This appeal arises out of a mandamus action brought in Liberty Superior Court. In April 1983, appellant, Robert C. Lansford, was notified by the Superintendent of the Savannah school system that his teaching contract would not be renewed for the 1983-84 school year. Pursuant to the Fair Dismissal Act, OCGA § 20-2-940 et seq. (Code Ann. § 32-2101c), appellant was notified there would be a hearing on the matter before the appellees, the Professional Practices Commission (P.P.C.) on July 13, 1983. 1 Through his counsel, appellant requested the P.P.C. issue pre-hearing discovery subpoenas for the purpose of compelling the presence of witnesses at depositions and to compel the production of documents. The request was denied July 6,1983. The appellant then sought and was granted by the superior court, an ex-parte mandamus nisi order which continued the P.P.C. hearing until the motion could be heard and determined. That order was vacated the next day after a hearing due to appellant’s failure to notify the Attorney General as required by OCGA § 9-10-2 (Code Ann. § 3-116). 2 The hearing proceeded before the P.P.C. as scheduled. The P.P.C. affirmed the decision not to renew appellant’s contract. Thereafter, appellant brought this action seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the P.P.C. to issue pre-hearing discovery subpoenas and order a new hearing before the P.P.C. The trial court denied the writ on the ground the discovery sought would have been pursuant to the Civil Practice Act which is not applicable to administrative proceedings.
In this appeal, appellant contends the trial court erred in denying mandamus relief. We disagree and affirm.
Mandamus is a harsh remedy and ought not be granted unless a defect in legal justice would ensue from failure to grant it. OCGA § 9-6-20 (Code Ann. § 64-101). The right to the extraordinary writ
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exists only when the person seeking it has a clear legal right to have the particular act performed.
Hernandez v. Camden County Commrs.,
Furthermore, mandamus will not lie where it appears that the complainant has not availed himself of the administrative remedies available under OCGA § 20-2-1160 (Code Ann. § 32-910).
Surrency v. Dubberly,
Appellant also contends the Administrative Procedure Act, specifically OCGA § 50-13-13 (a)(6) (Code Ann. § 3A-114), authorizes the discovery subpoenas he sought. We find no merit in this contention as it is well settled that a local board of education is not included within any of the definitions of “agency” contained in the
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statute and is thus outside its scope. OCGA § 50-13-2 (1) (Code Ann. § 3A-102);
Hood v. Rice,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
OCGA § 20-2-940(e)(l) (Code Ann. § 32-2101c) provides in relevant part, “ [t]he hearing shall be conducted before the local [school] board... or the local board may refer the matter for a hearing to a tribunal constituted by the Professional Practices Commission, created pursuant to Part 1 of this Article.”
OCGA § 9-10-2 (Code Ann. § 3-116) provides in relevant part, “Any verdict, decision, judgment, decree, order, ruling, or other judicial action by any court in this state in any matter in which this state or an official of this state in his official capacity is a party defendant.. .shall be void unless it affirmatively appears as a matter of record... [t] hat the Attorney General was given five days’advance written notice....”