73 Md. 105 | Md. | 1890
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This appeal is from a pro forma order passed by the Court below, upon an application for a mandamus to the
The appellants, citizens of the State and legally qualified voters of the county, allege that the County Commissioners have neglected and refused to appoint judges of election as required by the provision of the Code; the said commissioners treating and relying upon the Act of the General Assembly of 1890, ch. 538, as a valid and constitutional Act, whereby the power of appointment of judges of election in that county is taken from the County Commissioners, and vested in a Board of Election Supervisors, appointed by the Governor of the State; and the appellants, alleging that the Act of 1890 is invalid, pray that the commissioners may be- compelled to appoint the judges of election under the provisions of the Code, irrespective of the Act of 1890, ch. 538. They allege that this latter Act is miconstitutional and void, upon three distinct grounds:
1st. That it was not duly approved and signed by the * Governor, within the time required by the Constitution.
2nd. That it is a local or special Act, and, as such, is repugnant to and in violation of section 33 of Article 3 of the Constitution; and 3rd. That it violates section 29 of Article 3 of the Constitution, because the subject of the Act is not sufficiently described in the title thereof.
In the petition it is alleged that the Act of 1890, ch. 538, was presented to the Governor for his signature on the 31st day of March, 1890, and was approved and' signed by him on the 8th day of April following. But, by the amended answer of the appellees, it is alleged, in denial of the allegation of the appellants, that the session of the General Assembly of 1880, adjourned sine die
Having disposed of this preliminary question of evidence, we come now to consider the main questions for decision; and the first and principal of these is, was the Act in question signed by the Governor within the time allowed by the Constitution?
1. As we have just stated, the two Houses of the General Assembly adjourned sine die on the 81st of March, 1890, and the Act under consideration was not presented to the Governor for his approval until the 4th day of April thereafter. He approved and signed it on the 8th of April, and the bill was thereupon deposited in the office of the Clerk of the Court of Appeals, where all bills passed and signed by the Governor are required to be recorded.
The Constitution contains two sections that have direct relation to the subject of inquiry. The first of these is section 30 of Article 3, the Legislative Article; and the second is section IT of Article 2, the Executive Article, and which last mentioned section confers upon the Governor the qualified veto power.
While the Constitution declares that, during the session of the Legislature, if the Governor does not return a bill that has been presented to him for approval, within six days after such presentation, (Sundays excepted,) it shall become a law in like manner as if he had signed it, there is no express limitation of time within which he shall sign the bill where it has been presented to him during the session, but an adjournment occurs before the expiration of the six days. In such case, it would seem to be clear, by implication, that the Governor would have the full extent of the six days within which.to determine whether he would sign the bill or not. The qualified veto power is conferred upon the Governor for a substantial and important purpose, — to restrain and defeat hasty and inconsiderate legislation. He may defeat the bill by assigning reasons against it during the session of the Legislature, unless overcome by a three-fifths vote of the
If, then, a bill presented to the Governor during the session of the General Assembly, and signed by him within the six days but after the adjournment of both Houses, may become a law, why may not a bill presented by the proper officers of both Houses, as soon as practicable after the adjournment, be signed by the Governor with the same effect? There is nothing in the Constitution that forbids it, unless we hold that the presentation of the bill to the Governor for his approval is a legislative act, and as such can not be performed after the adjournment of the General Assembly. This latter proposition is sought to be maintaimed by the appellants, and they rely for its support upon some general expressions found in the opinion of this Court in the case of Hamilton vs. State, ex rel. Wells and Hardesty, 61 Md., 14. But there was no such question in that case, and none
But is this contention maintainable? The General Assembly is restricted as to the period of its session, but it may enact laws up to the last moment of its session; and it is matter of common knowledge that many of the most important bills that are passed are frequently not acted upon and passed until near about the end of the session. These bills after their passage are supposed to be in the custody and keeping of the chief clerks of the two Houses; aud it is made their duty by statute, (Code, Art; 41, sec. 1,) as soon after the passage of bills as may he practicable, to seal them with the Great Seal of the State, and- present them to the Governor for his approval. To do this requires time, and where there are a great many bills passed just in the closing hours of the session, more time would likely be required than would be allowed, if all bills were required to be actually presented to the Governor before the adjournment of the session.
It is earnestly insisted, however, on the part of the appellants, that the terms of the section of the Code just referred to, contemplate and require the presentation of all bills to the Governor during the session of the Legis
The practice under the veto clause of the Constitution of the United States has been much relied upon in argument, — the veto clause in our State Constitution being similar to that in the Federal Constitution. It is contended that as the practice under, and therefore the practical construction of, that clause of the Constitution of the United States has been to require the President to sign bills before the adjournment of Congress, the same practical construction of a similar clause in our State Constitution should prevail. But the circumstances that gave rise to the practice under the Constitution of the United States have never existed in our legislative proceeding.
It is very clear that the Act under consideration is not a local or special Act for any of the particular inhibited cases enumerated in the Constitution; nor is it a special law or any case for which provision has been made by existing general law. It is not in any sense a special law for any case.
The Act under consideration purports to be a general law, and is amendatory of the general law of the State, passed to regulate the appointment of judges of election, the time, place and manner of holding elections, and of making returns thereof. The provisions of the Act are restricted in their application to about three-fourths of the State; the remainder of the State being subject, to the pre-existing law for the regulation of elections.
The constitutional provision (Const., Art. 3, sec. 49,) conferring upon the Legislature power to pass laws to regulate elections in the State, does not require that such laws should be uniform throughout the State. They must be free and equal to all persons entitled to vote; but there is nothing in the Constitution to require the modal proceeding to be the same in every part and section of the State. To the Legislature is confided the power to pass laws to regulate the subject-matter of holding and conducting elections; and while it may be a subject of regret that the provisions of the statute under consideration were not given application to the entire State, the exception of the nine counties from
Whether the Act of 1890, ch. 538, be regarded as a general, or as a public local law, would seem to he quite immaterial; though, according to decided cases, it may be regarded as a general law as distinguished from a mere local law. It is said that an Act, within the meaning of the Constitution, may not be absolutely general to the whole State, and yet not be local in a constitutional sense. People, ex rel. vs. Newburgh, &c. Plank Road Co., 86 N. Y., 1, 7. And where the Bill of Rights of a State declared that all elections must be-equal, it was held, upon elaborate consideration, that an Act to regulate elections was not obnoxious to any constitutional objection because it did not provide an uniform regulation for all parts of the State. People, ex rel. vs. Hoffman, et al., 116 Ill., 587. The question of the wisdom or policy of such form of legislation is not for this Court to determine; but simply whether the Act under consideration has constitutional validity, and of that we are clearly of opinion it has.
3. The remaining question is one about which little need be said. It is contended by the appellants that the Act of 1890, ch. 538, is repugnant to section 29 of Article 3 of the Constitution, 'because the subject of the Act is not sufficiently described in its title. There is but one principal subject of the Act, and that is stated to.be “Elections.” The title of the Act is “An Act to repeal and re-enact with amendments, section 54 of Article 33 of the Code of Public General Laws, title (Elections, ’ and to add new sections thereto,” &c. In view of the
It follows from what we have said that the order appealed from should he affirmed, with costs to the appellees.
Order affirmed.
Concurrence Opinion
filed the following concurring opinion:
This proceeding is intended to test the constitutionality of the Act of 1890, chapter 588. As no question has arisen on the pleadings, it is unnecessary to consider their details.
The appellants assign three reasons in support of their position that the Act in question is void. They are as follows:
First. That the Governor’s approval was given after the expiration of the time, when he could constitutionally approve it.
Second. That it is a special law, and therefore repugnant to the thirty-third section of the third Article of the Constitution.
Third. That the subject is not described in the title, and that therefore in this respect it is in violation of the twenty-ninth section of the same Article.
I will consider the first of these reasons. The requisites to the validity of statutes are prescribed by section thirty of the third Article of the Constitution. When passed by the General Assembly, they are to be sealed with the Great Seal and presented to the Governor; if he approves them, he is required to sign them in the presence of the presiding officers and chief clerks of the Senate and House of Delegates. The Constitution requires nothing more to be done in order to give opera
It has been suggested that unless some period is fixed within which the Governor is obliged to sign bills, he • might retain them for an indefinite time, and cause great public inconvenience by the delay. It may be answered that all public officers are bound to perform their duties with promptness and diligence. An unreasonable delay in the discharge of duty is grave misconduct in a public officer. It would be unbecoming in the Court to anticipate that the Executive Department would neglect its duty. If unhappily, such an event shall ever occur,- we must deal with the case as law and justice may require. But we are not called upon to lay down in advance a rule to meet this contingency. It is possible that we may some day be obliged to declare
After what has been said it is not important to determine whether this law was presented to the Governor on the thirty-first of March, or on the fourth of April. We think, however, after a careful consideration of all the circumstances, that it was presented on the fourth' of April. It was approved by the Governor on the eighth day of the month. We do not decide this question as an issue of fact on evidence adduced by the parties, or on admissions made by them; hut on our constitutional responsibility to take judicial notice of the statute, and of all matters which affect its validity. To enable us to sustain this responsibility, it is our duty to avail ourselves of all trustworthy information within our reach. On this point the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, in Gardner vs. The Collector, 6 Wallace, 499, has been twice approved by this Court. The closing words of the opinion very clearly express the true doctrine on this point. “'We are of opinion, therefore, on principle as well as authority, that whenever a question arises in a Court of law of the existence of a statute, or of the time when a statute took effect, or of the precise terms of a statute, the Judges who are called upon to decide it, have a right to resort to any source of information which in its nature is capable of conveying to the judicial mind a clear and satisfactory answer to such question; always seeking first for that which in its nature is most appropriate, unless the positive law has enacted a different rule.”
I fully agree with what is stated in the opinion of the Chief Justice in reference to the second and third grounds of objection to the law.
Dissenting Opinion
filed the following dissenting opinion, in which Ikving, J., concurred.
I am obliged to dissent from the judgment of the Court in this case, and this I do with a good deal of reluctance. I say with reluctance, because the object of the Act in question is to provide additional safeguards to the voter in the free and independent exercise of the right of suffrage, and as such, it must commend itself to all good citizens. But, however meritorious the Act may be, it is, in my opinion, an invalid Act, because it was signed by the Governor after the adjournment of the Legislature, and this he could not do under section 17 of Article 2 of the Constitution.
This section provides that “Every bill which shall have passed the House of Delegates and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the Governor of the State; if he approve, he shall sign it, but if not, he shall return it, with his objections, to the House in which it originated, which House shall enter the objections at large on its Journal, and proceed to reconsider the bill; if, after such reconsideration, three-fifths of the members elected to that House shall pass the bill, it shall be sent with the objections to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if passed by three-fifths of the members elected to that House, it shall become a law * * * If any bill shall not be returned by the Governor within six days, (Sundays excepted,) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law in like manner as’ if he signed it; unless the General Assembly shall, by adjournment, prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law.”
Provision is thus made in the first place that every bill passed by the General Assembly, shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the Governor, and if he approves it he shall sign it, and thereupon it becomes a
Besides, there is another objection which in my judgment is fatal to the Act, and that is it applies to the voters of certain counties, and not to all voters in the State. The Legislature has no right of course to add to, or abridge or in any manner impair the qualifications of voters prescribed by the Constitution, but it may, I concede, provide reasonable regulations for the exercise of the right of suffrage, provided however such regulations apply to each and every voter. It has no right to say that the voters of one county shall not exercise this