[¶ 1] Patricia Langwald appeals from a divorce judgment distributing the parties’ marital property and awarding child support. She argues the district court incorrectly valued and distributed the marital property. She also argues the district court incorrectly calculated child support. We affirm the judgment of the district court regarding the property valuation and distribution, and reverse and remand for the district court to properly calculate child support.
I
[¶ 2] Nathan and Patricia Langwald were married in 1994 and have three children. Before their marriage, he purchased farming property from his parents through a contract for deed. During their marriage, he worked on the family farms while she was the primary caregiver for the children. She was also involved in the farming operations by assisting with payroll, paying bills, and keeping books for the business. In 2011, Nathan Langwald was in a motorcycle accident and suffered a traumatic brain injury requiring several months in hospitals and rehabilitation centers. For a period .following the accident, he was unable to farm. Patricia Langwald continued to care for the children, the rental properties, and the farm and business operations. She also obtained his power of attorney following the accident. In 2012, she rented the entirety of the “contract for deed” farmland for approximately $47,000 per year. In 2013, Nathan Langwald began taking back some of the farmland to farm himself and cash rented the balance.
[¶ 3] Patricia Langwald initially sued her husband for divorce in Montana. Discussion between the parties led to her dismissing the Montana divorce action because the bulk of the marital estate was in North Dakota. He then sued her for divorce in North Dakota. At the 2015 trial, Nathan Langwald called Justin Jones as an expert witness to testify to the value of the parties’ real property. Betty McGuire was Patricia Langwald’s expert witness to the same. After trial, the district court awarded $1,231,919.51 in marital assets to him and $776,429.47 in marital assets to her and ordered him to pay $100,000 in equalization payments. The court gave her primary residential responsibility of the three children of the marriage and ordered him to pay child support.
[¶ 4] The district court had jurisdiction under N.D. Const, art. VI, § 8, and N.D.C.C. § 27-05-06. The appeal is timely under N.D.R.App.P. 4(a). This Court has jurisdiction under N.D. Const, art. VI, § 6, and N.D.C.C. § 28-27-01.
II
[¶ 5] Patricia Langwald argues the district court’s property valuation was clearly erroneous. She argues the district court did not give appropriate weight to
[¶ 6] “A district court’s valuation of property is a finding- of fact, subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review.”
Kostelecky v. Kostelecky,
The value a trial court places on marital property depends on the evidence presented by the parties. Because a trial court is in a far better position than an appellate court to observe demeanor and credibility of witnesses, we presume a trial court’s property valuations are correct. We will not reverse a trial court’s findings on valuation and division of marital property unless they are clearly erroneous. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, there is no evidence to support it, or if, although there is some evidence to support it, on the entire evidence the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made. A choice between two permissible views of the evidence is not clearly erroneous if the trial court’s findings are based either on physical or documentary evidence, or. inferences from other facts, or on credibility determinations.
Id.
(quoting
Olson v. Olson,
[¶ 7] Here the district court had to decide between the parties’ competing real estate valuation experts. • The district court found Jones’ testimony to be more credible and persuasive because he took into consideration the type of irrigation system on the property and his valuation was more recent. We. have held “the district court is in a better position than this Court to judge the credibility and observe the demeanor of witnesses and to determine property values.”
Kostelecky,
Ill
[18] Patricia Langwald also-argues the district court’s property distribution was clearly erroneous. She argues the court improperly awarded Nathan Langwald a substantially higher share of the marital assets and failed to explain the disparity.
[¶ 9] A district court’s distribution of marital property is treated as a finding of fact, which this Court reviews under the clearly erroneous standard of review.
Hoverson v. Hoverson,
The respective ages of the parties, their earning ability, the duration of the marriage and conduct of the parties diming the marriage, their station in life, the circumstances and necessities of each, their health and physical condition, their financial circumstances as shown by the property owned at the time, its value at the time, its income-producing capacity, if any, whether, accumulated before or. after the marriage, and such other mat,ters as may be material,
Ulsaker v, White,
[¶ 11] “Our law does not require a set formula or method for dividing marital property; rather, the division is based on the particular circumstances of each case.”
Hoverson,
[¶ 12] Here the district court awarded Nathan Langwald $1,231,919.51 of the marital assets and Patricia Langwald $776,429.47. Of the total marital estate valued at $2,008,348.98, Nathan Langwald was awarded approximately 61% of the marital assets and Patricia Langwald approximately 39%, leaving a 22% disparity in the property division. The court, however, also awarded Patricia Langwald a $100,000 property distribution payment, bringing the disparity in the property division to approximately 12%. While this is a disparity in the property division, the district court adequately explained its reasoning.
[¶ 13] In reaching its decision, the district court considered the factors in the Ruff-Fischer guidelines and made specific findings under the factors it deemed relevant. The court found the parties’ marriage of twenty years to be a long-term marriage. The court found the parties have roughly the same earning ability, although Patricia Langwald likely has greater earning' ability, considering her college attendance and health. The court also found that she was managing the rental properties, raising the children, and attending college, all without requiring her to work outside the home. The court found that while she spent a great deal of time nursing Nathan Langwald back, to health after his accident, - “her conduct leading up to and during separation is concerning.” The court went- on to state:
She took money from joint accounts and at least-a portion of husband’s disability check. She kept all the income from the rental properties. She does not appear to have any concerns with having prohibited him from having access to a great deal of their liquid assets during ■the two years they have been separated.
[¶ 14] To explain the disparity in the property distribution, the district court stated:.
As the Court noted, although the; property distribution is not equal, the 'Court finds it is equitable. Husband has been awarded all of the parties’ debt. Wife has income producing property and no debt. A substantial portion of the parties’ marital estate came from Husband’s family. Husband desires to continue farming. Wife is awarded a property distribution payment. If husband .cannot afford to farm and make the payment, he will have to make the tough choices that wife proposed the Court order as alternative -distributions.
Although a substantial' disparity exists between the property awarded to the parties, the district court sufficiently explained its reasoning for distributing the property as it did. The court considered all of the facts of the case against the Ruff-Fischer guidelines, and the district court’s property division under the guidelines was not clearly erroneous.
IV
[¶ 15] ' Patricia Langwald also argues the district court’s child support calculation is clearly erroneous. She argues the district court should have imputed Nathan Langwald’s income at a higher amount based on' the earning capacity of the farming property when-it is rented out. She also argues the court did not adequately explain its calculations of his net income.
. [¶ 16] .“Child support determinations . involve questions of law which are subject to the de novo standard of review, findings of fact which are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review, and may, in some limited areas, be matters of discretion subject to the abuse of discretion standard of review.”
Buch-holz v. Buchholz,
Income must be sufficiently documented through the use of tax returns, current wage statements, and other information to fully apprise the court of all gross income; Where gross income is subject to fluctuation, regardless of whether the obligor is employed or self-employed, information reflecting and covering a period of time sufficient to reveal the likely extent of fluctuations must be provided.
N.D. Admin: Code § 75-02-04.1-02(7). Under N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-04.1-05(4) regarding net income from self-employment: ■
Self-employment activities may experience significant changes in production and income over time. To the extent that information is reasonably available, the average of the most recent five years of each self-employment activity, if undertaken on a substantially similar scale, must be used to determine self-employment income. When self-employment activity has not been operated on a substantially similar scale for five years, a shorter period may be used.
Similarly, the guidelines also state:
Calculations made under this chapter are ordinarily based upon recent past circumstances because past circumstances are typically a reliable indicator of future circumstances, particularly circumstances concerning income. If circumstances that materially affect the child support obligation have changed in the recent past or are very likely to change in the near future, consideration may be given to the new or likely future circumstances.
N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-04.1-02(8). “While parents have a duty to support their children to the best of their abilities, the guidelines in N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-04.1-02(8) provide the district court with discretion to consider the true state of the parties’ financial circumstances when evidence of past income is not a reliable indicator of future earnings and to determine the obligor’s ability to support his child accordingly.”
State ex rel KB. v. Bmer,
[¶ 17] Here the district court ordered Nathan Langwald to pay $699 per month in child support based on his annual income of $28,536. The court made this finding on the basis of the parties’ proposed child support calculations. The court found Nathan Langwald’s calculations were more accurate, and adopted them for its calculation. There is nothing in the district court’s judgment, however, suggesting the court ever made any findings regarding how Nathan Langwald’s income was calculated. Instead, after briefly introducing the matter, the judgment simply states, “Pursuant to North Dakota Child Support Guidelines, based on Father’s annual income of $28,536.00 his child support obligation is $699.00 per month for child support for three minor children.” There is nothing reflecting how the court calculated his net income based on past earnings or which past earnings it was excluding from its calculation for net income and why.
[¶ 18] A district court’s failure to provide sufficient detail regarding its net income calculation in determining the child support obligation is reversible error.
See Pernber v. Shapiro,
[¶ 19] Here the district court’s findings were insufficient regarding Nathan Lang-wald’s net income and child support obligation. The court suggested his annual income is $28,536 without giving any explanation of how it arrived at'that amount. The- district court’s order cannot be sustained in the absence of specific findings regarding net income and child support.
See
N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-04.1-02(10);
Krueger,
y
[¶ 20] We affirm the district court judgment regarding the property valuation and distribution. We reverse the district court judgment regarding child support and remand for recalculation.