50 So. 365 | Ala. | 1909
In this case our first impression was that the bill of exceptions should be stricken from the record, upon the idea that the date of the adjournment of the circuit court was not shown by the record. Upon another inspection of the record we find that the date of adjournment is properly shown, and therefore the bill cannot be stricken, and the cause must be considered on its merits.
The defendant Walter Andrews offered in evidence a mortgage executed by W. T. Langley (husband of the plaintiff) to A. H. Slaughter on the 16th of June, 1894, conveying the lot in controversy, as well as other realty, to secure a debt of $2,579.68, recited as being at that time due from said Langley to' said Slaughter. The record shows an assignment of this mortgage by Slaughter to S'. M. Inman & Co., and one by Inman & Co., to J. E. Andrews. It also shows that a bill was filed in the chancery court of Tallapoosa county by J. E. Andrews against W. T. Langley, A. H. Slaughter, Inman & Co., and others, claiming through Langley, to foreclose said mortgage. It was averred in the bill that on the day the mortgage was executed W. T. Langley was indebted to the mortgagee, A. H. Slaughter, in the sum recited in the mortgage, and that the mortgage was given to secure the payment of that indebtedness. All of the defendants disclaimed any interest in the subject-matter
The proceedings of the chancery court and the register’s deed were offered as evidence by the defendant, and were admitted over the objection of the plaintiff that she, not being a party to the proceedings, was not bound thereby. The.record shows that the mortgage was assigned by Slaughter, the mortgagee, to Inman & Co., and by Inman & Co., to J. E. Andrews, before the plaintiff’s deed was filed for record; but there is no proof to the effect that the mortgage or either of the assignments
It may be that the foreclosure proceedings were competent evidence, as connecting links between the purchaser’s (Walter Andrews’) deed from the register and the mortgage foreclosed; but he became the purchaser after the plaintiff’s deed was filed for record, and to render him exempt from the effect of the notice to the mortgagee it was indispensable that there should be proof of a valuable consideration for the mortgage, or that the assignments were based upon valuable considerations at the time made. Neither the foreclosure proceedings, the recitals in the mortgage, nor those in the assignments, can operate against the plaintiff as proof of consideration paid. — Buford v. McCormick, 57 Ala. 428. The defendant’s title depended-upon the mortgage, and, in the absence of proof of consideration for it or for the assignments, plaintiff should have been allowed to make proof of notice to the mortgagee of the existence of her title before the mortgage was executed; and the court erred in giving the general charge at defendant’s request.
The same consisderations adverted to, in respect to lack of proof of consideration for the mortgage and as
Beversed and remanded.