. CAVANAGH’sreliance on Justice CAVANAGH’sdiscussion of declining join In to Justice one decisis, go and HATHAWAY stare Justices WEAVER concurrences, they expressly ad- further. In their step overruling prece- to approach no standardized vocate “[tjhere is no need for this Court Concluding dent. decisis,” regarding test stare adopt any standardized “case-by-case” analysis a Justice advocates for WEAVER restraint, com- “judicial notions of based on undefined sense, Her of these application mon and fairness.” nature unprincipled to this case exemplifies notions circular empty, her She advances the position. simply of and serving applying conclusion: “In the rule of law restraint, sense, and a sense of fairness judicial common hand, I agree join majority to the case at with that Lee and its are over- opinion’s holding progeny duty a when judge’s ruled.” Justice HATHAWAYdescribes a deciding precedent “policy whether to overrule as dependent upon be the facts determination” “will WEAVER, presented.” and circumstances Like Justice on an unex- empty, she votes to overrule Lee based overruling “the reasons for Lee are plained conclusion: paramount any special articulated test do so are compelling justifications overwhelming this case.” Hathaway espoused WEAVERand have each

Justices troubling reviewing their views that whether a case merely “policy” overruled is determination should be guided by any that need not be standard several cases, including Regents other recent Univ Mich of Co, 289; (2010), Titan Ins 487 Mich 791 NW2d 897 Carrier, and McCormick v 795 NW2d (2010). professed approaches rely entirely Their on their subjective views of the law. As Justice YOUNG personal, LSEA v Bd of Ed Dissenting Opinion Corrigan, noted in his dissent to Univ Mich their Regents, of approaches very are “the antithesis the ‘rule of . law’. . Univ Mich Regents, 487 Mich at 325 (Young, J., dissenting). He observed: law, by definition, requires judges rule of to decide principles, advance, on cases the basis announced in personal subjective rather than on a preference for or against party stability before them. This ensures in the despite law diversity judges’ personal beliefs. we, judges, is, Whether as quite simply, “like” the outcome irrelevant to whether it reflects a correct of conclusion law. harrowing It is that Justices WEAVER and HATHAWAY either do concept it, not understand this or refuse to subscribe to preferring subjective to base their on “policy decisions consideration[s].” [Id. at 327.]

Justice MARKMANalso warned problem that the primary this approach with is that

“litigants will, coruse, of have no notice of beforehand which [‘analytical approach’] employed, justices will be for the Petersen, themselves will not know this beforehand.” 484 (Markman, J., Mich dissenting). at 380 Under the concurring justices’ “analytical approaches,” consistently [would

“there applied process be] no . . . judge promises with which the comply. beforehand to He may ‘fair,’ or promise she to be may and he or she seek to fair, be but there are no rules for how this fairness is to only be achieved. promise There is judge that the will [precedent] basis, case-by-case address each using on [‘policy whatever considerations’] he or she believes are required in suspicion instance. simply And the be varying cannot avoided that these and indeterminate [‘policy may largely considerations’] be function preferred by judge by outcome his her personal parties attitudes toward the and their causes.” J., [Id. at 340 n dissenting), 10 quoting (Markman, Petersen, J., dissenting).] at 381-382 (Markman, These warnings have come full circle in this case where the majority overrules an body entire law without Mich 349 Dissenting by Corrigan, Opinion whether to decide factors any agreed-upon on

relying overruling appropriate. precedent SUPPORTING LEE IN THE PAST, B. AFTER CONCLUDES

THE NOW INEXPLICABLY MAJORITY DECIDED IT WRONGLY THAT WAS Lee decision to overrule majority’s Significantly, individually by espoused “standards” under the various course, its threshold conclu on justice depends, each that Lee was But conclusion wrongly decided. sion KELLY, Chief Justice reliance of is belied itself WEAVER, on the wisdom and Justice CAVANAGH Justice expressly Lee. KELLYand Justice CAVANAGH Chief Justice in Lee. Lujan joined test of the adoption the Court’s Lee, J., (Kelly, CAVANAGH, J., joined 464 Mich at majority’s dissenting “agree[ing] adoption with the but test”).35 Indeed, Lujan was the Justice CAVANAGH of the the Lujan to propose adopting this Court justice of first adoption and advocated for test; expressly employed he Lujan had concluding test Fire Fighters fractured Detroit decision. (Cavanagh, J, dissenting at 651-652 See Lee Associated accepted herself part). Justice WEAVER Builders, & n where she explicitly Mich at 127 held that Lee actions and declaratory governs alleged an plaintiff where a seeks enforce in cases does not confer statutory but the statute right affirmed explicitly These have also justices its own terms. agreement concept judicial power with the their controversy require is bounded case Richmond, (Cavanagh, J., at 34 E.g., 486 Mich ment. JJ.) Hathaway, by Kelly, C.J., and Markman and joined “ ‘ right ... is the judicial power “[t]he (stating arising between actual controversies determine on Lee in which See also Crawford, Cavanagh, 466 Mich J., concurred). at 256-257 (per curiam opinion relying LSEA LANSING BD OF ED V Dissenting Opinion by Corrigan, duly adverse litigants, instituted in courts of proper ’ ”) (citations omitted; jurisdiction” ellipsis and brack original); ets in In Question re the United Certified from Mich, States Dist Court Eastern Dist 622 NW2d for (2001) (“ ‘[judicial J., dissenting) (Weaver, ” “ power’ ‘the hear power to and determine contro versies between parties, adverse in liti questions ”) (citation omitted). gation.’ quotation marks In justices’ light of these am positions, former I mystified at their current conclusions that Lee was not only decided, wrongly misguided but was so that we should now Michigan’s standing throw jurisprudence into turmoil in order to Indeed, overrule Lee. their result has every appearance of mere power grab broad, intended to ascribe unconstitutional authority the Court as it is now configured with this majority new at Ironically, helm. Justice Weaver’s dissenting comments in In Question re the Four Certified from teenth Dist Texas, Court Appeals (2007), NW2d 206 There, are apropos. she reiterated her lack of support 7.305(B), MCR permits which this Court to requests entertain for advisory opinions from foreign courts, because any the subrule “lacks limiting language on when the may Court answer a question certified J, ....” Id. dissent (Weaver, ing). A lack limits, of express opined, she “leav[es] door and open the docket majority.” to the whims of the Id.

As if to her illustrate point, majority underpins supposed its consideration of the doctrine stare decisis with its conclusion that our constitutional stand- ing doctrine is “at the expense of the .. public interest. because it may prevent litigants from enforcing public rights, despite the presence of adverse interests and parties, regardless of whether Legislature in- 487 MICH Opinion by Dissenting Corrigan, J. of the part to be of enforcement private right

tended a self-serving, But this scheme.” statute’s enforcement is en- interest” “public of the formulation rhetorical that, It in ignores own majority’s making.36 tirely of the Legislature the case, no indication there is enforce private right have a to intended that ignores it significantly, Most at issue. statute constitution, and in our expressed interest as public’s above, in that do not have depth courts explained and, expressly pro- power exceptions absent unlimited tradi- constitution, not exceed the should vided powers on the of the by intruding judicial power tional legislative executive and branches. IN TURMOIL: C. MICHIGAN JURISPRUDENCE TO OVERRULE MAJORITY’S INCREASING WILLINGNESS

THE WITH WHICH IT DISAGREES PRECEDENT its continues to exhibit absolute majority Thus the its aims with- inconvenient to disregard precedent for As Justice MARKMAN consequences. out to the regard majority opinion to the emphasized in his dissent McCormick, 487 Mich at 265-266: cursory analysis majority’s of the treatment

Even a power January precedent to since it ascended regard precedents that of sufficient for recent reveals lack directly previous contrary their own assertions of to needlessly stare overrule cases on account of need to that, majority argues and the dozens of states federal courts framework, Lujan respective those entities’ constitutions who use public reasoning cause detriment interest. This alarmist serious Indeed, argument Lee. provides support overruling no this whole test, manipulative majority’s stare decisis nature underscores widely commonly accepted displace used here is used to which disruptive public interest is the state of More national standard. today: standards, majority defined returns no law to which the against allowing litigious bring individuals unfounded lawsuits thus fellow citizens. LSEA Bd of Ed Dissenting Opinion by Corrigan, complaints part

decisis. on Past their that cases should not only thing changed be overruled when the that has is the membership gone by wayside. of the Court have the justices “[A]ll the who the comprise majority . .. should more clearly recognize consequences the they of what omitted). doing.” Indeed, are Id. at (emphasis in overruling significant numerous cases of this Court— the list growing catalogued of which is in by McCormick Justice id. 266-273—in the period brief MARKMAN, since the current majority came to in power January 2009, I find the majority’s feigned adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis here hard to swallow. Nothing “ about the majority’s decision today ‘promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, [or] contributes to the actual perceived integrity and ” the judicial process.’ 367, Ante at quoting Payne v 808, Tennessee, 2597; 501 US 111 S L Ct 115 Ed 2d (1991). Rather, majority the throws into turmoil a well-accepted constitutionally sound doc- trine applicable every civil in suit this state that filed adopted this Court the rectify uncertainty total in this area was evident cases as such Detroit Fire Fighters, 449 629. I am Accordingly, nonplussed by Justice CAVANAGH’s lip ironic service to Alexander ‘ that, Hamilton’s warning “to an arbitrary “avoid courts, discretion in the it indispensable that [courts] by should be bound strict down rules and precedents which serve and point to define out their duty every particular case that comes before them ....”’” Ante at 366, Petersen, quoting 484 Mich at by 314-315 (opinion (Alex J.), quoting Federalist p No. Kelly, Hamilton) (Clinton 1961). ander ed, Rossiter Finally, illustrated, as Justice MARKMAN has also this presents yet case another troubling element 487 MICH349 Dissenting Opinion Corrigan, J. precedent. disregard unbounded

majority’s current cases, McCormick, recent see other as several Here as 273-274, the issues accepting instead of Mich at case, parties throughout argued by framed to brief parties directed the instead majority should be majority former decision whether case have to this Yet, noted, parties as overruled. Even governs dispute. their argued that Lee always renders a favorable majority whom —for the correctness challenged decision here —never Further, although Lee to their case. applicability partici have public and members groups other amicus curiae at by filing case briefs pated invitation, supports plain brief single majority’s standing here.37 argument they have tiffs’ THE MAJORITY FURTHER RESPONSE TO IV ash, analysis stare decisis majority’s than the Rather like a bulimic like in their mouths: taste bile should bender, now day majority justices the after a three vigorous protestations of a decade’s worth purge As of decisis. they principle are committed to the stare Mich length demonstrates at Univ Justice YOUNG of J., dissenting), Mich at 321-323 Regents, (Young, defended stare decisis majority stridently members dissenting years cases their many past supported for when their up posi- Then-Justice KELLY summed positions. majority’s Indeed, request responded to of the amici curiae who Lee, only questioned analyzing Lee one to file briefs correctness (NWF), following which cases it: the Wildlife Federation and the National 608, Wildlife, applied plaintiff 471 Mich which the successful in Nat’l was argue notably, have even the NWF does not Lee. Most Rather, Legislature standing here. stresses its belief that NWF if statute, standing permit grants plaintiff should expressly courts plaintiff qualifies regard also the suit without whether Lee/Lujan test. under the LSEA Bd of Ed Dissenting Opinion Corrigan, Park, City 675, 712; tion in Pohutski v Allen (2002) J., NW2d 219 dissenting), stating: (Kelly, Court, “[I]f each believing reading successive its correct and past readings wrong, rejects precedent, then year the law will fluctuate from year, rendering our jurisprudence dangerously they unstable.” Yet here Lee, overrule notably most without ever addressing their former adherence to the LeelLujan test.

As I here, the Court established Lee and as recount Lee built on was this Court’s concepts historical standing. By reversing post-Lee here, the line of cases the majority “brings claims that it this Court back to quo Unfortunately, status ante.” pre-Lee status quo resulting from House Speaker, was confusion and bitter division regarding pro- rules that vided no guidance clear regarding Michigan’s constitu- tional requirements.38 It is this state to which the majority returns Lee law. did not sacrifice Michigan standing jurisprudence, as the majority per- sists in repeating, nor did Lee conclude that federal standing jurisprudence expressly was binding Michi- Rather, gan. Lee commonly favored the accepted federal brought test which consistency Michigan courts in light of our articulated, lack of a clearly workable test. Further, as members of the majority recognized, have simply there is no constitutional “conflict” that would Michigan’s prevent continued use the Lujan/Lee test for standing.39 These as truths —as well the overall 38 persists majority suggesting clear, The in that had a standing workable for doctrine “decades” before Lee was decided. To the contrary, our Speaker, 1993 in decision House where the Court was apparently Michigan’s unable to make approach sense of historical to standing, standing impossible left our apply doctrine muddled and to any consistency. with 39 majority’s unexplained suggestion that, Michigan, in “contro versy” something throughout means different than the rest of the nation Dissenting Opinion Corrigan, in the test —are evident the Lee

reasonableness in Lee itself. of the test acceptance near-unanimous rejects very the majority now is that the possible How it in Detroit himself Justice CAVANAGH suggested by test a test adopting Lee Court of accusing the Fighters, Fire prece- of inconsistent “casually decades displaced that to detriment the dent,” likely result in serious “is to law? As interest,” “contrary” Michigan is to public context,40 similar has observed Justice YOUNG Antonin Scalia Court Justice Supreme States United about the our concerns best described may have regard to stare recent about-face with majority’s with approach its new decisis as well as following observation: might be be Evidently, governing standard is to what Court, majority of this unfettered wisdom of called the case-by-case people on a basis. This an obedient revealed to government of that the Constitu- only not not the laws is government of established; laws all. tion it is not a 2597; Olson, 108 S Ct L 487 US [Morrison (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).] 2dEd majority criticizes me actu- Finally, although case, my addressing presented ally questions majority analysis necessary precisely because unworkable, approach stand- amorphous an applies agreeing, little trouble The lower courts had ing. decisions, do have brief relatively in Lee. But principles under the enunciated the reasons courts majority’s so obscures approach it in the standing requirements place impose first above, controversy” explain As “case or I federal is without basis. range may only be heard in requirement of controversies limits requirement courts, from the and this is distinct federal —common controversy actual case or exists law alike—that an federal and state place. the first J., dissenting). Regents, 487 at 320-321 (Young, Mich Univ of LSEA Bd of Ed Dissenting Opinion by Corrigan, J. a position leaves the dissent in akin to one who must thus, “prove negative”; why a I to attempt show plaintiffs lower courts’ conclusions that could clearly are proceed not correct under the terms of indisputably by the statute invoked plaintiffs standing. to establish Indeed, light of the express code, terms of the school its procedures, enforcement and its disciplinary provi- sions, I am baffled by majority’s conclusion, under discretionary its own approach, new that the trial court abused concluding its discretion that could proceed here. is majority’s How the new for non-test standing anything a proclamation but it will de- cide, on the personal considerations, basis of policy plaintiff may whether a maintain a suit against particular defendant?

The majority essentially concludes that plaintiffs have their safety because might have been one 380.1311a(l) aim MCL any without to regard Legislature’s actual intent or to the ramifications of this suit. For although example, no one this suit represents rights students’ may thus no one con- —and rights sider their as the suit proceeds or an eventual settlement —the majority presumes right re- sult will simply come out in the wash after the com- plaint is standing grounds. Indeed, authorized on under the majority’s approach, prevents what anyone with a proclaimed “substantial interest” from defen- suing a dant such as the school board here in an attempt to trample rights unrepresented on the of an third party?41 41 May failing I sue a landlord under a local noise ordinance for to evict my noisy neighbor my May neighbor? police notice without to I sue the department failing teenagers loitering my ticket outside case, might allege favorite seat at a window local restaurant? In each I duty particular that the had defendant to enforce a law I and that had a “substantial interest” its presented. enforcement under the facts Further, case, may perfectly willing in each the named defendant be 487 Mich 349 Dissenting Opinion Corrigan, J. needs to show a concrete longer no plaintiff

Because a actually has or that the court injury, particularized defendant, to me from that grant relief power create a cause body intended to legislative action, Par- plaintiff proceed. can any such presumably plaintiffs to sue to enforce ticularly by permitting with no atten- agency’s statutory duties governmental to create Legislature to intended tion whether the action, ignores separation the majority utterly cause of sole including Legislature’s the powers of principles proper duties to define the. to such and purview legislate for enforcement.42 mechanisms their arguing, comply my happy as and do so without with demands to here, proceed no because I have do the case should not defendants right govern relationship party absent with the third or affect the his expressed regarding party’s rights. the third This similar concerns Court by judicial power of the Nat’l view the offered dissent Wildlife—which today discussing majority suits the overrules —when environmental 324.1701(1) protec brought the environmental under MCL of tion act: “judicial dissenting] power,” th[e the Under former view of “any person” “any enjoin person,” example, seek from for could activity mowing gas-powered because his lawn with a mower such allegedly pollution air fossil fuels when other creates uses “any “Anyperson” person” are sue for alternatives available. could using property, allowing much much fertilizer on his or too too “any “Any person” property. runoff from a feedlot on his could sue using person” pesticides in amounts of his home from excessive “Any “any person” improp- garden person” or farm. could sue for “Any person” erly disposing petroleum-based of could used oils. backyard grilling practices, “any person” improper exces- sue sprays propellants, sive of aerosol or wasteful lawn use watering. 649-650.] [471 presented against in Nat’l At least the scenarios involved suits Wildlife offending here, majority allegedly party; permits plaintiffs to they despite punish. maintain suit the absence students seek are filed Members of the executive branch thus vulnerable to suits any person claiming a I note the interest in their affairs. substantial may city following timely In the illustration of what arise. midst of ongoing ongoing public and the crisis its school Detroit’s financial woes LSEA v Bd Ed Dissenting Opinion Corrigan, J. majority’s Consistent with the deconstruction Michigan’s guiding legal principles over the last two years, the state, anyone result boils down to this: in this else, anyone has to sue any time. As in McCormick, for example, where the majority significantly lowered the threshold for suits against Michigan drivers under our automobile no-fault scheme,43 insurance majority continues to encour age litigation individuals, high courts, at a cost to governments local and local complete officials. This destabilization of established law benefits no one.

V CONCLUSION reasons, For each of I these dissent. I would affirm the decision of Court which reached Appeals, correct result and properly of this applied law state. The majority’s conclusion that have standing any analysis here is devoid of any incorrect under meaningful test. Its to grant standing decision here under an new amorphous test of its is making own unprincipled and opportunistic; in its haste to overrule system, joined group an activist teachers and school board members Bobb, emergency manager sue Robert financial of the Detroit Public Schools, seeking challenge salary terms of his contract with superintendent the Governor and the state of schools. A circuit court judge suit, concluding legal dismissed that the did not have Schultz, standing. Judge Marisa throws out lawsuit over Financial Manager pay, News, July 29, majority’s Bobb’s Detroit 2010. Under approach, they new allege their suit seems tenable all because have to is management an ill-defined “substantial interest” in the of local schools. 43 McCormick, (Markman, J., dissenting) (“By See 487 Mich at 286-287 nullifying legislative compromise that was struck when the no-fault adopted compromise grounded act was in concerns over excessive —a litigation, over-compensation injuries, availability of minor and the today legal affordable insurance —the Court’s decision will restore a reappears environment in which each of these hazards and threatens the system.”). continued fiscal soundness of our no-fault 487 Mich 349

Dissenting Opinion Corrigan, J. Court, it teachers grants of this precedent yet another public our for of children from expulsion to sue right rights. any regard the students’ without schools Lee eschew the well-established Finally, its choice to courts, contrary power limitless aggregates test only damage the rule of law constitution, and will to our state. our MARKMAN,JJ., CORRIGAN, concurred with YOUNGand

Case Details

Case Name: Lansing Schools Education Ass'n v. Lansing Board of Education

Court Name: Michigan Supreme Court

Date Published: Jul 31, 2010

Citation: 487 Mich. 349

Docket Number: Docket 138401

Court Abbreviation: Mich.